NYĀYAKUSUMĀÑJALI

OF UDAYANĀCĀRYA

VOLUME 1

WITH TRANSLATION AND EXPLANATION BY
N.S. Dravid

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To

Professor K. Satchidananda Murty

Foreword

Nyāyakusumāñjali by Udayanācārya is one of the central works of Nyāya philosophy. While *Ātmatattvaviveka* by the same author is devoted almost entirely to the refutation of the basic doctrines of Buddhism, *Nyāyakusumāñjali* takes up the somewhat more constructive task of defending the epistemological and metaphysical doctrines of Nyāya. One of the most interesting features – both philosophically and from the point of view of the history of Indian thought – of *Nyāyakusumāñjali* is its set of 'proofs' for the existence of God. Nowhere else in the corpus of Nyāya texts does the problem of God's existence receive such detailed attention.

Professor N.S. Dravid's translation (including his explanatory notes) of *Ātmatattvaviveka* (published quite recently by Indian Institute of Advanced Study) has already made a mark in the world of philosophical scholarship in India. His translation of *Nyāyakusumāñjali* is a worthy sequel to *Ātmatattvaviveka*. It not only fills an important gap in the availability of classical Indian thought, but, with the explanatory notes and analytical comments of Professor Dravid, it will be an invaluable aid to our understanding and assessment of a very important school of Indian philosophy.

12 September 1996 MRINAL MIRI

Preface

While writing his commentary on Vācaspati's *Tātparyaṭīkā*, Udayanācārya, the great Nyāya philosopher of ancient India, has addressed a fervent prayer to Sarasvatī, the Goddess of wisdom, that she might keep a watch on his speech and mind so that they do not slip up while he is engaged in interpreting Vācaspati's statements. This prayer has been continually ringing in my mind during the last three years when I had been at work on *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, a treatise authored by Udayana himself. This treatise is a sort of companion to *Ātmatattvaviveka*, another famous treatise by Udayana, on which I had published a volume in 1995. If *Ātmatattvaviveka* is out and out destructive in its approach, its main objective being the demolition of all important Buddhist doctrines, then *Nyāyakusumāñjali* is mainly constructive in its concern to defend the methodological doctrines of Nyāya. If the Buddhists are the main adversaries against whom the polemics of *Ātmatattvaviveka* are directed, then it is the Mīmāṃsakas – and sometimes the Vaiśeṣikas too – who bear the brunt of Udayana's polemical attack in *Nyāyakusumāñjali*. Avowedly the treatise is composed to establish the reality of God but the author seems to have used this subject as an excuse to discuss and defend the epistemological and methodological doctrines of Nyāya by criticizing the corresponding doctrines of the two well-known schools of Mīmāṃsā as well as the school of Vaiśeṣika. Perhaps *Nyāyakusumāñjali* is the first authoritative treatise on the Nyāya philosophy in which a systematic exposition and rigorous argumentative defence of the main doctrines of the school have been presented by the most outstanding exponent of the school. A unique and notable feature of the work is the detailed discussion and defence of various inferential proofs for the existence of God contained in it. It needs to be specifically pointed out in this connection that theism had not been a part and parcel of either Nyāya or Vaiśeṣika philosophy till the advent of Udayana's *Nyāyakusumāñjali*. Gotama, the founder of the Nyāya school, makes only a passing and oblique reference to God in a single aphorism of the more than nine hundred aphorisms on Nyāya composed by him. Kaṇāda, the founder of the Vaiśeṣika school, does not at all mention God anywhere in his aphorisms. It is very difficult to say whether these two allied schools were originally theistic or atheistic. But whatever may have been the character of these schools to start with, they were invested with theism by Udayana.

It is generally thought by western philosophers that theism is beyond the pale of logical proofs. The great German philosopher Kant has even exposed the absurdity of attempting any proof to establish the existence of the first cause of the universe. It is this very proof endowed with all necessary logical refinements, and many other proofs that have been discussed and defended by Udayana in *Nyāyakusumāñjali.* Besides theism there are many other topics of current interest like 'validity of induction', 'causality', 'nature of things', 'nature of capacity', etc. which are critically considered and new light thrown on each of them in the treatise.

In this first volume of my two-volume work on *Nyāyakusumāñjali,* I have tried to render the text in English, passage by passage, giving subtitle to each passage. The passages are divided on the basis of the issues or sub-issues discussed in them. If some passages are short, some are inordinately long. The sentences in the text have been split up into component words so that even a reader with some knowledge of Sanskrit can correlate the English translation with the Sanskrit text. In the explanations accompanying every piece of translation a lucid, running and brief exposition of the translated text is given and wherever necessary important points arising from the exposition are discussed. In the second volume, to be published shortly, an analytical-critical survey of the content of the whole treatise is presented.

I take this opportunity to express my deep gratitude to Professor Mrinal Miri, an eminent Indian philosopher and Chairman of Indian Council of Philosophical Research, for writing the foreword to this volume. Mr. Buddhadev Bhattacharya, the Executive Editor and Dr. Mercy Helen, the Programme Officer, ICPR, have both been immensely helpful to me in getting the book printed. I simply do not know how I can repay for all the kind help that I have received from them so far.

Nagpur N.S. DRAVID

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FIRST BUNCH OF FLOWERS
(of arguments)

Supplicatory auspicious verse

TEXT: सत्-पक्ष-प्रसरः सतां परिमल-प्रोद्बोध-बद्ध-उत्सवः।
प्रम्लानः न विमर्दने अमृत-रस-प्रस्यन्द-माध्वीक-भूः॥
ईशस्य-एष निवेशितः पद-युगे भृङ्गायमाणं भ्रमत्।
चेतः मे रमयतु अविघ्नं अन्-अघः न्याय-प्रसून-अञ्जलिः॥

Translation (Abbreviated below as Trans.): In the above verse the doctrines of Nyāya are compared with flowers by the use of words having double-meaning. The words are applicable both to the Nyāya doctrines and flowers.

As applied to flowers: May this bunch of flowers, which are, like Nyāya, pure, having been obtained by right means, and are fresh, bring to my mind unhindered joy, as they are offered at the twin feet of the Supreme Lord. The flowers are such that their petals expand on being kissed by sunlight. The diffusion of the fragrance of the flowers causes sustained pleasure to those who inhale their smell for the first time. Even on being pressed the flowers do not droop. They are the fountain of the grape-wine-like flow of the juice of the immortal nectar.

As applied to the Nyāya doctrines: May this cluster of the doctrines of the Nyāya philosophy, which are pleasant like flowers, render my mind free of all suffering and conditions of suffering, as they are directed at the valid proof and conditional arguments or positive and negative inferences intended to prove the existence of God. My mind (which is freed from suffering by Nyāya doctrines is fidgety like the honeybee, being worried over the sufferings of humanity and is therefore anxious to find the means of dissipating this suffering. The doctrines of the Nyāya referred to are flawless, as, by their means inference of the major in the proper minor (which is qualified by the absence of certainty regarding the presence of the major as qualified by the absence of desire to infer the major) can be had or alternately, the contra-factual conditional pervading the minor term can be precipitated. Moreover by means of these

doctrines knowledgeable people can be helped to have valid inference based on the invariable concomitance of the middle and major terms thereby to be greatly pleased. The doctrines or the arguments based upon them are not contradicted by counter-arguments.

By cultivating the knowledge of the proof for the existence of God (and related doctrines) one attains freedom from pain which is intrinsically desirable.

Explanation (Abbreviated below as EXPL.): According to the time-honoured practice of ancient Indian authors Udayana starts the composition of his treatise with a supplication addressed to the Lord that the Nyāya doctrines to be discussed by him might succeed in establishing the existence of God. By inserting the supplicatory verse at the beginning of the treatise, Udayana is able to explain the nature of the subject as also the purpose of discussing the subject in the treatise. It is the belief of all Indian authors that without the grace of God the successful completion of a long treatise can't be achieved. Unexpected interruptions can be overcome only by means of divine grace. In the above, the proper minor term referred to is defined as the term which is qualified by the absence of the certainty of the major as characterised by the absence of the desire to infer. This means that even if the major is otherwise known to be present in the minor it can be inferred if there is such a desire. A proper minor is free from all the defects arising from the fallacies that characterise the improper middle term. The real concomitance of the middle and the major helps rule out all fallacies pertaining to the middle term in the inference. The nectar referred to is redemption which in the Nyāya view is of the nature of the absolute absence of pain. Happiness is not regarded by this school as the ultimate goal of existence as the self in the state of release is divested of all its special attributes including even knowledge. Two questions arise here. First, so long as one is active one cannot be free from rebirth and pain invariably associated with it. Even the attempt to expiate the result of action by suffering or enjoying its consequences is bound to give rise to other actions. Thus the chain of actions is never going to cease. Second, what purpose is the proof of God's existence going to serve? It is the illusion with regard to the nature of one's own self that causes all misery in man's life, How is this illusion to be dissipated by inquiring about the reality of God? Both these questions are being answered in the following verse.

Object of the inquiry declared

TEXT: स्वर्ग-अपवर्गयोः मार्गं आमनन्ति मनीषिणः।
यत्-उपास्तिं असौ अत्र परमात्मा निरूप्यते ॥

TRANS.: We now elucidate the nature of the lord or the transcendental self whose worship is considered by knowledgeable people to be the means of attaining heavenly bliss and redemption.

EXPL.: Regarding the first of the above questions it is stated here that since divine worship is the means both of absolute and relative freedom from pain and empirical existence itself, there is no possibility of actions being perpetuated. Absolute cessation of actions can be achieved if there is no attachment to them. As to the second question the answer suggested in the passage is that even the realisation of divine nature can remove illusion regarding one's own real nature. By God's grace the deluded man is able to get rid of his delusion and attain self-knowledge.

Need of the inquiry stressed

TEXT: इह यद्यपि यं कं अपि पुरुषार्थं अर्थयमानाः शुद्ध-बुद्ध-स्वभावः इति औपनिषदाः, आदि-विद्वान् सिद्धः इति कापिलाः, क्लेश-कर्म-विपाक-आशयैः अ-परामृष्टः, निर्माण-कायं अधिष्ठाय संप्रदाय-प्रद्योतकः अनुग्राहकः च इति पातञ्जलाः, लोक-वेद-विरुद्धैः अपि निर्-लेपः स्वतंत्रः च इति महा-पाशुपताः, शिवः इति शैवाः पुरुष-उत्तमः इति वैष्णवाः, पितामह इति पौराणिकाः, यज्ञ-पुरुषः इति याज्ञिकाः, सर्वज्ञः इति सौगताः, निर्-आवरणः इति दिगंबराः, उपास्यत्वेन देशितः इति मीमांसकाः, लोक-व्यवहार-सिद्धः इति चार्वाकाः, यावत्-उक्त-उपपन्नः इति नैयायिकाः, किं बहुना, कारवः अपि यं विश्वकर्मा इति उपासते तस्मिन् एवं जाति-गोत्र-प्रवर-चरण-कुल धर्मादिवत् आ-संसारं प्रसिद्ध-अनुभावे भगवति संदेह एव कुतः? किं निरूपणीयम्? तथापि-

न्याय-चर्चा इयं ईशस्य मनन-व्यपदेश-भाक्।
उपासना एव क्रियते श्रवण-अनंतर-आगता ॥

श्रुतः हि भगवान् बहुशः श्रुति-स्मृति-इतिहास-पुराणेषु इदानीं मन्तव्यः भवति, 'श्रोतव्यः, मन्तव्यः' इति श्रुतेः।

आगमेन अनुमानेन ध्यान-अभ्यास-रसेन च।
त्रिधा प्रकल्पयन् प्रज्ञां लभते योगं उत्तमम्॥ इति स्मृतेः च।

TRANS.: But when the great creations of the Lord Śiva (like the Vedas) are well-known where is the doubt about His existence to start the inquiry about it? (God's existence in some form or other is accepted by everybody), for, whatever goal of human existence he seeks, if he is the follower of the Upaniṣads, he regards God as of a pure and sentient nature, if he happens to be devoted to Kapila's teachings he thinks God as eternal and intrinsically conscious, if he has faith in Patañjali he views God as a Being who is not tainted by the five afflictions (mentioned in the Yoga school), the moral and immoral activities, the three kinds of results of these activities and merit and demerit and Who, incarnating Himself as a human being transmits the knowledge of the Vedas to other human beings and imparts them instruction in other things; if he is dedicated to the great Pāśupata cult he takes God to be the independent Being who remains pure despite His indulgence in antisocial and antivedic activities, if he is a Śaivaite he worships God as Śiva, if he is a Vaiṣṇavaite he prays to God as Viṣṇu, if he is fond of the Purāṇas he believes God to be the grandfather (of all created beings), if he is attached to the sacrificial cult he thinks God to be the Being to whom offerings are made in the sacrifices, if he is a Jaina of the Digambara sect he thinks God to be devoid of the veil of the body and ignorance, if he is a Mīmāṃsist he treats the deities commended in Vedic hymns as God, if he is a Nyāya scholar he thinks of God as a Being who is endowed with only those of the above-mentioned attributes which can be rationally ascribed to Him, and if he is a Cārvāka he takes God to be the being whom common people regard as God. What more need be said about this Being? Even the masons worship this Being as the Lord Viśvakarmā (who is supposed to have built the structure of this world). God's nature is therefore as widely known as are the castes, the gotras, the natures of the sages, the Vedic recensions and the customs of different families. What then is there to explain? Yet this rational discussion about God which is called 'meditation' is nothing other than God's worship and such a worship follows the study of scriptural texts about God. We have learnt enough about God from the scriptures, the Smṛties, the epics and the Purāṇas. Now is the turn of thinking about God. The Vedas also say that, first one should listen to texts and then think. The Smṛties also remark that one who cultivates knowledge of God by means of learning through scriptures, ratiocination and the joyful practice of meditation can, by this threefold employment of his intellect attain the supreme realisation (of the real nature of self).

EXPL.: The Mīmāṃsakas who do not admit a being like God treat the deities named in hymns as God. The Jainas who are atheists regard Jina himself as God. Thus all those who seek to attain any of the four goals of human existence, that is those who lead a purposeful life worship God under some form or other. In the view of Nyāya God has all those attributes that can be rationally ascribed to Him. It may here be asked; 'If everything worth knowing about God is already learnt from scriptures and other sources doesn't the inferential enquiry about God land the enquirer into the fallacy of proving the already known?' One can't say in reply to this that inferential and non-inferential knowledge of God are concerned with different properties of God. It is particularly prescribed by the Vedic texts that both these forms of knowledge should have God himself (under the same form) as their object. Nor can one say that the rational enquiry should concern itself only with the veridicity of the scriptural texts, for the scriptural information is very clear on this matter. It asks us pointedly to meditate upon the same thing that has been learnt about. The correct reply to the above question is this: Even if verbal knowledge about God has already been acquired one can have inferential knowledge also about God. The fallacy mentioned above cannot prevent the occurrence of this knowledge as *Pakśatā*, one of the conditions of inference is, as explained earlier, of the nature of the absence of a qualified certainty about the major's presence in the minor. If there is desire to infer God then for all the other kind of knowledge of God that one may have, one can certainly have inferential knowledge of God. It can't be urged against this that any rational discussion about a thing has to be preceded by some doubt about it. Doubt is not an essential prerequisite of thinking or discussion. Verbal inferences are not preceded by any doubt about their objects. If doubtfulness is considered to be an essential condition of the major term in the inference it would qualify the major term as it is inferred. Even competence to be the object of doubt understood in terms of the absence of the positive and negative evidence of the presence of the major in the minor, cannot be supposed to be a prerequisite of inference. In the case of the inference of a universal property like 'knowability' there cannot be any

negative evidence for the absence of the major as the major is universally present.

Notwithstanding this it may be urged that doubt provokes curiosity which is essential for a rational enquiry. So the disjunctive propositions expressing doubts concerning God's existence are laid down below in the order in which they are going to be considered in the treatise.

The propositions to be discussed listed and the first one taken up for detailed consideration

TEXT: तत् इह संक्षेपतः पञ्चतयी विप्रतिपत्तिः। अलौकिकस्य परलोक-साधनस्य अभावात्। अन्यथा अपि परलोक-साधन-अनुष्ठान-संभवात्। तत्-अभाव-आवेदक-प्रमाण-सद्भावात्। सत्वे अपि तस्य अप्रमाणत्वात्। तत्-साधक-प्रमाण-अभावात् च इति। तत्र न प्रथमः कल्पः-

सापेक्षत्वात्, अनादित्वात्, वैचित्र्यात् विश्ववृत्तितः।
प्रति-आत्म-नियमात् भुक्तेः अस्ति हेतुः अलौकिकः॥

न हि अयं संसारः अनेक विध-दुःखमयः निरपेक्षः भवितुं अर्हति, तदा हि स्यात् एव न स्यात् एव वा, न तु कदाचित् स्यात्।

TRANS.: Now, briefly there are five different propositions expressive of doubt that are to be discussed, namely, 'that there is no transcendental cause of other-worldly existence, that even if there is no such cause one may be persuaded to perform the rituals that lead to the other-worldly existence; that there is evidence to prove the nonexistence of God; that even if God's existence is envisaged on the basis of some proof the latter is not valid; and that moreover there is no valid proof establishing the reality of God.

Among these the first (alternative) proposition is not tenable because the dispositions to act, of different knowledgeable persons are various. They are conditioned and have a beginningless chain of causes and, because the enjoyment of the results of actions is confined to the agents (or the selves of the agents) only, there has to be a transcendental cause (leading to the other world). Certainly this world which abounds in all kinds of misery cannot be unconditioned. If it were so it will always be there or will never be at all. It will not be occasional.

EXPL.: God as the sustainer of the merit and demerit of men which lead to the other-worldly existence of men is sought to be proved by the theist. Five different but related doubts beset this proof. These doubts are expressed through the five different propositions that are going to be discussed in the five sections of the treatise. The propositions are disjunctive in form having mutually-contradictory predicates. Both these predicates have to make sense to the disputants who debate the proposition. Even if a disputant denies the predicate which his opponent seeks to affirm the denied predicate must be meaningful to him. Otherwise his denial (even if polemical) will become otiose. The first proposition to be immediately taken up for consideration may be formulated as below:

> 'Are or are not all knowable things the objects of perceptions which are not generated by the transcendental contacts of sense-organs known as 'generic' (*Sāmānyalakṣaṇa*) and 'cognitive' (*Jñānalakṣaṇa*) respectively?' According to Nyāya the inductive cognition is had by means of a transcendental contact of the sense-organ with all objects of a certain generic character when only a single object of that character is present before it. The transcendental contact of the senses produced by the yogic powers enables the yogins to perceive all past and future objects. There is also the cognitive transcendental contact with an object present elsewhere and not before the sense. The perceptions due to these familiar types of transcendental contacts are excluded in the above proposition. In regard to merit and demerit the debatable proposition may be like this: 'Is or isn't there an attribute of self which is not the object of empirical mental perception?'

As to the other-worldly existence the proposition to be debated is, 'Am I or am I not the owner of a body different from the one through which I am having experiences of pleasure and pain?'

The first of the above propositions expresses doubt regarding the existence of God by suggesting that merit and demerit which God is supposed to sustain may not exist at all. The second proposition expresses the same doubt by suggesting that even without the belief in God as the author of the Vedas the Vedic injunctions may be followed if the Vedas are regarded as self-authoritative.

The third proposition suggests that even if the Vedas may be authored by an omniscient being like God He cannot be the creator of the world. The fourth suggests that there cannot be a being like God who, without being embodied can be a dependable being. The fifth proposition states

that the proofs adduced for God's existence are all invalid. All these are Cārvāka's contentions. What the Cārvāka intends to convey by means of these denials is this: There cannot be causation because casual relationship involves necessity but necessity is not perceptible. It is also not inferrible because inference too depends upon the necessary relationship of the middle and the major terms. This is countered by the arguments given in the text. Causality, conditionality or occasionality of effects is a matter of perception. If the necessity of cause-effect-relationship is doubted there is the contra-factual conditional to remove the doubt. There can also be inference to establish causality like this: 'All effects depend upon their causes for their production because they are occasional; whatever is not produced is not occasional in nature'. Occasionality is defined as existence at some time combined with nonexistence at others. Since certain things are known to be produced the major term in the inference cannot be said to be unreal and as a real term it can be taken to cover all occasional entities.

It may be asked, 'Granted that things, or more precisely, their origination is occasional does not this origination itself originate and if it does, will not this process involve infinite regress?'. The answer to the question is, 'No'! Origination is the occurrence of the relation of the originating thing with the first moment of its existence. The first moment and the relation with this moment have origination but not the fact of origination itself. So there is no regress (It is meaningless to say that 'Origination originates'). If things are occasional, then causes too must be occasional. The causes of these causes too must be occasional. This process leads to infinite regress. But the regress is ontological and therefore like the regress in the mutual causality of the seed and the sprout it cannot be treated as a fallacy.

In reply to the contention of the Cārvāka it is argued above that if the world is unconditioned or uncaused it would either be eternal or simply nonexistent. But how can uncausedness be said to be concomitant with both eternity and its opposite, nonexistence? The answer to the question is that absence of occasionality which is sought to be precipitated by the causalist on the basis of the assumption of unconditionality is equivalent to the disjunction of eternity and nonexistence. Anything that is not occasional is either eternal like the sky or nonexistent like the sky-flower. So we have the contra-factual conditional in this form; 'If the world is unconditioned it may either always be like the sky or it may never be, like the sky-lotus.' Since occasionality is the conjunction of the properties of existence at some time and nonexistence at others, the negation of this conjunction is equivalent to the disjunction of the

negation of these properties taken separately. Thus we get nonexistence at all times, and existence at all times as the respective negations of the conjunction.

The hypothesis of sudden (or chance) production discussed and refuted.

TEXT: अकस्मात् एव भवति इति चेत्? न।

हेतु-भूति-निषेधः न स्व-अनुपाख्य-विधिः न च।
स्वभाव-वर्णना न एवं अवधेः नियतत्वतः।।

हेतु-निषेधे भवनस्य अनपेक्षत्वेन सर्वदा भवनं अ-विशेषात्। भवन-प्रतिषेधे प्राक् इव पश्चात् अपि अ-भवनं अ-विशेषात्। उत्पत्तेः पूर्वं स्वयं असतः स्व-उत्पत्तौ अ-प्रभुत्वेन स्वस्मात् इति पक्ष-अनुपपत्तेः। पौर्वापर्य-नियमः च कार्यकारणभावः। न च एकं पूर्वं अपरं च। तत्त्वस्य भेद-अधिष्ठानत्वात्। अनुपाख्यस्य हेतुत्वे प्राक् अपि सत्व-प्रसक्तौ पुनः सदातनत्व-आपत्तेः।

स्यात् एतत्। न अकस्मात् इति कारण-निषेध-मात्रं वा, भवन-प्रतिषेधः वा, स्व-आत्म-हेतुकत्वं वा, निरुपाख्य-हेतुकत्वं वा अभिधित्सितम्। अपि तु अनपेक्षः एव कश्चित् नियत-देशवत् नियत-काल-स्वभावः इति ब्रूमः। निरवधित्वे अ-नियत-अवधित्वे वा कादाचित्कत्व-व्याघातांत्। न हि उत्तर-काल-सिद्धित्व-मात्रं कादाचित्कत्वम्। किन्तु प्राक्असत्वे सति। स-अवधित्वे तु सः एव प्राच्यः हेतुः इति उच्यते। अस्तु प्रागभावः एव अवधिः इति चेत्? न। अन्येषां अपि तत्-काले सत्वात्। अन्यथा तस्य एव निरूपण-अनुपपत्तेः। तथा च न तत्-एक-अवधित्वं, अविशेषात्। इतर-निरपेक्षस्य प्रागभावस्य अवधित्वे प्राक् अपि तत्-अवधेः कार्य-सत्व-प्रसङ्गात्। संतु ये केचित् अवधयः, न तु ते अपेक्ष्यंते इति स्वभाव-अर्थः इति चेत्? न अपेक्ष्यंते इति कः अर्थः? किं न नियताः? आहोस्वित् नियताः अपि अनुपकारकाः? प्रथमे धूमः दहनवत् गर्दभं अपि अवधीकुर्यात्। नियामक-अभावात्। द्वितीये तु किं उपकार-अंतरेण? नियमस्य एव अपेक्षा-अर्थत्वात्। तस्य

एव च कारण-आत्मत्वात्। ईदृशस्य च स्वभाव-वादस्य इष्टत्वात्। नित्य-स्वभाव-नियमवत् एतत्। न हि आकाशस्य तत्वं आकस्मिकं इति सर्वस्य किं न स्यात् इति वक्तुं उचितं इति चेत्? न। सर्वस्य भवत: स्वभावत्व-अनुपपत्ते:। न हि एकं अनेक-स्वभावं नाम। व्याघातात्। ननु एवं इह अपि सर्वदा भवत: कादाचित्कत्व-स्वभाव-व्याघात: इति तुल्य: परिहार:? न तुल्य:। निरवधित्वे अ-नियत-अवधित्वे वा कादाचित्कत्व-व्याघातात्। नियत-अवधित्वे हेतुवाद-अभ्युपगमात्।

TRANS.: Let the occasional effect come into being all of a sudden (without being dependent upon any cause. There will then be no need to admit causal relationship). In reply the causalist says that the Sanskrit word meaning 'all of a sudden' may be taken in the sense of the negation of causation or origination, self-origination, origination from the unreal or as the description of the very nature of the effect. But none of these alternatives is tenable as there are definite limits (earlier and later) to the existence of effects.

If as per the first alternative, causation of things is denied then their origination being unconditioned they would exist at all times as there is nothing to restrict their existence to particular periods. As to the alternative that things are self-produced, it cannot be pressed as nothing is capable of producing itself. Causality in fact consists in the necessity of antecedence and consequence. The same thing cannot be both the antecedent and the consequent as sequential relationship depends upon difference of the relata. If the unnameable or the fictitious is supposed to be the cause then the effect can even preexist its cause and so it would become eternal. May it be urged against this that by the description of origination as sudden it is not intended to deny causality absolutely, or to negate origination, affirm self-origination or unreal-origination? What is meant by the description is that just as things by their own nature (without depending upon others) exist at certain places, (the places they occupy) only, so by their own nature they occur at certain times only and not at others. No! This will not do! If the existence of things has no limit or has only irregular limits then their occasionality will be jeopardised. Certainly occasionality does not consist in subsequent existence only but it consists in such an existence as is qualified by prior nonexistence. If things' existence is limited then the limit which precedes this existence is called the cause. 'Let then the antecedent nonexistence itself be "the limit of things" existence?' No! Other things also precede this existence. If the other things like the material cause which help define the antecedent nonexistence are not taken into account the antecedent nonexistence cannot be identified as related to a particular effect. So a thing cannot have antecedent nonexistence alone as its existential limit, it being just like other things coexisting with it. If the antecedent nonexistence excluding the other coexistent things constituted the limit of the thing it precedes, then the latter would exist even prior to its origination and so be eternal. But can't it be urged against this that even if there may be other limits yet they are not needed by the thing produced and this is what is meant by the remark that 'things are self-produced?' Well, if so then we ask, 'what is meant by saying that the limiting thing is not needed by the effect?' Does it mean that the limit is not necessary or even though necessary it is of no use to the limited? If the first, then the smoke may have even the donkey as its limit as there is nothing to distinguish between the donkey and other limiting things. If the second alternative is true then what is the use of any other limit? Necessity of the limit is itself the meaning of 'use' (or condition). This itself is the meaning of causation. This kind of naturalism is acceptable to us. The necessity of such nature in produced things is just like the necessity of eternal nature in eternal things. But can't it be contended that like the unconditioned eternity of the eternal sky the occasionality of other things also is unconditioned? No! What is common to everything cannot constitute the specific nature of certain things. Certainly a single property cannot constitute the nature of many different things as this would lead to incompatibility. But then, in the case of the occasional entity also, can't it be similarly contended that there arises a similar incompatibility in treating the occasional thing as eternal? No! The objections are not similar in the two cases. If there is no limit or the limit being there if it is irregular then the occasional character of things gets jeopardised. But if the limit is admitted to be regular then this admission leads to the affirmation of the doctrine of causation.

EXPL.: In the above the negation of causal production may be taken in the sense of non-causal production by using the negative particle as the prefix of the word *Hetu* used for the cause. The non-cause is either the effect itself or the nonexistent. Thus we get the two alternatives referred to above. The word *Akasmāt* used by the Cārvāka may by an ad hoc convention be also taken in the sense of 'by nature'. So we get one more alternative to consider.

In the text the Cārvāka's contention that things may be occasional by nature may be explained thus; just as a piece of cloth for example, though

caused by yarns and the weaving machinery, is located only in its material cause, so things, though occasional may exist only at certain times because this is their nature.

The antecedent nonexistence of a thing can be its earlier limit provided its relation to the thing is revealed by the material and other causes of the thing. So along with the antecedent nonexistence these causal conditions also would have to be reckoned as the earlier limits of a thing.

In the text it is argued against the Cārvāka that if anything preceding the existence of another thing can delimit it then even a donkey preceding the occurrence of a certain smoke can delimit it's existence. What this means is that if smokeness inhered in a thing which is not concomitant with fire (because the donkey is supposed to be the earlier limit of smoke) then smoke would be produced by the causal collocation which excluded fire.

In the text 'causality' is not usefulness because even to be useful there will have to be a cause for the useful cause and thus there will result infinite regress. The necessary prior occurrence itself is the essence of causality.

Further in the text occasionality is said to conflict with eternal existence but a thing is occasional if it is unlimited or limited. If a thing is limited it may be regularly or irregularly limited. Of these a thing which is unlimited or irregularly limited is found to be other than occasional. So it follows that only regularly limited things are occasional. As a matter of fact causality is established by perception itself.

The crux of the above criticism of the Cārvāka contention is this; Certain things are known to be occasional. They cannot be supposed to be so of themselves because just as they exist at some time they do not exist at any earlier time. This nonexistence of a thing being beginningless it cannot set a limit to the existence of the thing. Besides the well-known causal conditions of a thing have also to be considered as the limitors of the thing's existence. If they necessarily preexist the thing they cannot be denied to be its limitors. Thus we arrive willy-nilly at the notion of the cause which necessarily preexists a thing and delimits its anterior existence.

Objection to the above and its rejoinder elaborated

TEXT: स्यात् एतत्। उत्तरस्य पूर्वः, पूर्वस्य उत्तरः, मध्यमस्य उभयं अवधिः अस्तु। दर्शनस्य दुरपन्हवत्वात्। त्वया अपि एतत् अभ्युपगंतव्यम्। न

हि भाववत् अभावे अपि उभय-अवधित्वं अस्ति। तत्-वत् भावेषु अपि अनुपलभ्यमान-एकैक-कोटिषु स्यात्। न स्यात्। अनादित्वात्।

प्रवाहः अनादिमान् एष न विजाति-एक-शक्तिमान्।
तत्वे यत्नवता भाव्यं अन्वय-व्यतिरेकयोः॥

प्रागभावः हि उत्तर-काल-अवधिः अनादिः, एवं भावः अपि घटादिः स्यात्। अनुपलभ्यमान-प्राक्-कोटिक-घटादि-विषयं न इदं अनिष्टं इति चेत्? न। तावत्-मात्र-अवधि-स्वभावत्वे तत्-अहः वत् पूर्वेद्युः अपि तं अवधीकृत्य तत्-उत्तरस्य सत्व-प्रसङ्गात्। अपेक्षणीय-अंतर-अभावात्। एवं पूर्व-पूर्वं अपि। भावे तत् एव सदातनत्वम्। तत्-अहः एव अनेन भवितव्यं इति अस्य स्वभावः इति चेत्? न। तस्य अपि अन्हः पूर्व-न्यायेन पूर्वं अपि सत्व-प्रसङ्गात्। तस्मात् तस्य अपि तत्-पूर्वकत्वं एवं तत्-पूर्वस्य अपि इति अनादित्वं एव ज्यायः, न तु अपूर्व-अनुत्पादे कस्यचित् अपूर्वस्य संभवः इति। तथा अपि व्यक्ति-अपेक्षया नियमः अस्तु न जाति-अपेक्षया इति चेत्? न। नियत-जातीयता-स्वभाव-व्याघातात्। यदि हि यतः कुतश्चित् भवन् एव तत्-जातीय-स्वभावः स्यात्, सर्वस्य सर्व-जातीयत्वं एक-जातीयत्वं वा स्यात्। एवं तत्-जातीयेन यतः कुतश्चित् भवितव्यं इति अस्य स्वभावः तदा अपि सर्वस्मात् सर्व-जातीयं एक-जातीयं वा स्यात्। कथं तर्हि तृण-अरणि-मणिभ्यः भवन् आशुशुक्षणिः एक-जातीयः? एक-शक्तिमत्वात् इति चेत्? न। यदि हि विजातीयेषु अपि एक-जातीय-कार्य-कारण-शक्तिः समवेयात्, न कार्यात् कारण-विशेषः क्व अपि अनुमीयेत। कारण-व्यावृत्त्या च न तत्-जातीयस्य एव कार्यस्य व्यावृत्तिः अवसीयेत। तत् अभावे अपि तत्-जातीय-शक्तिमतः अन्यस्मात् अपि तत्-उत्पत्ति-संभवात्। यावत्-दर्शनं व्यवस्था भविष्यति इति चेत्? न। निमित्तस्य अदर्शनात् दृष्टस्य च अनिमित्तत्वात्। एतेन सूक्ष्म-जातीयात् इति निरस्तम्। अ-वन्हेः अपि तत्-सौक्ष्म्यात् धूम-उत्पत्ति-आपत्तेः। कार्य-जाति-भेद-अभेदयोः समवायि-भेद-अभेदौ एव तंत्रं न निमित्त-असमवायिनी इति चेत्? न। तयोः अ-कारणत्व-प्रसङ्गात्। न हि सति भावमात्रं तत्,

किन्तु सति एव भावः। न च जाति-नियमे समवायिकारणमात्रं निबंधनं अपि तु सामग्री। अन्यथा द्रव्य-गुण-कर्मणां एक-उपादानकत्वे विजातीयत्वं न स्यात्। न च कार्य-द्रव्यस्य एषा रीतिः इति युक्तम्। आरब्ध-दुग्धैः एव अवयवैः दधि-आरंभ-दर्शनात्।

TRANS.: Let then be this (argument against causality). 'Let the earlier be the limit of the later, the later the limit of the earlier and let both be the limits of that which exists between the earlier and the later. You too have to admit this on pain of denying perceptual testimony. Certainly negation does not have both the limits as a positive entity has. (Antecedent nonexistence does not have the earlier limit and the posterior nonexistence does not have the later limit). In the same manner certain positive entities which seem to have only the earlier or the later end-point may be supposed to have only one limit. So even granting that a certain positive entity (like the world) has a limit it cannot be proved that the limit must be an earlier one so that it could be identified with the cause of the entity! No! This cannot be the case because (this cause-effect-series) is beginningless. This series or process is not such that the members of it are endowed with a common power or capacity despite their generic diversity. So one should try to determine generic and specific causality of things (like the dry grass for burning only) on the basis of their positive and negative association with their respective effects.

If positive entities are treated like negation then like anterior nonexistence which is beginningless even positive entities like the clay-pot would have to be regarded as beginningless. It can't be urged against this that such a contingency in the case of some clay-pot or any other entity whose causal collocation is not observable is not undesirable. If all the earlier entities constituted the earlier limit of the said entity then it could exist even earlier than the moment at which it actually exists. There is no other requisite whose absence might delay such earlier existence or occurrence. In this way the occurrence of the entity can be shifted to more and more anterior days and if this could happen this would constitute eternity itself. Could it be urged against this that to exist only on the day it does is the very nature of a positive entity? No! This day also by the above logic could (be said) to occur earlier (If this day is beginningless then the entity existing in it will also be beginningless). Thus every day we have a day previous to it and so it is best to admit a beginningless series of days or periods. On this admission nothing which is not preceded (by some causal collocation) can come into being and so the

possibility of sudden emergence into being of anything gets ruled out (what this means is that the origination of a thing can be determined by what goes before it; if no earlier determinant of origination is there the origination could occur at any earlier time).

One may here ask, 'let there be causal determination only in respect of individuals, but not their generic nature or type?'. The answer to this question is that individual determination would militate against the regular and natural generic character of things. If a thing though produced by any casual condition whatsoever retains its own special generic character then anything would have any generic character or everything would have an identical generic character. Likewise if a thing having a certain generic character is supposed to be by nature producible by any causal conditions, even then everything can produce things of any generic character or of the same generic character. '(But if the causal conditions having an identical generic character are not supposed to produce effects having diverse generic characters then) how is the fire produced by dry grass, churning of a wooden trough or concentration of sun-rays in a glass, of the same generic character?', it may be asked. (Can one say in reply to this question that this is so because) an identical capacity or power inheres in all these producers of fire? No! If even in different types of causes there inhered the capacity to produce effects of identical generic character then nowhere from the occurrence of an effect the prior occurrence of a particular cause can be inferred (as different types of causes are supposed to be productive of an identical type of effect). Also from the absence of a particular cause the absence of only that type of effect which corresponds to the cause would not be inferrible (as different types of causes are supposed to produce an identical type of effect). If one specific cause is absent another cause endowed with the identical productive capacity can produce the effect. Could one urge against this that the nature of causal determination of effects can be decided on the basis of the observation of actual different types of cases of causation? (An identical productive capacity is postulated only in those cases where even in the absence of known causes the effect is produced by an unknown (or unfamiliar cause). No! This cannot be urged! The basis for the postulation of the capacity (namely the capacity itself) is not observed and what is observed is not the basis. (In dry grass for example the property or capacity determining fire-causality is not observed and what is observed namely, grassness, does not determine fire-causality). This reply helps dispose of the suggestion that some invisible property like immediate-productivity inhering in dry grass etc., determines their causality (If capacity cannot do so). If an invisible

property determined causality then this property itself should produce smoke when fire is not present. May it be urged against this that the generic similarity and dissimilarity of effects is determined by the identity and diversity of the material causes only; the efficient and non-material causes have nothing to do with these? No! This is not correct, for then there cannot be efficient and non-material causes at all. To be a cause is not just to be such that when it is present the effect is present. It is to be such that only if it is present the effect is present. Certainly in the determination of generic causality the material cause by itself is not competent. It is the causal collocation that is really competent. If this were not so then as substance, qualities and actions have (all of them). substance itself .s their material cause they would not have different generic characters. But could it be the case that the above rule is applicable to non-eternal substances only (and not quality etc.)? No! (Even in the case of a non-eternal substance like curd) it is found that the components which have produced milk help produce curd (when milk curdles).

EXPL.: The Cārvāka's rejoinder to the foregoing criticism is that the causal collocation producing an effect cannot depend upon another causal collocation to produce it. So it has to be regarded as devoid of an earlier limit like the anterior nonexistence. In the same manner some positive entities too may be so regarded. But this supposition would entail eternity of the positive entity.

In the text the view of Mīmāṃsā that different causes of an effect are endowed with a power to produce the latter is presented and criticised. There cannot be one power common to different causes of an effect as the generic diversity of the effect would then be left undetermined. Against the contention that the diversity of the material cause determines the generic diversity of the effect it is argued in the text that the components of milk itself when conjoined with some sour curdling agent go to produce the curd. Objection may be taken to this argument on the ground that since the invisible atoms are not tastable only the visible parts of milk are to be inspected to find out if they are characterised by milkness or curdness. On inspection it is found that these parts are not endowed with milkness but are endowed with curdness. From this fact it can be inferred that curdness characterises even atoms and if it does so it cannot be maintained that the material causes of milk go to produce curd which is quite different from it. If curdness is denied to inhere in atoms as it is a generic property subordinate to a generic property like earthness which is subordinate to substanceness (according to the rule laid down by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika that a generic property which is subordinate to the second degree to substanceness it cannot characterise atoms; what this means in simple terms is that at the atomic level the distinctions of milk, curd etc. do not hold good) then milkness too cannot be supposed to inhere in atoms.

The above objection may be answered thus. It cannot be denied that milk which curdles on being set is needed for the production of curd. So the law of parsimony requires that we admit milk-producing atoms themselves to produce curd on being accompanied by some adventitious conditions. The admission of curd-producing atoms over and above those of milk-productive atoms is nothing but redundant. Moreover the artificial quality of milk is known to be conducive to the production of curd of corresponding special quality. There is also the general rule laid down by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika on the testimony of common experience that a substance which is the resultant of the destruction of another substance is the material product of the material causes of the latter. For example a piece of cloth torn out of a large one is the material product of the yarns which are the material components of the large cloth. So if curd comes into being only when milk is destroyed or curdled then the material components of milk itself must be the material components of curd. One may object to this rule by pointing out that the destruction of pests helps the production of and growth of plants but they (the pests and the plants) do not have common material causes. This objection may be taken care of if the destroyed substance (referred to in the rule) is characterized as non-obstructive of the production of the other substance. Some Nyāya thinkers are of the view that milkness, curdness etc. are qualitative generic properties which indirectly coexist with substanceness. So the very components which produce milk or the substance tasting like milk are productive of curd.

Generic and specific cause-effect-relations explained and justified

TEXT: एतेन अपोहवादे नियमः निरस्तः। 'कार्यकारणभावात् वा' इत्यादि-विप्लव-प्रसङ्गात्। तस्मात् नियत-जातीयता-स्वभाव-भङ्गेन व्यक्ति-अपेक्षया एव नियमः इति फूत्कारेण तृणादेः एव, निर्मंथनेन अरणेः एव, प्रतिफलित-तरणि-किरणैः मणेः एव इति प्रकार-नियमवत् तेन एव व्यज्यमानस्य कार्यजाति-भेदस्य भावात्। दृश्यते च पावकत्व-

अविशेषे अपि प्रदीपः प्रासाद–उदर–व्यापकं आलोकं आरभते न तथा ज्वाला–जाल–जटिलः अपि दारु–दहनः न तरां च कारीषः। यः तु तं न आकलयेत् स कार्य–सामान्येन कारण–मात्रं अनुमियात् इति किं अनुपपन्नम्? एवं तर्हि धूमादौ अपि कश्चित् अनुपलक्षणीयः विशेषः स्यात् यस्य दहन–अपेक्षा इति न धूमादि–सामान्यात् वन्हि–सामान्यादि–सिद्धिः। एतेन व्यतिरेकः व्याख्यातः। तथा च कार्य–अनुपलब्धि–लिङ्ग–भंगे स्वभावस्य अपि असिद्धेः गतं अनुमानेन इति चेत्? प्रत्यक्ष–अनुपलंभ–गोचरः जाति–भेदः न कार्य–प्रयोजकः इति वदतः बौद्धस्य शिरसि एष प्रहारः। अस्माकं तु यत्–सामान्य–आक्रान्तयोः ययोः अन्वय–व्यतिरेकवत्ता तयोः तथा एव हेतु–हेतुमत्–भाव–निश्चयः। तथा च अवान्तर–विशेष–सद्भावे अपि न नः विरोधः। किं पुनः तार्णादौ दहन–सामान्यस्य प्रयोजकं तृणादीनां विशेषे एव नियतत्वात् इति चेत्? तेजो–मात्र–उत्पत्तौ पवनः निमित्तम्। अवयव संयोगः असमवायी, तेजः–अवयवाः समवायिनः। इयं एव सामग्री गुरुत्ववत्–द्रव्य–सहिता पिण्डितस्य। इयं एव तेजोगतं उद्भूत–स्पर्शं अपेक्ष्य दहनं, तत्र अपि जलं प्राप्य दिव्यं, पार्थिवं प्राप्य भौमं, उभयं प्राप्य औदर्यं आरभते इति स्वयं ऊहनीयम्।

TRANS.: By the foregoing refutation stands refuted the likely contention that by adopting the theory of *apoha* (advocated by the Buddhists) the necessity of causal relationship can be upheld. (For example the dry grass is the cause of fire [under the form of or as 'that which is other than what is other than dry grass']. Thus capacity and generic property as causal determinants can be avoided. If the *Apoha*-theory is adopted then, since innumerable fires cannot be individually comprehended by the different exclusions some of the fires would be left out in the enumeration of the causes of smoke. Thus the familiar causality of fire in respect of smoke would thereby be jeopardised. The causal necessity is established by means of the observation of positive and negative association of cause and effect but this association cannot be established [as shown above] and so the necessity would be jeopardised). Hence to avoid the denial of the effects being of specific types, the causal necessity pertaining to the latter must be supposed to be correlative to individual causes only. Thus it would follow that blowing would be accessory only to the dry grass, churning only to the wooden trough and the refracted solar rays only to the inflammable stone in producing fire. The special property of the effect produced by any of these causes is manifested by the relationship of the former with the latter. This is why it is found that a bright lamp produces light which pervades the whole interior of a palace but burning fire-wood does not do so and much less does the burning grass do so although all these effects are alike fires. If someone does not apprehend the specific nature of the effect he will perceive only the general nature of the effect and infer therefrom the general nature of the cause. What is inconsistent in this view of the diversity of the apprehension of causal relationship? But (couldn't it be urged that) if it is suspected that there is some unrecognised special property even in the smoke which depends upon fire then the occurrence of smoke as smoke would not lead to the inference of fire as fire and the inference of the absence of fire would also not lead to the inference of the absence of smoke (if the suspicion occurs)?. This explains the doubtfulness of the negative inference also. Thus if the apprehension and non-apprehension of the effect which are respectively the signs of the positive and negative association of the middle and major terms, cannot take place then nature as middle term would be rendered ineffective and as a result inference would cease to be a source of knowledge. In reply to this objection it may be stated that this objection is (in fact) a blow on the head of the Buddhist who maintains that the specific property which is known to be positively and negatively associated with an effect is not its determinant. In our view however if any two things are ascertained to be positively and negatively associated as endowed with their respective generic properties then they are known to be causally related under those very properties. So even if there are (extra) specific differences in the cause or the effect we are not opposed to the admission of the generic causal relationship between the two. But then one can't ask, 'what is it in the dry grass etc. to determine the effecthood of fire as fire when dry grass is invariably associated with a specific type of fire only?' The (detailed) answer to the question is this: Air is the efficient cause (as blowing) of the origination of light only, the conjunction of parts of the burning material is the non-material cause and the parts of light are the material cause of the latter. This very collocation of causes combined with heavy substance is the generator of gold. This combination itself inclusive of the vivid feel of hotness is the producer of fire; with the addition of water again this combination produces lightning and with the addition of earthy substance it produces terrestrial

light; but when both the substances come together in the collocation there arises the digestive fire (or heat) pertaining to the stomach. All this is to be thought out by a student himself.

EXPL.: It is now concluded that the specific characters of effects are determined by the specific characters of the causes producing them. Thus the fire kindled by burning dry grass is of a different character than that produced by churning a wooden trough. The specific character of the fire is determined by the corresponding specific character of its cause which is other than the material cause. If someone does not notice the specific character of an effect he can infer from the general nature of the effect only the general nature of the cause. It may be asked if in the absence of the testimony of competent perception the reality of different types in fires can be admitted. In the case of light however which is known to be of a special type conditioned by a special cause, the different causes of different lights are not regarded as endowed with an identical productive capacity. The reply to the question is that the admission of a limited number of types or species of fire is more parsimonious than the admission of innumerable capacities corresponding to the different causes like the dry grass, the churning of the trough etc. which are accessory to the production of fire. It cannot be urged that all the different accessories are endowed with an identical capacity for producing different types of fire, for then if one or more of these accessories are absent the fire would not be produced. Nor can it be urged as above that the difference of types in fires is not noticeable. A fire produced by the burning of dry grass is known to be different from that produced by the churning of wooden trough. The perception of the difference is based only on the perception of the specific nature of the fire produced.

It may yet be asked, 'If there is some product which is producible by different causal collocations but is not endowed with specific characters corresponding to the different collocations how can the above-mentioned correlation between the effectual and causal characters be maintained? For example the destruction of a substance is caused either by the destruction of the locus of the substance or the non-material cause of the substance. The difficulty cannot be met by saying that the substantial destruction caused by the destruction of its locus is not caused by the destruction of the non-material cause because only if the substantial destruction is known to be uncaused by the destruction of the non-material cause it can be identified as one which is caused by the destruction of the locus. Thus there results the fallacy of mutual dependence.

The proper solution to the difficulty is to maintain that all destructions of substances are caused by the destruction of the non-efficient causes of the substances. Alternatively it can also be maintained that the destruction of a substance whose locus is existent is caused by the destruction of the non-material cause of the substance and similarly the destruction of a substance whose non-material cause is existent is caused by the destruction of the locus of the substance. But if both destructions, that of the locus and that of the non-material cause precede the destruction of a substance neither can be singled out as the sole cause of the latter, so both may be treated as the cause of the destruction of the substance. Regarding the generic casual relationship mentioned in the text it may be noted that although (for example) a seed as seed is the cause of the seedling as seedling it is not necessary that a seed must produce—and that too at all times—the seedling. Unless accompanied by the accessories a seed cannot produce the seedling. But though unproductive occasionally, a seed is not like a stone (in relation to the seedling), the generic casualty of the seed consists in the fact that only when the latter is present the seedling is produced.

The Advaitic and Sāṃkhyan views of causation stated and criticised.

TEXT: तथा अपि एकं एक-जातीयं एव वा किंचित् कारणं अस्तु कृतं विचित्रेण। दृश्यते हि अ-विलक्षणं अपि विलक्षण-अनेक-कार्यकारि। यथा प्रदीपः एकः एव तिमिर-अपहारी, वर्ति-विकार-कारी, रूपान्तर-व्यवहारकारी इति चेत्? न। वैचित्र्यात् कार्यस्य।

एकस्य न क्रमः क्व अपि वैचित्र्यं च समस्य न।
शक्ति-भेदः न च अभिन्नः स्वभावः दुरतिक्रमः॥

न तावत् एकस्मात् अनपेक्षात् अनेकम्। अ-क्रमात् क्रमवत्-कार्य-अनुपपत्तेः। क्रमवत्-तावत्-कार्यकरण-स्वभावत्वात् तस्य तत् तथा, यौगपद्यवत् इति चेत्? अयं अपि क्षणभंगे परिहारः न तु सहकारि-वादे। पूर्व-पूर्व-अनपेक्षायां क्रमस्य एव व्याहतेः। क्रम-नियमे तु अनपेक्षा-अनुपपत्तेः।

न अपि अनेकं अ-विचित्रम्। यदि हि अन्यूनं अनतिरिक्तं वा दहन-

कारणं अदहनस्य अपि हेतुः न असौ अदहनः, दहनः वा स्यात् उभय-आत्मकः वा स्यात्। न च एवम्। शक्ति-भेदात् अयं अ-दोषः इति चेत्? न। धर्मि-भेद-अभेदाभ्यां तस्य अनुपपत्तेः। अ-सङ्कीर्ण-उभय-जनन-स्वभावत्वात् अयं अदोषः इति चेत्? न। न हि स्वाधीनं अस्य अ-दहनत्वं अपि तु तत्-जनक-स्वभाव-अधीनम्। तथा च तत्-आयत्तत्वात् दहनस्य अपि तत्त्वं केन वारणीयम्? न हि तस्मिन् जनयितव्ये न असौ तत्-स्वभावः। तस्मात् विचित्रत्वात् कार्यस्य कारणेन अपि विचित्रेण भवितव्यम्। न च तत् स्वभावतः तथा। ततः सहकारि-वैचित्र्य-अनुप्रवेशः। न तु क्षणः अपि तत् अनपेक्षः तथा भवितुं अर्हति।

TRANS.: Despite the above let the cause of the world be a unique entity like Brahman (as the Advaitins say) or some entity of a general nature like *Prakṛti* (as the Sāṃkhyans hold), why admit the causality of diverse entities (like the merits of different persons for the creation of the world)? Certainly we see even ordinary objects giving rise to many different (and strange) effects. For example fire, though a single entity does yet dissipate darkness, burn the wick and also help identify a thing like the pot. The answer to the question is negative because the effects to be produced are diverse. The single (hypothetical causal) entity is never serially productive and the entity of a general nature cannot have effects of diverse natures. Nor is capacity the cause of (special) effects, because it is identical with the thing endowed with it. If however things were diversely productive by their very nature then this nature being one and the same (throughout), the effects produced would also be one and the same.

Certainly from a single entity unaided by any accessories many different entities cannot be generated. Without the accessories (whose serial occurrence determines the serial occurrence of the effects) the serial production of the effects by the cause cannot be accounted for. Can't it be urged against this that the cause is by its very nature productive of all its effects in a regular sequence just as even a single cause like the lamp is simultaneously productive (as mentioned above) of many different effects? No! (This cannot be urged). This would be a fit retort to the advocate of the momentarist doctrine (which maintains that if an entity is capable of producing many different effects it must produce them all as soon as it comes into being). The above is a fit retort to this Buddhist contention as according to it the very nature of the cause is to be serially

productive. If the earlier effects (produced by the cause) are not required by the later ones their sequential character itself would be jeopardised. But if effects are necessarily sequential they cannot be independent of each other. Nor is the multiple general entity the cause of diverse effects. If at all the entity that is the cause of fire alone, neither anything more nor anything less, were also the cause of anything other than fire then the product of the cause would not be other than fire or of the nature of fire or it would turn out to be both firey and non-firey in nature. But this is not the case. Can't it then be asserted that as the capacities in relation to the effects differ, so the effects differ (despite the identity of the cause) and so the aforesaid fallacy does not arise? No! Whether the capacity is the same as or different from its locus—the cause—in either case the fallacy remains. Can one say against this that the cause is by nature productive of both fire and non-fire separately and thus the fallacy can be overcome?. No! The non-firey nature of non-fire is not *sui generis* but is due to the non-fire-producing-nature of the cause. But if the production of fire also is due to this non-fire-producing-nature then who can prevent fire turning into an instance of non-fire? Certainly it is not a fact that when fire is being produced the non-firey nature of the cause is forfeited. So effects being diverse their causes too must be diverse. But this diversity does not pertain to the being of the cause. Hence it is that the diversity of accessories finds place in the causal relationship. Even in the view of momentarism the last momentary cause of an effect cannot be productive of the latter without the aid of the accessories.

EXPL.: The Advaitins hold that the non-dual Brahman alone is the cause of the world of multifarious entities. On the other hand the Sāṃkhyans opine that *Prakṛti* which evolves into all the different elements and objects of the world is the universal cause. Both these views are criticised here. If the cause is a single entity its effects cannot have diversity or regular sequential character. A common entity like *Prakṛti* also cannot account for the diversity of effects. If therefore special capacities are postulated to explain the diversity, these capacities cannot be supposed to be the same or different from their loci. Moreover one and the same entity cannot be taken to be endowed with diverse and even contrary natures so that on different occasions it could produce different and even opposite effects. It may here be contended that as one and the same entity like the lamp is seen to produce many different effects so an identical cause can be supposed to be the producer of all diversity in the world. This contention is met by the reply that the diversity in produc-

tion by single entities is due to the help of accessories available to their cause.

Discussion of the fourth argument for the unseen cause of the world

TEXT: अस्तु दृष्टं एव सहकारि-चक्रं किं अपूर्व-कल्पनया इति चेत्? न। विश्ववृत्तितः।

विफला विश्व-वृत्तिः नो न दुःख-एक-फला अपि वा।
दृष्ट-लाभ-फला न अपि विप्रलंभः अपि न ईदृशः॥

यदि हि पूर्व-पूर्व-भूत-परिणति-परंपरा-मात्रं एव उत्तरोत्तर-निबंधनं न परलोक-अर्थी कश्चित् इष्टापूर्तयोः प्रवर्तेत। न हि निष्फले दुःख-एक-फले वा कश्चित् एकः अपि प्रेक्षा-पूर्व-कारी घटते, प्राक् एव जगत् । लाभ-पूजा-ख्याति-अर्थं इति चेत्? लाभादयः एव किं-निबंधनाः? न हि इयं प्रवृत्तिः स्वरूपतः एव तत्-हेतुः। यतः वा अनेन लब्धव्यं, यः वा एनं पूजयिष्यति सः किमर्थम्? ख्याति-अर्थं अनुराग-अर्थं च। जनः दातरि मानयितरि च रज्यते। जन-अनु-राग-प्रभवाः हि संपदः इति चेत्? न। नीति-नर्म-सचिवेषु एव तदर्थं दानादि-व्यवस्थानात्। त्रैविद्य-तपस्विनः धूर्त-बकाः एव इति चेत्? न। तेषां दृष्ट-संपदं प्रति अनुपयोगात्। सुख-अर्थं तथा करोति इति चेत्? न। नास्तिकैः अपि तथा करण-प्रसङ्गात्। संभोगवत्। लोक-व्यवहार-सिद्धत्वात् अफलं अपि क्रियते वेद-व्यवहार-सिद्धत्वात्। संध्या-उपासनादिवत् इति चेत्? गुरु-मतं एतत् न तु गुरोः मतम्। ततः न इदं अनवसरे एव वक्तुं उचितम्। वृद्धैः विप्रलब्धत्वात् बालानां इति चेत्? न। वृद्धानां अपि प्रवृत्तेः। न च विप्रलंभकाः स्व-आत्मानं अपि विप्रलभंते। ते अपि वृद्धतरैः इति एवं अनादिः इति चेत्? न तर्हि विप्रलिप्सुः कश्चित् अत्र यतः प्रतारण-शंका स्यात्। इदं-प्रथमः एव कश्चित् अनुष्ठाय अपि धूर्तः परान् अनुष्ठापयति इति चेत्? किं असौ सर्व-लोकोत्तरः एव यः सर्वस्व-दक्षिणया सर्व-बंधु-परित्यागेन सर्व-

सुख-विमुखः ब्रम्हचर्येण तपसा श्रद्धया वा केवल-पर-वञ्चन-कुतूहली यावत्-जीवं आत्मानं अवसादयति? कथं च एनं एकं प्रेक्षाकारिणः अपि अनुविदध्युः? केन वा चिन्हेन अयं ईदृशः त्वया लोकोत्तर-प्रज्ञेन प्रतारकः इति निर्णीतः? न हि एतावतः दुःखराशेः प्रतारण-सुखं गरीयः। यतः पाखण्ड-अभिमतेषु अपि एवं दृश्यते इति चेत्? न। हेतु-दर्शन-अ-दर्शनाभ्यां विशेषात्। अनादौ च एवं-भूते अनुष्ठाने प्रतायमाने प्रकार-अन्तरं आश्रित्य अपि बहु-वित्त-व्यय-आयास-उपदेश-मात्रेण प्रतारणा स्यात् न तु अनुष्ठान-अगोचरेण कर्मणा। अन्यथा प्रमाण-विरोधं अंतरेण पाखण्डित्व-प्रसिद्धिः अपि न स्यात्। अस्तु दान-अध्ययनादिः एव हेतुः जगत्-वैचित्र्यस्य इति चेत्? न। क्षणिकत्वात्। अपेक्षितस्य काल-अंतर-भावित्वात्।

TRANS.: Let then the collocation of known (familiar) accessories themselves be productive of the diversity (of effects) ? Why postulate the unseen merit (or demerit) as the cause of the diversity? This question is answered thus. The universal disposition to practice the Vedic rituals cannot be infructuous nor can it have only suffering as its fruit. It cannot have even some familiar object as its goal. There cannot also be cheating in this matter by anybody. If only the series of earlier transformations of (inanimate) objects are supposed to lead to their later transformations (and thus all causation is sought to be explained) then no one desirous of attaining the other-worldly existence would ever engage in ritual and other altruistic activities like the performance of the sacrifices and the construction of water-reservoirs etc. Certainly no one who acts with foresight takes interest in activities which are useless or which result only in suffering, what to say of the interest of the whole world in these activities? Can it be said that certain people engage in such activities with a view to secure gain, respect and popularity from them? Well! If so, we ask, 'How do the gain etc., result from these activities?' Surely the disposition toward these activities does not by itself give rise to gains etc.. What can be the purpose of anybody giving anything or showing respect to a person engaging in rituals etc. except earning merit thereby? But can't one suggest that even charity and showing respect are activities which bring popularity and affection to the agent of the activities as is indicated by the saying 'Riches result from the affection of the masses?' No! Charity etc. are prescribed only for those who are adept in diplo-

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macy and those who are jovial fellows. May it be then that the ascetic experts in the three branches of knowledge or the Vedas are no better than cunning foxes (storks) and so they are just like diplomats? No! Obliging the Vedic experts (even if they are cunning foxes) is not going to procure material wealth to anybody. Can one say then that rituals etc. are performed for the sake of the happiness they yield? No! If it were so even the nonbelievers would engage in the ritualistic activities as they (for example) do in sexual activity. Can it be urged then that even infructuous (ritualistic activities) are usually practised because they are sanctioned by custom just as the prayers in morning and evening, which produce no result are practised by the three castes simply because they are enjoined by the Vedic authority? No! This view—though propounded by Prabhākara nicknamed as Guru or 'the great teacher' is not great or worth upholding. It should not be adduced at all if it has no rational basis. May it be that elderly people have duped young men and made them follow ritualistic practices? No! This is not possible as the elderly people themselves follow these practices. It is never the case that swindlers swindle even themselves. But isn't it likely that the elderly people are themselves misled by earlier elderly people and these by those still earlier so that this series stretches back to beginningless time? No! If such is the case then there is none in this chain who is really inclined to deceive so that the possibility of deception may be entertained. But can't it be contended that some cunning fellow starts practising the rituals for the first time with the sole object of cheating and persuading others to engage in those practices? Well! If this were the case then this person must be an extraordinary human being who, gifting away all his belongings to others, shunning all his friends and relatives, avoiding all pleasures, practising celibacy and austerities and inspired by faith, mortifies himself all his life solely to gratify his desire to cheat and mislead others! How will knowledgeable people follow in the footsteps of such a (so-called) cheat? How again is this person ascertained to be a cheat by an unusually-intelligent person like you? Certainly the pleasure of cheating is not more important than so much suffering! But isn't it the case that even those who are recognised as hypocrites indulge in practices (which have no mundane result and so) could be supposed to have extra-mundane results)?. No! (The two cases are different from each other). In the latter case some or other mundane result for the (apparently fruitless) practices are available but for ritualistic practices no such mundane result can be envisaged at all. Moreover only if certain practices having other-worldly results are established from beginningless time there may arise the possibility of some charlatan taking recourse to cheating by depending upon the former, through mere preaching (unaccompanied by practice) of certain practices to carry out which demands vast expenditure and hard labour. (Such a charlatan will not himself follow the practices which he preaches). If the established Vedic practices were themselves of the nature of cheating then the practices of the Buddhists cannot be treated as fraudulent (as they are opposed) to the former. Well, let then charitable activities, the study of the scriptures etc. themselves be the cause of diversity in the world! No! This view cannot be held. All these things are transitory while their supposed result comes into being when the latter no longer obtain.

EXPL.: Elaborating the fourth middle term mentioned in an earlier verse the author maintains that the beginningless ritualistic tradition followed by the Vedic scholars cannot be taken to be based on misconception or cheating. Those who follow this tradition are very knowledgeable about what they profess and do. They stand to gain nothing by falsely persuading others in engaging in very costly and laborious ritualistic practices. It is also not the case that the people seek to attract the attention of others so that they might benefit from them. Why should people be attracted towards such persons and be eager to benefit them? The Vedic tradition of hard, selfless, costly and disciplined ritualistic activities cannot thus be condemned as deception. Even for any deception to thrive there has to be some truth which the deception seeks to imitate.

Argument for capacity as an entity advanced

TEXT: चिरध्वस्तं फलाय अलं न कर्म अतिशयं विना।
संभोगः निर्विशेषाणां न भूतैः संस्कृतैः अपि॥

तस्मात् अस्ति अतिशयः कश्चित्। ईदृशानि एव एतानि स्व-हेतु-बल-आयातानि येन नियत-भोग-साधनानि इति चेत्? तत् इदं अमीषां अतीन्द्रियं रूपं सहकारि-भेदः वा? न तावत् ऐन्द्रियकस्य अतीन्द्रियं रूपम्। व्याघातात्। द्वितीये तु अपूर्व-सिद्धिः। सिद्धयतु भूत-धर्मः एव गुरुत्वादिवत् अतीन्द्रियः। अवश्यं त्वया अपि एतत् अंगीकरणीयम्। कथं अन्यथा मंत्रादिभिः प्रतिबंधः? तथाहि करतल-अनल-संयोगात् यादृशात् एव दाहः दृष्टः तादृशात् एव मंत्रादि-प्रतिबंधे सति दाहः न

जायते। असति तु जायते। तत्र न दृष्ट–वैगुण्यं उपलभामहे। न अपि दृष्ट–सादुण्ये अदृष्ट–वैगुण्यं संभावनीयम्। तस्य एतावत्–मात्र–अर्थत्वात्। अन्यथा कर्मणि अपि विभागः कदाचित् न जायेत। न च प्रतिबंधक–अभाव–विशिष्टा सामग्री कारणम्। अभावस्य अकारणत्वात्। तुच्छः हि असौ। प्रतिबंधक–उत्तंभक–प्रयोग–काले च तेन विना अपि कार्य–उत्पत्तेः। प्राक्–प्रध्वंसादि–विकल्पेन च अनियत–हेतुकत्व–आपातात्। अकिंचित्–करस्य प्रनिबंधकत्व–अयोगात्। किंचित्–करत्वे च अतीन्द्रिय–शक्तेः स्वीकारात्। मंत्रादि–प्रयोगे च इतर–इतर–अभावस्य सत्वे अपि कार्य–अनुदयात्। अतः अतीन्द्रियं किंचित् दाह–अनुगुणं अनुग्राहकं अग्नेः उन्नीयते यस्य अपकुर्वतां प्रतिबंधकत्वं उपपद्यते। यस्मिन् अ–विकले कार्यं जायते। यस्य एक–जातीयत्वात् अनियत–हेतुकत्वं निरस्यते इति।

TRANS.: No action which has ceased to exist long ago is competent to produce its effect without giving rise to some special effect. Even if the body, senses etc. of the agent of the action are (supposed to be) endowed with the effect of the latter the enjoyment by each agent of the fruits of his own actions and not of others if he does not carry any effect of the action is not accountable. Therefore there exists some transcendent entity. But can't it be contended that the body, the senses etc. as produced by the capacity of their respective causes are themselves such that they give rise to pleasant and unpleasant experiences only in those selves (with which they are associated)? Well! if this is so then we ask, 'is the nature of this entity some non-sensible property or is it some kind of auxiliary condition?' Certainly there cannot be a sensible entity endowed with an insensible nature. To say this is to contradict oneself. If however the second of the above alternatives is true then the reality of merit and demerit is established. Well! Let then this (auxiliary condition) be proved to be some insensible property of objects as the property of heaviness is. You too have necessarily to admit this. Otherwise how is it that incantation etc. cause obstruction to the burning of fire?. To explain: fire is seen to be (extinguished or) prevented from burning by the chanting of incantation, but if there is no preventive agent the fire burns. In this case we do not see the absence of any known casual auxiliary. Again when all the known casual conditions are present in an instance the

absence of some unseen casual condition should not be postulated (if the effect does not take place). The (so called) unseen cause is meant to be only the collocation of the known casual condition. If this were not so then even in the presence of movement,'(disjunction or) separation (of the moving object from its place of conjunction) may not occur (if some unseen cause of separation were not co-present with the movement). But can't it be urged that for every effect such a collocation of casual conditions as is qualified by the absence of obstructions, is required? No! An absence (or negation) cannot be a cause as it is (a rejectable entity or) a nonentity. When the preventer and the stimulator are both present then even in the absence of the (preventer-absence-qualified) collocation the effect is produced. Besides, absences being of various types like the anterior, the posterior etc., if one of these is present in an instance of causation the other may be absent and so the causality of absence cannot be strictly maintained. Moreover that which is infructuous cannot be the obstructor. But if the obstructor is admitted to be active then this entails the admission of the insensible capacity of potency. When the incantations are chanted there is present the absence which is of the nature of difference of all obstructions and yet the effect (fire) does not result from its causes. So one has to infer the reality of something which is favourable and helpful to the production of fire. Anything opposed to this can be taken to be the obstructor. If this something is unhindered then the effect is sure to result. This effect is not diverse in nature, so irregularity of its causation is avoided.

EXPL.: Now the author adduces a proof for merit and demerit as inherent in the different selves. Since no ritualistic action lasts as long as its mundane or extra-mundane effect does not arise it is necessary to admit that the former leaves behind some special effect which cannot inhere in the body, or the senses of the agent of the action or things in the world. These are associated with all selves as each of them is ubiquitous and so every result of every action could be enjoyed by any self. It can't be urged against this that the objects of enjoyment are endowed with such different natures that only the selves for whom they are respectively intended enjoy them. Such natures of objects are not to be seen and there cannot be an insensible nature in sensible objects. Despite this fact insensible natures in things can be admitted because even in the presence of all causal conditions an obstructive condition is seen preventing the emergence of the effect. This can be due only to the inherence of some power or capacity in the obstructive condition. The proposition to be discussed about the reality of capacity may be phrased

thus. 'Is or isn't fire endowed with a property helping the emergence of fire and inherent in not more than one object?' The last qualification draws attention to the assumption that every causal entity is endowed with its own specific capacity to produce its own effect.

The postulation of capacity can be avoided if the absence of obstruction is regarded as one of the causal conditions or the determinant of the causality of the causal collocation. But for various reasons the latter alternative cannot be adopted. For one thing, absence is not an entity to be treated as a cause or causal determinant. For another, there are many kinds of absences and there is no common nature of these absences so that the absence as such can be regarded as the cause. Besides the obstructive condition must produce some obstruction. If it does then this condition must be some power which is insensible.

The causality of absence maintained

TEXT: अत्र उच्यते–

भाव: यथा तथा अभाव: कारणं कार्यवत् मत:।
प्रतिबंध: विसामग्री तत्–हेतु: प्रतिबंधक:॥

न हि अभावस्य अकारणत्वे प्रमाणं अस्ति। न हि विधिरूपेण असौ तुच्छ: इति स्वरूपेण अपि तथा। निषेध–रूप–अभावे विधे: अपि तुच्छत्व–प्रसङ्गात्। कारणत्वस्य भावत्वेन व्याप्तत्वात् तत्–निवृत्तौ तत् अपि निवर्तते इति चेत्? न। परिवर्त–प्रसङ्गात्। अन्वय–व्यतिरेक–अनुविधानस्य च कारणत्व–निश्चय–हेतो: भाववत् अभावे अपि तुल्यत्वात्। अभावस्य अ–वर्जनीयतया संनिधि: न तु हेतुत्वेन इति चेत्? तुल्यम्। प्रतियोगिनं उत्सारयत: तस्य अन्य–प्रयुक्त: संनिधि: इति चेत्? तुल्यम्। भावस्य अभाव–उत्सारणं स्वरूपं एव इति चेत् अ–भावस्य अपि भाव–उत्सारणं स्वरूपात् न अतिरिच्यते। तस्मात् यथा भावस्य एव भाव: जनक: इति नियम: अनुपपन्न: तथा भाव: एव जनक: इत्यपि। क: अनयो: विशेष:? प्रतिबंधक–उत्तंभक–प्रयोग–काले तु व्यभिचार: तदा स्यात् यदा यादृशे सति कार्य–अनुदय: तादृशे एव सति उत्पाद: स्यात्। न तु एवं, तदा अपि प्रतिपक्षस्य अभावात्। असत्–प्रतिपक्ष: हि प्रतिबंधक–अभिमत: मंत्र: प्रतिपक्ष:। स: च तादृश:

नास्ति एव? य: तु अस्ति न असौ प्रतिपक्ष:। तथा अपि विशेष्ये सति एव विशेषण–मात्र–अभाव: तत्र स: च उत्तंभक–मंत्र: एव इति अन्या एव सामग्री इति चेत्? न। विशिष्टस्य अपि अभावात्। न हि दण्डिनि सति अ–दण्डानां अन्येषां न अभाव:, किन्तु दण्ड–अभावस्य एव केवलस्य इति युक्तम्। यथा हि केवल–दण्ड–सद्भावे उभय–सद्भावे द्वय–अभावे वा केवल–पुरुष–अभाव: सर्वत्र अविशिष्ट: तथा केवल–उत्तंभक–सद्भावे, प्रतिबंधक–उत्तंभक–सद्भावे द्वय–अभावे वा केवल–प्रतिबंधक–अभाव: अविशिष्ट: इति अवधार्यताम्। अथ एवं–भूत–सामग्री–त्रयं एव किं न इष्यते? कार्यस्य तत्–व्यभिचारात् जाति–भेद–कल्पनायां च प्रमाण–अभावात्। यथा–उक्तेन एव उपपत्ते:। भावे वा कामं असौ अस्तु, का न: हानि:? प्राक्–प्रध्वंसादि–विकल्प: अपि न अनियत–हेतुकत्व–आपादक:। यस्मिन् सति कार्यं न जायते तस्मिन् असति एव जायते इत्यत्र संसर्गाभाव–मात्रस्य एव प्रयोजकत्वात्। य: तु संसर्गाभाव–तादात्म्य–निषेधयो: विशेषं अनाकलयन् इतरेतराभावेन प्रत्यवतिष्ठते स: प्रतिबोधनीय:। तथा अपि अभावेषु ज़ाते: अभावात् कथं त्रयाणां उपग्रह: स्यात्? अन्–उपगृहीतानां च कथं कारणत्व–अवधारणं इति चेत्? मा भूत् जाति:। न हि तत्–उपगृहीतानां एव व्यवहार–अङ्गत्वम्। सर्वत्र उपाधिमत्–व्यवहार–विलोप–प्रसङ्गात्। एतेन प्रतिबंधके सति अपि तत्–जातीय–अन्यस्य अभाव–संभवात् कार्य–उत्पाद–प्रसङ्ग:। अनुत्पादे वा तत: अपि अधिकं किंचित् अपेक्षणीयं अस्ति इति निरस्तम्। यथा हि तत्–जातीये सति कार्यं जायते अर्थात्, असति न जायते इति स्थिते तत्–भावे अपि तत्–जातीय–अंतर–अभावात् न भवितव्यं कार्येण इति न, तथा एतत् अपि। अनुकूलवत् प्रतिकूले अपि सति तत्–जातीय–अंतर–अभावानां अ–किंचित्क रत्वात् इति। यत् तु अ–किंचित्करस्य इति। तत् अपि असत्। सामग्री–वैकल्यं प्रतिबंध–पदार्थ: मुख्य:। स: च अत्र मंत्रादि: एव। न तु असौ प्रतिबंधक:। तत: किं तस्य अ–किंचित्करत्वेन? तत्–प्रयोक्तार: तु प्रतिबंधार:। ते च किंचित्करा: एव इति किं अ–समञ्जसम्? ये तु व्युत्पादयंति कार्य–

अनुत्पादः एव प्रतिबंधः इति तैः प्रतिबंधं अ-कुर्वतः एव प्रतिबंधकाः इति उक्तं भवति। तथाहि कार्यस्य अनुत्पादः प्रागभावः वा स्यात् तस्य काल-अंतर-प्राप्तिः वा? न पूर्वः। तस्य अनुत्पाद्यत्वात्। न द्वितीयः। कालस्य स्वरूपतः अभेदात्। तत्-उपाधेः तु मंत्रं अंतरेण अपि स्व-कारण-अधीनत्वात्। प्रागभाव-अवच्छेदक-काल-उपाधिः तत्-अपेक्षः इति चेत्? न। मंत्रात् पूर्वं अपि तस्य भावात्। तस्मात् सामग्री-तत्-कार्ययोः पौवपर्य-नियमात् तत्-अभावयोः अपि पूर्वापरभावः उपचर्यते। वस्तुतः तु तुल्य-कालत्वं एव इति न अयं पंथाः। न चेत् एवं शक्ति-स्वीकारे अपि कः प्रतीकारः? तथा हि प्रतिबंधकेन शक्तिः वा विनाश्यते, तत्-धर्मः वा, धर्म-अंतरं वा जन्यते, न जन्यते वा किं अपि? इति पक्षाः। तत्र अ-किंचित्करस्य प्रतिबंधकत्व-अनुपपत्तेः। विपरीत-धर्म-अंतर-जनने तत्-अभावे सति एव कार्यं इति अभावस्य कारणत्व-स्वीकारः प्रागभावादि-विकल्प-अवकाशः च। तत्-विनाशे तत्-धर्म-विनाशे वा पुनः उत्तंभकेन तत्-जनने अ-नियत-हेतुकत्वम्। पूर्वं स्वरूप-उत्पादकात् इदानीं उत्तंभकात् उत्पत्तेः। न च समान-शक्तिकतया तुल्य-जातीयत्वात् न एवं इति सांप्रतम्। विजातीयेषु समान-शक्ति-निषेधात्। न च प्रतिबंधक-शक्तिं एव उत्तंभकः विरुणद्धि न तु भाव-शक्तिं उत्पादयति इति सांप्रतम्। तत्-अनुत्पाद-प्रसङ्गात्। काल-विशेषात् तत्-उत्पादे तत् एव अ-नियत-हेतुकत्वं इति।

TRANS.: Just as positive entities are both causes and effects so the negation or absence too can be both cause and effect. Obstruction is absence of the collocation of causal conditions. Whatever causes this absence is called the obstructor.

Certainly there is no proof for disallowing absence as cause. Surely it cannot be the case that because absence is non est as a positive entity it is so by its very nature. If this were so then (the counter-proposition too can be urged that) since absence is real as absence the positive entity is non est or unreal. But isn't it a fact that causality is concomitant with positivity and so if the latter is absent in an instance the former too is absent in it? Well, then even the opposite of this can be maintained. The positive and negative association of two things on the basis of which

their causal relationship is maintained is common to both positive and negative entities. Can one say then that negation being uneliminable where an effect takes place it is present there but surely it is not needed there as a cause? No, this can be said of the positive entity too. Perhaps one may say then that the presence of negation before the production of an effect is determined by something other than itself namely, its counter-positive which it excludes. No! This is common to the positive entity too. May one say then that the very nature of the positive entity consists of the exclusion of its negation? No! Even the nature of negation may be taken to be not different from the exclusion of the positive entity (which is its counter-positive). Hence just as the stipulation that a positive entity is the cause of a positive entity only is not reasonable so also it is not reasonable to stipulate that only a positive entity can be a cause. What difference is there between these stipulations? In the instance where both the obstructior and the stimulator are present there could take place the fallacy of dissociation of cause and effect only if the effect ensued from the cause in the very condition in which it is not productive of the effect. But this is not the case. Even (when both the obstructor and the stimulator are present with the cause) the proper obstructor is not present at all; this is so because the incantation (which leads to the extinction of fire) is recognised as an obstructor only if it is not itself obstructed (by its opposite). But that which coexists with the stimulator (of fire) is not such. In the instant case the incantation is not an obstructor.

Where however the obstructor which is the qualificand is itself present but the qualifier, namely the absence of the stimulator is absent (that is to say) the stimulator is present, there the latter itself is the cause (not the absence of the qualified obstructor). This means that there are different casual conditions for the same effect. (But such a view need not be entertained). In the cited instance the qualified obstructor also is absent. Surely (in the similar instance of the absence at a place of someone wielding a stick it is not the case that, when the stick-wielding person is present (at the place) there does not exist the absence of all those not holding the stick but there exists only the absence of the absence of the stick. (When the stick-holder is present the stick also is present so that the absence of the stick which is the qualifier of the non-stick-holder remains absent. But it is not this absence alone which is absent, even those who are not stick-holders are also absent). When the stick alone or both the stick and the stick-holding man are present or both of these are absent at a place, absence of the man by himself exists in that place, so likewise when the stimulator alone is present or both the stimulator

and the obstructor are present or even if both these are absent at a place the absence of the obstructor alone at that place is beyond doubt and this fact needs to be particularly noted by you (the opponent). If this is so one may ask, 'why not admit three different causal collocations (one inclusive of the stimulator alone, another inclusive of both the stimulator and the obstructor and yet another excluding both these)? We reply that such a view leads to the fallacy of causal irregularity. (Because of the plurality of causes no cause will invariably precede every effect). Moreover there is no evidence to accept generic diversity of effects. The above formulation (of the causality of the absence of the obstructor as qualified by the absence of the stimulator) is by itself sufficient to explain all cases of causation. Even if the generic diversity of effects is admitted our position remains unharmed. It should not be thought that the diversity of the above absence as anterior, posterior, difference etc. should lead to irregularity of causation (because if one of these different types of absences is present the other type of absence is absent). The rule that 'that which being present the effect does not come into being is the very thing in whose absence alone the effect comes into being' (which expresses causality) demands the occurrence of only the relational absence of the qualified obstructor (and not other kinds of absence). If some objector without being cognizant of the difference between the relational absence or negation and identity-absence or difference raises objection (on the ground that even when the obstructor is present its identity-absence or difference is present), he should be made to realise his error (by means of a counter-objection namely, that even in his view the presence of the cause is coexistent with its difference). But can't it be urged against the above that there being no common genus characterising the three types of absences they cannot be comprehended (in the causal formula) and then they cannot be identified as causes? No! Let there not be any such genus. It is not necessary that only those entities that are endowed with genus are objects of usage. If this were so then things which are endowed with non-generic properties only will cease to be talked about. By this rejoinder stands refuted the possible contention that even if one obstructer (of an effect) is present if another obstructer of the same type is absent the effect must ensue; but if it does not ensue then something over and above the absence of the obstructer must be needed for the production of the effect. Just as, when it is established that an effect is produced when its causes—which are of a certain type, are present—and when they are absent the latter is not produced, it cannot be argued that even when one of the (typical) causes is present other individuals of the same type

being absent the effect cannot be produced, so too one cannot argue as above (that something over and above the absence of the obstructor is needed for the production of the effect). As in the case of the favourable entity so also in the case of the obstructing entity (it may be maintained) that when one individual of the obstructing-type is present the absence of other individuals of the same type is not of any help in producing the effect. As to the objection that what is ineffective cannot be an obstructer (we urge that) this objection too is erroneous. Obstruction means primarily deficiency of causal collocation. In the instant case this deficiency is the same as the incantations etc. themselves (as the absence of the incantations etc. is the cause the absence of this absence is identical with the incantations etc.). But these are not the agents of obstruction. So what does it matter if these are ineffective?. However those who use the incantations etc. are certainly obstructors (or obstructive agents). And these are definitely effective so there is nothing inconsistent in this account. As to the explanation of some thinkers that the non-production of the effect is itself the nature of the obstruction (we say that) this amounts to saying that even that which does not offer any obstruction is the obstructor. To explain: (It may be asked), 'Is the non-production (or non-occurrence) of the effect the same as the anterior nonexistence of the effect or its being related with a different time? It cannot be the first as the anterior nonexistence is beginningless. It cannot be the second too. There are not many times (time being only a single ubiquitous entity). And the qualifications or conditions of time (like the solar movement) are produced by their own causes and not by incantations etc. Can it be urged against this that the condition determining the qualification of time by the anterior negation of the cause is certainly dependent upon (or caused by) the incantations etc. ? No! The said condition exists even prior to the incantations (as the time and the anterior negation both exist beginninglessly). On this account the anterior absence of the effect and the relational absence of the cause cannot be related as earlier and later as is required by the law of causality (if it is applicable to these). The antecedent-consequent-relationship necessarily applying to the casual collocation and its effect is imposed upon the absences of these (although they are not so related). However the fact is that the absences are simultaneous only (and not successive). If this is not so (that is, if incantations etc. are only obstructions and not their agents) then even by admitting capacity (or potency) as a real entity how can the foregoing objections be met? To explain: (We ask), 'Does the obstructor destroy the capacity of production (inhering in the cause) or the property of productivity characterising the capacity or

produce a property in the cause which is opposed to the emergence of the effect or finally does the obstructor not produce either any capacity or property at all in the cause? These are the four possible alternatives (open to the advocate of capacity as a real entity). Among these the last alternative is untenable because what is ineffective cannot be an obstructor. If the obstructor is (supposed to be) productive of a property unfavourable to the production of the effect then it follows that the effect is produced only if the unfavourable property is absent. Thus the causality of absence (or negation) is entailed and also the (undesirable) possibility of entertaining other absences like anterior or posterior, being also the causes. On the first two alternatives, if, even when the capacity or its productivity is destroyed the addition of the stimulator to the causal collocation does lead to the production of the effect then causal irregularity is entailed. If the stimulator is not present the cause alone, and when the stimulator is present it alone produces the effect (with unobstructed capacity) and this is irregularity of causation, the effect being produced by the stimulator (and not by the cause). Can it be urged against this that the different causes of the effects are endowed with an identical productive capacity and thus there is no causal irregularity? No! Different types of entities cannot be supposed to be endowed with the same type of capacity. But may it not be the case that the stimulator does not produce any capacity but only opposes the obstructive capacity of the obstructor? No! This is an improper response. If it were correct the effect would not come into being at all (as the obstructor is supposed to have destroyed the productive capacity of the cause without regaining which the latter cannot bring about its effect). If it is contended that the productive capacity of the cause is restored by (the appropriate) time itself then (too) there results (the fallacy of the irregularity of causation).

EXPL.: Countering the objection that the absence (of the obstruction) cannot be regarded as cause as absence is a nonentity the critic says that in every respect absence is just like its positive counter-positive. No exception can be taken to absence being treated as a cause. Besides the positive and negative association of two things which determines their causal relationship obtains between an absence and its supposed effect or cause too. As to the suggested discrepancy between the occurrence of the absence of the obstructor and its effect where the obstructor is present with the stimulator before the production of its effect, it may be pointed out that the absolute absence of the obstructor is not the cause. It is the absence of the obstructor that is qualified by the absence of the

stimulator which is the cause. Such an absence coexists with the absence of the stimulator, the absence of the obstructor and also the absence of both the stimulator and the obstructor. Can one say that the qualified is nothing other than the qualifier, the qualificand and their relation taken separately so that there are three different absences of these three and thus three different causal collocations result by the inclusion of the latter among the causal conditions? If it is urged that there is only one absence of all the three constituents of the qualified (complex), then such an absence being the absence of a conjunction it can coexist with every one of these conjuncts so that even when the obstructor alone (the qualified entity) is present the former being present the effect should come into being. So neither separate absences nor one absence of the conjunction can do duty for the absence of the qualified (complex). Can it be said then that the separate absences of the qualifier, qualificand etc. are endowed with the common property of being the opposite of the qualifier, qualificand etc. which may be taken to be the determinant of the causality characterising each of these ? No! This suggestion too cannot be entertained. If the separate absences are—because of their opposition to the qualified, taken to be the contradictory of the latter then the absence of this absence should be identical with the qualified. Thus the qualifier and the qualified would be rendered identical. Moreover the other two absences also being opposed to the qualified the absences of these absences would also be identical with the qualified.

One other view of the absence of the qualified (complex) is to treat it as the absence of the qualificand whose counter-positiveness is determined by the qualifier. Such an absence coexists with all the three absences mentioned above. This view however entails universal momentariness as everything may be taken as absent in the present moment as qualified by its presence in the moment just past.

Gaṅgeśa, the great logician holds the view that, since the usage pertaining to qualification depends upon the relationship of the qualifier and the qualificand the (corresponding) usage pertaining to the absence of the qualified would depend upon the absence of this relationship. Qualification is therefore no other than this relationship. When the qualifier or the qualificand or both these are absent the relation of qualification is absent. This relation is identical with its relata viz. the absence of the stimulator and the obstructor. So the absence of relation is the same as the absence of the absence of the stimulator or the stimulator itself. If so then only if the stimulator is present the fire would burn otherwise not (even if the obstructor is not present). This diffi-

culty can be avoided if the nature of the relation is defined as the capacity to generate determinate cognition (of absence qualifying a positive or negative locus) without the mediation of any relation. This kind of relationship between the stimulator-absence and the obstructor is absent in all the cases mentioned above. It may now be asked, 'Is the absence of the qualified obstructor when the qualifier is absent, of the nature of anterior or posterior or relational negation of the former? It cannot be the first two as then the obstructor would be rendered momentary. It cannot be the last one as the relational negation is known to be absolute while the negation of the qualified is not so (it being occasional in nature). If despite this fact the said absence is treated as absolute then even when the obstruction is present its absence would be present thus entailing the emergence of fire. To overcome this difficulty even absolute absence is to be regarded as relationally determined by the time at which it occurs at a particular place. Such an absence cannot be equated with anterior and posterior absences because when, for example a pot exists at a place its absence is known to exist at all the other places but its anterior or posterior absence exists nowhere. This is why during the existence of a thing nobody says that the thing will come into or has gone out of existence.

It is now urged by the Mīmāṃsists that incantations, moonstone etc. must produce some obstruction to the burning of fire and this is not possible unless these have the capacity for causing the obstruction. The opponent replies that obstruction is nothing but deficiency of casual collocation which includes the absence of the obstructive conditions. Incantations etc. do not produce this deficiency. It is the sentient agent who by chanting the incantations brings about the deficiency. So in the strict sense the sentient agent alone is the obstructor.

It is contended by some that obstruction is nothing other than the non-production of the effect and this being caused by the non-occurrence of the cause, this latter is the obstructor, not any sentient being. This view cannot be upheld inasmuch as the anterior absence of the effect which is the same as its non-production is beginningless and so non-producible. In the strict sense it is not proper to say that the non-production of the effect is due to the non-occurrence of the cause. It is the sequential nature of the cause and the effect which is imposed upon the absence of the cause and that of the effect and thus this latter pair is regarded as causally related.

However if the foregoing cannot establish the reality of capacity as an entity then one may adduce the following inferential proofs to establish it.

1. All causes are endowed with a property which is positive in nature, invisible, peculiar to an individual and favourable to the production of the effect. The causes are such by their very nature as is for example the self as the cause of which merit and demerit are such properties.
2. Special inferences to establish the special capacities of individual causes are like, 'Fire for example is the inheree of a property which is positive in nature, peculiar to an individual, invisible and favourable to burning, because it is a cause like the self (which is endowed with merit and demerit). Fire associated with the moonstone (which obstructs burning) is devoid of a property conducive to burning because it fails to produce burning like the fire whose fuel is exhausted.'

Since the conjunction with self as endowed with its merit and demerit is needed for all occurrences apart from their respective causal collocations, the qualification 'peculiar to an individual' is introduced in the major terms in the above inferences to exclude the conjunction as a universal cause. The inferences are however vitiated by the fallacy of ineffectiveness as even the absence of obstructions can account for the occurrence of all effects (as explained above) and there is no evidence opposed to the thesis contradicting the inferences.

In the above and a previous passage the author has tried first to defend the Mīmāṃsā doctrine of capacity or potency as an entity in its own right from different angles and then he has demolished one by one all the Mīmāṃsā arguments favouring potency. The first argument that the different types of causes like dry grass, churning of wooden trough etc. which are alike productive of the same effect like fire must be supposed to be endowed with an identical potency to produce an identical effect is countered by the view that there has to be some property common to the different causes determining their identical productivity. If some type-difference is noticeable in the effects produced by the different causes then the diversity of the causal auxiliaries may be taken to be responsible for it.

The second Mīmāṃsā argument for potency to the effect that the stimulator must be endowed with potency to subdue the obstructor of the productive operation of a cause is met by the reply that the admission of potency can be avoided if the absence of the obstructor as qualified by the absence of the stimulator is included among the causal conditions of an effect. In support of this reply it is maintained that even absence can be both a cause and an effect.

The third argument that nothing can be obstructive unless it exerts to cause obstruction and so the obstructive agent must posses the capacity for exertion is countered by the argument that obstruction is nothing but deficiency of causal collocation or the absence of causal collocation which is the same as the entity causing obstruction. Only persons using this entity are the obstructors.

The last argument for potency that the obstructor is in fact the cause of the non-production of the effect and so it must possess the capacity to cause non-production is rebutted by the denial that non-production being of the nature of anterior absence of the effect is not producible at all.

Potency may be regarded as destroyed by the obstructor but this supposition would entail the admission of the absence of the obstructor as cause. If therefore the productive property of potency is supposed to be destroyed by the obstructor then the regeneration of the property by the stimulator would entail the admission of causal irregularity, The different types of these supposed causes cannot also be taken to be endowed with a common potency to explain causal uniformity. If however the stimulator is taken to be only the suppressor of the obstructive capacity of the obstructor of the casual collocation, then the productive capacity of the latter having already been destroyed by the obstructor, the effect would not be produced at all.

Argument for induced potency mooted

TEXT: स्यात् एतत्। मा भूत् सहज-शक्तिः आधेय-शक्तिः तु स्यात्। दृश्यते हि प्रोक्षणादिना व्रीह्यादेः अभिसंस्कारः। कथं अन्यथा काल-अंतरे तादृशानां एव कार्य-विशेष-उपयोगः? न च मंत्रादीन् एव सहकारिणः प्राप्य ते कार्य-कारिणः इति सांप्रतम्। तेषु चिर-ध्वस्तेषु अपि कार्य-उत्पादात्। न अपि प्रध्वंस-सहायाः ते तथा। एवं हि यागादि-प्रध्वंसाः एव स्वर्गादीन् उत्पादयंतु कृतं अपूर्व-कल्पनया। तेषां अनन्तत्वात् अनंत-फल-प्रवाहः प्रसज्येत इति चेत्? अपूर्वे अपि कल्पिते तावान् एव फल-प्रवाहः इति कुतः? अपूर्व-स्वाभाव्यात् इति चेत् तुल्यं इदं इह अपि। तावता अपि तत्-प्रध्वंसः न विनश्यति इति विशेषः। स्यात् एतत्। उपलक्षणं प्रोक्षणादयः न तु विशेषणम्। तथा च अ-विद्यमानैः अपि तैः उपलक्षिताः

व्रीह्यादयः तत्र तत्र उपयोक्ष्यंते। यथा गुरुणा टीका कुरुणा क्षेत्रं इति चेत्? तत् असत्। न हि स्वरूप-व्यापारयोः अभावे अपि उपलक्षणस्य कारणत्वं कश्चित् इच्छति, अतिप्रसङ्गात्। व्यवहारमात्रं तु तत्-ज्ञान-साध्यं न तु तत्-साध्यम्। तत्-ज्ञानं अपि स्व-कारण-अधीनं, न तु तेन निरन्वय-ध्वस्तेन जन्यते। अस्तु वा तत्र अपि अतिशय-कल्पना, किं नः छिन्नम्? यद्वा यागादेः अपि उपलक्षणत्वं अस्तु, तत्-उपलक्षितः कालः यज्वा वा स्वर्गादि साधयिष्यति, कृतं अपूर्वेण। न च देवदत्तस्य स्व-गुण-आकृष्टाः शरीरादयो भोगाय, तत्-भोग-साधनत्वात्। स्रक्-आदिवत् इति अन्वयि-बलात् अपूर्व-सिद्धेः न अ-विशेषः इति सांप्रतम्? इच्छा-प्रयत्न-ज्ञानैः यथायोगं सिद्ध-साधनात्। न च तत्-रहितानां अपि भोगः इति युक्तिमत् येन ततः अपि अधिकं सिद्ध्येत्। न अपि स्व-गुण-उत्पादिताः इति साध्य-अर्थः, मनसा अनैकांतिकत्वात्। न अपि कार्यत्वे सति इति विशेषणीयो हेतुः। तथा सति उपलक्षणैः एव सिद्ध-साधनात्। असतां तेषां कथं उत्पादकत्वं इति चेत्? तत् एतत् अभिमंत्रणादिषु अपि तुल्यम्। तस्मात् भावभूतं अतिशयं जनयंतः एव प्रोक्षणादयः काल-अंतर-भाविने फलाय कल्पंते, प्रमाणतः तत्-अर्थं उपादीयमानत्वात्, याग, कृषि-चिकित्सादिवत् इति। अन्यथा कृष्यादयः दुर्घटाः प्रसज्येरन्। बीजादीनां आ-परमाणु-अंत-भंगात्। तेषु च अवांतर-जातेः अभावात् नियत-जातीय-कार्य-आरंभ-अनुपपत्तेः।

TRANS.: Let then there be this argument (in support of the reality of capacity)) Even if there isn't such a thing as innate capacity in the cause (for producing its effect when the obstructor has destroyed the capacity) there can certainly be there an (externally-implanted capacity). We do observe that the paddy etc. are purified (sanctified) by means of the ritualistic sprinkling of sacred water etc. on it (which is a proof for the reality of implanted capacity). If the sanctification did not take place (in the paddy) how can only the sanctified paddy be of use in the preparation of the special effect (like the rice-ball) ? But can't the paddy etc. be productive of the special effect, only with the help of the incantations etc. but without any capacity being implanted in them? No! Even when the accessory causes have gone out of existence long before, the paddy

of any plant. There would thus be no definite causal relationship between the seed and the seedling burgeoning from it.

EXPL.: Against the earlier argument that when the productive capacity of fire has been destroyed by the obstructor, the stimulator, even if present with the obstructor cannot produce (or revive the capacity) it is now contended that the stimulator can certainly inculcate the productive capacity in fire as ablution does in respect of the paddy used in sacrifices. Without this implanted capacity of theirs the paddy etc. cannot be of use in the sacrificial ritual. Only when the paddy is sanctified by ablution it can be used in the sacrifice. Ablution is transitory activity. If it did not leave behind some effect in the paddy it would be of no use in the sacrifice, so it must be admitted that the effect of ablution in the paddy survives it and it permanently affects the paddy. It cannot be urged against this that the paddy as accompanied with the chanting of appropriate hymns is itself the producer of the rice-ball used in the sacrifice. The rice-ball is prepared long after the chanting of the hymns is over. If it is urged again that the paddy as associated with the cessation of the hymns and the ablution is the producer of the rice-ball then similarly in the case of the sacrifice it can be urged that it is the cessation of the sacrificial ritual that produces heavenly bliss as its result. (The sacrificial act is over long before its result is produced). Thus the postulation of the unseen merit (as the mediator between the sacrifice and its remote result) would become redundant. If, the cessation being endless the undesirable contingency of an endless repetition of the fruits of sacrifice is feared to be precipitated by the above suggestion then the same contingency may be taken to be precipitated in the case of the assumption of the unseen merit too. If a particular instance of merit is supposed by its very nature to be productive of a single result only then the cessation of sacrifice too— despite being endless—may be taken to be productive of a limited state of heavenly existence only. One may contend against the view of implanted capacity that ablution etc. need not produce any sanctification in the paddy used in the sacrifice. The indirect qualification by the ablution which is past, of the paddy which is present is adequate to sanctify it and its being used for the sacrifice. Don't we regard a commentary as one authored by Prabhākara nicknamed as Guru when Prabhākara no longer exists, simply because the commentary was written by the latter long ago? Or the battlefield used by the scions of the Kuru clan as the battlefield of the Kurus when the latter have ceased to exist long ago? No! this view is untenable. The non-qualifying adjunct cannot be the cause unless it itself or the process initiated by it immediately precedes the effect. As to the usage regarding the commentary and the battlefield mentioned above it is due to the cognition of the authorship or occupancy and not to the author or the occupier himself. This cognition too does not depend upon the author or the occupier. It depends upon its own (different) causes. Even if some merit is supposed to be generated in the commentary by its author (which is conducive to some beneficial result) the supposition has no relevance to the present case. Moreover even the sacrificial and other rituals could, on the above view, be regarded as non-qualifying adjuncts of their ultimate results. The time of the sacrifice or the priest officiating in the sacrifice may himself be regarded as the cause so that the causality of the unseen would be jeopardised. One cannot urge against this that the reality of merit is inferentially established as it is merit alone which procures the various means (like the body and its appurtenances) of pleasure for the human agent, because the inference is afflicted by the fallacy of proving the already proved. The sacrifices themselves which are of the nature of the will to perform certain actions could be taken to be the procurers of the means of pleasure (instead of the unseen merit which is sought to be inferentially established). Thus the view is unavoidable that ablutions etc. should be regarded as the causes of the emergence of certain excellences in the paddy etc. which (as endowed with the excellences) are usable in the sacrificial ritual later.

As is obvious the above argument and counter-argument are concerned with the proof and disproof of 'Capacity' as an entity conducive to the production of remote or proximate effects of the cause which is endowed with the capacity. The cause may not be born with a capacity but some activity or agent may instil a specific capacity or excellence in the cause so that it, as so endowed is usable for some specific purpose even when the activity or agent no longer exists. Earlier it was shown that even without the admission of capacity the emergence of the effect, when both its obstructor and stimulator are present along with the cause, can be explained if the absence of the obstructor as qualified by the absence of the stimulator is laid down as the supplementary cause of the effect. Against the admission of capacity it was stated earlier that if the obstructor destroyed the productive capacity of the cause nothing can regenerate the capacity. The foregoing argument seeks to show that things like the stimulator can induce capacity in a causal entity if the obstructor has destroyed it. An additional proof for the existence of induced capacity is the fact that seeds sown in the soil cannot sprout into the right kind of sapling if they are not invested with the specific capacity for giving rise to the sapling. In the soil seeds get totally disinte-

grated so that only their atoms survive the disintegration. These atoms do not possess the specific character of any sapling and yet they are productive of a particular type of sapling which is possible only if the sowing process generates a specific capacity in the seeds.

The view that only the human agent is sanctified and affected by the ritualistic process defended

TEXT: अत्र उच्यते–

संस्कारः पुंसः एव इष्टः प्रोक्षण-अभ्युक्षणादिभिः।
स्व-गुणाः परमाणूनां विशेषाः पाकजादयः॥

यथा हि देवता-विशेष-उद्देशेन हुताशने हविः-आहुतयः स-मंत्राः प्रयुक्ताः पुरुषं अभिसंस्कुर्वते, न बर्हिं न अपि देवताः तथा व्रीह्यादि-उद्देशेन प्रयुज्यमानः प्रोक्षणादिः पुरुषं एव संस्कुरुते न तम्। यथा च कारीरि-जनित-संस्कार-आधार-पुरुष-संयोगात् जलमुचां संचरण-जल-क्षरण-रूपा क्रिया, तथा व्रीह्यादीनां तत्तत्-उत्तर-क्रिया-विशेषाः। यथा च एकत्र कर्तृ-कर्म-साधन-वैगुण्यात् फल-अभावः तथा परत्र अपि। आगमिकत्वस्य उभयत्र अपि तुल्यत्वात्।
न तर्हि बर्हिषः इव व्रीह्यादेः पुनः उपयोग-अंतरं स्यात्, उपयोगे वा तत्-जातीय-अंतरं अपि उपादीयेत, अविशेषात्। न। विचित्राः हि अभिसंस्काराः केचित् व्याप्रियमाण-उद्देश्य-सहकारिणः एव कार्ये उपयुज्यंते। किं अत्र चित्रं, विधेः दुर्लंघ्यत्वात्। यथा च अभिचार-संस्कारः यं हेतुं उद्दिश्य प्रयुक्तः तत्-अपेक्षः एव तत्-संबद्धस्य एव दुःखं उपजनयति न अन्यस्य। न वा तत्-अनपेक्षः। एवं अभिमंत्राणादि-संस्काराः अपि भवंतः न मनाक् अपि न उपयुज्यंते। कथं तर्हि व्रीह्यादीनां संस्कार्य-कर्मता इति चेत्? प्रोक्षणादि-फल-संबंधात् एव।
ननु यत्-उद्देशेन यत् क्रियते तत् तत्र किंचित्करं, यथा पुत्र-इष्टि-पितृ-यज्ञौ। तथा च अभिमंत्रणादयः व्रीह्यादि-उद्देशेन प्रवृत्ताः इति अनुमानं इति चेत्? तत् न। हविः-त्यागादौ अनैकान्तिकत्वात्। न हि ते कालांतर-

भावि-फल-अनुगुणं किंचित् हुताशनादौ जनयंति। किं वा न दृष्टं इन्द्रिय-लिङ्ग-शब्द-व्यापाराः प्रमेय-उद्देशेन प्रवृत्ताः प्रमातरि एव किंचित् जनयंति न प्रमेये इति? कृषि-चिकित्से अपि एवं एव स्यातां इति चेत्? न। दृष्टेन एव पाकज-रूपादि-भेदेन उपपत्तौ अदृष्ट-कल्पनायां प्रमाण-अभावात्। तथा च लाक्षा-रस-अवसेकः व्याख्यातः। अतः एव बीज-विशेषस्य आ-परमाणु-अंत-भंगे अपि परमाणूनां अवांतर-जाति-अभावे अपि प्राचीन-पाकज-विशेषात् एव विशिष्टाः परमाणवः तं तं कार्य-विशेषं आरभंते। यथा हि कलम-बीजं यवादेः, नर-बीजं वानरादेः, गो-क्षीरं महिष्यादेः जात्या व्यावर्तते, तथा तत्-परमाणवः अपि मूलभूताः पाकजैः एव व्यावर्तंते। न हि अस्ति संभवः गो-क्षीरं सुरभि, मधुरं, शीतं, तत्-परमाणवः च विपरीताः। तस्मात् तथा-भूताः परमाणवः तथा भूतैः एव आद्य-अतिशयः अंत्य-अतिशयः अंकुरादिः वा इति किं अत्र शक्ति-कल्पनया? कल्पादौ अपि एवं एव। इदानीं बीजादि-संनिविष्टानां अस्मदादिभिः उपसंपादनं तदानीं तु विभक्तानां अदृष्टात् एव केवलात् मिथः संसर्गः इति विशेषः। न च वाच्यं इदानीं अपि तथा एव किं न स्यात्? यतः कृष्यादि-कर्म-उच्छेदे तत्-साध्यानां भोगानां उच्छेद-प्रसङ्गात्। अनवस्था-भयात् च अदृष्टानि कर्माणि दृष्ट-कर्म-व्यवस्थया एव भोग-साधनानि इति उन्नीयते। तस्मात् पाकज-विशेषैः संस्थान-विशेषैः च विशिष्टाः परमाणवः कार्य-विशेषं आरभंते। ते च तेज-अनिल-संसर्गैः विशेषैः, ते च क्रियया सा च नोदन-अभिघात-गुरुत्व-द्रवत्व-अदृष्टवत्-आत्म-संयोगेभ्यः यथायथं, इति न किंचित् अनुपपन्नम्। निमित्तभेदाः च पाके भवंति। तत् यथा हारीत-मांसं हरिद्रा-जल-अवसिक्तं हरिद्रा-अग्नि-प्लुष्टं उपयोगात् सद्यः व्यापादयति। दश-रात्र-उषितं कांस्ये घृतं च अपि विषायते। ताम्रपात्रे पर्युषितं क्षीरं अपि तिक्तायते इत्यादि।

TRANS.: Ablutions, water-sprinklings etc., which are performed in the course of sacrifices help sanctify (or produce excellence in) only the self of the agent of the activity. (They do not produce any effect in paddy

etc., the articles used for the sacrificial purpose). As to the productivity of the atoms (in respect of gross products like mango, orange, seedlings etc.) it may be stated that the intrinsic qualities like colour, taste, smell etc. of the atoms which are modifiable by heat give rise to corresponding qualities in the gross products. (There is no need to postulate any capacity in the atom to account for the production of a particular effect). Just as the offerings of oblations intended for certain deities and (proffered or) thrown into the sacrificial fire while chanting the appropriate hymns do help sanctify the agent of the sacrifice, not the fire or the deities so also the ablutions etc. which are aimed at the paddy etc. do sanctify the (human) agent of the sacrifice and not the paddy etc. Again as the scattering and rain-pouring movement of the clouds is generated by the contact with the latter of the agent who is the repository of the sanctifying effect produced by the *Kariri* sacrifice (which is supposed to cause rainfall) so also the subsequent (to ablutions) specific effects of the paddy etc. are connected with the (human) agent who is sanctified by the ablutions etc. If in the case of the agent there is likely to be absence of any result of the ritualistic activity due to there being some defect in the agent, the action or the means of action, so in the other case of the paddy etc. also, the result does not ensue if there is any defect in ablutions etc. Both these facts are alike scripturally testified. (That the agent is sanctified and that the paddy etc. are effective only by being connected with the sanctified agent is known only through the scriptures). But if this is so then just like the grass which is scripturally enjoined to be used only as the place where the paddy used in the sacrifice is put (and not for any other purpose), the paddy etc. too will not have any use other than that of being instrumental in sanctifying the agent. If at all it had any other use then even something other than paddy but similar to it could be put to that use. There is no difference between the paddy and any other thing in respect of their instrumentality (in producing sanctity in the agent, whether they have or have not been subjected to ablution). This objection can be met by the admission that there are certain extraordinary sanctifying rituals which produce their effect (in the agent) only with the help of the auxiliary object used in the course of the performance of the ritual. What are we to say in the matter? The scriptural injunction in the case is simply untransgressable. Just as in the case of the ritual relating to destroying one's enemy the ritual causes suffering only to that person towards whose body it is directed and on which it depends for its fructification, and it cannot be effective without the help of this body so also the sanctifying rituals are effective only with the help of the (instrumental) objects towards which

they are directed. But then how can the paddy etc. be treated as the sanctified objects in the sacrifice when it is the agent who is the ultimate beneficiary of the sanctifying ritual? The answer to the question is that the mere connection with the result of the activity of ablution is sufficient to invest paddy with some kind of sublimatory objectivity in relation to the ritual.

It may here be asked, 'whatever activity is executed keeping a certain object (goal) in view that activity produces some effect in that object, as for example the sacrifice intended to lead to the birth of offspring or that aimed at the gratification of one's ancestors; and likewise the chanting of certain hymns directed at the paddy etc. must produce some effect in the paddy itself (not in the agent performing the sacrifice). Thus this inference ('an activity must produce some effect in the object at which it is aimed') proves that ablutions, chanting of hymns etc. produce some capacity in the object with which they are concerned. This however is not a correct argument as the inference on which it is based is afflicted by the fallacy of deviation. The offering of oblation in fire is an activity which does not produce any effect in the fire conducive to the result which is expected to come into being (as a result of the activity) at a distant time. Alternately, is it not well known that the processes due to sense-object-contact, (the presence of the) middle term (in the minor) and the (hearing of) words aimed at their (respective) objects produce their effect in (the mind of) the knower (who is the agent) only and not in the known objects? 'But if so then agriculture and medical treatment of patients also would lead to their (respective) results through the production of some sanctification in their agents (as the activities of ablution, ablation etc. are supposed to do)? No, this cannot be maintained. If the known agencies of qualitative and other changes caused by heat can account for the production of the different results of soil-cultivation, medical treatment etc. there is no reason to postulate the agency of unseen merit for the purpose. The agency of heat-generated qualitative changes can also explain how the seeds soaked in the juice of lac and then sown in the soil give rise to pink-coloured flowers and not the usual white flowers (here too there is no need to extrapolate the agency of merit). Only because of this fact (that if known causes are adequate to explain an occurrence an unknown or unseen cause should not be postulated for the explanation) the seeds, though undergoing disintegration right up to the level of atoms which are not endowed with any specific genus like cottonness, mangoness etc., are yet productive of their respective specific effects, only as invested with certain specific characteristics of theirs which are generated by heat. Just as

paddy-seeds differ from barley-seeds, human genes differ from monkey-genes or cow's milk differs from buffalo-milk intrinsically (or generically), so the ultimate atomic constituents of these entities differ from each other because of their respective heat-generated qualities only. It cannot be the case that while cow's milk is sweet-smelling and cold its atoms are quite opposite in nature. So like their gross products—the seedlings etc. which are endowed with heat-generated qualities like colour, smell, taste etc., the atomic constituents of these products are also endowed with heat-generated qualities and as such they give rise to their primary products, namely, the dyads (endowed with similar qualities) and also their ultimate products namely, the gross seedlings etc. (endowed with heat-generated corresponding qualities). There is therefore no use for the postulation of a novel entity like capacity (to explain the gradual creative process). Even at the start of creation it was only thus that all gross products came into being. The only difference between the creative process occurring now and that at the start of creation is that in the first case it is we who help bring together the various atoms giving rise to the seedlings while in the latter case it is merit (of selves) which brings the ultimate atoms together. It should not be urged against this that even now merit itself may bring together the atoms. If merit determined the creative process (all the time) then nobody will engage in activities like cultivation so that the good and bad experiences resulting from these activities would not accrue to anybody at all. Even (if the merit of the cultivator is there to help the creative process yet) to uphold the law of causal determination of all occurrences in the world it has to be admitted that merit becomes effective only through the agency of known causes. Thus it follows that the atoms as endowed with heat-generated qualities and specific conjunctions (with certain other atoms) give rise to specific products. The heat-generated qualities also arise as a result of the conjunction of the atoms with light, air, water etc. These conjunctions result from specific movements caused respectively by impulsion, impact, weight, wetness and conjunction with self as endowed with merit etc. on different occasions. Thus there is no inconsistency in the above explanation. Heating involves different conditions. For example the flesh of a pigeon soaked in turmeric-juice and baked in fire kindled with turmeric-sticks, if eaten, causes immediate death. Fried butter kept continually in a copper vessel for ten days turns into poison. Even milk kept in a copper container overnight acquires a bitter taste and so on.

EXPL.: In reply to the foregoing contention that ceremonial ablutions, water-sprinkling etc. performed in sacrificial rituals must be productive of some (capacity-like) excellence in the paddy or grass which are the objects of the former activities it is now maintained that the real object of the said performances is only the purification of the mind of the agent of the performances not the production of any objective excellence. The paddy, grass etc. are treated as objects of the performances only because they happen to be the vehicles of the performances whose ultimate goal is the purification of the agent. This goal is not at all connected directly with ablutions etc. occurring in the paddy or grass but even indirect connection through the body of the agent when he handles the latter for use in the sacrifice may be regarded as investing them with efficient causality in relation to the purification. It may here be asked, 'If the ablution of the paddy is not supposed to bring about any purificatory effect in the paddy but is taken to be only conducive to the agent's purification then, the paddy cannot be used for any other purpose in the sacrifice, its purpose being exhausted in its being wetted by the ablution. If some other use is suggested for the paddy because of the scriptural injunction, then even some substitute-object can be used deputising for the paddy.' The only possible answer to this query is that scriptural injunctions though unaccountable are untransgressable. Many things other than the paddy can play the role of the paddy in the sacrifice but scripture enjoins that only paddy is to be utilised for producing the ultimate object—namely the agent's purification by the sacrificial ritual. In the well-known *Śyena* sacrifice for example the ultimate object of the ritual in the sacrifice is the destruction or death of the enemy. So it is the destructive effect in the body of the enemy that is brought about by the *Śyena* ritual. The performer of the ritual, the agent, however remains unaffected by the consequences of the ritual.

It may be asked again, 'Isn't it a fact that an action produces its effect only in that object at which it is directed? If it is so then ablutions, chanting of hymns etc. being directed at the paddy or such other things used in the sacrifice must produce some effect only in the latter and not in the agent of the sacrifice'. This contention however is not correct. The offering of oblation is directed at the sacrificial fire but it does not produce any effect in the fire. Similarly the various means of cognitions like perception, inference etc., are directed at their respective objects but the cognition they generate is enjoyed by the cognising agent and not the cognitive objects. This is so mostly in the case of all religious activities whose fructification is mediated by the unseen merit resulting from the latter. Agriculture and medicine for example are effective without

the mediation of any unseen merit, so their effect is not transferred to the person who practices agriculture or medicine. The harvest or the suffering patient enjoy the benefits of the soil-cultivation or the medical treatment. All empirical causality is thus direct and unmediated by any unseen agency except in the case of the causal operation of atoms at the beginning of creation. The collocation of various causal auxiliaries needed for the causal operation in the primeval atoms cannot be brought about by any human agency. Only the maturing destinies of different selves can produce the necessary collocation. It is therefore not at all necessary to admit 'capacity' or 'power' as an independent entity over and above the nine substantive entities admitted by the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* school.

The above argument against capacity cannot be acceptable to the Mīmāṃsists. If ablutions, incantations etc. enjoined to be performed in connection with paddy and other materials used in sacrifices are not supposed to sanctify them and thus produce in them some kind of excellence then what can be the purpose and purport of the scriptural injunctions regarding the ritual? Is it sensible to say in reply to this that all ritualistic actions relating to the sacrificial materials are meant to produce some sanctifying effect in the agent alone? If such were the case then the agent could have performed ablutions etc. upon his own person instead of the paddy etc. and thus directly derived the benefit of this activity. It is rather far-fetched to say that ablutions performed on one thing produce their benefit upon something quite different from it namely, the agent.

Further, such a rather counter-intuitive view does not help the Nyāya philosopher to do away with the admission of capacity. If the excellence of the sacrificial materials is of the nature of capacity won't the sanctifying excellence of the agent also be of the nature of capacity? What then is the gain in denying excellence in the materials and ascribing it to the agent? It won't do to say against this that the excellence of the agent is not of the nature of capacity while that residing in the materials used in the sacrifices is so. Just as the excellence of materials is their capacity because it is by its means that the materials are capable of producing their remote consequences, so the agent too is capable of attaining the ultimate result of his performance of the sacrificial ritual only by means of acquiring his sanctifying excellence by using the sacrificial materials properly.

Two things however can be said against the above criticism of the author's position. First, the excellence (or sanctity) acquired by the agent is something quite different from capacity and it only helps qualify the agent to attain the ultimate result of sacrificial performance. The excellence does not bring about the attainment of the result. Secondly, the admission of as many excellences as there are materials used in the course of the sacrifice is rather redundant. In lieu of innumerable excellences we may admit just the excellence of the agent which in any case we have got to admit. Scriptures are no guide in resolving this problem as they only enjoin certain actions. Whether each of these actions produces some effect in the material used in the course of the action or in the agent engaged in the action, it is not possible to decide simply by means of scriptural injunctions.

Query regarding the above view of the agent's sanctification

TEXT: यत्र तर्हि तोये तेजसि वायौ वा न पाकजः विशेषः तत्र कथं उद्भव-अनुद्भव-द्रवत्व-कठिनत्वादयः विशेषाः? कथं वा पार्थिवे प्रतिमादौ प्रतिष्ठा दिना संस्कृते अपि विशेष-अभावात् पूजनादिना धर्मः व्यतिक्रमे तु अधर्मः अ-प्रतिष्ठिते तु न किंचित्? न च तत्र यजमान-धर्मणा अन्यस्य साहाय्यकं आचरणीयम्। अन्य-धर्मस्य अन्यं प्रति अनुपयोगात्। उपयोगे वा साधारण्य-प्रसङ्गात्।

TRANS.: (If as stated above different qualities in earthy objects arise due to the effect of heat generally on the qualities of their components, then) the qualitative differences of watery, luminous, and airy objects not being caused by heat, how are the differences consisting in vividness, non-vividness, liquidity, solidity etc. of the gross (watery, luminous etc.) objects to be explained? How again in earthy icons etc. consecrated by the installation-ceremony there emerges merit through their worship and demerit if they are not worshipped; and if the installation is not performed neither merit nor demerit emerges in spite of the fact that there is no excellence in the icons? (Thus it has to be conceded that some excellence in the icon does emerge as the result of the ceremonial consecration effected by the agent. It would not therefore be proper to deny that even in the case of certain earthy objects excellences in the latter and not in the agent are produced by religious ceremonies). Certainly in this case the merit in the agent (host) does not lead to the emergence of merit in the worshipper. What is a quality or characteristic of one individual only cannot be of help to any other indi-

vidual's quality or characteristic. If it can, then there will not be any distinction between a consecrated and a non-consecrated icon (The merit acquired as a result of the execution of consecration by the agent cannot last long; so when it is exhausted it cannot be there to contribute to the emergence of the worshippers' merit in the absence of which there will not remain any distinction between consecrated and non-consecrated icons).

EXPL.: Earlier it was maintained that without the assumption of any capacity in earthy components of gross earthy objects certain qualitative differences of the latter can well be accounted for on the basis of certain heat-produced changes taking place in the former. Objecting to this the critic urges that changes in gross watery, luminous and airy objects are not found to result from heat-produced changes occurring in the component-objects. These are instances of changes unmediated by merit. There can also be instances of changes of temporal type which are mediated by merit. Consecration of an earthy icon leads to acquisition of virtue if the icon is worshipped. It is the worshipper who benefits from the worship not the consecrator. So it has to be admitted that the act of consecration (on the part of the agent) produces some excellence in the icon itself (not in the consecrator).

Reply to the query

TEXT: अत्र उच्यते–

निमित्त-भेद-संसर्गात् उद्भव-अनुद्भवादयः।
देवता: संनिधानेन प्रत्यभिज्ञानतः अपि वा॥

उपनायक-उदृष्ट-विशेष-सहाया: हि परमाणवः द्रव्य-विशेषं आरभंते तेषां विशेषात् उद्भव-विशेषा: प्रादुर्भवंति। यथा स्वभाव-द्रवा: अपि आप: निमित्त-भेद-प्रतिषिद्ध-द्रवत्वा: कठिनं करकाद्यं आरभंते इत्यादि स्वयं ऊहनीयम्। प्रतिमादयः तु तेन तेन विधिना संनिधापित-रुद्र-उपेन्द्र-महेन्द्रादि-अभिमानि-देवता-भेदा: तत्र तत्र आराधनीयतां आसादयंति। आशीविष-दष्ट मूर्छितं राज-शरीरं इव विष-अपनयन-विधिना आपादित-चैतन्यम्। संनिधानं च तत्र तेषां अहंकार-ममकारौ। चित्रादौ इव स्व-सादृश्य-दर्शिनः राज्ञः इति नः दर्शनम्। अन्येषां तु

पूर्व-पूर्व-पूजित-प्रत्यभिज्ञान-विषयस्य प्रतिष्ठित-प्रत्यभिज्ञान-विषयस्य च तथात्वं अवसेयम्। एतेन अभिमंत्रित-पय:-पल्लवादयः व्याख्याता:। धटादिषु का वार्ता? कुशला एव इति चेत्? न। न हि सामग्री दृष्टं विघटयति, न अपि अदृष्टम्। ज्ञापकत्वात्। न अपि अदृष्टं उत्पादयति। धर्म-जनने सदा विजय-प्रसङ्गात्। विपर्यये सदा भङ्ग-प्रसङ्गात्।
अत्र उच्यते–

जय-इतर-निमित्तस्य वृत्ति-लाभाय केवलम्।
परीक्ष्य-समवेतस्य परीक्षा-विधयः मता:॥

यदि अपि धर्मादि-अभिमानि-देवता-संनिधिः अत्र अपि क्रियते, ता: च कर्म-विभव-अनुरूपं लिंगं अभिव्यंजयंति इति अस्माकं सिद्धान्तः, तथा अपि पर-विप्रतिपत्तेः अन्यथा उच्यते। तेन अपि हि विधिना तत् एव जयस्य पराजयस्य वा निमित्तं अभिव्यक्तं कार्यं उन्मीलयति। कर्मण: च अभिव्यक्तिः सहकारि-लाभ: एव। तत् च सहकारि, स: अहं अनेन विधिना तुलां अधिरूढः य: अहं पापकारी निः-पाप: वा इति प्रत्यभिज्ञानम्। यत् आहु:–

'तान् तु देवा: प्रपश्यंति स्वः च एव अंतरपुरुषः।'

अथवा प्रतिज्ञा-अनुरूपां विशुद्धिं अपेक्ष्य तेन धर्मः जन्यते निमित्ततः विधानात् विजय-फल-श्रुतेः च। अ-विशुद्धिं च अपेक्ष्य अधर्म:। पराजय-लक्षण-अनपेक्षित-फल-उपदर्शनेन फलतः निषेधात्।

TRANS.: Here we explain as below: It is due to the collocation with auxiliary conditions like the unseen merit (and demerit of different selves) that the atoms give rise to composite objects endowed with different qualities like vividness and non-vividness. As to the property of prayer-worthiness acquired by icons, (it can be said that) it accrues to them as a result of their contact with the self of the agent (who has earned sufficient merit by the ceremonial installation of the latter). Even the recognition by the worshippers that the icon has been ceremonially consecrated may be supposed to give rise to its prayer-worthiness.

The atoms produce specific composite entities only on being conjoined with certain other atoms by the merits of different selves (to form dyadic, triadic etc. compounds). The specific qualities or characteristics

of the atoms are responsible for the emergence of composite entities endowed with specific qualities. For example, water though liquid by nature gives rise to solid ice, snow etc. when its liquidity is suppressed by adventitious conditions. Such explanations (of casual operation) should be thought out by the readers themselves. As to the icons of deities, these (may be supposed to) acquire prayer-worthiness as a result of the ceremonial installation in the icons of deities which are identified with Indra, Upendra, Mahendra etc. This is just like the king's body having lost consciousness on being bitten by a snake and then revived (by means of incantation or medical treatment) and thus regaining its vigour and activity. The installation of deities on the icons is their identification as 'This is I', or 'This is mine' with them. This is like, for example, the king's feeling a sense of identity with his appearance in his photograph or portrait. Such is our view of this matter. But according to those thinkers who do not believe in the reality of deities the prayer-worthiness of icons is the result of the realisation or recognition that the latter have all along been worshipped by devotees. (These people may offer worship to the icons because others have been doing so). This mode of explanation applies even to consecrated water, trees, leaves etc. (which are used to remove poison from poisoned limbs etc. No capacity or power need be supposed to be produced by these sanctified objects).

Another query

(If thus capacity is denied then) how to account for the effectiveness of the scale and other such things in denying the sinfulness or otherwise of a suspected sinner? (If there is no capacity induced by certain rituals in the scale it cannot help detect the sinfulness or otherwise of a suspected sinner). The answer to the question cannot be a complacent 'yes'. The collocation of causal conditions like ascending the scale-pan by the suspect sinner, his swearing his innocence etc. do not destroy either some visible or invisible condition (obstructive of) the test. It only helps detect the culpability or otherwise of the alleged sinner. Nor does the collocation produce some merit or demerit and thereby lead to the detection. If merit alone were produced by the collocation then the test would always absolve the tested person of guilt; if demerit alone were produced then the guilt would invariably be charged on the tested person (even if he were innocent). So it has to be admitted that some power or capacity in the scale is produced by the causal collocation.

EXPL.: To the foregoing question 'how the agent's merit can confer on an icon the status of an object deserving worship' and to another related question the answer given above is that the ceremonial consecration of the icon by the agent is sufficient to make the deities invoked to feel identified with the icon and thus make it a worshippable object. There is no need to postulate the genesis of a capacity-like object in the icon to account for the status it acquires through the consecration. The same is the case with scales used to determine the guilt or innocence of an alleged sinner. In ancient times scales used to be used to settle cases of the allegation of sin. Certain rituals were performed before the alleged sinner took the scale-test. It is natural to think that the consecration of scales induced some capacity in them which helped expose the truth about the sin and it's perpetrator. The author explains that without the admission of any kind of capacity in any object it is possible to explain the causality of the scale in settling the matter.

Answer to the above query

TRANS.: The testing procedures (in the case of the use of scales) are adopted (only) to reveal the merit or demerit of the person taking the test which results in the verification of his sin or innocence, although in this case too (as in the previous case) we maintain that the deities who have regard for virtue approach the scale (on being invoked) and cause manifestation of signs corresponding to the virtuous or evil nature of the action performed. (There doesn't emerge any capacity in the scale by the testing ceremony). This is our (Nyāya's) view. (But it may not be acceptable to Mīmāṃsā as it doesn't believe in sentient deities which can consciously produce any result). But we explain this in a different way to satisfy other (Mīmāṃsist) thinkers. (The explanation is this):

Even the ceremony of ascending the scale etc. helps reveal the merit or demerit which gives rise to the rise or fall of the scale-pan by which the innocence or guilt of the alleged sinner is settled. The revelation of merit or demerit is nothing other than its collocation with auxiliary causes like the realisation on the part of the tested person that he who has ascended the scale is sinless or sinful.

As is stated in a Smṛti text which states that:

> 'The Gods watch those persons who undergo the various tests. Also the inner man residing in the hearts of each of these persons keeps a watch on the actions of these persons'.

Alternatively it may be said that if the person taking the scale-test is really sinless then his ascending the scale (after due ceremony) produces merit (which leads to the vindication of his earlier declaration that he has committed no sin). (The conformity of the person's declaration of his innocence coupled with the ascent on the scale to his actual innocence is productive of merit which leads to the vindication of his innocence). Likewise the guilt of the person coupled with his ascent on the scale (to make a show of his taking the test) produces demerit which leads to the loss of face of the person. We may infer the existence—though undiscovered—of scriptural prohibition to the effect that a guilty person should not take the test.

Nature of capacity in the Nyāya view discussed

TEXT: अथ शक्ति-निषेधे किं प्रमाणम्? न किंचित्। तत् किं अस्ति एव? बाढम्। न हि नः दर्शने शक्ति-पदार्थः एव नास्ति। कः असौ तर्हि? कारणत्वम्। किं तत्? पूर्व-काल-नियत-जातीयत्वम्, सहकारि-वैकल्य-प्रयुक्त-कार्य-अभाववत्वं वा इति। ततः अधिक-निषेधे का वार्त्ता? न काचित्। तत् किं विधिः एव? सः अपि नास्ति प्रमाणाभावात्। संदेहः तर्हि? कथं एवं भविष्यति? अन्-उपलब्धचरत्वात्। विवादः तर्हि कुत्र? अनुग्राहकत्व-साम्यात् सहकारिषु अपि शक्ति-पद-प्रयोगात् सहकारि-भेदे। तत्र अपि दहनादेः अनुग्राहकः अधिकः अस्ति एव यः प्रतिबंधकैः अपनीयते यदि तदा न विवदामहे। अस्मत्-अभिप्रेतस्य च अभावादेः च अनुग्राहकत्वं अंगीकृत्य निः साधनाः मीमांसकाः अपि न विप्रतिपत्तुं अर्हंति। ततः अभावादिः अनुग्राहकः इति एके। न इति अपरे। इति विवाद-काष्ठायां व्युत्पादितं च एतस्य अनुग्राहकत्वम्। किं अपरं अवशिष्यते यत्र प्रमाणं अभिधानीयं इति अलं अति-विस्तरेण। तथा अपि चेतनः एव अयं संस्क्रियते न भूतानि इति कुतः निर्णयः इति चेत्? उच्यते। भोक्तृणां नित्य-विभूनां सर्व-देह-प्राप्तौ अ-विशिष्टायां विशिष्टैः अपि भूतैः नियामक-अभावात् प्रति-नियत-भोग-असिद्धेः। न हि तत्-शरीरं, तत्-मनः, तानि-इन्द्रियाणि विशिष्टानि अपि तस्य एव इति नियमः। नियामक-अभावात्। तथा च साधारण-विग्रहवत्व-

प्रसङ्गः। न च भूत-धर्मः एव कश्चित् चेतनं प्रति अ-साधारणः? विपर्यय-दर्शनात्। द्वित्व-आदिवत् इति चेत्? न। तस्य अपि शरीरादि-तुल्यतया पक्षत्वात्। नियत-चेतन-गुण-उपग्रहेण एव तस्य अपि नियमः न तु तत्-जन्यता-मात्रेण। स्वयं अविशेषात्।

तथापि तत्-जन्यतया एव उपपत्तौ विपक्षे बाधकं किं इति चेत्? कार्यकारणभाव-भंग-प्रसङ्गः। शरीरादीनां चेतन-धर्म-उपग्रहेण एव तत्-धर्म-जनन-उपलब्धेः। तत्-यथा इच्छा-उपग्रहेण प्रयत्नः, ज्ञान-उपग्रहेण इच्छादयः, तत्-उपग्रहेण सुखादयः इत्यादि। प्रकृते अपि चेतन-गताः एव बुद्धयादयः नियामकाः स्युः इति चेत्? न। शरीरादेः प्राक् तेषां असत्वात्। तथा च निर्-अतिशयाः चेतनाः साधारणानि भूतानि इति न भुक्ति-नियमः उपपद्यते। एतेन सांख्यमतं अपास्तम्।

एवं हि तत्। अकारणं अकार्यः कूटस्थ-चैतन्य-रूपः पुरुषः, आदि-कारणं प्रकृतिः अचेतना परिणामिनी। ततः महत्-अदि-सर्गः। न हि चितिः एव विषय-निबंधन-स्वभावा? अ-निर्मोक्ष-प्रसङ्गात्। न अपि प्रकृतिः एव तदीय-स्वभावा। तस्याः अपि नित्यत्वेन अ-निर्मोक्ष-प्रसङ्गात्। नापि घटादिः एव आहत्य तदीयः। दृष्ट-अदृष्टत्व-अनुपपत्तेः। नापि इन्द्रियमात्र-प्रणाडिकया, व्यासंग-अयोगात्। नापि इन्द्रिय-मनोद्वारा। स्वप्न-दशायां वराह-व्याघ्रादि-अभिमानिनः नरस्य अपि नरत्वेन आत्म-उपधान-अयोगात्। नापि अहंकार-पर्यंत-व्यापारेण। तत् व्यापार-विरमे अपि श्वास-प्रयत्न-संतान-अवस्थानात्। तत् यत् एतासु अवस्थासु स व्यापारं एकं अनुवर्तते, यत्-आश्रया च अनुभव-वासना तत् अंतः करणं उपारूढ़ः अर्थः पुरुषस्य उपधानीभवति। भेद-अग्रहात् च निष्क्रिये अपि तस्मिन् पुरुषे कर्तृत्व-अभिमानः। तस्मिन् अचेतने अपि चेतन-अभिमानः। तत्र एव कर्म-वासना। पुरुषः तु सर्वथा पुष्कर-पलाशवत् निर्लेपः। आलोचनं व्यापारः इन्द्रियाणां, विकल्पः तु मनसः, अभिमानः अंहकारस्य, कृति-अध्यवसायः बुद्धेः। सा हि बुद्धिः अंश-त्रयवती। पुरुष-उपरागः, विषय-उपरागः व्यापार-आवेशः च इति अंशाः। भवति हि मया इदं कर्तव्यं इति। तत्र मया इति चेतन-उपरागः, दर्पणस्य इव

मुख-उपराग: भेद-अग्रहात अ-तात्विक:। इदं इति विषय-उपराग:, इन्द्रिय-प्रणाडिकया परिणति-भेद: दर्पणस्य इव नि:श्वास-अभिहतस्य मलिनिमा पारमार्थिक:। एतत्-उभय-आयत्त: व्यापार-आवेश: अपि। तत्र एवं-रूप-व्यापार-लक्षणाया: बुद्धे: विषय-उपराग-लक्षणं ज्ञानम्। तेन सह य: पुरुष-उपरागस्य अतात्विकस्य संबध: दर्पण-प्रतिबिंबितस्य मुखस्य इव मलिनिमा सा उपलब्धि: इति। तदेवं अष्टौ अपि धर्मादय: भावा: बुद्धे: एव। तत्-सामानाधिकरण्येन अध्यवसीयमानत्वात्। न च बुद्धि: एव स्वभावत: चेतना इति युक्तम्। परिणामित्वात्। पुरुषस्य तु कूटस्थ-नित्यत्वात् इति। तत् एतत् अपि प्राक् एव निरस्तम्।

TRANS.: 'Well! What is the proof for (your denial of the reality of capacity) '. 'Nothing'. 'Then is capacity a real entity ?' 'Yes it is!'. 'Certainly it is not the case that in our school an entity, like capacity is not envisaged at all!' 'What is it then?' 'It is causality!' 'What is causality?' 'It is, "to be generically similar" to what invariably (unconditionally and immediately) precedes the effect' or it is 'the absence of the effect determined by the absence of the auxiliary conditions of the effect'. 'If this is so what is your proof for denying capacity which is something over and above causality?'. 'There is no proof whatsoever'. 'Does it mean then that you too admit capacity as a real entity?' 'No, we do not admit capacity as there is no valid proof for it'. 'Does it mean then that you have doubt about the reality of capacity?' 'How can this be if capacity is simply unknown?' 'But if this is so how can there be any controversy between us when the very basis of controversy is an absolutely unknown entity?' 'Well! The word "Capacity" is usually used to denote even the auxiliary conditions of an effect because capacity resembles the former in being conducive to the production of the effect'. (If there are several auxiliary conditions of an effect then the word 'Capacity' is used to denote one of these auxiliary conditions which is predominant). Among the auxiliaries there exists thus an extra condition which is conducive to the production of the effect like the absence of obstruction (which is needed for the production of effects like fire) which is excluded by the occurrence of obstructions. (This condition may be equated with capacity). If this is admitted by the opponents then we have no dispute with them. (Even the upholders of capacity admit absence of obstruction as an auxiliary condition of all production. In addition they hold capacity to be a necessary condition of production which is uncalled for). The Mīmāṃsist philosophers upholding the causality of capacity over and above that of the absence of obstructions have no ground to sustain their view. Thus the controversy about capacity boils down to this that one party, namely, the Naiyāyikas treat absence etc. as auxiliary conditions for production while the other party, namely, the Mīmāṃsakas deny this. But it has already been explained that absence can be a causal condition. So what is left now for which a proof or explanation would have to be stated? Enough is enough!

Positive proof that the agent is sanctified by ritualistic activities

(Earlier, detailed criticism has been attempted of the view that the material and other things used in the sacrificial ritual are not sanctified nor do they bear the ultimate effect produced by the ritual. The agent it is who is sanctified and who is the ultimate beneficiary of all ritualistic actions. Now a positive proof for this view is being adduced). It is asked, 'How can it be determined that only the sentient agent is sanctified by the rituals and not the materials used in the sacrifice?' To this question our reply is this. 'All the individual selves—which are the enjoyers of the fruits of action are eternal and ubiquitous and so all of them pervade all the human bodies in the world (although they are severally connected with different bodies by their respective destinies). The enjoyment by each sentient self of the results (happiness or misery) of its own actions and not of others' cannot be regulated by insentient materials even if they are endowed with some merit supposed to be produced by ritualistic actions. If even the body, the senses and the mind pertaining to a self are supposed to be endowed with merits, even then it cannot be determined that these belong to a particular self only. There is nothing to determine such a mutual relationship. In the absence of the relationship any body-mind-complex can belong to any self. But couldn't some property of the body-mind-complex, which the self inhabits be peculiarly related to it (and so it and no other self can enjoy the pleasure, pains etc. associated with that complex)? No! Known properties like colour, form etc. characterising the body-mind-complex and other material entities are not peculiarly accessible to particular selves. But couldn't there be a quality like 'twoness' etc. in the body-mind-complex which is connected with that self only through whose counting-activity the number comes into existence? No! The peculiar relationship of twoness etc. with an individual self is like the relationship of the body-

mind-complex with the self inhabiting it and it is yet to be established. (So it cannot be cited as an example to prove the later relationship). Twoness etc. are connected with particular selves because they engender numerical cognition in the very self whose counting-activity brings them into being. They may be generated by the body (whose quality they may be) but the fact of this genesis is irrelevant to the connection of the number with the self. The peculiar relation of number to the self consists in the fact that its cognition accrues only to that self whose (counting or) enumerative cognition brings it into being. In itself the number as the quality of the body or other entities does not differ from qualities like colour, smell etc. characterising the entities (as these are enjoyable by different selves and so are commonly related to them). But what is wrong in holding that a quality like the unseen merit characterising a certain body (or body-mind-complex) is peculiarly related only to the self inhabiting it (and thus the ownership of different bodies by different selves can be regulated)? The answer to the question is that the body etc. are known to cause pleasures, pains etc. in the sentient self only by depending upon certain qualities belonging to it. To illustrate this rule: effort in a self is generated only by a desire belonging to it, desire etc. in the self are engendered only by (the prior occurrence of corresponding) cognition in it and likewise pleasure and happiness in the self are generated by (the emergence of) desire (for the former) in it. (If so) let then the cognition etc. of the self be themselves (instead of the unseen merit earned by the self) the cause of the self's pleasure and pain (or the benefit accruing to the self from ritual-performance), so that the latter would not accrue to any other self and thus the relationship of cognition and enjoyment would be strictly regulated? No! Such a view cannot be upheld. The self does not have cognition prior to its embodiment (but there has to be the distinction between one self and another even before the selves are embodied, as even the embodiment of the self is the result of its actions but the actions cannot take place without embodiment. Thus actions need the body and the body needs actions). As a result the sentient selves are bereft of any specific characteristic in the absence of cognition etc., and the body etc. (even inhabited by the different selves) have no specific relationship with any particular self. As a result the restriction of the enjoyment of the benefits of action to the agent of action cannot be upheld.

Discussion of the Sāṃkhya view

By these arguments the views of Sāṃkhya stand refuted. The views are as follows: The *Puruṣa* or the principle of sentience is of uncaused and ineffective nature. The primitive cause *Prakṛti* is insentient but changeable. From it emerges the universe beginning with the *Mahat* (or cosmic intellect). Certainly the sentient principle alone is not by nature bound to the objective world. If it were so it would never be released from the bondage. Nor is *Prakṛti* alone by nature the sole cause of the enjoyment of the world by the selves, for then, it being eternal release from bondage (of the sentient principle) can never occur. Nor again can the totality of different objects be themselves sentient. If they were so then they cannot be cognised and uncognised at different times. Could it be said that perceptibility and insentience in objects arise as a result of their coming and not coming in contact respectively with the external sense-organs (and not because of there being any of the so-called internal organs)? No! If it were so then the cognition of things can never be delayed when there is sense-object-contact. Perhaps it may be urged that the external and internal senses together produce the cognitions of objects but on this view it cannot be explained why a person dreaming that he is a swine or a tiger does not also experience that he is a man in the dream when he is actually a man. If to overcome this difficulty even the ego-sense is included in the causal collocation producing cognition then in the state of dreamless sleep the external and internal sense-organs together with the ego-sense having ceased to be operative, exhalation and inhalation, which are the result of effort cannot go on uninterruptedly. So it has to be admitted that, that which continues to work in all these three (waking, dreaming and sleeping) states and that on which all experience leaves its impression is (the constituent of the) internal organ (known as) *Mahat*. All objects assimilated by the *Mahat* are imposed upon the *Puruṣa* or self. And it is due to the non-apprehension of the difference between the *Mahat* (or intellect) and the self that there arises the sense of agency in the latter and the sense of sentience in the insentient *Mahat* (and through it in *Prakṛti*). The impressions or invisible traces of ritualistic actions in the form of merit or demerit take place in the *Mahat* itself. The *Puruṣa* however is devoid of any blemish or effect like the lotus-leaf floating dry in water. The function of the sense-organs is to produce indeterminate cognition of the object (by means of their contact with it). The contact of the mind with the sense-organs and of the latter with the object produces determinate cognition

of the object. The conscious assimilation of cognition, conation etc. (expressed by statements like 'I know, I do' and so on is the function of ego-sense. The function of intellect is the decision to engage in action. This intellect however has three components involving the sentient principle, the object and the activity (of cognition, conation etc.). In the statement (consciously made by a person), 'I have to do this' all three of these entities stand revealed. 'I have to', reveals the involvement of the sentient principle in the activity. This involvement is like that of the face (reflected) in the mirror and it is false because in it the distinction of the sentient from the intellect remains unknown. 'This' in the statement reveals objective involvement. Intellect flows out through the sense-channels towards the object and assumes its form. It is just like the haze spread over the surface of a mirror when one breaths over it. Depending upon these two (involvements there takes place activity-involvement) also. Both these involvements are real (not false as the first kind of involvement). The involvement of the object in such an intellect is what is known as cognition. The contact of the sentient principle (imposed upon intellect with this cognition) is known as apprehension or understanding. It is false just like the soiled character appearing in the face reflected in the mirror. Like this apprehension all the so-called eight qualities like pleasure, pain, desire, aversion etc. are modifications of intellect itself because they are known as coexistent with apprehension. The intellect cannot be regarded as intrinsically sentient as it is subject to change. But the *Puruṣa* is absolutely unchangeable. But this Sāṃkhyan doctrine also stands refuted by the foregoing criticisms.

EXPL.: To the earlier question, how the scale-test and other scripturally-prescribed tests can vindicate the innocence of a charged person taking the test if the scale is not sanctified by the rituals performed before the test takes place the answer given above is that certain deities invoked in the ritual appear near the scale and help reveal signs, indicating the innocence of the tested person. The point of the answer is that there is no need to admit the genesis of any capacity or sanctifying effect in the scale, the main instrument of testing. If the Mīmāṃsā view that deities are not sentient beings is accepted then the answer to the foregoing question will be different. It will be to the effect that the rituals combined with the realisation on the part of the tested person that he is sinless leads to the vindication of his sinlessness. There is no need therefore to admit the generation of any capacity in the scale so that it could help vindicate the sinlessness of the tested person.

All this criticism is not intended to prove that there is nothing like capacity in the Nyāya view. Causality itself is capacity. Causality can be defined either as 'being of the nature of a necessary occurrent which is immediately prior to the occurrence of the effect' or 'being unattended by the effect due to the absence of auxiliary conditions of the production of the effect'. The first of these definitions of causality applies even to auxiliary conditions of production. So just as primary causality is regarded as capacity, auxiliary causality also may be so regarded. Now we know that absence of obstructions is an auxiliary cause of production. Even when all known causes of an effect are present an obstructive condition introduced in the setup may prevent the emergence of the effect. Mīmāṃsakas explain this non-emergence of the effect by saying that the productive capacity of the causal collocation is overpowered by the obstructive capacity of the obstructor. The Mīmāṃsakas do not admit absence as an entity and so they do not hold absence of obstruction as an auxiliary cause of production. But earlier it has already been shown that even absence is an entity and it can be a cause.

Here one may ask, 'How does an obstructive condition obstruct the production of the effect or prevent the causal collocation from exercising its productive function? It is not that the usual causal collocation is inadequate for the production of its effect; in normal circumstances it does produce its effect. It does not normally need a booster to offset the obstructive effect of the obstruction; if absence of obstruction is supposed to be an additional auxiliary condition then in a situation where no obstruction is present the absence of obstruction would be rendered useless for the production of the effect. It would therefore be necessary to give an account of the nature of the obstructive function without bringing in the supposed causality of the absence of obstruction. This is possible only if obstruction is understood as overpowering the capacity of a relatively weak entity by an entity possessing stronger and opposite type of capacity. This explanation is amply supported by the fact that supplementing of the weakened and inactivated causal collocation by a booster suppresses the obstructive effect of the obstructor and helps the collocation produce the effect. The situation illustrating this state of affairs is the presence of the moonstone (which is supposed to ooze water if moonlight falls upon it) along with the sunstone (which helps kindle fire), at a place where dry fuel is present. While the moonstone obstructs ignition the sunstone suppresses the obstructive capacity of moonstone and helps the fuel to be ignited. Nyāya seeks to account for this possibility by stipulating that the obstructor whose absence is reckoned as one of the causal conditions of production has to be taken as

qualified by the absence of the booster. So, either when the booster is present or when the obstructor is absent the above absence will be present and the effect will be produced. This strategy can be made to work only if the causality of absence is admitted. Mīmāṃsā has a point when it maintains that absence being a nonentity it cannot be treated as a cause of anything. When all positive conditions of an effect are present the genesis of the latter does not await the arrival of the absence of the negative condition. One may however urge that usually the negative conditions are not present when causal collocation is available. That is to say the absence of negative condition does not need to be procured, it is available of itself. But still the fact remains that only the positive conditions of an effect are sought after and procured when their effect is sought to be produced.

As in the case of capacity so in the case of sanctification also one may demand a positive proof for the aforementioned conclusion that only the sentient individual agent is sanctified by the ritualistic actions, not the materials used in the sacrifice, or the body, mind, senses etc. of the agent. The proof is that the individual self as self being ubiquitous, any body, mind or group of senses can belong to any self. Even if the body inhabited by a self is supposed to bear the merit caused by sanctification it cannot be regarded as belonging only to the former and not to any other self. There is not anything special in that body so that only its pleasure pain etc. are enjoyed by the self inhabiting it. Every self is connected with every body, every mind or every sense-organ so that anyone of these may cater to the experiences of every self'. The point of this contention is that the identity of a self cannot be derivative from the identity of the body because a body as a living body is identifiable only as the body owned by a certain self. Not only this. A body caters to the various experiences of the self inhabiting it not as an entity independent of the latter but as one whose (experiential) causality is supported by some experience of the self; for example a body can engender desire in a self only as sustained by the appropriate cognition of the latter. Similar is the case with other experiential causalities of the body. What this means is that unless a self owns a body as its own the body cannot be peculiarly related to it. This owning of the body by the self is the indirect causality of its cognition, desire, etc. through the mediation of the body it inhabits. It may here be asked, 'The restriction of the experiences of pleasure, pain etc. catered by a body to the self owning the body can be explained by involving, as mentioned just now, the cognitive and other qualities of the self in the bodily causality relating to the experiences. There is no need to admit the emergence of any unseen

merit or sanctity in the self as a cause of the experiences. If the body and other external entities are not supposed to be endowed with any unseen merit the self too need not be supposed to acquire any merit resulting from ritualistic performance'. This account holds good of the experiences of the self when it is in the embodied condition but when it is disembodied on the cessation of the body at death and before the assumption of another body in the next birth there will be nothing in it to predetermine the acquisition of certain future experiences by it if the emergence in it of merit or sanctity is not admitted. There has to be there in each self something distinctive of it whether it is embodied or not, which procures for it only certain experiences associated with a certain body although it is connected with every body. This admission of the individual distinctions of different selves by Nyāya strikes at the root of the Sāṃkhyan doctrine of *Prakṛti* as the creator and *Puruṣa* as the knower of the universe. *Puruṣas* are totally devoid of any distinctive characteristic either in the embodied or the disembodied state although in the embodied state they get falsely implicated in the modifications taking place in the *Mahat* or cosmic intellect which manifest themselves as individual intelligences in the lives of different individuals.

If this criticism of the Sāṃkhyan conception of *Puruṣa* or self is closely considered it will be found to recoil on the Nyāya view of self itself. First, Nyāya cannot explain satisfactorily how one self differs from another in the state of release when both are totally bereft of the qualities like cognition, emotion, conation etc. which distinguish them from each other in their embodied state. Nyāya has tried to overcome this difficulty by means of the assumption that each released self is endowed with its own characteristic specificity called *Viśeṣa* (a principle of individuation). Since nothing more can be said about specificity except that it distinguishes one self from another this explanation of distinction is just a cover for saying that every self is a distinct entity although its distinction is inexplicable. (So here we have innumerable instances to illustrate the counter-principle of non-identity of indiscernibles. There is neither discernment nor any discernible entity among released selves in the Nyāya theory).

Secondly even in the non-released state when the self is disembodied it cannot be endowed with any merit or sanctity as only the body sustains the origination and continuance of these qualities in the self. Perhaps the residual traces of these qualities may be taken to characterise the self in the disembodied state. But it is difficult to uphold such a view as Nyāya admits the necessity of embodiment for the origination of residual traces. If both the origination and destruction of residual traces

require the sustenance of the body, then even the continuance of the traces cannot do without bodily support. The revival of residual traces again and again during the embodied state of the self does depend upon the bodily support and it is admitted by Nyāya. Thus the author's criticism of the Sāṃkhyan view of self as absolute sentience does not seem to be quite justified.

Criticism of the Sāṃkhya view

TEXT: तथाहि-

कर्तृ-धर्मा नियंतार: चेतिता च स: एव न:।
अन्यथा अन्-अपवर्ग: स्यात् अ-संसार: अथवा ध्रुव:॥

कृति-सामानाधिकरण्य-व्यवस्थिता: तावत् धर्मादय: नियामका: इति व्यवस्थितम्। चेतन: अपि कर्ता एव, कृति-चैतन्ययो: सामानाधिकरण्येन अनुभवात्। न च अयं भ्रम:, बाधक-अभावात्। परिणामित्वात् घटादिवत् इति बाधकं इति चेत्? न। कर्तृत्वे अपि समानत्वात्। तथा च कृति: अपि भाविकी महत: न स्यात्। दृष्टत्वात् अयं अदोष: इति चेत्? तुल्यम्। अचेतन-अकार्यत्वं बाधकं, कार्य-कारणयो: तादात्म्यात् इति चेत्? न। असिद्धे:। न हि कर्तु: कार्यत्वे प्रमाणं अस्ति। प्रत्युत 'वीतराग जन्मादर्शनात्', इति न्यायात् अनादिता एव सिद्ध्यति। यत् यत् च कार्ये रूपं दृश्यते तस्य तस्य कारण-आत्मकत्वे रागादय: अपि प्रकृतौ स्वीकर्तव्या: स्यु:। तथा च सा एव बुद्धि: न प्रकृति: भाव-अष्टक-संपन्नत्वात्। स्थूलतां अपहाय सूक्ष्मतया ते तत्र संति इति चेत्? चैतन्यं अपि तथा भविष्यति। तथा अपि असिद्ध: हेतु:। तथा सति घटादीनां अपि चैतन्य-प्रसङ्ग:, तादात्म्यात् इति चेत्? रागादिमत्व-प्रसङ्ग: अपि दुर्वार:। सौक्ष्म्यं च समानं इति। तस्मात् यत्-जातीयात् कारणात् यत्-जातीयं कार्यं दृश्यते, तथाभूतात् तथाभूतमात्रं अनुमातव्यं, न तु यावत्-धर्मकं कारणं तावत्-धर्मकं कार्यं, व्यभिचारात् इति किं अनेन अप्रस्तुतेन? यदि च बुद्धि: नित्या, अनिर्मोक्ष-प्रसङ्ग:। पुंस: सर्वदा स-उपाधित्वे स्वरूपेण अन्-अवस्थानात्। अथ विलीयते, तत: न अनादे: विलय:

इति आदिमत्वे तत्-अन्-उत्पत्ति-दशायां क:-नियंता? प्रकृते: साधारण्यात्। तथा च अ-संसार:। पूर्व-पूर्व-बुद्धि-वासना-अनुवृत्ते: साधारण्ये अपि असाधारणी इति चेत्? बुद्धि-निवृत्तौ अपि तत्-धर्म-वासना-अनुवृत्ति: इति अप-दर्शनम्। सौक्ष्म्यात् न दोष: इति चेत्? मुक्तौ अपि पुन: प्रवृत्ति-प्रसङ्ग:। निर्-अधिकारित्वात् न एवं इति चेत्? तर्हि स-अधिकारा प्रसुप्त-स्वभावा बुद्धि: एव प्रकृति: अस्तु कृतं अंतरा प्रकृति-अंहकार-मन: शब्दानां अर्थान्तर-कल्पनया। सा एव हि तत्तत्-व्यवहार-गोचरा तेन तेन शब्देन व्यपदिश्यते शारीर-वायुवत् इति आगम: अपि संगच्छते इति अत: अपि हेतु: असिद्ध:। अधिकार-निवृत्त्या बुद्धे: अ-प्रवृत्ति: अपवर्ग:। वासना-योग: च अधिकार:, तत: संसार:। धर्म-धर्मिणो: अत्यंत-भेदे च कौटस्थ्य-अविरोध:। भेद: च विरुद्ध-धर्म-अध्यास-लक्षण: घट-पटादिवत् प्रत्यक्ष-सिद्ध:। न च सामानाधिकरण्यात् अभेद: अपि। तत् हि समान-शब्द-वाच्यत्वं, एक-ज्ञान-गोचरत्वं एक-अधिकरणत्वं, आधार-आधेयभाव:, विशेष्यत्वं, संबंधमात्रं वा भेद: एव। भेदे अपि च उपपद्यमानं न अभेदं स्पृशति इति। तस्मात् सर्वं अवदातम्।

TRANS.: In our view the merit and demerit of the individual self determine the kind of experiences (good or bad) that come to it (as the result of the actions it engages in). The self itself is the sentient being who is the agent of actions. If sentience and effort (leading to action) are not regarded as coexistent in the self but these qualities are supposed to characterise the self and intellect respectively then the self will never be released or it will never have bondage. This will be so because the intellect which is supposed to be the seat of all activity and thus the determinant of self's experiences may be eternal or ephemeral; if it is the former it will prove to be an eternal bondage for the self; if the latter then, when it has not come into being there will be nothing to bind the self. So the self will remain free (and continue to be so for eternity, for, there is no particular reason why the intellect should suddenly come into being and start restricting the freedom of the self).

It has already been established earlier that merit, demerit etc. which coexist with effort in the being of the self determine what kind of experi-

ences the self may have. Even the sentient being is none other than the doer or the active agent. Effort and sentience are known to be coexistent. This knowledge cannot be looked upon as illusory. There is no knowledge or experience contradicting this. One may say against this that the sentient cannot be the doer as the doer is necessarily changeable as the pot which is a moving entity which changes continually but the sentient does not (and cannot). But this applies even in the case of the intellect. (One may argue that the intellect cannot be active because it is changeable. Changeability is not a sign of sentience or activity). So activity cannot be a natural property of intellect. If it is contended that intellect is known to be active and so no argument against this can be treated as valid then the same can be said of the sentient being active. It may be urged that the intellect cannot be sentient as it is the product of the insentient *Prakṛti* and in the Sāṃkhyan view the cause and its product are identical in nature. But it is not established that the active entity (or principle) is a product. Instead as it is stated in a Nyāya aphorism, the active being must be beginningless. Moreover if it is thought that whatever properties appear in an effect, all those properties must appear in the cause (as the effect and the cause are identical) then even love, hate etc. (which are manifested in intellect) should be present in the *Prakṛti* (the ultimate cause). If this is accepted then it would be intellect itself, being endowed with all the eight internal states. It cannot be the bare *Prakṛti*. It may be urged (in partial acceptance of this suggestion) that the eight states of intellect are certainly present in *Prakṛti* in the subtle form shedding their gross form as it is in intellect. But if it were so then sentience also may be supposed to be present in subtle form in *Prakṛti* and if it were true then the earlier argument that intellect cannot be sentient as it is the product of *Prakṛti* cannot hold good. Even *Prakṛti* is now shown to have sentience in subtle form. It may be argued against this that the sentience of *Prakṛti* entails the sentience even of inert entities like pot, tree etc. (So it has to be conceded that the inert objects are the products only of inert and insentient *Prakṛti*). But then even if sentience is denied of *Prakṛti* the presence of internal states like love, hate etc. which characterise intellect cannot be denied of *Prakṛti* with the result that the inert entities like pot, tree etc. being products of *Prakṛti* would inherit love, hate etc. from the latter. If these states are supposed to be present in subtle form in *Prakṛti* as well as its inert products, the same can be supposed in the case of sentience also. The upshot of all this is the principle that when an effect of a certain type is found to be produced by a cause of a certain type then from the kind of generic character of the effect the same kind of generic character of the cause can be inferred. But certainly one cannot make a valid inference that all the properties of the cause must appear in the effect as properties absent in the cause appear in the effect and some of those that are present there do not appear in the effect and thus there is no parallelism between the properties of the cause and those of the effect. Let us however stop this irrelevant discussion.

Now if the intellect is eternal the *Puruṣa* or self can never be released as being eternally conditioned by the intellect it is impossible for the self to regain its unconditioned pristine status. If however intellect is susceptible to dissolution in *Prakṛti* then it cannot be beginningless. So before the intellect came into being what was there to determine (and regulate) the experiences of the *Puruṣa*? *Prakṛti* is common to all selves; it cannot regulate differently the experiences of different selves. So there cannot be bondage for any self (as intellect, the main cause of bondage is nonexistent). May it not be the case that intellect while dissolving leaves behind its trace in *Prakṛti* which (trace) in its turn leaves behind its own trace and thus the chain is indefinitely extended? Thus even the common *Prakṛti* can—with the help of the traces embedded in it—regulate the experiences of the self. But the assumption that the traces of intellect which are some kind of properties of the latter survive the intellect is bad metaphysics. If the traces are supposed to be the subtle form of the intellect and indestructible then even in the state of release they will continue to exist so that the self as conditioned by the subtle intellect would not cease to be active. But if there is no urge for action in the intellect how can the self be disposed to act? Well! In that case there is no need to admit a separate entity like *Prakṛti*, intellect itself with its (sometimes) manifest and (sometimes) dormant active nature may be taken to be *Prakṛti*. It can also take the place of ego-sense, mind etc. by assuming their respective functions. There will not then be the need of taking the words *Prakṛti*. 'Ego-sense' and 'Mind' to stand for different entities; intellect itself as fulfilling the functions of these entities may be referred to by different names. It is just like the same wind being called by different names like *Prāṇa*, *Apāna* etc. as it is located in the different parts of the human body. If thus the intellect is the primal matrix of every thing it cannot be a product and so the middle term in the earlier inference will be rendered fallacious as it does not qualify the minor term (intellect). The urge or disposition to act is the active nature of intellect. When this disposition of the intellect is in abeyance the intellect ceases to function which leads to release. If the active nature of the intellect is manifest there occurs bondage of the self (this means that it is really the intellect which suffers bondage and has liberation and so it is the same as the self or *puruṣa*. But if this is so how can

the self be eternal and immutable as the Sāṃkhyans take it to be? The answer is that) a property and its locus are absolutely different from each other. So even if activity and inactivity may characterise the self they cannot affect its absolute nature. The difference between properties and their loci like that between potness, clothness and pot, cloth etc. is perceptually established. These two are seen to be endowed with incompatible characteristics. But can't these two be treated as non-different too as they are denoted by coordinate expressions? (In the expression 'The pot is blue' the same entity seems to be denoted by both the words 'pot' and 'blue' occurring in the expression). Now, being denoted by coordinate expressions may mean 'being the denotends of coordinate terms,' 'being objects of identical cognition', 'having identical locus', 'being related as locus and located,' 'being the epistemic qualificand' and 'just relationship'. (Of these the first, second and last varieties are compatible both with difference and non-difference but the rest are compatible with difference only not with non-difference. So the self's intrinsic eternity is not affected by the non-eternity of its qualities or properties). Thus everything in the above criticism of Sāṃkhya stands clarified.

EXPL.: Refuting the Sāṃkhyan doctrine of non-coexistence of sentience and doership or activity as explained above the author stresses the point that the experiences of pleasure and pain in the self cannot be determined by the activity etc. of the intellectual principle external to the self. Self's experiences or sentience can be determined by its own merit and demerit. It cannot be the merit or demerit or even some specific property belonging to an external object or even to the body. The fact is that mere determination or regulation of the qualities, properties etc. of one thing by those of another is quite possible. But in the case of the experiences of the self what needs mainly to be explained is the privacy coupled with the peculiar pleasurable or painful character of the experiences. Qualities or properties of things including the body which are public objects cannot be supposed to explain the privacy of self's experiences. If therefore the self is supposed to be endowed with merit and demerit determining and regulating its experiences then there is no need to admit the external objects—which are indirect causes of the production of merit and demerit in the self—to be themselves endowed with merit and demerit. This seems to be the core of the author's criticism against the Mīmāṃsā theory of capacity as also the Sāṃkhyan theory that activity etc. belong to the intellect, not to the self.

The criticism is rather weak. If the body that a self inhabits is not private to it or intrinsically owned by it, it cannot acquire privacy by

being related to the qualities of self in any manner. It will always remain a public object. But it is really not so. It is intrinsically a private entity as cognition, conation etc. are private to the self. Of course these can be and are disowned by the self sometimes as it disowns its body but this disownment does not transform these into public objects to be owned or enjoyed by others. One may dispute this contention on the ground that even public objects like eatables are converted into privately-enjoyed dishes just by eating. No two persons can enjoy the same edible or the same piece of edible. This leads to the view that privacy is a privilege that the self consciously or unconsciously confers upon things partly or wholly external to it as well as upon its own qualities and properties. If this view is correct then the author's earlier contention that the body which is a public entity can be privatised only by getting involved in the causal operations of the self's qualities can be only partially sustained. The involvement of the body in the causal operation should mean (if the author is correct) that the body is owned by the self.

The main criticism of the Sāṃkhyan theory by the author rests upon the Sāṃkhya's separation of agency from sentience and ascribing them to the intellect and self respectively. According to Sāṃkhya the sense of agency experienced by the self is the result of the imposition of the agency of the intellect on the self while in the Nyāya view the self is the real agent. It may here be noted that according to the testimony of common experience it is the body that acts on being impelled by the mind or self. So the agency of activity should really be ascribable to the body, not to the self or both to the body and the self as the effort causing bodily activity belongs to the self according to Nyāya while activity belongs to the body. Moreover the kind of absolutely indeterminate sentience that Sāṃkhya ascribes to the self cannot be invested with agency even if Sāṃkhya were willing to treat sentience and doership as coexistent properties. So instead of taking objection to the separation of sentience and agency the author should have disputed the very possibility of self's being falsely implicated in the activity of the intellect. Even to be the agent of action the self has to have some determinateness in its nature which Sāṃkhya does not suppose it has.

As a matter of fact there does not seem to be much to choose between the Sāṃkhya and the Nyāya view on this issue. Just as in the Sāṃkhya view all *bhāvas* and all activity belong to the intellect so in the Nyāya view too all states of the self are engendered in it by the bio-psychical processes taking place in the body itself. The self is in reality only the bearer of the result of the bio-psychical processes taking place in the intellect. In the strict sense the self cannot be regarded either as the

knower or as the doer. Even the effort needed to activate the body is engendered in the self by the bio-psychical process only. Even the sense of agency or doership that the self enjoys is evoked in it by the bio-psychical process. The only function that the self alone may be supposed to perform is that of transmigration from one birth to another and on the cessation of the cycle of birth and death—to attain liberation. The body cannot be credited with this function as it is subject to decay and death. Mind being eternal can transmigrate and it does transmigrate according to Nyāya. On the death of the body the mind associated with the body is supposed to leave it and transmigrate with the self to another body at a suitable time. But mind cannot appropriate the function of the self as it is just an instrument of cognition and action and is atomic in size.

But while transmigrating can the self separated from the body carry the impressions or traces of its varied experiences that it enjoyed while it was embodied? Like the experiences even their impressions require the body to sustain their existence in the self. If the body is gone how can the impressions survive them? Mind alone cannot sustain the impressions. If it can, then in the next body to which the self transmigrates even the experiences of pleasure and pain associated with the previous body could be recollected which never happens.

The author could have taken to task Sāṃkhya for postulating entities for which there is no real use in the Sāṃkhyan scheme of things. For example the Sāṃkhyan account of cognition is full of superfluous entities. First, there is the *Puruṣa* which is conceived to be of the nature of sentience. Then there is the intellect which too is of the nature of sentience. Then there is the modification of the intellect which takes place when the intellect approaches the object and assumes its form. Lastly there arises cognition which is the result of the self being reflected in the intellect. The modification of the intellect appears to characterise the self as it stands reflected in the intellect. If the metaphor of reflection is excluded from this account of the cognitive process what we are left with are four different versions of cognition viz., cognition as pure sentience, cognition as intellect (or passive sentience), cognition as the process of sentience and cognition as consummation or attainment of sentience. It is very surprising that this metaphysical extravagance did not attract the critical notice of a perceptive thinker like Udayana.

At the end of his criticism of the Sāṃkhya doctrine the author seems to take credit for maintaining that the self remains eternal despite its being endowed with non-eternal qualities because the latter are only externally related to the self. But what use is the upholding of the reality

of such a self though eternal if neither during the lifetime of the individual nor after the fall of his or her body it can sustain the conscious identity of the individual by itself? As explained above self's consciousness depends upon its bodily association. By itself it cannot be conscious even of itself. When the body is rendered inactive in the state of sleep the self is not conscious and so is not aware of its own identity. Similar is its condition in the disembodied state. The eternity of the self does not help it in the least in retaining its felt identity.

One last point before we leave this subject. Sāṃkhya's attempt to invoke the sentience of *Puruṣa* in the epistemic process is obviously aimed at explaining the judgmental character of cognition. The modification of intellect is just a cognitive episode which is transformed into judgment only when the self falsely appropriates it as its own modification. In Nyāya this is called introspective awareness of cognition (In Sanskrit it is called *Anuvyavasāya*). But if the nature of this appropriation as described by Sāṃkhya is examined it will be found that the appropriation too is an episode different from the episode of modification. It is said that sentience of the *Puruṣa* is reflected in the intellect and as a result the modifications of the intellect appears as qualifying the reflection. This is the appropriation by *Puruṣa* of the modifications of the intellect. Even the incidence of the modifications of the self is no more than an episode. How can it be regarded as an act of judgement? The cognition due to the incidence cannot have the form, 'I see this' or 'This is so and so!' This is another weak point in Sāṃkhyan theory which seems to have escaped the critical notice of the author.

Discussion and rejection of the Cārvāka theory

TEXT: स्यात् एतत्। नित्य-विभु-भोक्तृ-सद्भावे सर्वं एतत् एवं स्यात्। सः एव कुतः? भूतानां एव चेतनत्वात्। काय-आकार-परिणतानि भूतानि तथा। अन्वय-व्यतिरेकाभ्यां तथा उपलब्धेः। कर्म-ज्ञान-वासने तु सर्वत्र प्रतिभूत-नियते अनुवर्तिष्येते यतः भोग-प्रतिसंधान-नियमः इति चेत्? उच्यते-

न अन्य-दृष्टं स्मरति अन्यः न एकं भूतं अपक्रमात्।
वासना-संक्रमः नास्ति न च गति-अंतरं स्थिरे॥

न हि भूतानां समुदाय-पर्यवसितं चैतन्यम्। प्रतिदिनं तस्य अन्यत्वे

पूर्व-पूर्व-दिवस-अनुभूतस्य अस्मरण-प्रसङ्गात्। नापि प्रत्येक-पर्यवसितम्। कर-चरणादि अवयव-अपाये तत्-अनुभूतस्य स्मरण-अयोगात्। नापि मृग-मद-वासना इव वस्त्रादिषु संसर्गात् अन्य-वासना अन्यत्र संक्रामति। मात्रा अनुभूतस्य गर्भस्थेन भ्रूणेन स्मरण-प्रसङ्गात्। न च उपादान-उपेयभाव-नियमः गतिः। स्थिरपक्षे परमाणूनां तत्-अभावात्। खंड-अवयविनं-प्रति च विच्छिन्नानां अनुपादानत्वात्। पूर्व-सिद्धस्य च अवयविनः विनाशात्।

अस्तु तर्हि क्षणभङ्गः। न च अतिशयः अपि अतिरिच्यते। किंतु सादृश्य तिरस्कृतत्वात् द्राक् एव न विकल्प्यते। कार्य-दर्शनात् अध्यवसीयते अंत्य-अतिशयवत्। तथा च भूतानि एव तथा तथा उत्पद्यंते यथा यथा प्रतिसंधान-नियमादयः अपि उपपद्यंते। क्षणिकत्व-सिद्धौ एवं एतत्। तत् एव तु अन्यत्र विस्तरेण प्रतिषिद्धम्।

TRANS.: Let then be this view (for consideration): All that has been said so far (regarding the self's being the beneficiary of ritualistic activity and also the agent of all activity) may be conceded if the enjoyer of all experiences is eternal and ubiquitous in nature. But how can an enjoyer of such a nature be proved? The material objects themselves are sentient and therefore the enjoyers of experiences. The material entities like earth, water, fire, air etc. transformed as the living organism of a living animal become sentient or conscious. This is so because by means of positive and negative association it has been found that only the combinations of different materials produce qualities like consciousness (although each of these materials is not possessed of these qualities). As to the restriction of experiences and recollection to previously-perceived objects the explanation on the above view is this. The residual traces of earlier actions and cognitions persist in the organism constituted by material components and in the same organism recollection of previously perceived things takes place. The traces precede the recollections and coexist with them. In reply to this we say this. It is a fact that what is perceived by one person is not recollected by another (so there has to be an identical being who perceives and then recollects what he has perceived) but the material elements which are supposed to constitute the self change from moment to moment and so do not remain the same from perception to recollection. (Neither the composite entity

constituted by the material elements nor the component limbs can be supposed to be endowed with sentience. The composite is changeable and the component limbs do not last till death. If any one of the limbs is amputated the body should become senseless. But this is not found to be the case). There is also no transmission of the experiential traces from one composite structure to another succeeding it. The traces of experiences are not substantive entities so that they could be passed on from one locus to another. (The traces are of the nature of qualities and as such they are tied down to the single substantive locus by the inherence-relation). So there is no alternative to the admission of an unchangeable substratum of all the so-called mental states.

The above text is elaborated thus: Certainly sentience or consciousness does not characterise the aggregate of material elements composing the living organism, This aggregate does not remain self-identical from one day to another. (The result of such mutability of the aggregate is that) what is experienced on one day cannot be recollected on the next day. Nor does sentience characterise each of the different elements or limbs composing the whole organism. If this were the case then what is experienced by a certain limb like the hand or the leg cannot be recollected if the experiencing limb is removed from the body. Nor again does the impression of the experiences of one limb of the body get transferred to another limb of the body as the fragrance of the musk clinging to a piece of cloth spreads to another piece of cloth as it comes in contact with it. If such a thing happened then the mother's experience could be recollected by the unborn child growing in the womb of the mother (as the child is in close contact with the mother's body). It may be urged against this that the transference of experiences from one thing to another takes place only if the two things are related with each other as the material cause and its effect. (The child in mother's womb is not the material effect of the mother's body). But this reply cannot hold good in the non-momentarist view either in the case of the atoms or that of the composite entity. The eternal atoms are not related with each other as material cause and its material effect. So there cannot occur in the atoms transference of experiences (or their recollection) from one atom to the other. The transference cannot take place even amongst composite entities. A man with some broken limb does not have the severed limb as the material cause of his mutilated body. So he should not be able to recollect the experiences he had in the severed limb before its severance. As to the earlier body which was intact and of which the severed limb was the material cause, it does not exist any more (so that the transfer of experiences can take place).

Alright! Let us then admit universal momentariness. (In this view), every moment a new entity (similar to the previous one and constituting a series of similar entities) comes into being but because of its similarity to the previous entity it is not recognised as a new entity. It is through the observation of the emergence of the effect that the prior occurrence of a new entity of the productive type is inferred. It is just like the inference of the prior occurrence of the collocation of causal conditions when the occurrence of the effect is observed as is maintained by Nyāya philosophers. Thus the successive origination of momentary material entities is such that the recollection of the experience of the earlier entity by the later entity can well be explained. But all this holds good if momentariness is taken as established. But that itself has been completely refuted elsewhere.

EXPL.: The view that is criticised here is the well-known materialistic view of Cārvāka according to which consciousness is the product of the aggregation of the material elements, earth, water, air and light. This is more or less the modern scientific view of the purely physico-chemical structure of the human body. The integrity of the body as a whole is not much affected even if one or more parts of the body are impaired or destroyed. The structure of the whole too may change completely but gradually with the destruction of the parts one after another and their replacement by other new parts and their taking over the functions of the old parts. Here we observe transference of functions from part to part as well as from one whole to another whole. Despite this the integrity of the conscious organism remains unaffected. How to account for this? The author has considered only a simple and an artificial example to test the transference-hypothesis. A living body which has lost one of its limbs is a new entity (in the Nyāya view) which differs radically from an entity all of whose parts or limbs are intact. This need not be acceptable to thinkers of other schools. In fact there can be very complex examples in which the transference-view can be tested. From the whole body every limb can be removed one by one till nothing of the old remains and yet the body as a whole remains intact. The whole, which is the organising and the integrating principle of the different parts or limbs of the body (which are all material entities) has to be regarded as radically different from the latter and also capable of surviving their gradual elimination. As such the whole is a functional whole in which the survival of the functions of the parts, not the survival of the parts is ensured. So the main plank of the author's criticism against the Cārvāka doctrine, viz., the impossibility of transmission of the impressions from parts to parts and from parts to whole has been proved by modern investigations in the physiology of living organism, quite wrong.

The author should rather have stressed the integral and holistic character of that which sustains the functional organisation of the innumerable limbs in the living body. By this means it would have been possible to bring out the non-material character of the integrating principle or entity. If it were a material entity it could not function without the material parts by which it is constituted initially. If it too changed gradually along with its changing components then it cannot be the integrating principle which remains self-identical throughout all changes taking place in the body. A still higher principle of integration will have to be postulated to sustain the changes taking place at the level of the component parts as also at the level of the composite entity. The highest integrating principle cannot be of the same material nature as the limbs of the body and the (physical) body itself. At least it cannot be of material nature as then it could not remain unchanged with all the material changes taking place in the body all the time. The affections of the body or its parts which are of the nature—of pleasure, pain etc. are not transferred to this highest non-material principle for, then the affections would have to be regarded as of dual nature. They would have to have their location both in the material body and its limbs as well as in the non-material organising principle of the body. The affections must have their seat only in the non-material principle and the body with its limbs would have to be regarded only as the sustainer of the occurrence of the affections in the non-material locus. All this may be taken as suggested by the adjective स्थिर meaning 'unchanging, constant' used for the organising principle by the author.

Discussion of arguments for universal momentariness

TEXT: अपि च–

न वैजात्यं विना तत् स्यात् न तस्मिन् अनुमा भवेत्।
विना तेन न तत्-सिद्धिः न अध्यक्षं निश्चयं विना॥

न हि करण-अकरणयोः तत्-जातीयस्य सतः सहकारि-लाभ-अ-लाभौ तंत्रं इति अभ्युपगमे क्षणिकत्व-सिद्धिः। तथा एक-व्यक्तौ अपि अविरोधात्। तद्वा तादृक् वा इति न कश्चित् विशेषः इति न्यायात्। ततः

तौ अनादृत्य वैजात्यं अ-प्रामाणिकं अभ्युपगमनीयम्। एवं च कारणवत् कार्ये अपि किंचित् वैजात्यं स्यात् यस्य कारण-अपेक्षा, न तु दृष्ट जातीयस्य इति शंकया न तत्-उत्पत्ति-सिद्धिः। दृष्ट-जातीयं आकस्मिकं स्यात् इति चेत्? न। तत्र अपि किंचित् अन्यत् एव प्रयोजकं भविष्यति इति अविरोधात्। न कार्यस्य विशेषः तत्-प्रयुक्ततया उपलभ्यते, नापि कार्य-सामान्यस्य अन्यत् प्रयोजकं दृश्यते इति चेत्? तत् किं कारणस्य विशेषः स्वगतः तत्-प्रयोजकतया उपलब्धः? कारण-सामान्यस्य वा अन्यत् प्रयोज्य-अंतरं दृश्यते यतः विवक्षित-सिद्धिः स्यात्? शंका तु उभयत्र अपि सुलभा इति। कार्य-जन्म-अजन्माभ्यां उन्नीयते इति चेत्? सहकारि-लाभ-अलाभाभ्यां एव उपपत्तेः। उन्नीयतां वा, कार्येषु शंकिष्यते, निषेधक-अभावात्। न हि धूमस्य विशेषं दहन-प्रयोज्यं प्रतिषेद्धुं स्वभाव-अनुपलब्धिः प्रभवति। कार्य-एक-निश्चेयस्य तत्-अनुपलब्धेः एव अनिश्चय-उपपत्तेः। कार्यस्य च अतीन्द्रियस्य अपि संभवात्। अतः एव अनुपलब्धि-अंतरं अपि निर्-अवकाशं इति।

एवं विधि-रूपयोः व्यावृत्ति-रूपयोः वा जात्योः विरोधे सति न समावेशः समाविष्टयोः च परापर-भाव-नियमः। अन्यून-अनतिरिक्त-वृत्ति-जाति-द्वय-कल्पनायां प्रमाण-अभावात्। व्यावर्त्य-भेद-अभावेन विरोध-अनवकाशे भेद-अनुपपत्तेः। परस्पर-परिहारवत्योः च समावेशे गोत्व-अश्वत्वयोः अपि तथाभाव-प्रसङ्गात्। सामग्री-विरोधात् न एवं इति चेत्? कुतः एतत्? परस्पर-परिहारेण सर्वदा व्यवस्थितेः इति चेत्? न इदं अपि अध्यक्षम्। एकदेश-समावेशेन तु सामग्री-समावेशः अपि उन्नीयते। यावत्-तत्-कार्ययोः परस्पर-परिहृति-स्वभावत्वात् इति चेत्? तर्हि कंप-शिंशपयोः परस्पर-परिहारवत्योः न समावेशः स्यात्। दृश्यते तावत् इदं इति चेत्? गोत्व-अश्वत्वयोः अपि न द्रक्ष्यते इति का प्रत्याशा? तथा च गतं अनुपलब्धि-लिंगेन अपि। क्वचित् अपि विरोध-असिद्धेः। ततः विपक्षे बाधक-अभावात् स्वभाव-हेतुः अपि अपास्तः।

ननु अस्ति तत्? तथा हि वृक्ष-जनक-पत्र-कांडादि-अंतर्भूता शिंशपा-सामग्री। सा वृक्षं अतिपत्य भवंती स्व-कारणं एव अतिपतेत्। एवं

शाखा दिमत्-मात्र-अनुबंधी वृक्ष-व्यवहारः। तत्-विशेष-अनुबंधी च शिंशपा-व्यवहारः। सः कथं तं अतिपत्य आत्मानं आसादयेत् इति चेत्? एवं तर्हि शिंशपा-सामग्री-अतर्भूता चलन-सामग्री। ततः तां अतिपत्य चलनादि-रूपता भवंती स्व-कारणं एव अतिपतेत्। तथा शाखादिमत्-विशेष-अनुबंधी शिंशपा-व्यवहारः तत्-विशेष-अनुबंधी च चलन-व्यवहारः। सः कथं तं अतिपत्य आत्मानं आसादयेत् इति तुल्यम्। नोदनादि आगंतुक-निबंधनं चलनत्वं न तु तत्-विशेष-मात्र-अधीनं इति चेत्? यदि नोदनादयः स्वभावभूताः ततः तत्-विशेषाः एव। अथ अ-स्वभाव-भूताः ततः सहकारिणः एव। ततः तान् आसाद्य निर्-विशेषा एव शिंशपा चलन-स्वभावान् आरभते इति, तथा च कुतः क्षणिकत्व-सिद्धिः? स्वभाव-भूताः एव आगंतुक-सहकारि-अनुप्रवेशात् भवंति इति चेत्? एवं तर्हि वृक्ष-सामग्र्यां आगंतुक-सहकारि-अनुप्रवेशात् एव शिशंपा अपि जायेत इति न कश्चित् विशेषः। एवं एतत्। किंतु शिशंपा-जनकाः तरु-सामग्रीं उपादाय एव। चलन-जनकाः तु न तां एव किंतु मूर्तमात्रं, तथा दर्शनात् इति चेत्? न एवम्। कंप-जनकाः शिंशपा-जनक-विशेषाः अपि संतः तान् अतिपतंति, न तु वृक्ष-जनक-विशेषाः शिंशपा-जनकाः तान् इति नियामक-अभावात्। शिंशपा-जनकाः तत्-विशेषाः एव, कंप-कारिणः तु न तथा किंतु आगंतवः सहकारिणः इति चेत्? एवं तर्हि तान् आसाद्य सदृश-रूपाः अपि केचित् कंप-कारिणः। अन्-आसादित-सहकारिणः तु न तथा। तथा च तद्वा तादृग्वा इति न कश्चित् विशेषः स्यात्। तस्मात् विरुद्धयोः समावेशः एव, समाविष्टयोः च परापर-भावः एव। अन्-एवं भूतानां द्रव्य, गुण, कर्मादि-भावेन उपाधिमात्रम्। तेषां तु विरुद्धानां न समावेशः व्यक्ति-भेदात्। जातीनां च भिन्न-आश्रयत्वात्। तथा च कुतः क्षणिकत्वम्? वैजात्य-अभ्युपगमे च कुतः अनुमानवार्ता। मा भूत् अनुमानं इति चेत्? न। तेन हि विना न तत् सिद्ध्येत्। न हि क्षणिकत्वे प्रमाणं अस्ति। तथा निश्चय-अभावात्। गृहीत-निश्चिते एव अर्थे तस्य प्रमाण्यात्। अन्यथा अतिप्रसङ्गात्।

ननु वर्तमानः क्षणः अध्यक्ष-गोचरः, न च असौ पूर्व-अपर-क्षण-

आत्मा। ततः वर्तमानत्व-निश्चयः एव भेद-निश्चयः इति चेत्? किं अत्र तत् अभिमतं आयुष्मतः? यदि धर्मी एव नीलादिः न किंचित् अनुपपन्नम्। तस्य स्थैर्य-अस्थैर्य-साधारण्यात्। अथ-धर्मः? तत्-भेद-निश्चये अपि धर्मिणः किं आयातम्? तस्य ततः अन्यत्वात्। वर्तमान-अवर्तमानत्वं एकस्य विरुद्धं इति चेत्? यदि सत्-असत्वं तत् तत् न। अनभ्युपगमात्। ताद्रूप्येण एव प्रत्यभिज्ञानात्। सदसत्-संबधः चेत्? न। उपसर्पण-प्रत्यय-क्रमेण एव तस्य अपि उपपत्तेः। प्रत्यभिज्ञानं अप्रमाणं इति चेत्? अस्ति तावत् अतः निरुपणीयं, क्षण-प्रत्ययः तु भ्रान्तः अपि नास्ति इति विशेषः।

TRANS.: (Now the author takes up certain arguments adduced by Buddhists in support of the doctrine of universal momentariness for detailed consideration and rejection. By way of summarising the discussion and criticism of the doctrine the author says as below:

> 'Momentariness cannot be maintained unless it is admitted that a productive entity differs from the nonproductive entity exactly similar to it in appearance'.

The productive entity is endowed with the specific property of immediate-productivity while no such property is known to characterise the unproductive entity. However there is no inferential proof for the reality of the hypothetical property of 'immediate-productivity' inhering in the productive cause. If such a property is admitted a corresponding property in the effect too would have to be admitted. This would render, the inference-type based on the effect as the middle term ineffective. But without inference universal momentariness cannot be established. Nor is momentariness established by indeterminate perception. (Buddhists regard only indeterminate perception as valid means of cognition) as without determinate perception of an object its reality cannot be established.

(Elaborating the above argument the author says that) if it is maintained that the availability or non-availability of auxiliary conditions to causal entities of a certain type determines their productivity or nonproductivity then universal momentariness cannot be established (as productivity and non-productivity have different determinants and they can characterise different entities of the same type). In like manner even a single causal entity can be productive or nonproductive depend-

ing upon the availability or otherwise of auxiliary conditions. There does not arise any incompatibility in thus regarding the same entity or an entity of the same generic type productive and unproductive in different circumstances. There is the general rule that whether it is a single entity or different entities of the same type they do not differ in respect of being productive or nonproductive under different conditions. So ignoring the availability or non-availability of the auxiliaries to the cause if the latter is supposed to be endowed with the special property of 'immediate productivity' it would be a quite unreasonable assumption. A similar assumption in the case of the effect also can be made. Even the effect may be supposed to be endowed with some special property which is engendered by the special cause. But these assumptions may create doubt regarding the causation by fire say, of the familiar (not of special type) smoke (or by any common cause of its common effect). As a result the inference-type based on causality would be rendered ineffective. But can't it be urged against this (the assumption of a special property in the effect) that the familiar common effects like smoke would be rendered accidental or causeless if only special effects have causes (of a special character)? Well! In reply to this one may even say that the familiar effect may be caused by some unseen agent (say a ghost)! Thus the irrationality of assuming a causeless effect can be avoided. But then (as per the above assumption) the special character of the effect is not determined by the common cause nor is the common effect caused (or determined) by any cause (as only the special cause produces the special effect). (Aren't there these irrationalities in the above assumption which necessitate the denial of any special character in the effect)? Well! If so then (on your assumption) has the special character supposed to be inherent in the cause, been known to be determinative of any effect? And if the common cause is real and effective is it known to produce any effect (if only the special cause is supposed to be productive of the effect)? If neither of these is true then how can your assumption be vindicated? If even (in the absence of any proof) the cause is suspected to be endowed with some special property, the effect too can be so suspected. But can't the productivity and non-productivity of the seed in the granary and the seed sown in the soil respectively be the proof for the special nature of the productive cause? No! This difference can be explained simply on the basis of the availability or otherwise of the auxiliaries to the cause or let this help prove the special nature of the cause but such a nature can be suspected to be present in the effect too, for, there is no evidence contrary to this. Certainly no inference based on non-cognition of nature as middle term can prove the absence of any

special nature or character in the effect like smoke as determined by a cause like fire. If the special nature or character is regarded as invisible then its reality can be determined only through the effect it produces but this effect also could be invisible. So one cannot be certain whether the special character is present in the effect or not. Not only the non-cognition of nature but any other kind of non-cognition cannot establish the absence of the special nature or character in the effect (if the cause is assumed to be endowed with a special character). Moreover the special generic property of immediate-productivity and the general property-whether these are positive in nature or of the nature of exclusion (as per the Buddhist view)—cannot be co-inherent in a cause. If they were co-inherent one of them would over-extend the other or the scope of one would be included in the scope of the other. (For example if immediate-productivity over-extended seedness then even things other than the seed would be productive of sprout. But if seedness over-extended immediate-productivity then even the productive seed could be devoid of immediate-productivity). If seedness and immediate-productivity had exactly the same scope there is then no point in admitting two such generic universals. (Besides such an admission would violate the law of parsimony). Even in the Buddhist view of the universal as exclusion of the other there have to be different excludents for the exclusions to differ from one another. If mutually-exclusive exclusions or universals are supposed to coexist then even cowness and horseness which exclude each other may be coexistent. Could one urge against this that cowness and horseness do not coexist only because the causal collocations productive of cows and horses which manifest respectively the two generic universals are different? Yes, this is true. But why is this so? May one say that this is so because the respective causal collocations always exclude each other? Well! If this is so it is not perceptible. Moreover part of the auxiliary conditions of the generation of the cow as well as the horse, namely destiny, time, space etc. being (known to be) identical, the whole collocation of auxiliary conditions also of both the cow and the horse could be inferred to be identical with each other. 'But aren't the cow and the horse which are the respective products of the two collocations naturally exclusive of each other?' It may be asked. Yes! (If mutual exclusion does not go with coexistence then the movement of shaking in the teak tree (which is identical with the shaking tree) and the tree (when it is standing still) being exclusive of each other the two cannot be together in the shaking teak tree. 'But we do see the moving teak. so how can their coexistence be denied?' One may ask, Yes! But what is the guarantee that cowness and horseness too (known to be non-

coexistent) cannot be seen to be coexistent in some entity (hitherto unknown)? If the coexistence can be observed then the inference-type based on non-cognition (proving nonexistence) would be rendered otiose. No two things would ever be opposed to each other so that the cognition of one of them could be used to infer the absence of the other supposed to be opposed to it. The inference-type based on nature would also be rendered ineffective if all kinds of opposition disappear because identity is prevented by opposition and if there is no opposition anything would be identical with anything else. 'But there is certainly evidence against any inference opposed to the identity of say, a teak tree and tree', it could be urged against the above. The evidence would be an argument like this, 'The causal collocation productive of the teak is included among the leaves, branches, stem etc. which produce a tree, so the former is concomitant with the latter? If the teak came into being by excluding the being of the tree (so that the inference based on identity of nature is rendered otiose) then the teak could come into being without its own causal collocation.' Likewise the word 'tree' is used for things possessing any kind of branches, stems etc. while the word 'teak' is used for things possessing special kinds of branches, stems etc. If this is so then how can the usage pertaining to the word 'teak' come into being, without including the object of the usage pertaining to the word 'tree'? This defence of inference based on nature by the Buddhist can be opposed by a corresponding argument applied to the movement in the branches of the teak thus, 'The causal collocation producing the movement of the branches of the teak are included in the causal collocation producing the tree and as such it is concomitant with the former, so the movement of fluttering in the leaves and branches of the teak cannot take place apart from the teak'. Also the usage relating to the word 'teak' pertains as shown above to the thing that has leaves, branches etc. while the usage relating to movement pertains only to those parts of a tree which are capable of movement. How then this latter usage can come into being by excluding the object of the usage pertaining to the teak? Thus there can be a counter-argument against the Buddhist's defensive argument. May it be contended against this that the movement in the branches of the teak is due to the impetus etc. of some accidental cause of motion (like wind) and not any causal condition productive of the teak? Well! If the impetus or impulse is the very nature of the teak then it is part and parcel of it (so the cause of the movement cannot exclude the causes of the teak). If on the other hand the impetus is not the nature of the teak then it is nothing but the auxiliary cause of the movement. The teak accompanied by this auxiliary

and unendowed by any special property (like immediate-productivity) gives rise to the movement of its branches. If such a view is admitted then momentariness cannot be established. But can't it be urged against this that the teak with moving branches is produced by a causal collocation inclusive of the impetus (so that the latter turns out to be a momentary entity different from a teak with unmoving branches)? Well! If such an explanation is adopted in the case of the genesis of the teak then it could also be maintained that the teak is produced by the inclusion of certain special causal conditions in the causal collocations productive of a tree. (So the nature of a teak would exclude that of the tree as the causal collocations respectively productive of them are different from each other). Thus there would be no difference between this and the previous case. This is however not true! There is a differences between the cases. In the former case the special causal conditions of the teak are productive of it only when they are accompanied by the general causal conditions productive of trees but the causal conditions productive of movement in the teak require not only the conditions productive of the teak but also those productive of all material things (as all material things are mobile; so the conditions of mobility are productive of movement in every material thing). This is what is generally observed. (There is no teak which is other than a tree but the movement of branches etc. is common to the teak and trees other than the teak). This is however not a correct view. You (the Buddhists) say that some of the causes of the teak are the causes of the movement of the branches of the teak and yet movement is not constant in the teak-branches nor is it the case that the movement does not occur in things other than the teak, but in the case of the relationship of the teak and the tree you opine that although some of the causes of the tree are the causes of the teak yet the teak does not over-extend the identity of the tree. But there is no basis for this discrimination in the two cases. May it be urged against this that in the case of the teak it is certain special causes of trees that produce the teak while it is some accidental conditions extraneous to the teak which produce the movement in the teak-branches and so movement is not a species of the teak as the teak is a species of the tree? Well! If so it can also be urged that the same collocation of conditions accompanied by some extraneous impulse produces movement but if this impulse is absent the collocation does not produce any movement. Except for the presence and absence of the impulse the collocation in the two cases is identical. Thus there is no difference in the collocation in the two cases except for the presence or absence of the impulse as an accidental condition. It has therefore to be admitted that two incompatible

generic properties can never coexist but if any two properties are found coexisting then they must be mutually related as the inclusive and the included properties. If any two incompatible properties appear to be coexistent then they have to be treated as substantive, qualitative or motile conditions only and not generic properties. (For example a blue lotus is not such because both blueness and lotusness—two incompatible properties—characterise the blue lotus; only because the blue colour characterises the blue lotus it is such an entity). If two properties are incompatible they cannot inhere in the same entity. (So immediate-productivity—the hypothetical property—invented by the Buddhist cannot coexist with (for example seedness in the seed). How can then momentariness be established? If however the special property is admitted without proof why then talk of its being inferred? 'Alright! Let there be no inference! No! Without inference momentariness cannot be established'. There is no perceptual cognition of it. There is no (definite) cognition (of the form, 'this is a momentary entity' or 'Everything is momentary') of momentariness. Indeterminate perception (which alone is a valid means of cognition for the Buddhist) has only that entity as its object which is determinately cognised by the determinate cognition. If this is not admitted then even the eternal entities would have to be deemed as perceptible.

One may ask, Isn't it the case that a thing existing in the present moment alone is perceptible? The presence in the present moment of a thing is quite different from the occurrence of the thing in the past and future moments. So the apprehension of presentness of the present thing is itself the apprehension of its difference from things existing in the past and the future. By way of reply to this question the questioner may be asked to explain what he—the respectable person—means by the 'present'. If he means the present substantive itself then no difficulty arises for the non-momentarist. A thing can exist in the present moment whether it is durable or momentary in nature. If however 'the present' means the present property of a thing, then even if this property differs from moment to moment how does it affect the durability of the thing it characterises when it is different from it? 'But how can the same thing be both present and not present (or other than present) ', it may be asked. Well! Presentness and non-presentness are not existence and nonexistence. We do not admit this. Even in the second, third moments etc. of its existence a thing is recognised to be the same entity and so it cannot be taken to be nonexistente in moments other than the moment of its origination. But isn't the relation of the same thing with existing presentness and nonexistent pastness itself inconsistent? No!

There is no inconsistency in this. As cognition is known to be cognitively related to present and past objects (without forfeiting its identity) so a thing can quite well be temporarily related to present and past moments. If it is objected that cognition is related to all kinds of objects simultaneously but the temporal relation of things is sequential, the relation with the present only succeeding (and not coexisting with) the relation with the past (which therefore cannot be acceptable) then it may be replied that the sequential occurrence of the respective auxiliary conditions available to the thing related may be supposed to account for the sequential character of the relation. But can't one deny the very validity of the cognition of durability or the recognition of the identity of a thing through a series of moments? Yes! The validity of such cognition or recognition may have to be established. But the Buddhist will have to concede that there are such cognitions or recognitions. As to momentariness, there is not even an illusory cognition of momentariness of things (which the Buddhist can adduce as evidence for his theory).

EXPL.: Now the author takes up the Buddhist doctrine of universal momentariness for detailed criticism. The main consideration supporting momentariness is the apparent co-occurrence of productivity and non-productivity in the same thing. Nothing is seen to be continually producing its effect. This appearance of incomparability is explained by the Buddhist by treating the thing at its productive moments as different from its nonproductive self (at other moments). The Nyāya explanation of this phenomenon is quite simple. It is to the effect that one and the same thing is productive if accompanied by the auxiliary conditions of production but it is not productive if no auxiliary condition of production accompanies it. The Buddhist does not deny the need of auxiliary conditions for production but he maintains that the cause on being accompanied by the auxiliaries acquires a special character, namely, that of 'immediate-productivity' on account of which it is enabled to produce the effect without delay. This cause is quite different from the earlier nonproductive cause although it appears to be exactly the same. 'But if the productive cause is admitted to be of a special type then its effect too should be admitted to be such', such a counter-argument may be urged against the above Buddhist argument. If thus both the cause and the effect are admitted to be of special types then the causal relation of common entities like fire and smoke would have to be discarded. This would even jeopardise the reality of common causes as they, with their common natures cannot be productive of any effect. Moreover the common effect (not the special one) would be rendered

causeless as the special cause, being devoid of the special property cannot be productive of anything whatsoever. One may contend against this that there is definite proof, for the cause being endowed with a special nature in the form of the production of the effect only on certain occasions, but there is no proof at all for postulating a special nature for the effect. But if we look closely into the matter we find that neither for the effect nor for the cause there is any convincing proof to postulate special natures. When the causality of the auxiliary conditions for production is admitted by the contending parties then the availability or non-availability of this to the main cause can very well explain the production or non-production by the latter.

Here the author puts up a strange argument to boost up his position. He urges that even if there is no positive proof for there being a special nature in the effect yet there is no definite proof contrary to this; so the effect too can be assumed to be endowed with a special nature. Non-cognition of any such nature cannot establish its nonexistence as this supposed special nature could even be invisible (At least the logical possibility of there being the special invisible nature in the effect cannot be ruled out). Even any other kind of non-cognition of which sixteen different varieties have been listed by the upholder of this means of cognition cannot be used as proof for the nonexistence of the hypothetical special nature if the effect of the latter is suspected to be invisible.

The above argument against the postulation of a special nature in the cause is not convincing at all. The Buddhist may be wrong in saying that the difference between productivity and non-productivity is a difference of natures. It may be an accidental difference but still it is a difference which even the Naiyāyika admits. The Buddhist explains this difference by postulating a special property to characterise the productive cause whereas the non-Buddhist says that the availability and non-availability of the auxiliaries can account for the difference. But what basis is there for postulating the special nature for the effect? The author hasn't adduced any such basis. In fact the very fact that the familiar common effect like smoke which is not supposed to be endowed with any special property would be rendered causeless is a strong argument against the assumption of any special nature in the effect. The suggestion that the possibility of an invisible special nature in the effect can be envisaged is, to say the least, puerile unless it is intended to cast aspersion on the Buddhist suggestion that the cause must be endowed with a special nature. As shown above there is some ground for this suggestion but none for the other one.

Continuing the criticism against the Buddhist view the author says that 'immediate-productivity' and seedness for example cannot be related mutually as properties of narrower or wider scope if they are supposed to coexist. If they are not coexistent they must be exclusive of each other. They cannot also be partly overlapping of each other. If there is partial overlap between them one of these would have to be denied to be a natural property. They cannot also exclude each other as some seeds for example, are productive. But what prevents seedness and immediate-productivity to be related as properties of wider and narrower scope? Seedness could be the property of wider scope while immediate-productivity would be a property of narrower scope as only some seeds are productive. What the author says here regarding the non-difference of properties of identical scope or extension is rather puzzling. How can the above two properties be of equal scope? What is the Buddhist going to gain by postulating a property which is equivalent in scope to 'seedness' for example?

By way of an aside a likely objection regarding the nature of the relationship of coexistent generic characters mentioned above may be discussed here. If coexistent genera are related only as properties of wider and narrower scope then how come goldness and potness for instance coexistent in a golden pot are not related mutually as wider and narrower in scope? One simple answer to the question is that the pot is not gold but a golden object, that is to pay an object fashioned from gold. A gold ingot may however be called 'gold'. So goldness cannot be supposed to inhere in the golden pot.

Turning to the above argument we find that the author has digressed from the main theme to one concerned with the inference based on identity (perhaps with the intention of defending the identity of the productive causal entity with itself in its unproductive state. The teak is the same as a tree and this fact is taken to be established by the Buddhist on the basis of the inference by identity. If a productive seed can be regarded as different in nature from the unproductive idle seed then even the teak can be regarded as different from the tree of which it is supposed to be a species. It may be contended against this that the productive causes of the teak are included among those that produce the tree, so the teak cannot come into being without the causal collocation productive of tree as such. Thus the identity of the teak cannot be excluded from the identity of the tree. But by a parity of reasoning even the identity of the movement of a teak with its branches fluttering in the wind cannot be taken to be excluded from the identity of the tree. Thus movement will be prevented from occurring in anything other than a

tree and just like the teak which is treated as a species of the tree, movement too could be treated as a species of teak. It could here be argued that the force of the wind which is not a part of the teak is needed for the movement of the teak-branches, so movement cannot be part and parcel of the being of the teak. But if the force of the wind is extraneous to the teak then it is only an auxiliary cause of movement and the teak combined with the force may be taken to be productive of the movement. There is no reason to maintain that the unmoving teak has been replaced by a different teak. If one contends against this that the said extraneous conditions themselves produce a new kind of teak with fluttering branches and different from the static teak then a similar contention can be made with regard to the production of the teak also. One can say that certain (special) extraneous conditions combined with the general causal conditions of a tree help produce the teak which therefore is different from a tree. This would contradict the identity-inference. However it could be said in favour of the identity-inference that the special conditions of teak-production do invariably depend upon the general causal conditions of the tree only while the special condition of the movement in the teak do not depend upon the latter alone but require the help of the general causal conditions of movement as such (or of all material objects and thus the moving teak could be said to differ from the static teak). This defence is flawed by the fact that in both the cases it is the relation of a specific property with the general property that is involved. If in one case the special property is inferred to be coexistent with the general property then in the other case too it could be so regarded. Just as the teak is a species of the tree so the moving teak may also be viewed as a species of the teak. Simply because it has fluttering branches the moving teak cannot be distinguished (in its being) from an unmoving teak. The real upshot of all this discussion is that although all general causal conditions of the unmoving and moving teak are identical yet if certain special conditions combine with the latter there results the movement of the teak (otherwise the teak remains unmoving). Thus it is established that if any two properties are mutually incompatible they cannot coexist and any two (or more) coexistent properties must be related as those of wider and narrower scope. What then is one to say of the descriptive expression, 'A blue lotus floats in the pond' which refers to the lotus in which lotusness, blueness and floatingness are all described as coexisting? Certainly these three properties are not mutually-related in the above-mentioned manner? The reply is that there is no coexistence here of different incompatible prop-

erties but coexistence of different things like quality and a certain kind of movement in a material thing.

The above argument boils down to this that just as a particular tree of a specific type does not differ from a tree (and the Buddhist himself defends the identity of the particular and the general by means of what he calls the identity-inference) so the productive cause, despite being a special instance of cause in general is the same as cause. So the unproductive cause is also a cause. Production under certain conditions and non-production in the absence of these condition by the cause are only its different changeable states. (Just as movement and its absence in its branches are the different states of the teak. If the teak is just a specimen of a tree then the moving teak is also just a specimen of the teak. So is the nonproductive cause a specimen of the cause). In order to prove momentariness the Buddhist has first to establish that the productive cause is different in nature from the unproductive cause. This is just like proving that the moving teak is different from the unmoving teak. If the Buddhist already admits this difference then he should not demur to admit the teak to be different from the tree. This admission would be suicidal to him. Production and non-production in the case of a cause are only conditional. As such they are not incompatible with each other. Only absolute production and absolute non-production are really incompatible.

This gives rise to the question, 'what constitutes the nature or the being of a thing if production of its effect is a conditional property (or characteristic) of it?' As per the Buddhist view, 'to be efficacious for production is the very essence of a thing' and the non-Buddhist need not take objection to this criterion of being or reality of things as laid down by the Buddhist. But the non-Buddhist cannot say that 'to be efficacious under certain conditions, that is, being accompanied by auxiliaries' 'is the nature of things'. Such a view of the nature of things would make everything to be constitutive of the nature of everything. Since certain conditions which are auxiliaries, are needed by a certain cause—to produce its effect these conditions would constitute the nature of the cause. The causes of these conditions being needed by these to be productive, these causes would constitute the nature of the former. The causes of these causes would similarly constitute the nature of the latter. So everything would enter into the nature of everything (as the Jainas maintain).

Besides the concept of nature does not seem to be consistent with the concept of 'being productive under certain condition only'. If production of its effect is the very nature of things how and why a thing should

remain unproductive for some time and then suddenly start producing its effect? Auxiliary causes are extraneous to this cause, their availability or non-availability cannot determine the productivity of the cause which is its very nature. Nature is that, endowed with which a thing comes into and goes out of being while availability of auxiliaries is an accidental property and so it cannot have anything to do with the nature of the thing.

Two different solutions to the above difficulty can be adduced by the non-Buddhist. He may say that it is only the generic nature of a thing to be productive. This means that some of the things endowed with the generic character are actually productive of the effects which are commonly supposed to be caused by them. These are the things which are accompanied by auxiliaries. There are many other things exactly like these which remain unproductive because they are not accompanied by auxiliaries. The generic character is common to both the productive and nonproductive individuals. So it can be said that an individual though in itself unproductive can be treated as generically productive.

Another answer to the above question is this: 'an individual cause cannot by itself be said to be productive of the ultimate cumulative effect which is the result of the collaboration of all the causal conditions. An individual contributes only its own partial effect to the total cumulative effect. But if there is no collaboration there is no cumulative effect so that the lone cause remains ineffective so far as the production of the latter is concerned. But some other effect due to its own individual activity the individual cause can certainly produce and this would be enough to endow it with reality.

The next argument for momentarism discussed by the author is based on the changing nature of things. From moment to moment in the course of its existence a thing cannot remain the same. If no other change takes place in the thing, the change of temporal relationship cannot but affect the nature of it. The non-Buddhist however does not admit that temporal changes are more than superficial. If they simply transformed the nature of the thing then the thing cannot be recognised to be the same from moment to moment. Unless some irrefutable proof against the veridicity of the recognition of the continuing identity of things is produced we cannot but admit that durability is fact and most of the things last for more than a moment.

Rejection of doubt regarding momentariness

TEXT: स्यात् एतत्। मा भूत् अध्यक्षं अनुमानं वा क्षाणिकत्वे तथा अपि संदेहः अस्तु। एतावता अपि सिद्धं समीहितं चार्वाकस्य इति चेत्? उच्यते–

स्थैर्य–दृष्ट्योः न संदेहः न प्रामाण्ये विरोधतः।
एकता–निश्चयः येन क्षणे तेन स्थिरे मतः॥

न हि स्थिरे तत्–दर्शने वा स्वरस–वाही संदेहः। प्रत्यभिज्ञानस्य दुर्–अपन्हवत्वात्। नापि तत्–प्रामाण्ये। सः हि न तावत् सार्वत्रिकः, व्याघातात्। तथा हि प्रामाण्य–असिद्धौ संदेहः अपि न सिद्धयेत्। तत्–सिद्धौ वा तत्–अपि सिद्धयेत्। निश्चयस्य तत्–अधीनत्वात्। कोटि–द्वयस्य च अदृष्टस्य अनुपस्थाने कः संदेह–अर्थः? तत्–दर्शने च कथं सर्वथा तत्–असिद्धिः? एतेन अ–प्रामाणिकः तत्–व्यवहारः इति निरस्तम्। सर्वथा प्रामाण्य–असिद्धौ तस्य अपि असिद्धेः। प्रकृते प्रामाण्य–संदेहः लून–पुनः–जात–केशादौ व्यभिचार–दर्शनात् इति चेत्? न। एकत्व–निश्चयस्य त्वया अपि इष्टत्वात्। अनिष्टौ वा न किंचित् सिद्धयेत्। सिद्धयतु यत्र विरुद्ध–धर्म–विरहः इति चेत्? तेन एव स्थिरत्वं अपि निश्चीयते। सः इह संदिह्यते इति चेत्? तुल्यं एतत्। क्वचित् निश्चयः अपि कथंचित् इति चेत्? समः समाधिः।

TRANS.: Let then be this argument in favour of momentariness. Even if there is no perceptual or inferential evidence for momentariness there can be doubt about it. Even this is sufficient to prove what the Cārvāka desires to prove. In reply to this we say as below:

There cannot arise any doubt regarding either durability of things or the recognition of durability. Nor again there can be doubt regarding the veridicity of all introspective cognitions. The first kind of doubt is ruled out because there is recognition of a thing existing continually for more than a single moment. The second kind of doubt is ruled out because the very occurrence of recognition is proof against the doubt about its reality. Doubt about the veridicity of all introspective cognitions is ruled out by the cognition of the occurrence of the doubt itself. This realisation is a cognition which at least must be veridical if the doubt has occurred (so all cognitions cannot be false).

Moreover if recognition is veridical in regard to the identity of a momentary entity then it cannot be treated as false in regard to durable entities which it attests to be durable. (In both cases recognition should equally testify the reality of its object).

Certainly neither in regard to the durable nor its recognition there does naturally arise any doubt (about the reality of the first or the truth of the second). The recognition of the durable cannot be denied to be real or veridical. There cannot also occur doubt regarding the veridicity of all introspective cognitions because such a doubt would be self-destructive. To explain: If no cognition is treated as veridical then even the occurrence of doubt cannot be confirmed as the introspective cognition of this occurrence cannot be veridical. If however the occurrence of doubt is confirmed then the validity of the said introspective cognition has also to be confirmed because the former confirmation depends upon the latter confirmation, (Even) for a doubt to occur it is necessary that its two alternatives undetermined as to their truth must first be presented in a cognition (or be cognised as such). Otherwise how can there be any doubt? But if the alternatives are presented how can cognitive veridicity be absolutely rejected? By this rejoinder stands rejected the possible contention that all usage regarding cognitive veridicity is in fact false. If all usage about veridicity is false then this very statement about falsehood amounts to a usage which is false. But in the case under consideration, namely, the durability of things, can't one say that there is reason for doubting the veridicity of the identity-cognition as such a cognition is falsified in the case of hair on the head of a person? The new shock of hair growing after the withering away of the earlier shock of hair appears to be the same as the latter. No! The definite identity-cognition which is veridical is admitted even by the Cārvāka (in the case of the momentary entity). If this is denied then difference-cognition too will have to be denied and then there would be no cognition at all. Alright! Yet the identity-cognition has that as its object which is not endowed with incompatible properties (so that the durable would be excluded from the purview of this cognition). If so the absence of incompatible properties in things would prove their durability too. If this is doubted then momentariness also can be doubted. If somehow in certain exceptional cases a valid cognition of durability is admitted then in other cases too it will have to be admitted (for similar reasons).

EXPL.: Is universal scepticism entertainable? This is the question which is being discussed here by the author. It is doubtful if any follower of the

Cārvāka viewpoint upheld scepticism or momentarism. It is also doubtful if the momentarist viewpoint of Cārvāka can be supported by the momentarist doctrine. The crux of the author's criticism of universal scepticism is that even to maintain such a theory it is necessary to deny it. First, there is the object regarding whose nature doubt is raised by the sceptic. This object must first be known as an object before the doubt regarding its real nature can be raised. In all doubts the objectivity of the object has to be beyond doubt. So also the alternatives which appear in the doubt must be definitely known as possible alternatives. Besides these the fact of the doubt as a psychological episode in someone's mind and the reality of the doubter have also to be definitely known. But can't there be a doubt in which neither the object of the doubt nor the different alternatives doubted are definite enough to be identified as such and such? Yes, there can perhaps be such an absolute doubt (almost the same as utter confusion). Such a doubt cannot be treated as a theoretical position which could be discussed or refuted by means of arguments. There has got to be some affirmation, however minimal it may be, for any meaningful discussion to take place. Neither momentarism nor its opposite can be established by means of absolute scepticism.

Objection that durability is incompatible with causality discussed and refuted

TEXT: ननु एतत् कारणत्वं यदि स्वभावः भावस्य नीलादिवत् तदा सर्व-साधारणं स्यात्। न हि नीलं किंचित् प्रति अनीलम्। अथ औपाधिकं तदा उपाधेः अपि स्वाभाविकत्वे तथात्व-प्रसङ्गः। औपाधिकत्वे तु अनवस्था। अथ अ-साधारणत्वं अपि अस्य स्वभावः एव, ततः उत्पत्तेः आरभ्य कुर्यात्। स्थिरस्य एक-स्वभावत्वात् इति चेत्? उच्यते-

हेतु-शक्तिं अनादृत्य नीलादि अपि न वस्तुसत्।
तद्-युक्तं तत्र तत् शक्तं इति साधारणं न किम्?॥

सर्व-साधारण-नीलादि-वैधर्म्येण काल्पनिकत्वं कार्यकारण-भावस्य व्युत्पादयता नीलादि पारमार्थिकं एव अभ्युपगंतव्यम्। अन्यथा तत्-वैधर्म्येण हेतु-फल-भावस्य अ-पारमार्थिकत्व-अनुपपत्तेः। न च कार्यकारणभावस्य अ-पारमार्थिकत्वे नीलादि पारमार्थिकं भवितुं अर्हति।

नित्यत्व-प्रसङ्गात्। तस्मात् अस्य पारमार्थिकत्वे अपरं अपि तथा न वा उभयं अपि इति। कथं एकं अनेकं परस्पर-विरुद्धं कार्यं कुर्यात्? तत्-स्वभावत्वात् इति यदि तदा उत्पत्तेः आरभ्य कुर्यात् अविशेषात् इत्यपि न युक्तम्। तत्तत्-सहकारि-साचिव्ये तत्तत् कार्यं करोति इति स्वभाव-व्यवस्थापनात्। इदं च साधारणं एव। सर्वैः एव तथा उपलंभात्। न हि नीलादेः अपि अन्यत् साधारण्यं इति।

TRANS.: Now (even though things are proved to be durable) if causality is the very nature of things then everything would be the cause of everything just as blueness is the property of every blue object, it is not the case that the blue object is so only for some persons and not for all. If however causality is a conditional property of things then if the condition is natural to things the previous difficulty remains unresolved (as causality will again turn out to be a natural and universal property). If the condition itself is conditional then if the second condition is natural the above difficulty will persist as there arises infinite regress. If to avoid the possibility of irregular causation it is assumed that regulated causality is also the nature of things then things should start their causal operation right from the moment of their origination as durable things retain the same nature all through their existence. In reply to this we say as below:

> If the causal capacity or nature of the cause is disregarded, that is to say, if causation is regarded as unreal then even the reals like the blue, the red etc. would be rendered unreal (as bereft of causation they cannot remain real). (Nor can there arise the contingency of things continuing to be productive throughout their existence because) only as accompanied by the auxiliaries things are capable of producing their effects. In this respect causation is just like common things (Just as only certain things are blue and certain others are red and so on, so only certain things accompanied by certain auxiliaries are productive of effects, not everything is productive of everything).

(Elaborating the above the author says that) if the opponent advocates the unreality of the causal relation by contrasting it with the real empirical objects like the blue, the yellow etc., then he has ipso facto maintained the reality of the latter. If the empirical objects were not treated as real then the causal relation cannot be contrasted with them and described as unreal. But certainly the empirical object cannot be re-

garded as unreal for then these not being subject to causation would turn out to be eternal. So if the empirical objects are real the causal relation too would be real or neither would be real. As to the objections that if causality is universal by nature then everything would cause everything even if they happened to be of incompatible natures and that everything would be continually engaged in the causal operation, the answer is that the cause is productive only when it is accompanied by its auxiliaries. This is the very nature of the cause and this fact has already been established, This is the generality of the causal relation as everybody understands it. Even the empirical objects are endowed with this kind of generality only.

EXPL.: The author here takes up the question of the definiteness of the causal relationship. Not anything can be the cause of any other thing. What is it that restricts this relationship? According to the author it is the auxiliary conditions that restrict the relationship of a particular cause to a particular effect as also, when the cause would be productive of its effect. So even if the cause is such throughout its existence it is operative and effective only when it is accompanied by all its auxiliaries. So general causality is not the nature of anything. Only a particular cause is related to and productive of a particular effect if it is accompanied by auxiliaries.

An objection to the causal principle and its rebuttal

TEXT: स्यात् एतत्। अस्तु स्थिरं, तथापि नित्य-विभोः न कारणत्वं उपपद्यते। तथाहि अन्वय-व्यतिरेकाभ्यां कारणत्वं अवधार्यते, न अन्वय-मात्रेण। अतिप्रसङ्गात्। न च नित्य-विभूनां, व्यतिरेक-संभवः न च स-उपाधेः असौ अस्ति एव इति सांप्रतम्। तथाभूतस्य उपाधि-संबंधे अपि अनधिकारात्। जनितः हि तेन सः तस्य स्यात् नित्यः वा? न प्रथमः पूर्ववत्। नापि द्वितीयः, पूर्ववत् एव। तथापि च उपाधेः एव व्यतिरेकः न तस्य, अविशेषात्। तद्वतः इति चेत्? न। सः च उपाधिः च इत्यतः अन्यस्य अ-तद्वत्-पदार्थस्य अभावात्। भावे वा सः एव कारणं स्यात्। अत्र उच्यते-

पूर्व-भावः हि हेतुत्वं मीयते येन केनचित्।
व्यापकस्य अपि नित्यस्य धर्मि-धीः अन्यथा न हि॥

भवेत् एवं यदि अन्वय-व्यतिरेकौ एव कारणत्वम्। किंतु कार्यात् नियतः पूर्वभावः। सः च क्वचित् अन्वय-व्यतिरेकाभ्यां अवसीयते, क्वचित् धर्मि-ग्राहकात् प्रमाणात्। अन्यथा कार्यात् कारण-अनुमानं क्व अपि न स्यात्। तेन तस्य अनुविधान-अनुपलंभात्। उपलंभे वा कार्य-लिंग-अनवकाशात्। प्रत्यक्षतः एव तत्-सिद्धेः। तत्-जातीय-अनुविधान-दर्शनात् सिद्धिः अन्यत्र अपि न वार्यते। तथापि वस्तुगत्या अनुविहित-अन्वय-व्यतिरेके एव कार्यात् कारणं सिद्ध्येत्, अन्यत्र तथा दर्शनात् इति चेत्? न। बाधेन संकोचात्। विपक्षे बाधक-अभावेन च अव्याप्तेः। दर्शन-मात्रेण च उत्कर्ष-समत्वात्। अस्य च ईश्वरे विस्तरः वक्ष्यते। सर्व-व्यापकानां सर्वान् प्रति अन्वय-मात्र-अविशेषे कारणत्व-प्रसङ्गः बाधकं इति चेत्? न। अन्वय-व्यतिरेकवत्-जातीयतया विपक्षे बाधकेन च विशेषे अन्-अतिप्रसङ्गात्। तथाहि कार्यं समवायिकारणवत् दृष्टं इति अदृष्ट-आश्रयं अपि तत्-जातीय-कारणकम्। आश्रय-अभावे किं-प्रत्यासन्नं असमवायिकारणं स्यात्? तत्-अभावे निमित्तं अपि किं उपकुर्यात्? तथा च अनुत्पत्तिः, सतत-उत्पत्तिः वा सर्वत्र-उत्पत्तिः वा स्यात्। एवं अपि निमित्तस्य सामर्थ्यात् एव नियत-देश-उत्पादे सः एव देशः अवश्य-अपेक्षणीयः स्यात्। तथा च सामान्यतः देश-सिद्धौ इतर-पृथिव्यादि-बाधे तत्-अतिरिक्त-सिद्धिं कः वारयिता? एवं अत्र असमवायि-निमित्ते चोदनीये।

TRANS.: Let then be this (objection to the principle of causality). We may admit the durable but the (so-called) eternal and ubiquitous self cannot be a cause (of its supposed qualities like pleasure, pain etc.) To explain: Causality of a thing is ascertained by means of its positive and negative association together. Mere positive association does not suffice for this as even non-causes happen to be positively associated with the effects. But the eternal and ubiquitous entities can nowhere be absent. Can then the eternal self as qualified by a non-eternal condition like the body be supposed to be absent? No! The eternal ubiquitous entity can-

not even be qualified by or connected with a non-eternal condition. This so-called non-eternal condition may have been either produced by the eternal or it may itself be eternal. It cannot have been produced by the eternal because the eternal cannot be a cause for the reason mentioned. If the condition is eternal it cannot be even invariably connected with the eternal as such a connection too needs the positive and negative association of the eternal which cannot be had. Even if the connection is admitted there cannot be absence of the eternal self but only of the condition because, whether the condition is present or absent the self would always be present. But isn't it a fact that when the condition is absent the conditioned is also absent? No! Apart from the eternal self and the condition there is nothing like the conditioned whose absence can be separately considered. If there can be such a separate conditioned entity then it may itself be the cause.

Regarding this objection our answer is as follows:

> Causality in fact is invariable preexistence of the cause in relation to the effect and this can be ascertained by positive association or negative association or by means of both. If this is not admitted then it will not be possible for Cārvāka to prove even non-causality as, the self that is the minor term in the proof cannot be known. (The self is inferentially known as the cause of certain qualities but it cannot be a cause as it is eternal and ubiquitous).

The above objection of the Cārvāka can be sustained if causality were nothing but positive and negative association (which is not the case). Causality is in fact the unconditional preexistence of the cause in relation to the effect. This is known in some cases through positive and negative association of the cause with the effect and in some other cases it is known through the middle term which leads to the knowledge of the cause which is the minor term in the inferential proof. (This is the proof of the self as the cause of the qualities like pleasure, pain etc.) If it were not so (if only the positive and negative associations were the means of ascertaining causality) then nowhere the cause could be inferred from the effect. The effect which leads to the inference of the cause is never seen to be coexistent with it. If it is so seen then there will be no occasion to infer it as its reality would be apprehended by perception itself. But isn't there the possibility of cognising generic coexistence of the effect and the cause for the cause to be inferred on the basis of the cognition? Yes! There is, but such a cognition is available in the case of the self also. But even so is it not a fact that unless the effect and the cause are not cognised as actually coexistent the former cannot be validly inferred from the latter, as is seen to be the case in other instances? No! Since the causality of invisible eternal entities in respect of certain qualities or effects is jeopardised if the cognition of both positive and negative association of the cause with the effect is supposed to be essential for determining the causality of the former the supposition is taken to be confined to visible and non-pervasive entities only. Besides there is no evidence opposed to the opposite view that negative association is not required to be known for the determination of causality. If therefore on the basis of mere positive association anything coexisting with the middle term in an inference is sought to be inferred with the help of the cognition of the middle term there results the fallacy of proving too much; (technically known as उत्कर्षसम). This will be elaborated in the section dealing with the inferential proof of God. This view may be disputed on the ground that all ubiquitous and eternal entities are coexistent with everything in the world, so they would have to be reckoned as universal causes. But since the ubiquitous self etc. are like the non-eternal and non-ubiquitous causes (like pot etc.) of qualities like colour, smell etc. in respect of being the material causes of cognitions etc., their causality cannot be supposed to extend to every non-eternal object. Moreover a ubiquitous entity like the sky cannot be regarded as the material cause of cognition etc. as then even through the ear (which is the sky as circumscribed by the auricular orifice) one could have cognition (thus the causalities of ubiquitous entities may be supposed to be restricted). All producible entities are known to have material causes, so a quality like cognition whose substratum is unknown may also be taken to have its special material cause similar to pot, tree etc. in respect of its association with its qualities. The necessity of the material cause for an effect cannot be denied for then there can be neither a non-material nor an efficient cause. The non-material cause is one which inheres in the material cause while the efficient cause is that which helps the non-material cause (so these causes cannot obtain without the material cause). If all kinds of causes are denied then either there will be no production of anything at all or continual production of anything or everything or production everywhere (of everything). If however it is contended that only the efficient cause, by dint of its own capacity brings about the genesis of its effect at a particular place (there being no need of either the material or the non-material cause) then the particular place would have to be treated as essential for the genesis of the effect. Thus it would be generally established that a place or a substratum is needed for the genesis of an effect. Now in the case of cognition etc., if

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the earth, water, etc.—the eight known substances—are ruled out as the loci of the qualities then a ninth invisible substance like self cannot be denied to be the required locus. In like manner the need of the non-material and the efficient causes for cognition etc. may also be conceived.

EXPL.: After having defended the causal principle the author takes up for consideration the very important problem of the causality of the eternal entities. This problem is peculiar to the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* school which admits many eternal entities like time, space, self etc., The problem arises because the eternal and ubiquitous entities cannot be both positively and negatively associated with their effects whatever they may be. These entities being always and everywhere present the absence of their effects when they are absent is impossible to ascertain. A simple possible answer to the problem is that negative association of the cause with the effect is only a means of ascertaining causality. It is not the nature or defining property of causality. What defines or constitutes the causality of a cause is its unconditional preexistence to the effect and this can be known even in the case of the eternal cause. Further in the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* view particularly, all the substantive substrata of qualities are supposed to be the material causes but even their preexistence to them cannot be known. The non-eternal substances are supposed to exist in the moment of their origination without their qualities yet it is not possible to observe the substances as preexisting their qualities. Here the author makes an important observation that unless the cause is inferred as the substratum of its qualities it can never be inferred as cause. If the cause and the effect are seen together the cause will be the object of perception itself. So the inference of cause is possible only where the cause is the substratum of its qualities. If on the basis of the perception of the preexistence of the cause to the effect or their coexistence in a certain case their general coexistence is concluded then by means of this cognition the causality of eternal entities also can be inferred. There would then be no need to ascertain the negative association of the eternal cause with its effect.

If thus the eternal entities are proved to be the causes of their qualities then one may raise the objection that the eternal ubiquitous entities could be universal causes as they preexist every effect and this preexistence is unconditional (as it is not temporally or spatially restricted). In reply to this objection the author says that the causality of the eternal entity is of the same type as that of non-eternal entities and so it cannot be unrestricted and be effective without the help of auxiliary causal conditions. This is not a very convincing reply. If causality consists only of unconditional preexistence to the effect of the causal entity then there is no reason whatsoever to deny universal causality to the eternal. Any eternal entity should cause or be the substratum of any effect or quality. Perhaps it may be urged against this that the eternal entity that though capable of being the universal material cause it is not a non-material or an efficient cause of its qualities. Unless these causes are joined to the eternal entity it cannot be endowed with the qualities whose substratum it is supposed to be. This defence (of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* view) is also not convincing. How can the qualities of the eternal entity be its own if they need certain extraneous causes in addition to their substratum to produce them?

Concluding prayer

TEXT: इति एषा सहकारि-शक्तिः असमा माया दुर्-उन्नीतितः।
मूलत्वात् प्रकृतिः प्रबोध-भयतः अविद्या इति यस्य उदिता॥
ईशः असौ विरत-प्रपंच-रचना-कल्लोल कोलाहलः।
साक्षात् साक्षितया मनसि अभिरतिं बध्नातु शांतः मम॥

TRANS.: The Divine Being—whose auxiliary power, that is, destiny which differs from person to person, is known as Māyā or enigma because its real nature is incomprehensible, as *Prakṛti* because it is the original matrix of the whole universe and as *Avidyā* because it is dissipable by enlightenmen; Who is also a Being who transcends all chaos caused by the disorderly creativity relating to the structure of the world and Who is at peace with Himself—may such a Being instil devotion to Himself in my mind and also be a direct witness to my devotion to Him.

EXPL.: In this concluding verse the author offers prayer to God by way of extolling destiny which he describes as God's auxiliary power controlling the empirical career of selves in the world. In the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* view God in association with destiny (and some other common conditions like space, time, merit, demerit etc.) determines the goings-on in the world. In the chapter just completed the author discussed mainly the question whether there is some non-empirical cause like destiny producing diversity of all kind in the world or not. In the course of this discussion the author also discussed many subsidiary questions like those

of the different possible causes of the world, the locus of the merit produced by ritualistic and other activities, universal momentariness, the *Sāṃkhyan Prakṛti* and its evolutes being the components of the world-structure, the nature and justification of the causal relationship etc. By answering all these questions the author has upheld the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* view on all these questions. Now in the second chapter of the treatise the author turns to another and a most important question viz., the question of the reality of the Divine Being.

SECOND BUNCH OF FLOWERS
(of arguments)

Discussion of the causes of cognitive validity

TEXT: तत् एवं सामान्यत: सिद्धे अ-लौकिके हेतौ तत्-साधनेन अवश्यं भवितव्यम्। न च तत्-शक्यं अस्मदादिभि: द्रष्टुम्। न च अदृष्टेन व्यवहार:। तत: लोकोत्तर: सर्व-अनुभावी संभाव्यते।

ननु नित्य-निर्दोष-वेद-द्वारक: योग-कर्म-सिद्ध-सर्वज्ञ-द्वारक: वा धर्म-संप्रदाय: स्यात् किं परमेश्वर-कल्पनया इति चेत्? अत्र उच्यते-

प्रमाया: परतंत्रत्वात् सर्ग-प्रलय-संभवात्।
तत्-अन्यस्मिन् अन्-आश्वासात् न विचार-अंतर-संभव:॥

तथा हि प्रमा ज्ञान-हेतु-अतिरिक्त-हेतु-अधीना, कार्यत्वे सति तत्-विशेषत्वात् अ-प्रमावत्। यदि च तावत्-मात्र-अधीना भवेत् अप्रमा-अपि प्रमा एव भवेत्। अस्ति हि तत्र ज्ञान-हेतु:। अन्यथा ज्ञानं अपि सा न स्यात्। ज्ञानत्वे अपि अतिरिक्त-दोष-अनुप्रवेशात् अप्रमा इति चेत्? एवं हि दोष-अभावं अधिकं आसाद्य प्रमा अपि जायेत, नियमेन तत्-अपेक्षत्वात्। अस्तु दोष-अभाव: अधिक:, भाव: तु न इष्यते इति चेत्? भवेत् अपि एवं यदि नियमेन दोषै: भाव-रूपै: एव भवितव्यम्। न तु एवम्। विशेष-अदर्शनादे: अभावस्य अपि दोषत्वात्। कथं अन्यथा तत: संशय-विपर्ययौ। तत: तत्-अभाव: भाव: एव इति कथं स: न इष्यते? स्यात् एतत्। शाब्दे तावत् विप्रलिप्सादय: भावा: एव दोषा:, तत: तत्-अभावे स्वत: एव शाब्दी प्रमा इति चेत्? न। अनुमानादौ लिंग-विपर्यासादीनां भावानां अपि दोषत्वे तत्-अभाव-मात्रेण प्रमा-अनुत्पत्ते:। अन्यत्र यथा तथा अस्तु शब्दे तु विप्रलिप्सादि-अभावे वक्तृ-गुण-अपेक्षा न अस्ति इति चेत्? न। गुण-अभावे तत्-अप्रामाण्यस्य वक्तृ-दोष-अपेक्षा नास्ति

इति विपर्ययस्य अपि सुवचत्वात्। अ-प्रामाण्यं प्रति दोषाणां अन्वय-व्यतिरेकौ स्तः इति चेत्? न। प्रामाण्यं प्रति अपि गुणानां तयोः सत्वात्। पौरुषेय-विषये इयं अस्तु व्यवस्था,अ-पौरुषेये तु दोष-निवृत्त्या एव प्रामाण्यं इति चेत्? न। गुण-निवृत्त्या अ-प्रामाण्यस्य अपि संभवात्। तस्याः अप्रामाण्यं प्रति सामर्थ्यं न उपलब्धं इति चेत्? दोष-निवृत्तेः प्रामाण्यं प्रति क्व सामर्थ्यं उपलब्धम्? लोक-वचसि इति चेत्? तुल्यम्। तत्-अप्रामाण्ये दोषः एव कारणं, गुण-निवृतिः तु अ-वर्जनीय-सिद्ध-संनिधिः इति चेत्? प्रामाण्यं प्रति गुणेषु अपि तुल्यं एतत्। गुणानां दोष-उत्सारण-प्रयुक्तः संनिधिः इति चेत्। दोषाणां अपि गुण-उत्सारण-प्रयुक्तः इति अस्तु। निः स्वभावत्वं एवं अपौरुषेयस्य वेदस्य स्यात् इति चेत्? आत्मानं उपालभस्व। तस्मात् यथा द्वेष, राग-अभाव-अविना भावे अपि राग-द्वेषयोः अनुविधान-नियमात् प्रवृत्ति-निवृत्ति-प्रयत्नयोः राग-द्वेष-कारणकत्वं, न तु निवृत्ति-प्रयत्नः द्वेष-हेतुकः, प्रवृति-प्रयत्नः तु सति अपि राग-अनुविधाने द्वेष-अभाव-हेतुकः इति विभागः युज्यते, विशेष-अभावात्: तथा प्रकृते अपि।

TRANS.: Since a non-empirical cause (of the world) like destiny has thus (by means of inferences discussed in the previous section) been established (it may be concluded that) there has necessarily to be a cause which brings destiny into being. Whatever may be this cause its causality in respect of destiny cannot at all be observed by beings like us. And there cannot proceed any purposeful activity relating to that which transcends our knowledge (or observation). There has therefore to be an extraordinary and omniscient being (who can and does impart the knowledge of the said causality to human beings so that they could undertake the right kind of actions).

It may here be asked, 'why posit a being like the almighty God when the continuity of the religious tradition (from immemorial times) can be explained as based on the authority of the eternal and faultless Vedic lore or the teachings of sages like Kapila who attained omniscience by means of their practice of the *yogic* discipline and religious activities? In reply we state the following:

Since right cognition or knowledge depends upon conditions external to it and since creation and annihilation of the world may occur

again and again (because of which the knowledge of the Vedas cannot be preserved without interruption caused by annihilation) and also since even the teachings of the sages cannot be wholly depended upon, therefore there is no go but to admit the reality of God to explain the uninterrupted existence of the religious tradition.

To explain: There is the inference that a veridical cognition depends upon causes which are different from the causes of cognition in general because it is a product and a species of cognition like false cognition. If veridical cognition depended only upon the causes of cognition in general then even false cognition could turn out to be a case of veridical cognition as even false cognition depends upon the causes of all cognitions. If it did not do so then it would cease to be a cognition. But isn't it the case that although invalid cognition is cognition yet it requires the inclusion of some defects in the causal collocation producing cognition to produce it? Well! If this is so then veridical cognition also may be supposed to require the inclusion of the absence of defects in the causal collocation producing it because absence of defects is a necessary condition of the production of veridical cognition. Alright! Let there be then this extra condition namely, absence of defects but we don't admit the need of a positive extra condition for the veridical cognition. This may be accepted if all defects obstructing the generation of veridical cognition were positive in nature but such certainly is not the case. Even the non-observation (or non-cognition of the distinctive features of the objects of perception) which is negative in nature may also be a defect. If it were not so how can doubt and false cognition arise from such non-cognition? So why not admit that the absence of this non-cognition is a positive entity only (namely the cognition of the distinctive features)? If non-cognition of the distinctive features of the object present were not a defect (causing misperception) how can doubt and misperception result from it?

Alright! Let this non-cognition be a defect for perception but so far as verbal cognition is concerned its defects are only the intent to mislead (by means of false statement) etc., and these being positive in nature it is only their absence that gives rise to veridical verbal cognition. (So since no positive causal condition is needed for the generation of veridical verbal cognition its veridicity may be deemed to be intrinsic). But such is not the case with inference and other nonverbal cognitions. Although a deviant middle term is a positive defect vitiating inference yet veridical inference cannot arise simply from the absence of this and other defects (as the presence of some positive qualities is also needed for it). Alright! Let anything be the case with other sources of cognition

but isn't it a fact that so far as verbal cognition is concerned there is no need of any excellence or merit in the speaker (or utterer of words over and above the absence of the above-mentioned defects) to generate veridicity in the cognition? Yes, then we can also say that the falsehood of a false verbal cognition is generated only by the absence of excellence or merit and so it does not require any positive defect to produce it (which is admitted by both the parties). But isn't the positive and negative association of defects with the falsehood of cognition already established (and so undeniable)?. Yes, it is and so is also established the positive and negative association of merit in the speaker and the veridicity of the verbal cognition. But let this hold good in the case of human speech only; in the case of the Vedic scripture however its veridicity may well be taken to be determined by the absence of the above-mentioned defects only! It may be contended. But then no positive merit being present in the scriptures (as they have no author) they could be regarded even non-veridical. If it is argued against this that the absence of merit is not known to generate or determine non-veridicity then it can be counter-argued that even absence of defects is not known to determine veridicity. In common speech in fact the causality of the absences of defects and merits in respect of veridicity and falsehood respectively of the former is equally established. Couldn't it be urged that falsehood of common speech is caused only by defects; as to the absence of merit (which is associated with falsehood), its presence when the defects are present is simply unavoidable? Well! In the case of the causality of merits also a similar contention is quite possible. But aren't merits needed for the elimination of defects? Yes! Defects also can be supposed to be needed for eliminating merits. But if these (veridicity and falsehood are caused by the merits and defects of the speaker then since) there is no (first) speaker of the scripture will the latter be devoid of any distinctive features of its own? Yes! This will be so for you who regard the scriptures as authorless. (We do not so regard it). So, as in the cases of efforts for acquisition and avoidance of things, although there obtains invariable association between absence of aversion and absence of desire for the things and the two kinds of effort respectively yet the latter are supposed to be caused only by desire and aversion respectively because of the invariable sequential relation that the latter respectively have with the former so it is in the present cases too. It is not rational to regard the effort of inclination as caused only by absence of aversion but the opposite kind of effort to have aversion as its cause, although there obtains an invariable sequential relationship between desire and the effort of inclination. There is no cause for discrimination between the two cases.

Still one may contend here that once the scriptures are proved to be authorless their veridicity can be established simply because they are not afflicted by any shortcoming associated with authorship. So this veridicity will remain unafflicted even if there are no merits to produce it. Why not then admit only absence of defects as the cause of the veridicity of the scriptures? (Merits are redundant for the veridicity). Well! If so then there can also be the opposite contention that the scriptures cannot be veridical as they are not associated with any author's merit (or excellence). Even then it can be contended that veridicity is certainly intrinsic. Yet because falsehood is caused by defects, the absence of defects in the scriptures is particularly mentioned above to remove every suspicion of falsehood in the latter. (There is no inference of veridicity here). There is therefore no occasion to set forth an inference to oppose the veridicity of the scriptures. But despite this the suspicion of falsehood caused by the absence of merit can certainly arise. If it is objected that mere absence of merit unattended by some defect cannot give rise to the suspicion of falsehood then it may also be objected that mere absence of defects unattended by some merit cannot give rise to veridicity. So both contentions are equally balanced against each other.

EXPL.: Now the author takes up the issue of the veridicity and falsehood of cognitions. This issue is divided into two parts viz. the origination of the veridicity and falsehood of cognition and the cognition of these properties of cognition. Nyāya holds the view both with regard to the causation and the cognition of these properties that these are external to the cognition to which they belong. There are conditions external to a cognition which produce veridicity in it or endow it with veridicity and there are certain other conditions which endow the cognition with falsehood. In this first section the author seeks to prove this external causation of veridicity and falsehood by means of an inference like this: A veridical cognition is produced by conditions which are other than the general conditions of all cognitions because it is a producible entity and a species of cognition like the false cognition. In this inference false cognition is cited as an instance of the concomitance of the middle and major terms of the inference because the external causation of the falsehood of false cognitions is acceptable to all schools of philosophy. They disagree only about the external causation of the veridicity of cognitions. It may here be objected that the so-called special conditions of veridical

cognitions are also conditions of cognitions. They cannot be denied to be the conditions of any cognition. This difficulty can be overcome by properly defining the term (which is the major term in the inference) 'not being the condition of all cognition'. The definition may be like this: 'The effecthood of which condition (in relation to veridicity) is not determined by the general property cognitionness which is common to all cognitions'. The special conditions determine only veridicity and falsehood of cognitions which do not pervade all cognitions. But can cognitionness be the determinant of any cognitive effecthood when there are cognitions which are eternal and therefore not producible at all? Only cognitionness as coexistent with producibility will be the determinant of the cognitive effecthood. If the major term is modified by introducing the qualification, 'coexistent with producibility', then since sense-organs are causally connected with a particular type of cognition only namely, perception, the effecthood relating to sense-organs will not be determined by the above property so that perception would turn out to be the cognition fulfilling the above description of the major term. As a result there will arise the fallacy of 'proving the already proved' (called सिद्ध साधन in Sanskrit.) This difficulty can be avoided if the above qualification is partly replaced by a negative qualification, so that the effecthood is described as one which is not determined either by veridicity or falsehood. The effecthood relating to sense-organs and characterising perceptual cognitions is determined by either of these two properties. Both veridical and false perceptions are caused by sense-object-contact. 'Coexistence with producibility', which is a part of the above qualification will of course remain as constituent of the major term, as eternal cognitions are not characterised by effecthood. Even this modification of the major term is found to lead to the above fallacy. For example a particular causal collocation of a certain type (which is supposed to be productive of cognition as such) does not produce all cognitions generically related to it as effects. So this particular collocation is different from those productive of all cognitions. Such individual causation relating to individual cognitions is an established fact. The inference which proves this is riddled with the fallacy of proving the already proved. It could be contended against this that the veridical cognition is not generically related to the individual collocations; only an individual instance of the latter is so related to it as its cause, so the fallacy cannot arise. This contention is not wrong but then the example instantiating the invariable concomitance of the middle and major terms in the inference, namely, the false cognition, would be falsified. A false cognition is not produced by a causal collocation which is productive of a veridical cognition. The inference cannot have a major term which occurs both in the minor (the veridical cognition) and the cominor(the false cognition). Besides veridicity coexistent with cognitionness cannot be the determinant of the effecthood of the veridical cognition as there is the eternal cognition of God which is eternal but unproduced. Veridicity therefore over-extends effecthood. The point of the above polemic is that cognition as cognition cannot be treated as a producible entity as there is the non-producible divine cognition. For this very reason even veridical cognition cannot be viewed as producible in its capacity as veridical cognition. Besides the external causal condition of veridicity, to be inferentially established, would be excluded by the major term itself if the latter is defined as 'being produced by a causal condition which is other than that which determines the effecthood of a veridical cognition'.

All these difficulties can be got over by reformulating the above inference in some such way: 'A product which is unlike another (product) generically is produced by causes which are unlike (generically) the latter as is for example a pot (which being unlike a piece of cloth has causes differing from those producing the latter)'. Another slightly complicated but more precise formulation of the inference would be this: Veridicity cohering with non-eternity is the determining property of the effecthood relating to the causality which is different from the causality relating to the effecthood determined by the generic property cognitionness cohering with non-eternity, because the former property viz., veridicity cohering with non-eternity is of a narrower scope than the latter property. The example illustrating the concomitance of the middle and major terms is falsehood. Simply put what this amounts to is that the special cause of the veridicity of cognition (or the determinant of the effecthood of this veridicity) is different from the cause of (non-eternal) cognitions as a whole (or is different from the determinant of the effecthood pertaining to the causality of cognitions as such).

Now the Mīmāṃsā school which advocates intrinsic veridicity coupled with extrinsic falsehood of cognition takes objection to the above inferences on the ground that while the presence of defects (of the sense-organs and other means of cognitions) is essential for the coming into being of a false cognition or a doubt no such cause is needed for the emergence of a veridical cognition. On this account cognitive veridicity may be viewed as intrinsic. Certainly if the means of cognitions are defective, the cognition resulting from them cannot be veridical, so it is essential that all possible defects must be nonexistent before the

veridical cognition arises. This nonexistence of defects is not a positive entity. So veridicity of a cognition need not be supposed to be externally caused. But if non-perception of the distinctive characteristics of two things is taken to be conducive to doubt about their identity then the absence of this non-perception which is the same as perception would have to be regarded as the positive cause of the definite and veridical cognition. If somehow this positive condition is equated with the absence of a negative condition and thus the intrinsic nature of veridicity is sought to be defended then in the same manner the intrinsic nature of falsehood also can be defended. It can be urged that it is the absence of merit in the means of cognition that is conducive to their defectiveness. It is necessary therefore to treat both veridicity and falsehood on equal footing. If one is regarded as intrinsic the other too must be so regarded and neither defects nor merits can be treated as mere absences of each other. The Mīmāṃsaka may again object that the scripture will be devoid of both veridicity and falsehood as neither merits nor defects are needed for their emergence. But this is the view of the Mīmāṃsaka only. The adherent of Nyāya does not regard the scripture as authorless and therefore not dependent upon any merit for its creation.

What comes out from the above discussion is the fact that no causal collocation can be identified as what is needed for cognition as such. Different causal collocations are needed for different types of cognition like perception, inference etc. 'For example sense-object-contact is needed for perception, the cognition of the presence of the middle term in the minor is needed for inference and so on. Even merit or efficiency required for veridical cognition differs from one type of cognition to that of another type. So the intrinsicality and extrinsicality of veridicity or falsehood as defined by the author had to be redefined as above. Of course the self-mind-body-(certain sensitive regions in the body)-contact can be seen to be the common cause of all cognitions but as stated above—the means of perception, inference etc. would then be other than this common cause, which being needed both by veridical and false cognitions the inference to external causation of the latter would be vitiated by the fallacy of proving the already proved.

It may here be noted that in the Nyāya view both veridical and false cognitions are full-fledged specimens of cognition while in the Mīmāṃsā view only veridical cognition is cognition. The so-called false cognition is just a counterfeit of cognition. So according to Nyāya all the causal conditions of veridical cognition are not the same as all the conditions of false cognition. For Mīmāṃsā the question of the causal conditions of false cognition does not arise at all.

Proof for the view that cognitive veridicity is externally cognised

TEXT: एवं प्रामाण्यं परतः ज्ञायते, अन्-अभ्यास-दशायां सांशयिकत्वात् अप्रामाण्यवत्। यदि तु स्वतः ज्ञायेत कदाचित् अपि प्रामाण्य-संशयः न स्यात्। ज्ञानत्व-संशयवत्। निश्चिते तत्-अनवकाशात्। न हि साधक-बाधक-प्रमाणाभावं अवधूय समान-धर्मादि-दर्शनात् एव असौ। तथा सति तत्-अनुच्छेद-प्रसङ्गात्। अथ प्रमाणवत् अप्रमाणे अपि तत्-प्रत्यय-दर्शनात् विशेष-अदर्शनात् भवति शंका इति अभिप्रायः, तत् किं प्रमाण-ज्ञान-उपलंभे अपि न तत्-प्रामाण्यं उपलब्धं, प्रमाण-ज्ञानं एव वा न उपलब्धम्? आद्ये कथं स्वतः-प्रामाण्य-ग्रहः, प्रत्यय-प्रतीतौ अपि तत् अप्रतीतेः? द्वितीये कथं तत्र शंका? धर्मिणः एव अनुपलब्धेः इति। यत् अपि झटिति प्रचुरतर-समर्थ प्रवृत्ति-अन्यथा-अनुपपत्त्या स्वतः प्रामाण्यं उच्यते तत् अपि नास्ति। अन्यथा एव उपपत्तेः। झटिति प्रवृत्तिः हि झटिति तत्-कारण-उपनिपातं-अंतरेण अन्-उपपद्यमाना तं आक्षिपेत्। प्रचुर-प्रवृत्तिः अपि स्व-कारण-प्राचुर्यम्। इच्छा च प्रवृत्तेः कारणम्। तत्-कारणं अपि इष्ट-अभ्युपायता-ज्ञानम्। तत् अपि तत्-जातीयत्व-लिंग-अनुभव-प्रभवम्। सः अपि इन्द्रिय-संनिकर्षादि-जन्मा। न तु प्रामाण्य-ग्रहस्य क्वचित् अपि उपयोगः। उपयोगे वा स्वतः एव इति कुतः एतत्? ततः समर्थ-प्रवृत्ति-प्राचुर्यं अपि प्रामाण्य-प्राचुर्यात्, तत्-ग्रहण-प्राचुर्यात् वा। स्वतः त्वं तु तस्य क्व उपयुज्यते? न हि पिपासूनां झटिति प्रचुरा समर्था च प्रवृत्तिः अंभसि इति पिपासा-उपशमन-शक्तिः तस्य प्रत्यक्षा स्यात्।

स्यात् एतत्। प्रामाण्य-ग्रहे सति सर्वं एतत् उपपद्यते। सः च स्वतः यदि न स्यात्, न स्यात् एव। परतः-पक्षस्य अनवस्था-दुःस्थत्वात् इति चेत्? न। तत्-अ-ग्रहे अपि अर्थ-संदेहात् अपि सर्वस्य उपपत्तेः। न च अनवस्था अपि। प्रामाण्यस्य अवश्य-ज्ञेयत्व-अनभ्युपगमात्। अन्यथा स्वतः-पक्षे अपि सा स्यात्। लिंगं निश्चितं एव निश्चायकम्। ततः तत्-

निश्चय-अर्थं अवश्यं लिंग-अंतर-अपेक्षायां अनवस्था इति चेत्? तत् किं अन्-उपपद्यमानः अर्थः अ-निश्चितः एव स्व-उपपादकं आक्षिपति, येन अनवस्था न स्यात्? प्रत्यक्षेण तस्य निश्चयात् तस्य च सत्तया एव निश्चायकत्वात् न एवं इति चेत्? मम अपि प्रत्यक्षेण लिंग-निश्चयात् तस्य च सत्तया एव निश्चायकत्वात् न एवं इति तुल्यम्। लिंग-ज्ञानस्य प्रामाण्य-अनिश्चये कथं तत्-निश्चयः स्यात् इति चेत्? अन्-उपपद्यमान-अर्थज्ञानस्य प्रामाण्य-अनिश्चये कथं तत्-निश्चयः इति तुल्यम्। न हि निश्चयेन स्व-प्रामाण्य-निश्चयेन वा विषयं निश्चाययति प्रत्यक्षम्। अपि तु स्व-सत्तया इति उक्तं इति चेत्? तुल्यम्। तथापि यदि तत्-लिंग-आभासः स्यात् तदा का वार्ता इति चेत्? अन्-उपपद्यमानः अपि अर्थः यदि आभासः स्यात् तदा का वार्ता इति तुल्यम्। सः अपि प्रामाण्यं आक्षिपति इति उत्सर्गः। सः च क्वचित् बाधकेन अपोद्यते इति चेत्? लिंगे अपि एवं इति तुल्यम्। तर्हि प्रामाण्य-अनुमाने अपि शंका तदवस्था एव इति निष्फलः प्रयासः इति चेत्? एतत् अपि तादृक् एव। अन्-उपपद्यमानः अयं एव असौ तथाविधः कश्चित् यः स्वप्ने अपि न आभासः स्यात् ततः न आशंका इति चेत्? लिंगे अपि एवं इति समः समाधिः। कः पुनः असौ अर्थः यः स्वप्ने अपि न आभासः स्यात्, यत् अन्-उपलंभे विभ्रम-अवकाशः यादृक्-उपलंभे च तत्-बाध-व्यवस्था? अन्यथा हि तथाभूतस्य अपि व्यभिचारे सा अपि न स्यात्। मा भूत् इति चेत्? न। भवितव्यं हि तत्व-अ-तत्व-अर्थ-विभागेन। अन्यथा व्याघातात्। कथं हि नियामक-निःशेष-विशेष-उपलंभे अपि विपरीत-आरोपः? तथा-भावे वा तत्-अतिरिक्त-विशेष-अनुपलंभे कथं बाधकम्? तत्-अभावे तु अबाधस्य कथं भ्रांतत्वं इति?

TRANS.: Similarly cognitive veridicity is externally cognised. If a certain cognition is not of the familiar type (that is to say it is not known to be similar to those cognitions where veridicity is well-established) then its veridicity can be suspect. Just like the falsehood of the false cognition the veridicity of the veridical cognition too is externally cognised (which means that the causal collocation leading to the cognition of the cognition is not adequate for yielding the cognition of the veridicity of the cognition. Some causal conditions over and above the former are needed for the cognition of cognitive veridicity). If cognitive veridicity is self-cognised (in the sense just mentioned) then the latter would never become suspect just as the cognitive nature of cognitions does not ever become suspect. There cannot be doubt about veridicity if it is definitely cognised. Mere perception of a property common to both veridical and false cognitions and characterising the veridical cognition but unaccompanied by the absence of either a positive or negative proof (for or against veridicity) cannot engender doubt about veridicity. If it did then the doubt can never be dispelled (as a common property like cognitionness common to both veridical and false cognitions will always be there as the object of perception). It may be urged against this that unless some distinctive property of the veridical cognition (or one associated with it) is not perceived there is bound to be doubt about veridicity as even a false cognition is sometimes mistaken for a veridical cognition. (This happens because the distinctive character of the false cognition goes unnoticed). If this is so then one may ask whether even when a veridical cognition is cognised its veridicity remains uncognised or the cognition of the veridical cognition in such a situation doesn't arise at all? If the first is true then how can there be the intrinsic cognition of cognitive veridicity (as veridicity remains uncognised even when the cognition is cognised)? If the second alternative is true how can there be doubt about veridicity when the subject of the doubt namely the veridical cognition is itself uncognised? (There is nothing given about which doubt can be expressed).

There are some disputants who justify self-cognition of cognitive veridicity on the ground that mostly a cognition gives rise to the successful disposition towards action without any delay and this cannot happen unless the cognition is known to be veridical as soon as it comes into being. But this justification is not correct because the non-delayed functioning of cognition can be explained otherwise. The occurrence of the immediate impact of cognition on disposition presupposes the occurrence of the collocation of its causes because without its causal conditions coming together it cannot take place. The frequency of the occurrence of the dispositions for action also presuppress the presence of an abundance of its causal conditions. The disposition is caused by desire. As to the desire, it is caused by the cognition that a certain cause of action leads to the fulfilment of the desire. And this cognition too is obtained as a result of the inference that the course of action is generically similar to another whose efficacy had already been ascertained in

the past by means of its successful culmination. This cognition—in its turn—is attained by means of sense-object-contact. Nowhere in the causal chain the use of the cognition of veridicity of cognition is noticeable. Even if the veridicity-cognition is supposed to be of use in furthering this process how can its intrinsicality be of any relevance to the use? Hence it has to be admitted that the high frequency of success (in the case) of dispositions to action is due (mainly) to the highly veridical character of the cognition giving rise to the disposition or the strong conviction that the cognition is endowed with veridicity. As to the alleged self-cognisedness of the cognition, where in this process leading to action can it be of use? Certainly it is not the case that since thirsty people happen to be impatient and eager to drink water they also directly visualise the thirst-quenching capacity of water. (The capacity is a property of water but it is not apprehended through the apprehension of water by the thirsty people simply because their thirst is intense. Similarly, however strong the conviction about the veridicity of a cognition may be it cannot be produced simply by the causal collocation producing the awareness of the cognition characterised by the veridicity.

Alright! Let then there be this argument (against the external veridicity view). The foregoing argument (of Nyāya) is justified only if veridicity of cognition can be apprehended. But if there is not self-apprehension of veridicity it cannot be apprehended at all. This is so because the extrinsic-apprehension-view is riddled with the fallacy of infinite regress. This argument is easily disposed of. Even if veridicity remains unknown, a doubtful cognition of it can also explain everything that needs to be explained. Nor is there any infinite regress (in external-veridicity view) as it is not admitted that veridicity of cognitions is necessarily to be cognised. If this were not so then even in the intrinsic-veridicity view there will arise infinite regress (as cognitive veridicity is supposed to be implied by the knownness in the object which is the result in the Mīmāṃsā view of the cognitive activity on the object. If cognitive veridicity cannot remain uncognised then the veridicity of the cognition of knownness will have itself to be cognised and the veridicity of this latter cognition will also have to be cognised. Thus there is bound to arise infinite regress). But is it not the case that the reason or middle term (like capacity to lead to the disposition to action) in the inference of cognitive veridicity cannot lead to the establishment of its major term unless its own veridicity has been established and inference to establish this veridicity will need another inference to establish its own veridicity; thus there is sure to result infinite regress in the opposite view? Well! Is it suggested by this argument that in the intrinsic-veridicity-view an inexplicable fact implies the explicating fact without its own veridicity being established? (As explained above it is for the explication of the fact of knownness that the prior occurrence of cognition producing knownness in the cognised object and its own veridicity are postulated). If so then this view too gives rise to infinite regress (as the veridicity of the inexplicable fact would first have to be ascertained before its implicate is found out and then the ascertainment in its turn would have to be ascertained for its veridicity and so on). It may be urged against this objection that the inexplicable fact (viz. the knownness appearing in the known object) is attested by perception itself and the perception by itself (without depending upon any other cognition attesting its veridicity) attests the reality of its object? The answer to this contention is that an exactly similar explanation is available in the case of the cognition of the middle term in the inference of cognitive veridicity. The middle can be perceptually cognised while the perception does not need to be cognised or attested by any cognition. If it is asked how the unauthenticated cognition of the middle term can yield an authentic cognition of the major term the answer is the counter-question how the unauthenticated cognition of the inexplicable fact can yield the authentic cognition of the prior occurrence of cognition. But isn't it the case that perception does not depend upon any definite cognition for the cognition of its object and so the inexplicable fact if perceived can quite well lead to the inference of the prior occurrence of cognition (as stated above). Yes! But this can be the case with the cognition of the middle term too. What would then be the case if the middle term turns out to be fallacious? Well! What would be the case if the alleged inexplicable fact also turns out to be fallacious? It may be said in reply to this that all inexplicables are natural impliers of their explicators. Only if there is some contrary evidence then this implication is prevented from taking place. (Even apparent inexplicables may be supposed to imply their implicates which appear to be the explicators). This reply applies in the case of the apparent (and fallacious) middle term also. But then even a fallacious middle term can help establish cognitive veridicity so that there would be no need to have a faultless middle term (like productivity of successful disposition to action). The effort to find out such a middle term would be simply wasted. Such a rejoinder however vitiates even the intrinsic-veridicity-cognition-view as even a false cognition of inexplicability (of knownness) could be supposed to lead to the postulation of veridicity of the explicating cognition. If it is contended against this that there can be some inexplicable fact which cannot be suspected to be illusory even in a dream state and on the basis of this cognitive veridicity

is postulable then even the middle term in the inference of veridicity can be regarded as beyond reproach and cognitive veridicity inferred by means of it. Thus in both cases the same contention holds good. 'But what kind of thing is this which is not falsified even in a dream (-like state)?' It may be asked. The answer is this: 'That whose non-cognition provides scope for the occurrence of illusion and whose cognition as such and such helps dispel the illusion and thereby establish the contradictory cognition is the thing that is not falsified even in a dream (or dreamlike state). If the middle term in an inference, despite fulfilling the aforesaid qualification is found to deviate from its major term then the opposition between illusion and truth would cease to exist. This opposition cannot be denied as the dichotomy between reality and unreality has got to be granted on pain of incurring self-contradiction. How can an incompatible property be imposed on a thing when all properties determining the nature of the thing are seen as characterising it? If some property other than those that determine the nature of a thing is not seen as characterising it along with the latter and yet the said imposition is made then it cannot be dispelled by the veridical cognition of the thing. And if there is no dispelling then the property imposed cannot be treated as illusory. (Above it is explained what kind of object can never be falsified or be subject to illusory imposition. Towards the end this explanation is elaborated. For example, if all the specific properties of a shell which determine the shell-nature are observed in a piece of shell then silverness—a property incompatible with shellness—cannot be observed along with shellness in the shell. As stated in the earlier explanation the cognition of shellness is preventive of the cognition of silverness. Of course if some property coexistent with silverness like the sheen of silver is observed in the shell then silverness may be observed in the shell. If despite its incompatibility with shellness silverness was observed as coexisting with shellness in the shell then the false observation or illusion will cease to be an illusion as it is not prevented from arising by the veridical cognition of the shell).

EXPL.: In the previous section the author discussed threadbare one important question relating to veridicity and falsehood of cognition namely, the question whether a cognition is by nature veridical or false and answered it in the negative. Some external conditions determine the truth or falsehood of cognitions according to Nyāya. In the Mīmāṃsā-view a cognition can never be false, what appears to be such is not cognition at all. True cognition is the only cognition that is there. So there is no question of the truth or veridicity of cognition being caused or determined by any condition external to cognition.

Now another related question is being taken up for consideration. This is the question of the cognition of the veridicity and falsehood of cognition. On this question also there are the same parties advocating positions similar to the previous ones. Nyāya says that both veridicity and falsehood of a cognition are cognised by a causal collocation different from that which is productive of the cognition of the cognition. In the view of the Bhaṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsā the inference or postulatory evidence which yields the cognition of a cognition also yields the cognition of its veridicity. The falsehood of a cognition however is cognised through inference which has nothing to do with the cognition of the cognition. In the Buddhist view which is not discussed in the text, falsehood of an unfamiliar cognition is cognised as soon as the cognition arises. Its veridicity however needs to be established by means of inference. In the view of Murārī Miśra, the founder of a Mīmāṃsā school about which not much is known, the veridicity of a cognition is cognised through introspection of the cognition. The followers of Prabhākara, the founder of another Mīmāṃsā school are of the view that cognition cognises its object, itself and its veridicity. Keeping this diversity of views on this issue in view it is necessary to formulate the problem for discussion in such terms that all the different views would be represented by it. Since all disputants are agreed on the external cognition of cognitive falsehood the required formulation has to represent views on the cognition of cognitive veridicity only. A tentative formulation will be somewhat like this: 'Is cognitive veridicity cognised by the same causal collocation which leads to the cognition of the cognition or not? The affirmative alternative in this disjunction represents the intrinsic-veridicity-views while the negative alternative represents the external-veridicity-views. The formulation as it stands is not properly worded because even the external-veridicity-view is covered by its affirmative side. The inference of the veridicity of cognition has the cognition which is the qualificand of veridicity also as its object so it can be regarded as a condition included in the causal collocation producing cognition of the cognition whose veridicity is in question. On this very ground cognitive falsehood also would have to be treated as intrinsically cognisable. The inference yielding the cognition of falsehood also yields the cognition of the cognition which is the qualificand of the falsehood. So the formulation would have to be modified to read thus; 'Is or is not the veridicity of a cognition cognised by a cognition which is not produced by the cognition of the former? In the intrinsic-veridicity-view a cognition is

cognised only as endowed with veridicity. This cognition of cognition is unproduced by it. But on the external-veridicity-view the inference leading to the cognition of veridicity of a cognition is necessarily produced by the cognition of the latter because for the inference of veridicity in the latter it has to be cognised beforehand as it is the major term in the inference. But this modification of the formulation is also not free from difficulty. Veridicity which is generally defined as 'not having an epistemic qualificand whose qualifier is not resident in it' cannot be the object of the cognition of a veridical cognition. The negative defining property of the veridical cognition cannot be supposed to appear in the introspective cognition of a veridical cognition. However if veridicity is understood as the simple property of 'having an epistemic qualificand with a qualifier which is resident in it' then every cognition of veridical cognition can be expected to apprehend this property. Since the veridical cognition has for its object an entity which appears in the cognition as characterised by a property residing in it the introspective cognition of the veridical cognition has to have only such an entity as its indirect object. If, for example the veridical cognition of a yonder piece of silver as silver is cognised, then the veridicity of this cognition which consists in its apprehension of the piece of silver as qualified by silverness, is sure to be cognised in the cognising cognition. If the qualifierness of silverness in relation to silver did not appear in the cognition of cognition then the latter may also have the form, 'I see something before me as also the property of silverness' instead of the usual form, 'I see something as silver'. Thus in the intrinsic-veridicity-cognition-view the cognition of cognition itself is supposed to apprehend both the cognition and its veridicity or the cognition as endowed with veridicity. The epistemic qualifier as resident in its qualificand is supposed to be cognised by the cognition of the veridical cognition. Such a view is not acceptable to the upholders of the external-veridicity-cognition-view. According to them if there occurs the cognition of an unfamiliar object or a cognition not of the usual type (with which one is familiar) then the veridicity of the cognition may be subject to doubt. This suggests that the qualifier appearing in such a cognition does not appear as actually residing in it. The form of the doubtful cognition of an object, say a piece of silver is 'Is it silver or just some glossy metal?' In this cognition both silverness and the property of being a glossy metal appear as epistemic qualifiers. Only one of these is actually resident in the object perceived.

Now there arises an important question in the external-veridicity view. If cognitive veridicity is to be inferentially established the middle term of this inference would be nothing other than 'causality in relation to successful urge for actions.' A cognition giving rise to a successful urge for action is generally veridical. The determinant of the cognitive causality in respect of the urge is the veridical being, or cognitive veridicity itself. So the major term and the determinant of the middleness of the middle term turn out to be identical. Thus cognitive veridicity happens to be inferred by means of a middle term which itself or its middleness is determined by veridicity. It may be urged to justify the inference that the said causality is not generically-determined. Each individual veridical cognition is separately identified as leading to a successful urge for action. On the basis of this characteristic of being the cause of a successful urge for action each veridical cognition is inferred to be veridical. But how is this causality of the cognition ascertained? If by perception, then the perception must occur either before or after the urge has arisen. It cannot occur when the urge is yet to arise because the causality relates to it. Nor can the perception occur after the urge has arisen because by the time the urge has resulted in successful action the cognition which is the remote cause of the action has gone out of existence. One answer to this difficulty is that although the cognition which caused the urge goes out of existence when the result of the action emerges yet the subjective impression left behind by the cognition evokes the memory of the cognition and then its causality relating to the urge is apprehended. Another answer to the difficulty is this. If, for example the veridicity of the cognition of the earthy nature of an earthy object is to be ascertained then, first, the cognition is apprehended as having earthiness as the epistemic qualifier of its qualificand. Thereafter there arises the sensory cognition of the quality of smell which is the specific quality of earthy objects. This is followed by the recollection of the earlier cognition of the earthy object. After this the residual trace or impression of the previous cognition of the epistemic qualifier earthiness coupled with the recollection of the previous cognition leads to the mental cognition or introspection that the earlier cognition of earthiness related only to that object which has smell as its specific quality. Thus the causality of the cognition of the earthy object in relation to the successful urge for action is apprehended. The crux of the difficulty is that all cognition being momentary the causal relation holding between a cognition and its remote consequence viz., the consummation of the action prompted by the urge resulting from the cognition cannot be apprehended. By the time the consequence of the action emerges the cognition would have disappeared. Only after the successful culmination of the action has been observed the causality of the cognition in relation to the urge

for the successful action can be apprehended. In both the above answers to the difficulty it is pointed out that even in the absence of the cognition its memory can do duty for it and its causality can well be apprehended. Even if no memory is admitted to occur at the time of the action a cognition or a series of them similar to the evanescent cognition can certainly occur and one of these can be simultaneous with the action. Thus the causality can quite conveniently be apprehended.

Nyāya's main argument against the intrinsic-veridicity-view is based on the fact that so often the veridicity of a cognition is subject to doubt. In fact every doubt can be supposed to be a doubt about the veridicity of a cognition. It is not the cognitive nature of a cognition that is the object of doubt. It is the veridical character of a cognition that becomes the object of doubt. If no proof for or against the veridicity of cognition is available mere apprehension of characteristics common to both veridical and false cognitions (when the absence of positive and negative evidence is there) is not conducive to doubt. Even cognitionness is a characteristic which both veridical and false cognition share and it is usually apprehended when a cognition is apprehended. The opponent can contend against this that since even false cognitions are sometimes mistaken for veridical ones it is non-apprehension of the specific (veridical or otherwise) nature of a cognition that is conducive to doubt about its veridicity and so the possibility of doubt regarding the veridicity of a cognition cannot be ruled out (even if all cognitions are regarded as intrinsically veridical). But if the contention is correct it implies that either the veridicity of a cognition remains unapprehended when the cognition is apprehended or the veridical cognition itself remains unapprehended. The first is the epistemic qualifier and the second the epistemic qualificand of the cognising cognition. Unless one of these remains uncognised the veridical nature of the veridical cognition cannot remain unnoticed. A possible argument against this rejoinder and in support of the opponent's contention is that mostly all successful actions are prompted only by intrinsically-veridical cognitions. (Some such actions may ensue even from cognitions of doubtful veridicity but they may be exceptions). If a cognition needed to be verified before it produced the urge for action then prompt action can never be possible. The lengthy process of ascertaining the veridicity of the cognition leading to the action would necessarily intervene between the emergence of the cognition and the occurrence of the action. But this argument fails to prove that the intrinsicality of cognitive veridicity is an essential requirement of prompt action. What such action or the urge for the action needs is strong desire which needs as its condition the knowledge

of the means of obtaining the desired object. This knowledge is gained by means of the inference that certain things are the means because they are generically similar to others which yielded the desired object on a previous occasion. The middle term in this inference is known by means of perception. Even in the case of religious or ritualistic actions the strong desire of certain people to engage in them is caused only by strong conviction about the veridicity of scriptural statements enjoining the performance of the latter. The intrinsicality of the veridicity of cognitions of any kind does not figure anywhere in the causal chain leading to the consummation of the action. In face of all these considerations, to stick to the intrinsicality-view is like opining that because thirsty people run after water as soon as they sight it they are able to directly observe the capacity of water to quench thirst. The perception of water does not lead to the perception of the thirst-quenching-capacity of water. This capacity has to be inferred. The mere sight of water does not produce the perceptual cognition of the capacity. So the cognition of cognition by itself does not produce the cognition of the veridicity of the cognition which is a special and accidental property of it which does not always characterise it. Mīmāṃsā does not hold a cognition to be false. Every cognition is veridical by nature in the Mīmāṃsā view. (So to cognise a cognition is to cognise it as veridical. What appears as false or more precisely, what is false is not cognition at all). When by means of inference a so-called cognition is ascertained to be false its very cognitionness stands cancelled.

Now the opponent raises an important question against the Nyāya view. The question is that unless cognitive-veridicity is supposed to be intrinsically cognised it cannot be cognised at all. If the veridicity of a certain cognition is cognisable by another cognition cognising it then the veridicity of the second cognition would be cognisable by a third cognition. Similarly the veridicity of the third would be cognisable by the fourth. Thus the series of cognitions would go on ad infinitum unless the veridicity of some cognition in the series is supposed to remain uncognised. But if the veridicity of a certain cognition remains uncognised then the veridicity of all cognitions earlier than it in the series would remain uncognised. Nyāya has two answers to this question. One answer is that the cognition of the veridicity of cognition is not needed for the cognition to be definite. If there is no doubt or conviction of falsehood in respect of a cognition it can, without a cognition of its veridicity, produce assurance about the reality of its object. And if there is no assurance or conviction regarding the reality (or existence) of the object of a cognition (or there is doubt about the latter)

the urge for action to obtain the object cannot be prevented from arising. Even doubt about the reality of an object can generate a desire to obtain the object. The second answer to the above question is that even where cognitive veridicity needs to be established the inference needed for this purpose would not lead to infinite regress as mentioned by the opponent. There is no necessity that every cognition needs to be verified in order to generate conviction about its object. A cognition whose veridicity is not established but whose falsehood also is not established or suspected can very well produce definite assurance about its object. If veridicity of cognition is taken to be necessarily cognised then the intrinsic-veridicity-cognition-view would also lead to infinite regress. In this view the perception of the knownness of an object when it is cognised leads by way of postulation to the cognition of the cognition which produces the knownness in the object. Knownness is an accidental property of an object which accrues to it when it is subjected to the cognitive activity. This activity of the mind is regarded by Mīmāṃsā as invisible but knowable by means of postulation. The Nyāya view of inferential cognition of veridicity is countered by Mīmāṃsā on the ground that the inference of veridicity cannot proceed because the middle term in the inference is not known to be veridical and if to ascertain the veridicity of the middle term another inference is resorted to then the veridicity of the middle term of the second inference too would need another inference to ascertain it. Thus there will result infinite regress. But a similar infinite regress afflicts the Mīmāṃsā-view too. The postulatory cognition of the knowledge of the object cannot do its work unless its postulatory character is ascertained by another postulation. The inference or the second postulation would similarly need another inference or postulation to certify its inferential or postulatory character. So every objection to the extrinsic-veridicity-cognition-view can be shown to be parallelled by an exactly similar objection to the intrinsic-veridicity-cognition-view. Also every kind of defence of the former can be paralleled by a similar defence of the latter. If some absolutely-indisputable postulatory fact is supposed to be available even for the postulation of cognition and its veridicity then a similar absolutely-indisputable middle also can be supposed to be available even for the inference of cognitive veridicity. So there is no basis whatsoever to make any discrimination between the two opposed views so far as the experiential evidence for each of them is concerned. There is one important point which needs to be noted in connection with this veridicity-view. Both the disputants seem to have ignored the fact that there is a necessary and experientially-attested distinction between truth and untruth or reality and unreality. This distinction is absolute and it cannot be assailed or questioned even in the dream-state. There are determinants of truth as well as of untruth and these are distinct from and opposed to each other. It is because of this fact that a valid reason or middle term in an inference or a true postulate is distinguished from an invalid middle term or a false and apparently postulating fact. Only on the basis of the knowledge of this distinction truth and reality are commonly distinguished from untruth and unreality. So when a doubt is sought to be raised regarding the validity of a properly-ascertained middle term in an inference the doubter must have awareness as to what the facts are which can dispel the doubt and what the other facts are which are conducive to the doubt. In the absence of a definite knowledge of these facts it is simply irresponsible to go on raising doubt about and questioning the credentials of a perceptually-ascertained middle term in an inference. There cannot be universal and absolute scepticism. Every doubt is an epistemic fact with a definite structure. There is the subject of the doubt and there are definite and mutually-opposed alternatives that are the contents (or objects) of the doubt. The reality of these three components of the doubt has (at least) to be made sure of by the doubter if the doubt is to be taken seriously. Even in a dreamlike condition the dreaming doubter cannot disclaim knowledge about these components of his doubt expressed in the dream. Of course the occurrence of illusions, erroneous cognitions, dreams etc. makes us predisposed to question (sometimes) the veridicity of cognitions which seem (for all practical purposes) to be quite veridical and indubitable. Let us discuss this question with the help of a concrete example. I dream that I am swimming in a tank and suddenly my legs are trapped by something in the tank and I drown. The frantic attempts to extricate myself that I make in the dream jolt me out of the dream into the broad waking state. I now realise that all that I seemed to have gone through was sheer illusion. This realisation is based on a clear-cut and experientially-attested distinction between dream-contents and contents of the waking state. The experience that is usually taken to attest the distinction is the memory of the dream-experience that lingers though in a hazy form after I have awakened. The felt contrast between the memory and the waking experience pressed upon the mind the distinctive features of the contents of the two states. This distinction and opposition of the two states is squarely based upon the distinctive features of their respective contents. In no case can this distinction of the experiences or their respective contents be disputed.

Could it be urged against this that although there is no actual possibility of disputing the said distinction the logical possibility of denying

the distinction cannot be ruled out. Even well-attested distinctions or experiential certitudes have been found to fail when confronted with the testimony of an experience of a superior type or some logical proof. For example the movement of the sun in the sky is a fact of perception but it is denied to be a fact on the ground that it does not cohere with many other facts of perception as also certain mathematical facts. This shows that no experience can be treated as absolutely certain and authentic. Even if at a certain stage of the development of our knowledge a certain level of experience is treated as absolutely authentic, it may get degraded as illusory if and when a higher development of knowledge is reached and the earlier experiential level is transcended. This is quite possible but this does not go against what is said above about the experientially-attested distinctions. To take the example of the dream and the waking state mentioned above, the distinction and contrast of these states cannot be denied even if the logical possibility of a state quite superior to and contrasted with the waking state is conceded (as in Advaita philosophy). It may be that both dreaming and waking along with their respective contents are unreal if some other state sublating their reality is experienced. But even then the distinction between the two states and their respective contents cannot disappear. It will remain as a distinction of more and less illusory and the criterion on the basis of which the distinction could be sustained is only that which the waking state provides. In this connection it is necessary to say a few words about what is frequently referred to as 'logical possibility' by modern logicians. It is said that despite experiential attestation of the reality of an object the logical possibility of its being unreal or illusory cannot be denied. To take the famous example of George Moore raising his two hands one after another and remarking emphatically, 'This is my one hand and this is another' to prove the reality of external objects; it has been contended against this that if the testimony of the eyes is suspected then Moore's show of hands would be of no avail at all. What is meant by this objection is that although no perceptual evidence against Moore's exhibitionistic proof is presently available yet the unexpected turning up of such a proof at any time cannot be denied. That is to say what appears to be an actual state of affairs is not a necessary state of affairs. But what is a necessary state of affairs? The answer is, 'that whose denial involves contradiction.'

But what is not contradictory? That which is entailed by a non-contradictory proposition or is itself a non-contradictory proposition. So ultimately we come back to the non-contradictory proposition itself which therefore needs to be defined in terms of what is nowadays called as the tautologous proposition. But neither Indian logic nor Indian philosophy envisage a tautologous proposition as proposition simply because it is vacuous. Nothing is really affirmed or denied in this so-called tautologous proposition.

If we view the difference of views on cognitive veridicity impartially we find some justification for the Mīmāṃsā-view but the weight of evidence seems to favour the Nyāya view. The justification for the Nyāya view is that ultimately it is only some cognition which attests truth (or reality). Nothing other than cognition can attest truth because attestation is only a form of cognition. But Mīmāṃsā is not justified when it goes beyond this and maintains the veridicity of all cognitions. This is not correct and it is counter-intuitive and uncommonsensical. Illusions, delusions etc. are universally recognised facts of experience. If they are not cognitions what are they? Mīmāṃsā has no satisfactory answer to this question. Nyāya has common experience on its side when it says that some cognitions are true while other cognitions are false. Nobody can deny this fact. But it is not quite correct to say that the truth of every cognition is confirmed by another cognition. If neither confirmation nor disconfirmation of a cognition by another cognition is available what is its status? Isn't such a neutral condition conducive to doubt both with regard to the veridicity of the cognition and the reality of its object? Unless some distinctive feature characteristic of a veridical or false cognition is apprehended in the cognition there is bound to arise doubt about its veridicity. This doubt is eliminated by the action following the cognition being rewarded with success. The experience of success is the ultimate clincher of truth. This experience may be of the nature of pleasure which is different from cognition. The verdict of this experience may also be doubted on the ground that such an experience occurs in the dream-state also. A hungry person may have the dream that he is enjoying sweet dishes served before him and yet wake up with acute hunger. This shows that even pleasure-sensations can be misleading or illusory. Yet the fact cannot be ignored that in spite of the occurrence of such illusions the distinction between illusion and veridical cognition is not lost sight of. The dream-experience is distinguished from waking-experience and therefore there have to be some features which set apart the waking experience from the dream-experience and experiences like it. These features may not be easy to identify. This or that feature in isolation may be common to both the veridical and the illusory experiences. But the features in their totality must be peculiar to veridical experiences and distinguish them from false experiences. Besides, the experience of pleasure is of a different type than the cognitive

experience. So even if cognitive veridicity is supposed to be inferrible by means of the testimony of the pleasurable experience caused by the cognition (through the successful action it prompts) the pleasurable experience may be taken to be intrinsically veridical. In the Nyāya view pleasure is not intrinsically conscious. It is quite different from cognition or consciousness.

Proof of the non-eternity of words

TEXT: स्यात् एतत्। परतः प्रामाण्ये अपि नित्यत्वात् वेदानां अनपेक्षत्वं महाजन-परिग्रहात् च प्रामाण्यं इति कः विरोधः? न। उभयस्य अपि असिद्धेः। न हि वर्णाः एव तावत् नित्याः। तथाहि इदानीं श्रुत-पूर्वः गकारः नास्ति, निवृत्तः कोलाहलः इति प्रत्यक्षेण एव शब्द-ध्वंसः प्रतीयते। न हि शब्दः एव अन्यत्र गतः। अ-मूर्तत्वात्। न अपि आवृतः। ततः एव संबंध-विच्छेद-अनुपपत्तेः। नापि अन्-अवहितः श्रोता। अवधाने अपि अनुपलब्धेः। नापि इन्द्रियं दुष्टं, शब्द-अन्तर-उपलब्धेः। नापि सहकारि-अंतर-अभावः। अन्वय-व्यतिरेकवतः तस्य असिद्धेः। नापि अतीन्द्रियम्। तत् कल्पनायां प्रमाण-अभावात्। अन्यथा घटादौ अपि तत्-कल्पना-प्रसङ्गात्। न च शब्दस्य नित्यत्व-सिद्धौ तत्-कल्पना इति युक्तम्। निराकरिष्यमाणत्वात्।

ये तु एकदेशिनः न एवं इच्छंति तान् प्रति उच्यते। विवाद-अध्यासितः शब्द-प्रध्वंसः इन्द्रिय-ग्राह्यः, ऐन्द्रियक-अभावत्वात्, घट-अभाववत् । न एतत् एवम्। इन्द्रिय-अ-संनिकृष्टत्वात्, अतीन्द्रिय-आधारत्वात् वा इति चेत्? न। इदं हि उपाधि-उद्भावनं वा स्यात्, व्यापक-अनुपलब्ध्या सत्प्रतिपक्षत्वं वा? न प्रथमः। स्वरूपयोग्यतां प्रति सहकारि-योग्यतायाः अन्-उपाधित्वात्। तस्याः तां अपेक्ष्य एव सर्वदा व्यवस्थितेः। नापि ऐन्द्रियक-आधारत्व-प्रयुक्तं अभावस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वम्। धर्मादि-अभावस्य तथा प्रसङ्गात्। अतः एव न उभय-प्रयुक्तम्। नापि द्वितीयः। प्रथमस्य असिद्धेः। अस्ति हि श्रोत्र-शब्द-प्रागभावयोः स्वाभाविकः विशेषण-विशेष्य भावः। विशेष्यस्य अतीन्द्रियत्वात् कथं ऐन्द्रियक-विशिष्ट-

ज्ञान-विषयत्वम्? तथा विशेष्यं अ-व्यवस्थापयतः च कथं विशेषणत्वं इति चेत्? न। तथा विशेष्य-व्यवस्थापनायाः फलत्वात्। न तु तदेव विशेषणत्वम्। आत्माश्रय-प्रसङ्गात्। विशेषण-भावेन समवाय-अभावयोः ग्रहणं, तथा-ग्रहणं एव च विशेषणत्वं इति। तस्मात् संबंध-अंतरं अंतरेण तत्-उपश्लिष्ट-स्वभावत्वं एव हि तयोः। सा एव हि विशिष्ट-प्रत्यय-जनन-योग्यता विशेषणता इति उच्यते। सा च अत्र दुर्निवारा। प्रतियोगि-अधिकरणेन स्वभावतः एव अभावस्य मिलितत्वात्। तथापि तया तथा एव प्रतीतिः कर्तव्या इति चेत्? न। गृह्यमाण-विशेष्यत्व-अवच्छिन्नत्वात् व्याप्तेः। अन्यथा संयुक्त-समवायेन रूपादौ विशिष्ट-विकल्प-धी-जनन-दर्शनात् गंधादौ अपि तथात्व-प्रसङ्गात्। तथापि न इन्द्रिय-विशेषणतया कस्यचित् ग्रहणं दृष्टम्। अपि तु इन्द्रिय-संबद्ध-विशेषणतया। सा च अतः निवर्तते इति चेत्? न। अस्य प्रतिबंधस्य इन्द्रिय-संनिकृष्ट-अर्थ-प्रति-संबंधि-विषयत्वात्। अन्यथा संयुक्त-समवायेन गंधादौ उपलब्धि-दर्शनात् समवायेन अ-दर्शनात् शब्दस्य अ-ग्रहण-प्रसङ्गात्। नापि अ-भावत्वे सति इन्द्रिय-आधारत्वात् सत्प्रतिपक्षत्वं, योग्यता-विरह-प्रयुक्तत्वात् व्याप्तेः। न च अतीन्द्रिय-आधारत्वं एव तस्य योग्यता-विरहः। तत्-विपर्ययस्य एव योग्यतात्व-आपत्तेः। न च एवं एव। धर्मादि-प्रध्वंस-ग्रहण-प्रसङ्गात्। दृश्य-आधारत्वं दृश्य-प्रतियोगिता च इति द्वयं अपि अस्य योग्यता इति चेत्? न। उभय-निरूपणीयत्व-नियम-अनभ्युपगमात्। प्रतियोगि-मात्र-निरूपणीयः अभावः। अन्यथा इह भूतले घटः नास्ति इति एषा अपि प्रतीतिः प्रत्यक्षा न स्यात्। संयोगः हि अत्र निषिध्यते। तत् अभावः च भूतलवत् घटे अपि वर्तते। तत्र यदि प्रत्यक्षतया भूतलस्य उपयोगः, घटस्य अपि तथा एव स्यात् अविशेषात्। अथ घटस्य अन्यथा उपयोगः, भूतलस्य अपि अन्यथा एव स्यात् अविशेषात्। कथं अन्यथा इति चेत्? प्रतियोगि-निरूपण-अर्थं अभाव-संनिकर्षार्थं च। तत्र प्रतियोगि-निरूपणं स्मरण-लक्षणं अनुपलभ्यमानेन अपि इति न तत्-अर्थं अध्यक्ष-गोचरत्वं अपेक्षणीयं अन्यतरस्य अपि। कुतः उभयस्य? संनिकर्षः तु भूतल-

घट-संयोग-अभावस्य इन्द्रियेण साक्षात् नास्ति। येन अस्ति तेन अपि यदि इन्द्रियं न संनिकृष्येत कथं इव तं गमयेत्? न च उपलब्ध-उपलभ्य-मानाभ्यां एव इन्द्रियं संनिकृष्यते। इतरेतर-आश्रय-प्रसङ्गात्।

तस्मात् संनिकर्षे सति योग्यत्वात् भूतलं अपि उपलभ्यते न तु तस्य उपलभ्यमानत्वं अभाव-उपलब्धेः अंगं इति युक्तं उत्पश्यामः। प्रकृते तु प्रतियोगि-निरूपण-अर्थं-तत्-उपयोगः। तस्य संयोगवत्त् आधार-निरूप्यत्वात्। नापि संनिकर्ष-अर्थं, तदभावस्य साक्षात् इन्द्रिय-संनिकर्षात् इति। न चेत् एवं कुतः एषा प्रतीतिः, 'इदानीं श्रुत-पूर्वः शब्दः नास्ति' इति? अनुमानात् इति चेत्? न। शब्दस्य एव पक्षी-करणे हेतोः अनाधारत्वात्। अनित्यत्व-मात्र-साधने अभावस्य नियत-कालत्व-असिद्धेः। आकाशस्य पक्षत्वे तद्वत्तया अनुपलभ्यमानस्य हेतोः अनैकांतिकत्वात्। शब्द-सद्भाव-काले अपि तस्य सत्वात्। एवं काल-पक्षे अपि दोषात् । अहं इदानीं निःशब्द-श्रोत्रवान्, शब्द-उपलब्धि-रहितत्वात्। बधिरवत् इति चेत्? न। दृष्टांतस्य साध्य-विकलत्वात्। व्याहतत्वात् च। बधिरः च श्रोत्रवान् च इति व्याहतम्। तस्य अपि च श्रवसः निःशब्दत्वे प्रमाणं नास्ति। अन्-उभोग्यस्य उत्पाद-वैयर्थ्यं प्रमाणं इति चेत्? न। आद्यादि-शब्दवत् उपपत्तेः। तेषां शब्द-अंतर-आरंभं प्रति उपयोगः अंत्यस्य न तथा इति चेत्? न। अंत्यत्वासिद्धेः। सर्वेषां च उत्पादवतां प्रयोजन-तत्-अभावयोः अस्मादृशैः अन्-आकलनात्। सुषुप्ति-अवस्थायां श्वास-प्रश्वासवत् च तत् उपपत्तेः। आरंभे हि सति प्रयोजनं अवश्यं इति व्याप्तेः। न तु आपाततः प्रयोजन-अनुपलंभ-मात्रेण आरंभ-निवृत्तिः। तथा सति कर्ण-शष्कुली-अवच्छेद-उत्पादः एव नभसः तं प्रति निवर्तेत। बधिरस्य तेन अनुपयोगात्। विवाद-काले बधिर-कर्णः शब्दवान् योग्य-देशस्य अन्-आवृत कर्ण-शष्कुली-सुषिरत्वात् तत्-इतर-कर्ण-शष्कुली-सुषिरवत् इति।

निःशब्दाः पणव-वीणा-बेणवः तत्-एक-ज्ञान-संसर्ग-योग्यत्वे सति तत्-अनुपलंभे अपि उपलभ्यमानत्वात्। यत्-यत्-एक-ज्ञान-संसर्ग-योग्यस्य अनुपलंभे अपि उपलभ्यते तत् तदभाववत् यथा अ-घटं

भूतलं इति चेत्? न। एक ज्ञान-संसर्ग-योग्यत्व-अभावात्। शब्दस्य श्रौत्रत्वात्, वीणादीनां चाक्षुषत्वात्। अभिमान-मात्रात् इति चेत्? न। तथापि शब्द-प्रध्वंसस्य अ-तत्-देशत्वात्। अत्यंताभावस्य च काल-अनियमात्।

स्यात् एतत्। शब्दवत्-आकाश-उपाधयः हि भेर्यादयः। तेन तेषु विधीयमानः शब्दः आकाशे एव विहितः भवति। प्रतिषिद्ध्यमानः च तत्र एव प्रतिषिद्धः भवति। शरीरे सुखादिवत् इति चेत्। न। तत्र सोपाधौ आत्मनि प्रत्यक्ष-सिद्धे सुखादि-निषेधस्य अपि प्रत्यक्ष-सिद्धत्वात्। न च एवं इह अपि। तत्-उपहितस्य नभसः अ-प्रत्यक्षत्वात्। उपाधयः तावत् प्रत्यक्षाः इति चेत्? न। तैः अभाव-अ-निरूपणात्। निरूपणे वा प्रत्यक्षेण अपि ग्रहण-प्रसङ्गात्। न च एवं सति पारमार्थिक-अधिकरण-निरूपणीयत्वं अभावस्य। न च ते अपि प्रत्यक्ष-सिद्धाः। सर्वत्र शब्द-कारण-व्यवधाने अपि उपलब्धस्य शब्दस्य नास्तिता-प्रतीतेः। आनुमानिकैः तैः तथा-व्यवहारः इति चेत्? न। हेतोः तद्वत्तया अनुपलभ्यमानत्वस्य अनैकांतिकत्वात्। अभाव-प्रतीति-काले संदिग्ध-आश्रयत्वात् च। उपलभ्यमान-विशेष्यत्व-पक्षे च असिद्धेः। इन्द्रिय-व्यवधानात् शब्दलिंगस्य च अनुपलंभात्। अपि च नष्ट-आश्रयाणां द्रव्य, गुण, कर्मणां नाश-उपलंभः कथम्? न कथंचित् इति चेत्? आश्रय नाशात् कार्यनाशः इति कुतः एतत्? अनुमानतः तथा उपलंभात् इति चेत्? न। तुल्य-न्यायेन उक्त-उत्तरत्वात्। तंतुषु नष्टेषु अपि यदि पटः न नश्येत् तद्वत् एव उपलभ्येत इति चेत्? एतस्य तर्कस्य अनुग्राह्यं अभिधीयताम्। यदेव उपलभ्यते न तत् कार्य-परंपरावत् योग्यस्य तथा अनुपलभ्यमानत्वे सति उपलभ्यमानत्वात् इति चेत्? न। तंतु-अवयवानां पट-अनाधारत्वे साध्ये सिद्धसाधनात्। पट-प्रध्वंसवत्वे साध्ये बाधितत्वात्। तस्य स्व-प्रतियोगि-कारण-मात्र-देशत्वात्। ये पट-ध्वंसवंतः तंतवः तदभाववंतः एते अंशवः इति साध्यं इति चेत्? न। तंतु-नाशोत्तर-कालं पट-नाशात् तद्वत्ता-अनुपपत्तेः। योग्यता-मात्र-साधने च पट-ध्वसं-असिद्धेः। तस्य नाश-अनाशयोः समानत्वात्। अन्-अन्य-

गतिकतया विशिष्ट-निषेधे कृते विशेषणानां अपि अभावः प्रतीतः भवति। गुण-क्रियावत्-पट-आधाराः तंतवः न संति स्व-अवयवेषु इति हि प्रत्ययः इति चेत्? तथापि गुण-कर्मणां पटस्य च प्रध्वंसः किं-अधिकरणः प्रतीयते इति वक्तव्यम्। अंशु-अधिकरणः एव इति चेत्? भ्रान्तिः तर्हि इयम्। आश्रय-अवच्छेदकतया तेषां अपि अ-दूर-विप्रकर्षेण तत्-देशत्वम्। एवंभूतेन अपि देशेन तत् निरूपणं, योग्यताया अ-व्यभिचारात् इति चेत्? न तर्हि प्रतियोगि-समवायि-देशेन एव प्रध्वंस-निरूपणं इति नियमः। प्रकार-अंतरेण अपि तत्-निरूपणात्। तस्मात् यस्य यावती ग्रहण-सामग्री तं विहाय तस्यां सत्यां तदभावः यत्र क्वचित् निरूप्यः देशे काले वा। इयान् तु विशेषः। सा सती चेत् प्रत्यक्षेण, ज्ञाता चेत् अनुमानादिना इति स्थितिः। एतेन 'सद्भयां अभावः निरूप्यते' इति शास्त्र-विरोधः परिहृतः वेदितव्यः। उभय-निरूपणीय-प्रतियोगि-विषयत्वात् अनुमान-विषयत्वात् च। अन्यथा आश्रयासिद्धि-प्रसङ्गात्। तत्र अपि न ग्रहणे नियमः, ज्ञानमात्रं तु विवक्षितं, तावत्-मात्रस्य एव तदुपयोगात्। क्वचित् ग्रहणस्य सामग्री-संपात-आयातत्वात्। यदि च अधिकरण-ग्रहे शास्त्रस्य निर्भरः स्यात् 'वन्हेः दाह्यं विनाश्य-अनुविनाशवत् तत्-विनाशः' इति न उदाहरेत् असिद्धत्वात्। न हि वन्हि-विनाशः तदवयव-परंपरासु एव निरूप्यः। तासां अ-निरूपणात्। नापि अन्यत्र गमन-अभावादिना पारिशेष्यात् अनुमेयः। हेतोः एव निरूपयितुं अशक्यत्वात्। आश्रय-अनुपलब्धेः। नापि निमित्त-विनाशात् सर्वं इदं एकवारं एव सेत्स्यति इति युक्तम्। तस्य अनैकांतिकत्वात्। तेजसा विशेषितत्वात् अयं अदोषः इति चेत्? न। व्याप्ति-असिद्धेः। न हि ईधन-विनाशात् तेजः-द्रव्यं अवश्यं विनश्यति इति क्वचित् सिद्धं, प्रत्यक्ष-वृत्तेः अनभ्युपगमात्। तस्मात् यत्-त्यागेन अन्यत्र गमनं न संभाव्यते तेन निमित्तादिना अपि देशेन प्रध्वंसः निरूप्यते इति अ-कामेन अपि स्वीकरणीयम्। गत्यंतर-अभावात्। अतः एव तमसः प्रत्यक्षत्वे अपि अभावत्वं आमनंति आचार्याः। एतेन शब्द-प्रागभावः व्याख्यातः।

एवं स्थिते अनुमानं अपि उच्यते। शब्दः अनित्यः उत्पत्ति-धर्मत्वात्, घटवत्। न च इदं प्रत्यभिज्ञान-बाधितम्। तस्य-ज्वालादि-प्रत्यभिज्ञानेन अविशेषात्। न एवं, अ-बाधितस्य तस्य स्वतः प्रमाणत्वात् इति चेत्? तुल्यम्। ज्वालायां तत् नास्ति, विरुद्ध-धर्म-अध्यासेन बाधितत्वात्। अन्यथा भेद-व्यवहार-विलोप-प्रसङ्गः, निमित्त-अभावात्। आकस्मिकत्वे वा अतिप्रसङ्गः-इति चेत्? तुल्यम्। शब्दे अपि तीव्र-तीव्रतर-मन्द-मन्दतरत्वादेः भावात् तत् इह न स्वाभाविकं इति चेत्? न। स्वाभाविकत्व-अवधारण-न्यायस्य तत्र तत्र सिद्धस्य अत्र अपि तुल्यत्वात्। न हि अपां शैत्य-द्रवत्वे स्वाभाविके तेजसः वा औष्ण्य-भास्वरत्वे इत्यत्र अन्यत् प्रमाणं अस्ति प्रत्यक्षात् विना। तत् तथा एव युज्यते। अन्यस्य उपाधेः अनुपलंभात् नियमेन तत्-गतत्वेन च उपलंभात् इति चेत्? तुल्यं एतत्। तथापि अतीन्द्रिय-अन्यधर्मत्व-शंका स्यात् इति चेत्? एतत् अपि तादृक् एव। तत् किं यद्-गतत्वेन यत् उपलभ्यते तस्य एव सः धर्मः? ननु एवं पीतः शंखः, रक्तः स्फटिकः, नीलः पटः इति अपि तथा स्यात् अविशेषात्? न। पीतत्वादीनां अन्य-धर्मत्व-स्थितौ शंखादीनां च तत्-विरुद्ध-धर्मत्वे स्थिते जपा-कुसुमादि-अन्वय-व्यतिरेक-अनुविधानात् च बाधेन भ्रान्तत्व-अवधारणात्। न च इह तार-तारतरत्वादेः अन्य-धर्मत्व-स्थितिः, नापि शुक-सारिकादि-गकाराणां तत्-विरुद्ध-धर्मत्वं, नापि अन्यस्य तत्-धर्मिणः अन्वय-व्यतिरेकौ अनु-विधत्ते। तथापि शंका स्यात् इति चेत्? एवं इयं सर्वत्र। तथा च न क्वचित् किंचित् कुतश्चित् सिद्ध्येत्। न च एतत् शंकितुं अपि शक्यते। अ-प्रतीते संस्कार-अभावात्। संस्कार-अन्-उपनीतस्य च आरोपयितुं अशक्यत्वात्। न च ध्वनि-धर्माः एव गृह्यंते। स्पर्शादि-अन्-अंतर्भावेण भावेषु त्वक्-आदीनां अ-व्यापारात्। न च श्रवणेन एव तत्-ग्रहणम्। अ-वायवीयत्वेन तस्य वायु-धर्म-अग्राहकत्वात् चक्षुर्वत्। तार तारतरत्वादयः वा न वायु-धर्माः श्रावणत्वात् कादिवत्। वायुः वा न श्रवण-ग्राह्य-धर्मा मूर्तत्वात् पृथिवीवत्। यदि च न एवं, कादीनां अपि वायवीयत्व-प्रसङ्गः। ततः किम्? अवयवि-गुणत्वे

अनित्यत्वम्। परमाणु-गुणत्वे अ-ग्रहणम्। द्वयं अपि एतत् अनिष्टं भवतः। अवश्यं च श्रवसा ग्राह्य-जातीय-गुणवता भवितव्यम्। बहिरिन्द्रियत्वात्, घ्राणादि-वत्। संतु ध्वनयः अपि नाभसाः तथा च तत्-धर्म-ग्रहणं श्रवसा उपपत्स्यते इति चेत्? न। तार-तारतरः वा अयं गकारः इत्यत्र ध्वनीनां अ-स्फुरणात्। न च व्यक्त्या विना सामान्य-स्फुरणं, कारणाभावात्। व्यक्ति-स्फुरण-सामग्री-निविष्टा हि जाति-स्फुरण-सामग्री। कुतः एतत्? अन्वय-व्यतिरेकाभ्यां तथा अवगमात्। ऐन्द्रियकेषु एव घटादिषु सामान्य-ग्रहणात्। अतीन्द्रियेषु मनः प्रभृतिषु च अ-ग्रहणात्। स्वरूप-योग्यता एव तत्र निमित्तं, अकारणं व्यक्ति-योग्यता इति चेत्? एवं तर्हि सत्ता, द्रव्यत्व-पार्थिवत्वादीनां स्वरूप-योग्यत्वे परमाण्वादिष्वपि ग्रहण-प्रसङ्गः, अ-योग्यत्वे घटादिषु अपि तत्-अनुपलंभ-आपत्तिः इति दुरुत्तरं व्यसनम्। तस्मात् व्यक्ति-ग्रहण-योग्यता-अंतर्गता एव जाति-ग्रहण-योग्यता इति तदनुपलंभे जातेः अनुपलंभः एव। तथा च न तार-तारतरत्वादीनां आरोप-संभवः इति स्वाभाविकत्व-स्थितौ विरुद्ध धर्म-अध्यासेन भेदस्य पारमार्थिकत्वात् प्रत्याभिज्ञानं अ-प्रमाणं इति न तेन बाधः। नापि सत्प्रतिपक्षत्वम्। मिथः विरुद्धयोः वास्तव-तुल्य-बलत्व-अभावात्। एकस्य अन्य तम-अंग-वैकल्य-चिंतायां अस्य वैकल्ये तस्य एव उद्भाव्यत्वात्। अ-वैकल्ये त्वदीयेन एव विकलेन भवितव्यं इति हीनस्य न सत्प्रतिपक्षत्वम्।

तथापि नित्यः शब्दः अद्रव्य-द्रव्यत्वात् इति अत्रापि साधन-दशायां किंचित् वाच्यं इति चेत् अ-सिद्धिः। द्रव्यं शब्दः साक्षात्-संबधेन गृह्य-माणत्वात् घटवत् इति सिद्ध्यति इति चेत्? न। एतस्य अपि असिद्धेः। न हि श्रोत्र-गुणत्वे द्रव्यत्वे वा असिद्धे साक्षात्-संबंधे शब्दस्य प्रमाणं अस्ति। परिशेषः अस्ति। तथाहि सत्-आदि-अभेदेन सामान्यादि-त्रय-व्यावृत्तौ, मूर्त-द्रव्य-समवाय-निषेधेन कर्मत्व-निषेधात् द्रव्य-गुणत्व-परिशेषे संयोग-समवाययोः अन्यतरः संबंधः इति चेत्? न। बाधक-बलेन परिशेषे द्रव्यत्वस्य अपि निषेधात् लिंग-ग्राहक-प्रमाण-बाध-आपत्तेः। बाधके सति अपि वा द्रव्यत्व-अ-प्रतिषेधे, कर्मत्वादीनां

अपि अ-प्रतिषेध-प्रसक्तौ परिशेष-असिद्धेः। तस्मात् एकदेश-परिशेषः न प्रमाणं, संदेह-संकोच-मात्र-हेतुत्वात्। अथ द्रव्यत्वे किं बाधकम्? उच्यते। शब्दः न द्रव्यं, बहिरिन्द्रिय-व्यवस्था-हेतुत्वात् रूपादिवत् इति परिशेषात् गुणत्वेन समवायि-सिद्धौ लिंग-ग्राहक-प्रमाण-बाधितत्वात् ना व्यवहित-संबंध-ग्राह्यत्वेन द्रव्यत्व सिद्धिः। न च असिद्धेन सत्प्रति-पक्षत्वम्। असिद्धस्य हीन-बलत्वात्।

ननु शब्दः तावत् अ-श्रोत्र-गुणः न एव इति त्वया एव साधितं प्रबंधेन। न च श्रोत्र-गुणः, तेन गृह्यमाणत्वात्। यत् येन इन्द्रियेण गृह्यते न असौ तस्य गुणः, यथा गृह्यमाणः गंधादिः। श्रोत्रं वा न स्व-गुण-ग्राहकं, इन्द्रियत्वात्, घ्राणवत् इति न गुणत्व-सिद्धिः इति चेत्? ततः किम्? न च एतत् अपि। घ्राणादि-समवेत-गंधादि-अग्रहे स्व-गुणत्वस्य अप्रयो-जकत्वात्। अयोग्यत्वं हि तत्र उपाधिः। अन्यथा सुखादिः न आत्म-गुणः तेन गृह्यमाणत्वात्, रूपादिवत्। आत्मा वा न तत्-ग्राहकः, तत्-आश्रयत्वात्, गंधादि-आश्रय-घटादिवत् इत्यादि अपि शंकेत। तस्मात् स्व-गुणः पर-गुणः वा अयोग्यः न गृह्यते। गृह्यते तु योग्यः योग्येन। तत् किं अत्र अनुपपन्नम्? अवश्यं च श्रोत्रेण विशेष गुण-ग्राहिणा भवितव्यं इन्द्रियत्वात्। अन्यथा तत्-निर्माण-वैयर्थ्यात्। तत्-अन्यस्य इन्द्रिय-अंतरेण एव ग्रहणात्। न च द्रव्य-विशेष-ग्रहणे तत्-उपयोगः। विशेषण-योग्यतां आश्रित्य एव इन्द्रियस्य द्रव्य-ग्राहकत्वात् न च द्रव्य-स्वरूप-योग्यता-मात्रेण। अन्यथा चांद्रमसं तेजः स्वरूपेण योग्यं इति तदपि उपलभ्येत। आत्मा वा मनो-ग्राह्यः इति सुषुप्ति-अवस्थायां अपि उपलभ्येत। अन्-उद्भूत-रूपे अपि वा चक्षुः प्रवर्तेत। तस्मात् गुण-योग्यतां एव पुरस्कृत्य इन्द्रियाणि द्रव्यं उपाददते न अतः अन्यथा इति स्थितिः। अतः एव न आकाशादयः चाक्षुषाः।

अस्तु तर्हि शब्दः नित्यः, नित्य-आकाश-एक-गुणत्वात्, तद्गत-महत्-परिणामवत् इति चेत्? न। अकार्यत्वस्य उपाधेः विद्यमानत्वात्। अन्यथा आत्म-विशेषगुणाः नित्याः तत्-एक-गुणत्वात्, तद्गत-परम-महत्ववत् इत्यपि स्यात्। अस्य प्रत्यक्ष-बाधितत्वात् अहेतुत्वं इति चेत्? न।

निरुपाधेः बाधादि-अनवकाशात्। स्वभाव-प्रतिबद्धस्य च तत्-परित्यागे स्वभाव-परित्याग-प्रसङ्गात्। तस्मात् बाधेन वा उपाधिः उन्नीयते अन्यथा वा इति न कश्चित् विशेषः। एतेन श्रावणत्वात् शब्दत्ववत् इत्यपि परास्तम्। अत्र अपि तस्य एव उपाधित्वात्। अन्यथा गंध, रुप, रस, स्पर्शाः अपि नित्याः प्रसज्येरन्। घ्राणादि-एक-एक-इन्द्रिय-ग्राह्यत्वात् गंधत्ववत् इत्यपि प्रयोग-सौकर्यात्।

विरोध व्यभिचारौ अ-संभावितौ एव अत्र इति असिद्धिः अवशिष्यते। सा अपि नास्ति। तथा हि, शब्दः तावत् पूर्वोक्त-न्यायेन स्वाभाविक-तीव्र-मन्दतर तमादि-भावेन प्रकर्ष-निकर्ष भावेन उपलभ्यते। इयं च प्रकर्ष-निकर्षवत्ता कारण-भेद-अनुविधायिनी सर्वत्र उपलब्धा। अकारणकाः हि नित्याः प्रकर्ष-वंतः एव भवंति यथा आकाशादयः। निकृष्टाः एव वा तथा परमाण्वादयः। न तु किंचित् अतिशयानाः कुतश्चित् अपकृष्यंते। तत् इयं नित्येभ्यः व्यावर्तमाना कारणवत्सु च भवंती जायमानतां आदाय एव विश्राम्यति इति प्रतिबंध-सिद्धौ प्रयुज्यते। शब्दः जायते, प्रकर्ष-निकर्षाभ्यां उपेतत्वात्, माधुर्यादिवत्। अन्यथा नियामकं अंतरेण भवंती नित्येषु अपि सा स्यात्, नियम-हेतोः अभावात्। शब्दात् अन्यत्र इयं गतिः इति चेत्? न। साध्य-धर्मिणं विहाय इति प्रत्यवस्थानस्य सर्व-अनुमान-सुलभत्वात्। न चेत् व्यंजक-तारतम्यात् व्यंजनीय-तारतम्यम्। अ-स्वाभाविकत्व-प्रसङ्गात्। व्यवस्थितं च स्वाभाविकत्वम्। न च व्यंजक-उत्पादकाभ्यां अन्यस्य अनुविधानं अस्ति। न च स्वाभाविकत्व-औपाधिकत्वाभ्यां अन्यः प्रकारः संभवति। स्यात् एतत्। तथापि उत्पत्तेः नित्यत्वेन कः विरोधः येन प्रतिबंध-सिद्धिः स्यात्? असिद्धे च तस्मिन् भवतां व्यापकत्व-असिद्धः अस्माकं अप्रयोजकः। सौगतानां संदिग्ध-विपक्ष-वृत्तिः अयं उपक्रांतः हेतुः इति चेत्? न। इदं हि उत्पत्तिमत्वं विनाश-कारण-संनिधि-विरुद्धेभ्यः नित्येभ्यः स्व-व्यापक-निवृत्तौ निवर्तमानं विनाशक-संनिधिमति विश्राम्यति इति। विनाश-कारण-संनिधानेन अवश्यं जायमानस्य भवितव्यं इति कुतः निर्णीतं इति चेत् ? न। तत्-असंनिधानं हि न

तावत् आकाशादेः इव, स्वभाव-विरोधात्। उत्पत्ति-विनाशयोः संसर्ग-दर्शनात्। अविरुद्धयोः असंनिधिः तु देश-विप्रकर्षात् हिमवत्-विंध्ययोः इव स्यात्। देशयोः अपि विप्रकर्षः विरोधात् वा हेतु-अभावात् वा। पूर्व-उक्तात् एव न प्रथमः। द्वितीयः तु पट-कुंकुमयोः इव स्यात् यदि हि कुंकुम-समागमात् अर्वाक् इव प्रध्वंसक-संसर्गात् अर्वाक् एव पटः विनश्येत्। यथा हि विनाश-कारणं विना न विनाशः तथा यदि कुंकुम-समागमं विना न विनाशः पटस्य इति स्यात् कः तयोः संसर्गं वारयेत्? तस्मात् अविरुद्धयोः असंसर्गः काल-विप्रकर्ष-नियमेन व्याप्तः। सः च अतः निर्वतमानः स्व-व्याप्यं उपादाय निवर्तते इति प्रतिबंध-सिद्धिः। स्यात् एतत्। यदि एवं अस्थिरः शब्दः कथं अर्थेन संगतिः अस्य उपलभ्यते। इति चेत्? यथा एव अस्थिरस्य अर्थस्य तेन। जातिः एव पदार्थः न व्यक्तिः इति चेत्? न। शब्दात् तत्-अलाभ-प्रसङ्गात्। आक्षेपतः इति चेत्? कः खलु अयं आक्षेपः नाम? न तावत् अनुमानम्। अनंताभिः सह संगतिवत् अविनाभावस्य अपि ग्रहीतुं अशक्यत्वात्। शक्यत्वे वा संगतेः अपि तथा एव सुग्रहत्वात्। व्यक्ति-मात्र-रूपेण अविनाभावः इति चेत्? न। व्यक्तित्वस्य सामान्यस्य अभावात्। भावे वा तत्-आक्षेपे अपि विशेष-अनाक्षेपात्। वाच्यत्वं अपि वा तथा एव अस्तु, किं आक्षेपेण? संगतेः अविरोधात् इति। अर्थापत्तिः आक्षेपः इति चेत्? न। व्यक्त्या विना किं अनुपपन्नम्? जातिः इति चेत्? न। तत्-नाश-अनुत्पाद-दशायां अपि सत्वात्। तथापि न व्यक्तिमात्रं विना इति चेत्? न। मात्र-अर्थाभावात्। व्यक्ति-ज्ञानं अंतरेण जाति-ज्ञानं अनुपपन्नं इति चेत्? न। तत्-अभावे अपि उत्पादात्। व्यक्ति-विषयत्वं विना जाति-विषयत्वं तस्य अनुपपन्नं इति चेत्? न। एवं तर्हि एक-ज्ञान-गोचरतायां किं अनुपपन्नं किं प्रतिपादयेत् इति? जातीनां अन्वय-अनुपपत्त्या व्यक्तिः अवसीयते इति चेत्? न। परस्पराश्रय-प्रसङ्गात्।

स्यात् एतत्। प्रतिबंधं विना अपि पक्षधर्मता-बलात् यथा लिंगं विशेषे पर्यवस्यति तथा संगतिं विनापि शब्द-शक्ति-विशेषात् विशेषे पर्यवस्यति। सः एव आक्षेपः इति उच्यते इति चेत्? न तावत् प्रतीतिः क्रमेण।

आक्षेपणीय-अभावेन विरम्य व्यापार-अयोगात्। जाति-प्रत्यायनं अपेक्षते इति चेत्? कृतं तर्हि शब्द-शक्ति-कल्पनया। तावता एव तत् सिद्धेः। ओम् इति चेत्। न। व्यक्ति-अन्-आलंबनायाः जाति-प्रतीतेः असंभवात् इत्युक्तत्वात्। प्रमाणांतर-आपात-प्रसङ्गात् च। स्मरणं तत् इत्ययं अदोषः इति चेत्? न। अन्-अनुभूत-अनन्वय-प्रसङ्गात्। अस्तु एका एव प्रतीतिः इति चेत्? कृतं तर्हि शक्ति-भेद-कल्पनया। एवं च यथा सामान्य-विषया शक्तिः एका एव तद्वति पर्यवस्यति तथा सामान्य-आश्रया संगतिः तद्वति पर्यवस्येत् इति। न च नित्याः अपि वर्णाः स्वर-आनुपूर्वी-आदि-हीनाः पदार्थैः संगम्यंते, न च तद्विशिष्टत्वं अपि तेषां नित्यं, तस्मात् तत्तत्-जातीय-क्रोड-निविष्टाः एव पदार्थाः पदानि च संबध्यंते, न अतः अन्यथा इति न एतत्-अनुरोधेन अपि शब्दस्य नित्यत्वं आशंकनीयं इति। यदा च वर्णाः एव न नित्याः तदा का एव कथा पुरुष-विवक्षा-अधीन-आनुपूर्वी-आदि-विशिष्ट-वर्ण-समूह-रूपाणां पदानां, कुतः-तरां च तत्-समूह-रचना-विशेष-स्वभावस्य वाक्यस्य, कुतः तमां तत्-समूहस्य वेदस्य? परतंत्र-पुरुष-परंपरा-अधीनतया प्रवाह-अ विच्छेदं एव नित्यतां ब्रूमः इति अपि नास्ति। सर्ग-प्रलय-संभवात्। अहोरात्रस्य अहोरात्र-पूर्वकत्व-नियमात् कर्मणां विषम-विपाक-समयतया समय अनुपलब्धौ शब्द-व्यवहार-विलोप-प्रसङ्गात्। घटादि-संप्रदाय-भङ्ग-प्रसङ्गात् च कथं एवं इति चेत्? उच्यते-

TRANS.: (Let then be this argument against the existence of God (as the author of the scriptures). Even if cognitive veridicity is admitted to be extrinsically generated the scriptures can be treated as self-veridical because they are eternal and therefore they do not depend upon the efficient functioning of any speaker's or author's faculties to make them veridical. The justification of this veridicity is also dependent upon the authority of the scriptures being upheld by venerable people (thus the generation as well as the cognition of the veridicity of the scriptural cognition may well be intrinsic despite the extrinsicality of common cognitions). The reply to this argument is that both of its contentions are groundless. Even the letters composing words are not eternal (what to say of the words, the sentences and the passages of which the scriptures consist). To explain: There are the perceptual cognitions of the form, 'Now there is no sound of "da" which was heard earlier', 'the hubbub has now subsided' etc. These cognitions confirm the occurrence of the dissipation of sounds. Certainly (one cannot say in these cases that) the sound has shifted from its original place to a different place. Being a formless (structureless) entity sound cannot move at all. Nor is sound muffled or veiled (when it appears to fade out) for this very reason. Only a structured entity is such that the sense-organs can be (connected and) disconnected with it so that even while existing at a place it may cease to be connected with the percipient's senses and as a result remain unheard by the latter. Nor again is it the case that the hearer is inattentive to the sound because even if the hearer is all attention no sound is heard by him. And since sounds other than the faded one (which may be present at the place of the latter) are clearly audible to the hearer, his ears cannot be supposed to be defective. It cannot be urged against this that for the audition of each specimen of a letter different causal conditions are needed. Positive and negative association of such conditions with the different letter-specimens is never established. Can it then be maintained that if a sound seems to fade out it is not really destroyed, it becomes only inaudible? No! This assumption is baseless and like sounds even common objects like pot may then be supposed to become invisible when they seem to be destroyed. If it is urged that sounds have to be regarded as becoming inaudible (if they cease to be heard after having been audible earlier) because they are eternal the rejoinder is that the assumption of the eternity of sounds is shortly going to be refuted.

As to the section of thinkers who do not admit that the destruction of sounds is perceptible we set forth a regular syllogistic inference (to prove the non-eternity of sounds) to satisfy them. The inference goes like this: 'The destruction of sound which is of disputed entitative status is a sensible entity because it is the negation or destruction of a sensible entity (sound) like the negation of a pot (which too is the negation of the sensible entity pot). It may be contended against this that the inference is invalid because the minor term in the inference, namely, 'the destruction of sounds' cannot be connected with any sense-organ (because the sky which is the locus of both sounds and their destruction is not connected with the ear) or the sky which is the locus of the destruction is invisible and so the destruction also would be invisible. In reply to this contention we may ask, 'Is this criticism of the above inference intended to expose the conditional character of the middle term of the inference or to highlight the fact that there is another inference which contradicts the major of the present inference? Such an inference is possible

on the basis of non-cognition of a pervading term like ('being connected with sense-organs' or 'having a perceptible locus'). The alleged conditionality of the middle arises thus: Contact with sense-organ is the condition which needs to qualify the middle term 'sensibility' in the previous inference. The condition pervades the major term because every sensible object happens to be connected with the appropriate sense-organ when it is sensed. But since the destruction of sound is the negation of a sensible entity—sound—and is thus the locus of the middle term and yet is unconnected—as explained above—with the ear, the condition is non-pervasive of the middle term. The alleged condition thus satisfies the definition of a condition. Another condition suggested by the above inference is, 'the property of—not having an imperceptible locus' or 'the property of having a perceptible locus'. This condition too is pervasive of the major and non-pervasive of the middle in the previous inference. All sensible objects have perceptible loci and since the destruction of sounds is located in the sky which is imperceptible the condition is both pervasive of the major and non-pervasive of the middle.

The fallacy of contradictory inference pointed out above arises thus; Contact with sense pervades all sensible entities. Similarly 'having a perceptible locus' is a property which is pervasive of all sensible entities. So the absence of these properties which is the absence of the pervader entails the absence of the major term in the previous inference. Here the first alternative is not tenable (that is, it is not possible to charge the middle term with conditionality). Natural capacity of a thing cannot be conditioned by the capacity of auxiliaries. (What this means is that the destruction of sounds is by nature sensible. The natural sensibility of it cannot be supposed to depend upon auxiliary conditions like sense-contact to determine it. So sense-contact cannot pervade sensibility. The destruction of sound is always capable of being sensed but it is not on that account always connected with the appropriate sense-organ. Even if it is not sensed it is sensible). Even the property of 'having a perceptible locus' cannot be taken to determine the sensibility (or perceptibility) of the sound-destruction for, then even the absence of virtue, vice etc. would be perceptible (as the self which is their locus is mentally perceptible). For this very reason the two together (namely the properties of 'being connected with sense organ' and 'having a perceptible locus' cannot be supposed to determine sensibility. Neither of these is present in the absence of virtue). The second fallacy of contradictory inference too does not afflict the previous inference. The first middle term viz., 'not being connected with a sense-organ' does not qualify the

minor term namely, 'the destruction of sound' in the inference. The ear which is the auditory sense-organ is certainly connected with the destruction of sound as the latter is the natural qualifier of the former (by the '*svarūpa*' relation). It may here be asked, 'If the qualificand is imperceptible how can it be the object of the determinate sensory cognition in which the destruction of sound is the qualifier' and again 'how the destruction of sound can be the qualifier if it does not distinguish its qualificand from other entities?' The answer to this query is that 'the distinguishing of the qualificand' and 'being the object of the determinate cognition of distinction' are only the results of qualification by a qualifier of its qualificand. These are not however the same as qualification (or the qualifier). If the result of qualification is identified with the qualifier this would lead to the fallacy of mutual dependence. For example the relation of inherence and negation are qualifiers (in a determinate cognition) because they are so cognised and they are so cognised because they are qualifiers. (This implies that being a qualifier is not the same as being so cognised). So without any relation (other than the self-relation called '*svarūpa*' or '*viśeṣaṇtā*' and identical with the negation) mediating between the ear and the destructive negation of sound these two occur as mutually implicated in the form of a qualificand and its qualifier. The capacity to produce the determinate cognition (of the form, 'this is absence of sound in the ear') is itself the qualifierhood of the qualifier. Such a qualifierhood cannot be denied in the present case as a negation or absence is by its very nature joined to the locus of its counter-positive. (The ear and the destruction of sound are joined to each other by their very nature). But then shouldn't the qualifierhood of the negation lead to (or involve) the cognition of the ear as the qualificand in a determinate cognition? (The negation cannot be cognised as qualifier unless the ear is cognised as the qualificand). No! (There is no such rule that the qualificand should be cognised with the qualifierhood of the qualifier). The rule pertaining to this is that if the qualificand is perceptible then it appears as qualificand in the cognition of the qualifierhood of the qualifier. If this were not so then the olfactory sensation of the smell of an object produced by the contact 'inherence in that which is conjoined to the olfactory sense-organ' should produce the sensory cognition of the smelling object too (when smell is sensed the smelling object is not sensed by the nose). But when the colour or form of an object is sensed by the above contact the object having the colour or the form is also sensed because it is accessible to the visual sense. (This is not the case with the smelling object). It may still be urged that no object is sensed as the qualifier of the sense-organ

(by which it is sensed), it is only as the qualifier of that which is in contact with the sense-organ that an object is sensed and such a qualifierhood excludes the destruction of sound. The reply to this contention is that the rule is applicable only to those things that are connected with things which are in contact with the sense-organ. If the rule is taken to apply to all sensible entities then since, smell and certain other qualities are sensed because of their indirect contact (namely 'inherence in that which is conjoined with the sense-organ') with the appropriate sense-organ and not because of their inherence in the sense-organ, sound would be rendered inaudible as it has no indirect contact with the ear.

(Thus the inference based on 'absence of sense-contact' as the middle term has been shown to be fallacious. Now the same inference with the second middle term is also being shown to be affected by fallacy). If 'being a negation' coupled with 'having an imperceptible locus' is taken to be the middle term in the inference of non-sensibility of the destruction of sound then there arises the fallacy of conditionality the condition being 'absence of competence'. An entity that is not sensible is not capable of being sensed. (The insensibility of a thing is not due to its having an insensible or imperceptible locus. The insensibility is intrinsic to the thing. For example the insensibility of the destruction of a dyad located in the atom is not due to the imperceptibility of the atomic locus of the destruction. The destruction itself is insensible). The concomitance of the middle with the major in the inference is as explained, conditioned by absence of capacity. Could it be contended against this that 'having an invisible or imperceptible locus' is itself the same as 'absence of competence to be sensed'? No! If it were so then the absence of this property would be the same as competence. If this too is admitted then the destruction or dissipation of virtue which has the self—a mentally-imperceptible entity—as its locus would turn out to be sensible by nature. This contingency can be avoided by defining competence in terms of the combination of the properties of 'having a sensible locus' and having a sensible counter-positive'. The absence or destruction of virtue has an invisible counter-positive like virtue and so, being bereft of the competence (as defined) of being sensible it is not sensible. This rejoinder however is not acceptable as the sensibility or perceptibility of absence cannot be admitted to depend upon the perceptibility of both its locus and the counter-positive. If this were not so then we cannot have even the simple perceptual cognition of the form, 'There is no pot here on the floor.' In this assertion the conjunction of the pot is negated. Now just as the floor is the locus of the absence of the conjunction of the pot so the pot too is a locus of it—as the pot is not conjoined

with itself. So like the floor the pot also would have to be perceptually cognised for the perception of the absence to arise. There is no difference between the pot and the floor in respect of their 'locus' character. (But as long as the pot is perceived on the floor its absence cannot be perceived there). It may be urged against this that the cognition of absence of the conjunction does not need the perceptual cognition of the pot. Even recollection of the pot will do to engender the absence-cognition. But this will not do as even the floor-cognition could well be recollective instead of being perceptual as there is nothing distinctive of this cognition. If it is asked how the floor could be of use to the perception of the absence of the pot (on the floor) the answer is that the recollective cognition of the floor helps define the nature of the counter-positive of the absence and also, the floor is one of the relata of the relation relating the sense-organ with absence. The cognition of the counter-positive of the absence is of the nature of recollection and this recollection does not require the actual present perception of the counter-positive. So neither the floor nor the pot needs to be perceived for the perceptual cognition of the absence to arise. Thus the supposed need of the perception of both of these for the occurrence of absence-perception is simply ruled out. So far as the relation of the absence of the floor-pot-conjunction with the sense-organ is concerned there is no direct relation between the sense organ and the absence (as it is the floor with which the absence is related by the qualificatory relation). So if that with which the absence is directly related, namely, the floor, is also not related with the sense-organ how can the latter lead to the cognition of the former (the absence)? (There has therefore to be the relation of the sense-organ with the floor through which the absence may be supposed to be related with the sense-organ. This is the second mode in which the floor, the locus, is of use in the perception of the absence located in it without the perception of the floor being required to precede the latter). It cannot be contended against this that the sense-organ gets in contact only with those things which are being perceived or which are perceptible. Since the perceptible is that with which the sense-organ gets in contact, this plea involves the fallacy of reciprocal dependence. The upshot of this discussion is that if there is sense-object-contact and the object is by nature perceptible then it is perceived. The floor is such an object and the sense-organ gets connected with it (when the absence of the pot-conjunction gets indirectly connected with the sense-organ. As a result the floor is also perceived when the absence is perceived). But the floor-perception is not instrumental to the absence-perception. This seems to us to be the correct view. In the present case

however the perception of the locus (sky) of the absence of sound is not required for the defining of the counter-positive of the absence or the destruction of sound, as unlike conjunction (in the case of the pot placed on the floor) sound is not defined by its location in the sky (conjunction is a relation whose cognition depends on the cognition of its relata while sound is just a quality and not a relation). Nor again the sky-perception may be taken to be needed for establishing indirect relation between the hearing-sense and the absence. The absence is directly related to the ear as it qualifies it. (The sky itself being the ear no connection between it and the hearing-sense is conceivable. Thus the destruction of sound can well be regarded as perceptible). If this were not so (that is to say if the absence of sound were not perceptible) then, how can there be a reflective cognition like, 'Now the sound (or word) heard earlier has ceased to exist?' Can this cognition be the result of inference? (The inference may be of the form, 'There is not now the past sound as it is inaudible'). No! If the past sound is made the minor term in the inference of its nonexistence then the middle term 'non-cognition now' cannot be located in it as it is nonexistent. If however the existing sound is taken as the minor term and its destructibility is sought to be inferred by means of its non-eternity then the nonexistence at a particular time of the sound (which is sought to be inferred) cannot be established by the inference. (Only general nonexistence can be proved by the inference). Another possible inference for proving the destruction of sound may be one in which the sky is the minor term, present absence of sound the major term and non-cognition (of the sky) as qualified by sound the middle term. In this inference the middle term is deviant as the sky, being invisible at all times is not cognised even when it is characterised by some sound. The absence of the major term which is the same as the presence of sound, thus coexists with the middle term viz. non-cognition of the sky as qualified by sound. Similarly in an inference in which a certain time when there is no sound is the minor term and the major and middle terms are as before (in the middle term time is taken to be unqualified by sound) the middle will be found to be deviant as, whether there is or is not sound at a certain time the time cannot be perceived. There may yet be an inference like this: 'I have ears which are at present devoid of any sound because I have no sound-sensation now like a deaf person.' This inference is fallacious as the example instantiating the concomitance of the middle and major terms is devoid of the major term and is also self-contradictory. A deaf person cannot have the hearing organ. Even if the person possessed the ears that is no valid proof that the latter are devoid of sound. Could it be said

that the proof for there being no sound in the ears of the deaf is the unenjoyability of such a sound, for an unenjoyable object cannot serve any purpose and therefore an unenjoyable sound cannot come into being? No! This cannot be true. The earlier sounds in the sound-vibration-sequence are not heard by any hearer and so they remain unenjoyed yet they do exist; likewise totally-unheard sounds also can be supposed to exist. But aren't the earlier vibrations needed for the genesis of the later vibrations which are certainly enjoyed? Yes! This is so, but the last vibration does not produce any vibration. So its utility consists in its enjoyability and since the sound-vibration supposed to occur in the ears of the deaf is not enjoyable it cannot be supposed to be real. However it can't be maintained that the sound-vibration occurring in the ears of the deaf is the last one (so that no further vibration is produced by it. So mere production of later vibrations could be the purpose that earlier vibrations may be supposed to serve). Moreover people like us cannot apprehend either the utility or disutility of all produced objects (so that the rule that every produced object must have some use could be upheld). Just as during sleep we are not aware of the purpose that inhaling and exhaling serve in our life and yet these physiological processes go on (of themselves) so there can exist unheard sound-vibrations in the ears of the deaf. The rule (relating genesis and utility) is that 'whatever comes into being has definite use (or serves some purpose)'. This rule is not infringed merely because in a certain instance the use of a thing is not discovered by a casual observation of it. Such a non-discovery does not lead to the denial of the genesis or the occurrence of the thing. If it is not so then since the deaf person has no use for the auricular organ there will not occur the circumscription of the sky by the auricular cavity (or eardrum) in the ears of the person. (There is also inferential proof for the above). The inference goes like this: At the time when other persons of sound hearing are able to hear sounds the deaf person present amongst them must have sound-vibrations in his or her ears too because he or she is close to the source of sound and the aperture in his or her eardrum is not closed as is the case with the ears of other persons. (By means of these inferences it is shown that deaf persons are not devoid of sounds and consequently the example in the earlier inference is devoid of the major term. There cannot therefore be a valid inference to prove the absence of sound).

(Now another inference is being set forth to establish the reality of the absence or destruction of sound). The inference is like this: 'The musical instruments like the lute, the flute and that which is called *panava* in Sanskrit are devoid of sound (in their natural condition because al-

though they are capable of being cognised as characterised by sound when they are played) yet they are cognised by themselves when their sounds are not cognised or heard. Whatever is cognised by itself despite being capable of being cognised—as characterised by a certain quality or property, is devoid of the latter, as for example the floor is devoid of the pot (although as characterised) by its conjunction with the pot the floor is the object of a determinate cognition of the form, 'There is pot on the floor.' This inference is also fallacious because the musical instruments cited—which are the minor term—are not cognised—by the cognition which cognises them as characterised by sound. The instruments are objects of visual cognition while sounds are cognised by the ear. Can it be urged that although there is not one source of cognition of the sound and the sounding instruments yet there is such general presumption (which finds expression in statements like, 'the lute is sweet-sounding' and so on)? Yes! There is the presumption but the absence of sound which is sought to be inferred (as located) in the musical instruments cannot be of the nature of destruction because destruction is located only in the locus of its counter-positive. Sound which is the counter-positive of its destruction is located in the sky (by the inherence-relation) and not in the instruments. The said absence cannot also be the absolute one because such an absence is not limited by time. It is always present in its locus. But in the above inference the absence sought to be inferred is a relative one. It is the present or future absence. (Thus the inference will be afflicted by the fallacy of absent major). Besides the proof of the absolute absence of sound in the minor term will not serve the purpose intended which is to prove the present absence of sound.

Let then there be this argument (to prove the destruction of sound): 'The kettledrum and instruments like it are the adjunctive conditions of the sky which is qualified (or filled) by sound. So the sound which is attributed to these instruments is really attributed to the sky itself. Likewise the sound negated in these instruments is actually negated only in the sky. It is just like the predication or negation of happiness in the living body. (So in the foregoing inference it is not really the instruments but the sky itself which is the minor term and so the middle term being located in it, the fallacy pointed out above cannot afflict the inference).' (But the example cited is not proper). The self which is the owner of happiness, misery etc. and is conditioned by the body is the object of internal perception. (So it can be the object of the predication and negation of happiness, misery etc.) The sky however is not perceptible with or without sounds. So the absence of sound cannot be predicated or denied of it. 'But aren't the conditions of the sky, viz., the instruments, perceptible and isn't this sufficient for the predication or negation?' It may here be asked. The answer is that the conditions not being the material causes of the sound they do not help define the absence of sound (which can be located only in the sky—the material cause of sound). If despite this the conditions themselves are supposed to help define the said absence then the conditions being perceptible entities the absence also would have to be regarded as perceptible. Moreover on this assumption absence would not be definable with the help of the real locus of its counter-positive (which is the general rule). Besides the conditions like kettledrum etc. are not always perceived yet the absence of sound is perceived. Even if a sounding musical instrument is imperceptible to a person due to its being hidden behind a wall the absence of the previously-heard sound is clearly apprehended by him. It cannot be urged against this that somehow the musical instrument is inferred as existing nearby and on the basis of this inferential cognition the usage regarding the absence of sound takes place. The usage will be of the nature of an inference like this: 'The lute etc., which are not seen, are devoid of sound as they are not cognised as making any sound'. In this inference the middle term is deviant. The instruments are visual objects while sound is audible. So even when there is sound in the instruments they being not audible, the middle term coexists with the absence of the major term. Moreover when the instruments are not perceptible (then merely on the basis of their inference) the absence of sound cannot be supposed to have the former as their loci. This may be doubtful. If the minor term is qualified as 'that which is being cognised' so that there is no doubt about its reality then since the instruments are not accessible to sensation nor to any other source of cognition, such a qualified minor term cannot be available for the inference. (Thus it is established that the cognition of the destruction does not require the prior cognition of its locus.)

Moreover (if the conclusion of the foregoing arguments is not accepted then) how to explain the cognition of the destruction of those substances, qualities and movements whose loci are destroyed? If no explanation of the cognition is possible how can there be the rule that an effect is destroyed when its material locus (and cause) is destroyed? May the explanation of the cognition be inference of the destruction based on the inference of the loci which have ceased to exist? No! Such a strategy had been adopted in the case of the earlier example but it led to certain inferential fallacies. The same fallacies may afflict the present inference too. It may be urged that there can be a contra-factual condi-

tional to justify the above rule. The conditional is like this: 'If, for example, the cloth is not destroyed even if the yarns constituting it are destroyed then it should be cognisable just as it was before destruction.' 'This is alright but what proof is sought to be supported by this conditional argument?' It may be asked. By way of answer the following inference (based on the conditional) may be cited, 'Whatever (like the fibres) appears to exist (when, the yarns being destroyed the cloth also is destroyed along with all its effects) is devoid of all the series of effects that issue from it sequentially because it appears by itself without being endowed by the latter'. Now in this inference if the absence of cloth is the major term then this being quite evident (as there is no cloth at all) the inference is afflicted by the fallacy of proving the already proved. If the destruction of the cloth is the major term then destruction being always located in that which is the material cause of its counter-positive and the yarn being the cause of the destroyed cloth the destruction cannot characterise the fibres which are the minor term in the inference. Thus there arises the fallacy of absent major. If the major term is modified to stand for the loci of the destruction of the cloth, then, since the destruction of the cloth is consequent upon the destruction of the yarns these cannot be the loci of the former. Perhaps the yarns in the foregoing major term may be qualified as those that are capable of being the loci of the cloth-destruction (even though sometimes the yarn-destruction precedes the cloth-destruction) and so if the above qualification is introduced into the major term the fallacy of absent major may be averted. But then the capability being present in the yarns even when the cloth is not destroyed the presence of the destruction in its locus cannot particularly be proved by the inference.

One may yet prove the occurrence of the destruction of the cloth in the fibres thus: The rule has to be admitted that the negation (or negative cognition) of the determined involves the negation of the determinants. Now there arises the cognition of the absence of yarns as qualified by the cloth as endowed with qualities etc., in the fibres which are the constituents of the yarns. In this determinate cognition the cloth, its qualities etc. are the various determinants, so their absence also is sure to be involved in the cognition. In this argument it needs to be specified as to what appears to be the locus or the qualificand of the absences of cloth, its qualities etc. It cannot be the fibres as they are not material causes of the cloth or its qualities. If despite this the fibres appeared as the loci in the cognition then the cognition cannot but be illusory. May it be the case that the fibres are the direct causes of the yarns and thus they determine the locative character of the yarns and the cloth in relation to the cloth and the qualities etc. of the cloth respectively; consequently the fibres are not devoid of the capacity to be the locus of the absence and thus they may help (define or) manifest it? Well! If this is so then the rule that destruction is (definable or) identifiable only through the identification of the locative inheree of its counter-positive goes by the board as even other means of identifying the destruction are now supposed to be available. (Thus it follows that whatever causal collocation produces the perceptual cognition of a thing, if it is present at a place or time without the thing itself being present there, then the absence of the thing is perceptible at that place or time. (It is not essential that the absence should be cognisable only in the locus of its counter-positive or be identifiable only as located there). But there is a point to be noted in this connection. If the said causal collocation is present at the time of the absence-cognition then the cognition is perceptual but if the collocation is not present but inferred or otherwise known to be present at another place or time then the absence too is cognised nonperceptually (for example one may have the cognition at a certain time of a certain thing having been absent or destroyed at an earlier time. The causal collocation needed for the perception of the thing is not present at the time of the absence-cognition).

The foregoing explanation helps rebut the likely allegation that the rule that an absence is defined by means of two reals (viz. its counter-positive and the locus) is infringed if the counter-positive alone is taken to define absence. This rule concerns only those absences whose counter-positives are definable by two entities (as is the case with the absence of conjunction). Besides this rule concerns those absences which are the objects of inferential cognition (as in the case of the cognition of the absence of the pervaded through the cognition of the absence of the pervader between which the relation of concomitance obtains). If the locus of the absence is not known then (the locus of the middle term remaining unknown) the inference (of the major term which is the absence of the pervaded would result in the fallacy of unestablished locus or minor). But even in this case a particular kind of cognition viz.. perception (of the locus) is not called for. Any kind of cognition of the locus would do to procure the cognition of absence. (Even recollection of the locus can serve the purpose). In certain cases like the cognition, 'This floor is devoid of the pot' the causal collocation of the cognition of the absence and the perceptual cognition of the floor go together and so it is the perception of the floor which leads to the cognition (which is perceptual) of the absence. If the import of the basic text of Nyāya, that is the aphorism of Gotama, were to stress the perceptual

character of the locus-cognition then in the aphorism he would not have cited 'destruction of fire' as example (In this aphorism it is stated that fire which is the destroyer of fuel is itself destroyed [or extinguished] after it has destroyed [or burnt out] the fuels; the fuel is not revived when the fire is destroyed. This example is cited to explain that the non-eternity of the character of non-eternity does not render the non-eternal eternal). Here the destruction of fire cannot be supposed to be cognised if the absence-cognition is supposed to depend upon the locus-cognition for, when the fire is destroyed no parts of fire are left in which the locatedness of the destruction can be perceived. Nor can the destruction of fire be inferred by the elimination of the possibility of the fire shifting to some other place. The elimination which is the middle term in the inference is itself an absence and so the occurrence of its cognition too needs explaining. If the locus of this absence is not cognised the absence (or elimination) would not be cognised. Nor can it be urged that the destruction of the fuel which is the efficient cause of the burning of fire leads at one stroke to the inferential cognition of the fire remaining at the place of burning and afterwards being extinguished there. The destruction of the efficient cause is not invariably associated with the destruction of the effect. Perhaps the association can be maintained if the associated effect is taken to be fiery. But no such invariable association is established. It is not established that a fiery or luminous object is invariably destroyed on the destruction of the fuel that kindles it. Among invisible loci such an association, even if it obtained—cannot be perceived. So it has to be admitted willy-nilly that the destruction of objects like fire which cannot move away from their efficient causes are definable or identifiable even by means of these (which may be the places where the destruction takes place). There is no other alternative explanation of the cognition of the destruction. This being so, the great teachers of Nyāya admit darkness to be of the nature of the absence of light even though it is perceptible. (The particles of light—which are the loci of light, not being visible, darkness would be rendered invisible if the locus-perception is supposed to be essential for absence-perception). This also explains the possibility of the cognition of the anterior negation of sounds. Just as the non-eternity of sounds is perceptually apprehended it is inferrible also. The inference goes like this: 'words or articulate sounds are non-eternal because they have genesis like pot, tree etc.' But isn't this inference contradicted by the recognition of the identity of words through different periods of time? No! Such a recognition isn't different from that pertaining to the burning flame. (If the latter is changing continually then words also could be supposed to be changing and therefore they would be non-eternal). But isn't the recognition of word-identity uncontradicted and self-valid? Well! This can be said of the recognition of flame also. But the flame is not identical from moment to moment as it appears to be endowed with incompatible properties (as every moment the oil and wick are being gradually destroyed by the flame). If despite this the flame is treated as unchanging then the usage of difference would disappear as there would be no basis for it (other than the appearance of incompatible properties). If however the usage is treated as accidental then anything can be supposed to be changeable from moment to moment. But words also are perceived to be endowed with incompatible properties, words are cognised as being low-pitched, high pitched etc. 'Isn't such a cognition relating to words unnatural?' No! The method by which it is determined in the case of a certain object that a property is naturally inherent in the object is applicable to words also and by its means it can be decided that being low-pitched, being high-pitched etc. are the natural properties of words; certainly there is no evidence other than perception by which it is determined for example that coldness and liquidity are the natural qualities of water or heat and brightness are qualities of light.

It may be urged that coldness, liquidity etc. are to be regarded as natural qualities of water and similarly heat, brightness etc. as natural quantities of light because no other quality or qualities are known to be such. Only these qualities are necessarily inherent in these substances. But this can also be said of the qualities of being low-pitched, high-pitched etc. as inherent in words or articulate sounds. If a doubt is expressed that perhaps low-pitchedness, high-pitchedness etc. may not be the natural qualities of words but of the inarticulate sounds through which the latter are manifested then a similar doubt can be expressed about the familiar qualities of coldness, liquidity etc., also. These too may be supposed to characterise some invisible substances hidden in water, light etc. This does not mean that a property or quality belongs to or is intrinsic to the very thing which it appears to characterise. If such were the case then because the conch looks yellow to the jaundiced person, the white crystal appears red because of its proximity to a red flower or a piece of cloth appears blue owing to its being washed in a blue solution, these various colours would have to be supposed to be intrinsic to the conch, crystal and cloth respectively. If this supposition is not entertained, the reason is that yellowness etc. are known to belong to other objects while conch etc. are known to be endowed with colours opposed to the former and the appearance of yellowness etc. in conch, crystal etc. is found to be positively and negatively associated with bile, red flower

etc. Thus the appearance of colours not belonging to conch etc. is found to be contradicted by the knowledge of the real colour of the latter and thus the appearance is realised to be illusory. But the low-pitchedness etc. cognised as characterising the uttered alphabets are not known to be the characteristic of any other thing.

Nor are the alphabets as uttered by parrots, koels etc. endowed with characteristics opposed to the characteristics of being low-pitched, high-pitched etc. Nor again are these dependent upon the positive and negative association of some entity endowed with these characteristics (as is found to be the case with the characteristic of redness of a piece of crystal lying near a red flower). But can't there be doubt that the apparent characteristics of the articulate sound are not its own? Yes! There can be such a doubt but if the doubt can be raised in this case it can be raised everywhere so that nothing can be proved by any proof in any case. Moreover the said doubt cannot occur at all, for doubt depends upon the recollection of doubted alternatives and recollection depends upon impressions of past experience: unless therefore there is experience of sounds as endowed with the above-mentioned characteristics there cannot result any impression of this experience. The said characteristics cannot be supposed to characterise inarticulate sounds only (although they appear to characterise articulate sounds). The tactual and other sense-organs have access to the perceptible objects only through their sensible qualities like touch, smell etc. The inarticulate sound has no touch and so it cannot be apprehended by the tactual sense. Nor can it be apprehended by the auricular sense only. The auricular sense does not contain any airy elements in it (as it is composed of ether circumscribed by the auricular aperture) and so it cannot have access to characteristics which pertain to air. (The different pitches of sounds are properties of air as the eye has no access to them). (If it is contended that) these properties are certainly sensed by the ear then it can be maintained that either low-pitchedness, high-pitchedness etc. do not characterise the air because these are audible like the uttered words or air is not endowed with characteristics which are apprehended by the ear because it has shape and form like earthy objects. If this is not true then words also will belong to air or be airy properties. But what is the harm if this is admitted? Well! In that case words may characterise either the composite entity or the atomic particles. If the first, then words are sure to be non-eternal (as the composite entity is non-eternal) and if the second is true then words cannot be heard at all. Both these contingencies are unacceptable to the opponent (the Mīmāṃsaka). Certainly the auricular organ must be endowed with the special quality which is of the same generic character as the quality inherent in the object apprehended by it as it is an external sense-organ like the olfactory and other sense-organs. (This is the inferential proof for sound being the special quality of the sky). 'Let then inarticulate sounds also be the qualities of the sky so that the properties like low-pitchedness, high-pitchedness etc., which are the properties of sound could be sensed by the ear', it may here be contended. This contention is not correct, for in the cognition of the form, 'This particular alphabet namely "ga" is high-pitched or more high pitched' it is not the inarticulate sound but an alphabet that is apprehended. How can then the properties of an unapprehended object be apprehended in the cognition? Without the individual inheree of a property being cognised the property cannot be cognised. The causal collocation resulting in the cognition of the genus or property are included in the causal collocation resulting in the cognition of the individual inheree of the genus or property. This fact is ascertained by means of positive and negative association (of the cognitions and the respective collocations). For example things like pot, cloth etc. being sensible their generic properties like potness, clothness etc. are also sensible. Mind etc. however are not accessible to any sense and so no generic property characterising these entities is sensually apprehended. Can it be urged that it is the intrinsic sensibility of the properties that determines their actual sensedness, so that the sensibility of the individual inheree of the properties has nothing to do with the latter? No! If this were so then existence, substanceness, earthness etc. being intrinsically sensible or perceptible properties these should be perceptible as characterising even invisible entities like atoms. If these properties are not regarded as intrinsically sensible then they will not be sensed as characterising even perceptible entities like pot. Thus the foregoing contention is mere sophistry. So it has to be admitted that the capacity to produce the cognition of the generic property is certainly part and parcel of the capacity to produce the cognition of the individual inheree of the property and so if the latter is not apprehended the former (the property) too is not apprehended. Thus low-pitchedness, high-pitchedness etc. cannot be supposed to be imposed upon the alphabets (and words composed of them). These properties must be treated as natural properties of the alphabets and since these are mutually incompatible their appearance in the alphabets contradicts the recognition of identity relating to them. (The alphabets cannot remain the same as they appear to be endowed with incompatible properties).

(Having thus disposed of objections based on recognition of identity to the inference of the non-eternity of articulate sounds the author now proceeds to deny the possibility of the fallacy of rebuttal of the inference by a contradictory middle term). There cannot arise the fallacy of a contradictory middle term in the foregoing inference. Two mutually contradictory inferences cannot be of equal epistemic strength for, then the minor term of these inferences would be endowed with incompatible properties which are the respective major terms in these inferences. So the opponent—the Mīmāṃsaka—would have to specify which of the five essential conditions of a valid middle term is absent in the case of the inference of the non-eternity of the alphabets (if there really is such an absence) mentioned above. If the opponent cannot specify any absent condition the middle term of his own inference must be devoid of some necessary condition and as such his inference cannot be strong enough to oppose the inference of the non-eternity of sound.

But even granting that there cannot be two equivalent and mutually opposed inferences relating to alphabets may one not adduce an inference like the following to prove the eternity of the latter? The inference would be this, 'Words are eternal because they are the substances without a substantive material cause. (Mīmāṃsā regards words as substantive entities not having the sky as their material cause). The advocate of the non-eternity of words should be able to controvert this inference if he has to save his position. The answer to this challenge is that words are not substantive entities at all. If another inference like, 'Words are substantive entities because they are apprehended by means of a direct contact of the sense-organ with them as is the case with an entity like pot,' is trotted out to establish the substantive nature of words then the rejoinder is that the middle term of this inference too is unestablished (as is the middle of the previous inference). But can't there be an inference like, 'Sound is a substantive entity because it is apprehended by means of its direct contact with the sense-organ as is the claypot', to establish the substantive character of sound? No! This too is not possible; unless it is established that sound is the quality of the ear or it is a substantive entity, its direct contact with the sense-organ cannot be established. But there can be inference by elimination of there being direct contact between sound and a sense-organ. The inference may proceed like this: 'Sound cannot be one of the three categories namely the universal, the specificity and the relation of inherence' as, unlike these, sound is known to be endowed with the generic universal of existence. 'It cannot also be of the nature of movement' as unlike movement it does not inhere in anything of a concrete shape. So sound can only be either a substance or a quality as these are the only remaining categories of reality. If sound is one of these it can be directly connected with the sense-organ either by the conjunctive or the inherence-relation. (If it is a substance it can be conjoined with the sense-organ and if it is a quality it may be inherent in the sense-organ itself). (Thus the foregoing inference can be defended against the charge of unestablished middle term). But such an inference by elimination cannot help establish the substantive nature of sound as there are proofs opposed to this as there are those opposed to the assumption of active or other character of sound. Thus the middle term in the foregoing inference is sure to be disestablished. If despite this the assumption of the substantiality of sound is not denied then even its active or other characters cannot be denied. So the inference by elimination will fail to prove anything and as such it can be of help only in restricting the scope of the doubt regarding the categorisation. The inference cannot be taken as evidence for sound being treated as a substance or a quality.

'But what is the evidence against sound being regarded as a substance?' It may here be asked. In reply we say as follows: There is the inference (to prove that sound is not a substance) that 'sound is not a substance because it is one of the objective conditions of the distinction between the different external sense-organs' or because it is endowed with a generic property which does not characterise the sensory objects cognisable by visual, olfactory etc. sense-organs, as is the case with colour, shape etc. which too are endowed with properties like colourness etc. which do not characterise sensory objects. Thus by means of this inference by elimination sound is proved to be a quality and consequently an inherent entity (inhering in the auricular sense-organ). As a result the earlier inference seeking to prove the substantive character of sound by means of the middle term 'being sensed by a sense-organ directly related to sound' fails to prove its major term as the middle term is found to be violated by the fallacy of deviation (as both qualities and substance can be directly connected with sense-organs).

As thus sound cannot be proved to be a substance the inference cited previously to counter the proof of the transitoriness of sound (by means of the middle term 'being a substance having no substantive locus or cause') remains unestablished and so it is incapable of disproving the transitoriness of sound.

But the Mīmāṃsaka may argue against this contention that the upholder of the transitoriness-view has himself proved by means of an elaborate argument that sound cannot be the quality of anything other than

the sky which is the auricular sense-organ. It can be proved further that sound cannot be the quality of the auricular organ too because there is the rule that whatever is sensed by a certain sense-organ cannot be the quality of it as is the case with smell etc. (Smell, colour etc. do not characterise the nose, the eyes etc. by which they are respectively sensed). There can also be an inference like the following to prove the above facts, 'The hearing sense cannot apprehend its own quality because it is a sense-organ like the nose which does not sense its own smell'. Thus sound can be proved to be other than a quality. But then how can the inference help establish the substantive nature of sound? (Merely proving that sound cannot be a quality is not sufficient to prove that sound is a substance). Moreover even the negative proposition that sound is not a quality cannot be established by the foregoing inference. The non-apprehension of its smell by the olfactory organ or the non-apprehension of its colour by the visual organ is not due to these qualities being respectively inherent in the olfactory and visual organs. The inferences set forth above are vitiated by the fallacy of conditionality the condition qualifying the middle term being 'insensitivity'. (the qualities are not sensed because by nature they are incapable of being sensorily apprehended). (this condition pervades the major but does not pervade the middle term in the inference). Qualities other than words and sounds are sensed by other sense-organs. Nor is the ear effective in sensing some special substance. A sense-organ can sense a substance only on the strength of its capacity to sense the special quality characteristic of the substance. (That is to say, no sense-organ can apprehend a substance without being able to apprehend its special quality. No sense-organ is competent to sense a substance by itself apart from its special quality). If this were not so then the light of the moon which is visible should be felt (with its feel) by terrestrial beings (there being no need to sense the feel of the light). Similarly the self being introspectible by mind it should be cognisable even during the state of deep sleep when none of its states is experienced. Also the eye should be able to sense things whose colour and form are not vivid (vividness of colour of an object being one of the essential conditions of the visual sensation of the latter). Since all these possibilities are ruled out it has to be concluded that sense-organs apprehend things only on the strength of their competence to sense the special qualities of those things. It cannot be otherwise. So the sky cannot be visually sensible as it has no colour or form sensed by any sense-organ.

(Now the followers of the Prabhākara School of Mīmāṃsā seek to turn the tables against the Nyāya proof above presented for the thesis

that words and sounds are qualities, not substances). Let then there be this inference, 'words are eternal because they are the qualities of sky only, just as the dimension of infinitude which is the quality of the eternal sky only is itself eternal'. (This inference contradicts the opponent's inference that words are ephemeral). No! The inference is fallacious as non-producedness is the condition which afflicts the middle term of the inference. (All eternal things are non-produced. So the eternity of words may be taken to be determined by their non-producedness instead of by the property 'being the quality of an eternal entity, the sky.' The middle term cited in the inference is not the determinant of the major). (If non-producedness were not the determinant of eternity then) we can even have a fallacious inference like, 'The special qualities of the self are eternal because they are only its qualities like its ubiquitous dimension'. 'But isn't the eternity of pleasure, pain etc.—the qualities of the self—perceptually contradicted and so the middle term in the inference is not a valid one?' It may be asked. The answer is that if the middle term in the inference is an unconditional determinant of the major then the major's presence in the minor must be uncontradictable. The concomitance of the middle and the major (which is the basis of inference, is supposed to be natural; so if even such concomitance fails (being conditional) then the middle and major will forfeit their very natures. It has therefore to be admitted that the middle in the above inference is afflicted by conditionality and so is irrelevant to the major. How this conditionality of the middle is ascertained (by means of perceptual contradiction) or otherwise is immaterial.

By the above stands condemned another inference which could be set forth to prove the same thesis. The inference goes like this: 'words are eternal because they are sensed by the ear like the property of wordness which is also sensed along with the words when they are heard'. In this inference also the above-mentioned property itself, namely non-producedness will be found to determine eternity and as such conditionality will afflict the middle term of the inference. If anything else determined eternity then like words, smell, colour, taste and feel would also be eternal. Just as words are sought to be inferred as eternal by the opponent on the basis of their being accessible to a single sense-organ so on a similar basis and on the analogy of the properties of smellness, tasteness etc. it will be quite easy to infer the eternity of smell, taste etc. If such an inference in the cases of smell, taste etc. is not allowed then a similar inference in the case of words also cannot be allowed.

In the earlier inference that words are non-eternal as they have genesis, the fallacies of incompatible and deviant middle terms are inconceivable. The possibility of the fallacy of an unestablished middle alone can be envisaged. But it too does not afflict the inference. To explain: According to the earlier elucidation words or sounds are sensed as endowed with the natural properties of excellence or inferiority which depend upon their different pitches. Excellence and its opposite as found in other things are known to be determined by different causes. Eternal entities like sky etc. being uncaused are always in the state of excellence or infinitude. Atoms which are also eternal and so uncaused always exist in the subtle state only. These entities do not exist in a comparatively superior or inferior state (so that they could excel some entities without excelling others). Thus relative excellence or superiority and inferiority which are excluded from eternal entities and associated with caused entities cannot but entail the producedness of the entity in which they inhere. This results in the establishment of concomitance between producedness and relative excellence and non-eternity. Thus we may have the inference: 'Words have genesis because they are endowed with relative excellence and its opposite, just as sweetness has different degrees of excellence. If without any determinant different degrees of excellence could arise in a thing then even eternal entities would be endowed with it (as there cannot be any determinant in relation to these entities).' Can't one say against this that causal determination applies only to those things that are other than words and sounds? No! Such a retort is possible in all inferences. One can counter that the middle in an inference coexists with the major in all loci except the minor (where alone the coexistence is observed). As a result the middle can always be charged with the fallacy of non-coexistence. If the higher or lower degrees of the manifested sounds (articulate and inarticulate) did not depend upon the higher and lower degrees of the manifestor then the manifestation of the manifested would be unnatural. But the naturalness of this is already established. Certainly there is no determinant other than the manifestor or the generator nor is there any determinate which is other than the natural or the conditional one. (So the qualities of high and low pitch etc. appearing in sounds cannot but be determined. Now the opponent comes forward with another argument to disprove the non-eternity of sound despite its being originated). Let then be this argument (to prove the indestructibility of sound): There is no incompatibility between eternity and origination so that non-eternity and origination could be treated as concomitant properties. If the concomitance is not established then the middle term in the earlier inference ceases

to be invariably concomitant with the major for the Nyāya philosopher. For the Mīmāṃsā philosopher the middle is irrelevant to the occurrence in the minor of the major or is not the determinant of the major as it is not excluded from the contra-minor (eternal) entities. For the Buddhists however the exclusion from contra-minors of the middle would be a matter of doubt. Such an argument cannot be entertained. The property of origination is excluded from the eternal entities which are opposed to the proximity of the conditions of destruction because the non-eternity which is the pervader of origination is excluded from the former and as such the property comes to be associated with things which are associated with the conditions of destruction. (Every originated thing is destructible because non-eternity pervading origination is excluded from eternal things which are not associated with the causes of destruction). If it is asked how it is known that the originated entity must be associated with the causes of its own destruction the answer is this: The originated cannot be unassociated—like the sky etc. which are eternal—with destructive causes unless they are naturally opposed to each other which however is not the case. Origination and destruction are known to be related with each other. If they are not opposed mutually then the absence of relation between them must be due to some spatial interval separating them from each other as is the case with the mountains of the Himālayas and the Vindhyās. As to the spatial interval between the two things (or properties), it can be taken to be due to their opposition or the absence of any cause of their coming together. The first cannot be the case because it has already been stated that origination is associated with destruction. (there is no natural opposition between these as things like fruit, tree etc. come into being and also go out of being). The second can be the case if we find it to be like a piece of cloth and the saffron powder. (These are not naturally opposed to each other). If sometimes these are in mutual contact at other times they are also remote from each other as there may not be a cause of these to bring them together. If a piece of cloth is destroyed (by certain causes) even before it came in contact with the destructive causes then these will cease to be the causes of its destruction. If even the saffron were needed for the destruction of the cloth as the destructive causes are, then who can deny that the former comes in contact with the cloth? From this it can be concluded that things, properties etc. which are not mutually incompatible may remain unconnected with each other (only) because of their non-contemporaneity. If things, properties etc. were mutually compatible and contemporaneous they would certainly be connected with each other. Since temporal difference always goes along with the separation

of the mutually-compatible entities, the absence of (the temporal difference entails the absence of the latter—the absence of separation). So origination and destruction of the originated thing not being naturally opposed to each other they are bound to come together in the same thing at the appropriate time when the collocation of the causes of the originated thing takes place. (In plain language this means that everything excluding destruction that comes into being is bound to be destroyed in course of time. So even words and sounds which originate cease to exist and are therefore non-eternal).

Alright! Let there be then this argument against the inference of the non-eternity of words and sounds 'If (as explained above) words are non-eternal how can they be seen to be in consonance with their meanings?' (A word is related to the individuals denoted by it by the meaning-relation. Now when a certain word like 'pot' has faded out of existence then it cannot be supposed to denote the pot, it being nonexistent). The question is answered very simply. Just as the entities meant by a word being transitory, the word does not cease to have meaning on account of the fact that individual entities under their generic character are meant by a word, so even similar words under their generic character may he supposed to denote the different individual entities meant by them. If this is so why not admit that it is the generic character and not the individual endowed with the character that is meant by a word? Well! If so how does the word yield the verbal cognition of the individual (endowed with the generic character)? 'By means of implication (or presumption)', it may be replied. 'What is then this implication (or presumption)?' Certainly it is not inference. Just as the meaning-relation of a word with innumerable individual (meant) entities cannot be cognised so also the concomitance between a word and its innumerable denotends cannot be cognised. If it can, then even the meaning-relation of a word with all the individuals meant by it can be cognised under the form of the generic characteristic, common to all the meant individuals. 'Can't the said concomitance be cognised under the form of individuality?' No! There is nothing like common individuality. Even if there were such an individuality it cannot yield the implied meaning of the individual (as it would be common to all individuals characterised by it). Even the common meaning-relation between a word and its individual denotends could be of such a nature. Why then have the implied meaning? But couldn't implication be regarded as presumption itself? Well! Then what is inexplicable without implying the individual? It cannot be the occurrence of the generic characteristic (meant by the word) because the later continues to exist even when the individual has not come into being or has gone out of being. But can there be the genus if no individual whatsoever is there? Well! Here the meaning of the word 'whatsoever' or the corresponding Sanskrit word *'Mātra'* is inapplicable. (There is nothing like common individuality which can help pick up a certain individual as the intended meaning of a word). If by presumption it is meant that without the cognition of individuals the cognition of the genus comprehending them is not possible then this goes against the professed view of the opponent. He himself has maintained that the genus is cognised without the cognition of the individual. (If it were not so then presumption of the individual-meaning would not have to be postulated at all). Could the presumption be taken to mean that the meaning-cognition cannot have the genus as its object without having the individual too as its object? Yes! But then both the genus and the individuals would be objects of the same (verbal) cognition. How then can there be the problem as to what the word denotes (or means)? May it be contended against this that since the genus meant by a word cannot be connected with the meanings of other words in a sentence the individual has to be imported into the word-meaning? No! This would lead to the fallacy of mutual dependence. (The genus cannot be cognised without implying the individual and the individual cannot be cognised without the cognition of the genus characterising it).

Alright! Let there be then this proof for the foregoing thesis about word-meaning. It is a fact that even without the concomitance of particular instances of the middle and major terms in an inference the middle does lead to the inference of a particular instance of the major in the minor merely on the basis of its location in the minor. Similarly even in the absence of its connection with the individual (supposed to be meant by it) a word meaning the generic character of individuals may end up by denoting the individual endowed with the generic character because of the special nature of the meaning-capacity. And this is precisely what is called implication. But then it has to be explained why there is first the verbal cognition of the genus and thereafter by implication (or presumption) the cognition of the individual endowed with the genus. No cause of the cognition of the individual is lacking when the genus has been denoted so that the former should not arise along with the latter. Could one say that the verbal cognition of the genus is necessary for the cognition of the individual? Yes, but then there would be no use for the admission of the capacity of words to denote individuals which will anyhow be implied by the genus. The opponent may be willing to admit this but it has already been explained that a cognition of genus not involving the individual is impossible to occur. Moreover

since the cognition of the individual by words is brought about by the cognition of the genus and not by the known means of cognition it would amount to the admission of an extra source of cognition. If the cognition of the individual through the verbal cognition of the genus is regarded as recollective and as such the contingency of the admission of a new source of cognition is sought to be averted then a certain individual, say, a cow which is not previously perceived cannot be the object of recollection. Such an object would fail to be included in the meaning of the word 'cow'. If the verbal cognition of the genus and the individuals is treated as one and the same then there is no need to admit different meaning-capacities of a word. So just as the innumerable individuals as comprehended by their genus are denoted by a word and so the denotedness relating to the individuals is one, so words also, despite their ephemeral character may be taken to have one meaning-capacity in relation to the individuals meant by them. Wordness is common to different ephemeral specimens of words. (The capacity and denotedness are each single because their determinants are respectively single).

Even if the alphabets (or word units) are taken to be eternal they cannot denote things meant by the words unless they enter into a regular structure of properly-accented letter-series constituting words. But this structured nature of the alphabets cannot he eternal. So both the things meant and the words meaning them can be related with each other only as part and parcel of the thing-structure and the word-structure respectively. So even on the basis of the relation holding between words and things words cannot be supposed to be eternal. If thus letters or alphabets themselves are ephemeral what to say of words which are the result of a regular succession of letters brought into being by the intention of the utterer of the words to communicate his meaning through the latter? Sentences which are composed of words and the scriptures which are composed of sentences can simply not be imagined to be eternal if words and letters are not so. May we not understand the eternity of the Vedas simply as the non-interruption of its teaching-and-learning-tradition depending upon the succession of the teachers and the taught who helped perpetuate the tradition? No! This too cannot be maintained because there is creation as also annihilation of the world from time to time (on account of which the tradition cannot remain uninterrupted). But it may be asked, 'How can there be this discontinuity if every day is, as a rule, preceded by another day (which means that creation is beginningless), the actions of different persons reach maturation at different times and so the destinies generated by the actions cannot get exhausted (by fructification) simultaneously, the

organisation of the distinctions of caste, sub-caste etc., cannot be maintained, in the absence of the knowledge of verbal convention verbal communication among human beings disappeared and the traditional arts and crafts got disrupted?

In reply to this objection we say as below:

EXPL.: The extrinsic-veridicity of cognitions has already been established by means of several arguments set forth by the Nyāya philosopher so far. Now the various arguments intended to establish the eternity of words by Mīmāṃsā and even some other schools are being taken up one after another for critical consideration. The first argument seeks to define the authority of the scriptures on the ground that the letters of which the words in the scriptural texts are composed are eternal. The testimony of common experience is however directly opposed to the thesis of the argument. If the letters, words etc. were eternal they would not come into or go out of being with their utterance and its cessation. The non-sensation of letters etc. when their utterance comes to an end cannot be explained either by the assumption that the unheard letters continue to exist in an imperceptible condition or the assumption that different casual conditions are needed for sensing different letters or sounds. If this is true in the case of letters it could be true in the case of other entities also so that every entity could be regarded as eternal being imperceptibly existent when it is supposed to have gone out of existence.

Some Nyāya thinkers are of the view that the cessation of letters cannot be perceived because the usual contact between the sense-organ and absence namely, 'qualification of that which is in conjunction with the sense-organ' is not available in the case of the destruction of letters. The sense of hearing viz., the sky as circumscribed by the auricular aperture is supposed to be directly connected with the destruction of sound. There is no qualification of the conjoined. To controvert this view the author sets forth an inference to prove the sensory character of the destruction of sound. The inference goes like this: 'The disputed entity viz., the destruction of sound is a sensible entity because it is the destruction of a sensible entity just as is the absence of a pot; if the absence or destruction of a pot can be sensible the destruction of sound also can be sensible'. The inference is based on the Nyāya dictum that if a certain thing is sensible then its generic property as well as its absence are also sensible. Sound is sensible so its absence or its destruction is also sensible. The absence in a locus of all entities having shape is not sensible although it is the absence of both sensible and insensible entities

having shape. To avoid such cases of the discrepancy of the middle and major terms the counter-positive of the absence figuring as middle term in the inference has to be qualified as that whose counter-positivity is determined by sensibility. If only a few things having shape are sensible then the counter-positivity of the latter cannot have sensibility as its determinant. Mīmāṃsā objects to the inference on the ground that the destruction of sound is not connected by the usual relation viz., 'qualification of that which is conjoined with the sense-organ' with the ear. Moreover the supposed locus of the destruction is the insensible entity sky. Thus there arises the fallacy of contradictory inference or conditionality because the sensibility (which is the major term in the above inference) of the absences of pot, tree etc. is not due to their being the absences of sensible entities (which is the middle term in the inference), it is due to their being in contact with appropriate sense-organs or their being sensible entities. Thus the middle is not the determinant of the major in the inference. Alternatively it can be said that contact with sense-organs or the property of having a sensible locus pervades all entities that are sensible (the major term) but neither of these pervades the loci of the middle term viz., the absences of sensible entities. The absence of sound is such an entity but it is neither connected with any sense-organ nor has it a sensible locus. (The direct relation of the ear and the absence of sound is not admitted by the objector). The other fallacy of contradictory inference arises because of the middle terms, 'absence of connection with sense-organs' and 'the property of having invisible locus' leading to the inference of the contradictories of the major term in the above inference. The contradictory inference is this. 'The destruction of sound is invisible (and so nonexistent) because it is unrelated to any sense-organ or because it has an invisible locus'. Nyāya replying to the objection denies both the charges against its inference. Countering the first charge of conditionality it urges that the intrinsic capability of a thing cannot have auxiliary conditions as its determinant. For instance a seed is intrinsically or by nature capable of producing a sprout; soil, water, air etc. are the auxiliary conditions which help the productive process taking place in the seed. They cannot be treated as the determinants of the productive capacity of the seed. Similarly certain entities are sensible by nature. Sense-organ-contact which is only a condition of the sensible entities being sensed cannot be a determinant of the intrinsic sensibility of the latter. So a naturally-sensible entity may remain unrelated to sense-organs and therefore unsensed. Thus the alleged condition will be found to be non-pervasive of the major term and so fail to fulfil the definition of conditionality. It can

even be said that intrinsic capacity always depends upon the capacity of auxiliaries without which it does not manifest itself. So if the destruction of sound is a sensible entity then it must have relation with the auricular sense. For this reason the relational character of the ear-qualification by destruction cannot be denied. The property of having a sensible locus which is the second condition mentioned above cannot also be maintained to be such. Certainly it is not because the perceptible absences have perceptible loci that they are perceptible. If it were so then the absences of invisible qualities like virtue, vice etc. would also be perceptible as the self that is their locus is perceptible. For this very reason the above property and relation with sense-organ together cannot be taken to determine the perceptibility of a perceptible absence.

The second fallacy of there being a contradictory inference cannot also be upheld. The first alleged ground of the inference viz., 'absence of relation with any sense-organ' taken as middle term is unestablished. There certainly obtains the natural qualifier-qualified relation between the ear and the destructive absence of sound. One cannot contend against this that unless both the qualifier and the qualified are perceptible they cannot be known as so related. The ear which is taken to be the qualified entity is the sky which is invisible. So it cannot be apprehended as such and consequently even the absence of sound cannot be apprehended as the qualifier. This contention is ill-conceived because being the qualifier or the qualified is not the same as being the object of the determinate cognition of the qualifier qualifying the qualified. The determinate cognition is the result of one thing being the qualificand and another the qualifier. The qualifier-qualified-relation cannot include its own cognition as part and parcel of itself. The cognition is based on the relation but if the relation itself involved the cognition there would result the fallacy of self-dependence. 'But how can there be the qualifying by absence of the ear (the qualificand) if there is no relation between the two determining qualifierhood and qualificandhood?' It may be asked. In reply it may be stated that absence and its locus are by nature such that even without any relation mediating between them they get mutually connected as qualifier and qualified respectively. This mutually-connected nature of these two is itself known as their qualificative relation. Absence is always associated with the locus of its counter-positive. So the destructive absence of sound is necessarily associated with the sky in which sound inheres. This associative nature of absence and its locus is itself the competence (of the absence) to produce the determinate cognition of the form, 'here there is the absence'. Qualifierhood of absence is the same as this competence. Such

qualifierhood of the absence of sound cannot be denied as the latter is associated by nature with the locus of its counter-positive. It may be urged against this account of the qualificatory relation that like the qualifier the qualified or the qualificand too should appear in the determinate cognition as we find in the case of the cognition of the absence of pot on the floor. This is however not what we find about the cognition of the absence of sound. The sky which is the locus of this absence is invisible and so it cannot figure as the qualificand in the determinate cognition. This objection can be met by stipulating that only if the qualificand is perceptible by nature it can figure as such in the determinate perceptual cognition. But even in the absence of its perceptual cognition the absence of sound as the qualifier can certainly be perceptually apprehended. If this is not admitted then along with the smell of an earthly object the object should be perceptible (even when there is no visual contact with it). When the eyes are in contact (by the relation of 'conjunction with the inheree of') with the colour of an object, then along with the colour the object too is perceived. But such is not the case with smell and other qualities. These qualities being in contact with appropriate sense-organs, are perceived by them but their loci are not (visually) perceived (along with them). This is so because it is only through the eyes that an object is perceived.

One may yet contend that nothing is cognised as qualifying (or characterising) the sense-organ itself and so sounds (or their absence as characterizing the sky) are not cognisable. Only what qualifies that which is conjoined with senses is cognised. Qualities like colour, taste etc. and their absences are known to characterize things conjoined with sense-organs and so they are cognised. But such a contention is based on the false generalisation that every perceptible or cognisable object must be only indirectly connected with sense-organs and are cognised by the latter. If this were not so then sounds not being indirectly connected with the ear as smell, taste etc. are connected with the nose, tongue etc. they would not be sensed at all.

The other ground of the fallacy of there being a contradictory inference cited above also doesn't hold. The middle term of the proposed inference is the property of 'being an absence having an invisible locus.' By means of this middle term the contradictory of the major of the earlier inference, viz., 'being sensible' is sought to be established by the opponent. But the middle term is afflicted by the fallacy of conditionality, the condition being 'the absence of competence (to be sensible)'. It is not due to having an insensible locus that a thing (like the absence of sound) is invisible. The real cause of its insensibility is its lack of competence to be sensed. So even that which has an invisible locus can be sensed. 'If one urges against this that having an invisible locus is itself the absence of competence to be visible then the absence of this absence is, the property of having a visible locus which would be the same as competence. If this is conceded then the absence or destruction of merit, demerit etc. acquired by the self would have to be visible. This contingency may be avoided by defining 'competence to be sensible' as the conjoint property of having a visible locus and also a visible counter-positive. Such competence is not present in every sensible entity and so the earlier inference is not afflicted by conditionality. But it is not correct to maintain that absences are cognisable only if both their loci and counter-positives are cognisable. The cognition of the counter-positive alone is sufficient for the cognition of absence. If this were not true then there cannot arise the determinate perceptual cognition even of the absence of a pot on the floor. It is the contact of the pot with the floor which is negated in this cognition. It cannot be the anterior, posterior or absolute negation of the pot on the floor that can be the object of the determinate cognition. Now the absence of the contact of the pot is present on the floor. The pot is not located in places where it is absent. So one of the loci of the absence of the pot being the pot itself, if the pot is not visible at a place its absence at that place cannot be perceived. It may be contended against this that for the cognition of the absence of the pot the cognition of the pot is required because the pot is one of the conjuncts. A conjunctive relation is known only when both its conjuncts are known. The cognition of the pot that is needed for the cognition of the conjunctive relation need not be perceptual. Even a recollective cognition of the pot will serve the purpose. Such is not the case with the floor-cognition which has got to be perceptual if the absence is to be perceptual. But such a contention cannot be upheld. Even the floor (or locus) cognition can be recollective as the pot-cognition can be. The floor as the locus of the absence of the pot is required to be cognised (for the cognition of the absence of the pot) mainly because it is one of the conjuncts and also because it is one of the constituents of the sense-absence-contact. The first of these needs of the absence-cognition can be fulfilled even if the floor-cognition is recollective. There is no necessity of the perception of the floor (or the locus) for the absence-cognition. Even the counter-positive of the absence is not required to be perceived for this purpose. As to the sense-contact of the absence, it is only indirect as it is mediated by the floor. The absence qualifies the floor which is conjoined with the sense-organ. Thus the floor is only the constituent of the sense-absence-contract. It need not have been per-

ceived in order to be the constituent of the contact. If the locus of the absence conjoined with the appropriate sense-organ is naturally perceptible it would be perceived by the sense but its perceptibility cannot be one of the preconditions of the perceptibility of the absence. In the case of the absence of sound however the cognition of the sky—which is the locus of the absence of sound—cannot be required for engendering the cognition of the counter-positive namely, the sound, unlike conjunction which is a relation. Sound is a quality which does need the cognition of its locus (or any relata) for its own cognition. Only a relation needs the cognition of its relata for its cognition. Nor is the sky needed to be cognised as the constituent of the contact of the ear with the absence of sound. This absence is directly connected with the ear as its qualifier. Even if it were indirectly connected with the ear the perceptual cognition of the ear would not be needed for the absence-cognition. If absence of sound were not sensible there could not arise the cognition like, 'the sound heard sometime before has faded'. This cognition cannot be inferential. If the inference is like, 'The sound heard sometime back is now nonexistent because it is not audible', then the past sound being nonexistent it cannot be the minor term in the inference. This difficulty can be overcome by having sounds as the minor term and transitoriness as the major term in a new inference. But such an inference cannot prove the fading or dissipation of sound at a certain moment. The sky also cannot be taken as the minor term with absence of sound as the major term in another inference. If the middle term in this inference is 'Non-apprehension of the sky as being endowed with sound' then since the sky is always sensually inapprehensible, even when there is sound the sky cannot be cognised as endowed with sound. If however the form of the inference is that 'I am now without any sound in my ears because I have no sound-sensation in my ear like a deaf person' then obviously the example is devoid of the major term as a deaf person does not possess the hearing-organ. It could be urged that even the deaf person has ears with sounds although the sounds are not sensed by him. Not all sounds are heard even by persons of normal hearing. The earlier sounds from which emanate further sound-waves the last of which impinge upon the ears of a person of normal hearing are not heard by any person and yet they exist. Of course the earlier sound-waves in a series produce later sound-waves and so they serve some purpose. There are many things which though effective in some way or other are not known to be such by us; unknown to us such things go on producing their effects. So even the deaf person may be having the auricular organ and it may be serving some purpose or other. Thus the

foregoing inference seeking to prove that the absence of sound cannot be perceptually cognised (if it existed) is found to be fallacious. The perception of the fading or subsidence of sound cannot be denied.

Above the attempt of the author to criticise the various inferences adduced (not by the Mīmāṃsaka as he is opposed to the thesis of the destructibility of sound) to prove that sounds are non-eternal appears to be rather queer. The inferences cannot be expected to convince the Mīmāṃsaka because he is already convinced that sounds are eternal. So far as the Naiyāyikas are concerned they are definitely of the view that sounds are destructible and that this fact is known only inferentially and not perceptually.

Turning now to the various inferences that can be adduced to prove the possibility of the destruction of sound, the first such inference is this: 'The various singing instruments when played upon produce musical sounds. The sound-sensation that the audience has on listening to the instruments is that of the sounding-instruments in which the instruments are the qualificands and the musical sounds are the qualifiers. When the instruments are not played upon they are devoid of the sounds. So just like the floor which is devoid of the pot when it is removed from its surface so the instruments also are devoid of the music which was associated with them earlier.' This inference however does not prove that the instrument and the music are apprehended by the same sense-organ. It is eyes that visually apprehend the instrument while the music is sensed only by the ear. Besides the destruction of sound cannot be located in the instruments. The sky alone can be the locus of sound-destruction as it is the generating locus of sound.

The inference may perhaps be defended on one ground viz., that the various musical instruments are conditions of the sound-generating sky. So if a sound is said to emanate from or fade into the sky the affirmation and denial of sound apply to the instruments as well as the sky. The instruments can therefore very well be the loci of the destruction of sounds. This is just like the affirmation or denial of pleasure, pain etc., in the self although ordinarily they are affirmed or denied of the body conditioning the self. However this cannot be true as the sky is not perceptible as the self (endowed with pleasure, pain etc.) is perceptible or introspectible. It won't do to say against this that though the sky is imperceptible the limiting conditions of the sky are not so, because the absence of sound is not helped in its manifestation by the condition. If despite this the perceptibility of the condition is supposed to help the perception of the absence of sound then the assumption that the perception of the locus is essential for the perception of the absence lo-

cated in the latter would have to be discarded. Not only this. Even in the absence of the perception of the conditions limiting the sky the absence of sound in the latter is apprehended sometimes (when the former—the musical instruments—are veiled and so imperceptible).

Another objection to the earlier view that absence-cognition needs locus-cognition is that the destruction of substances, qualities and movements resulting from the destruction of their loci cannot be cognised as the loci are destroyed and therefore uncognisable. If such destructions are regarded as uncognisable then the rule that an effect is destroyed by the destruction of its causes can never be known. Even inference cannot yield this knowledge. Since the locus does not survive the destruction of the located there can be no inference with the locus as the minor term. If the contingency of the cognition of the cloth, for example, even after the destruction of the yarns producing it is trotted out as proof of the rule then the inference based on the unfavourable contingency would go like this: 'The fibres which survive the destruction of the locus of the cloth are devoid of the cloth and all its effects because despite their cognisability they are not cognised as present.' In this inference the absence of the cloth is perceptible in the fibres, so the inference is afflicted by the fallacy of proving the obvious. The destruction of the cloth cannot exist in the fibres which are the causes of the yarn, not of the cloth. Could then the major term in the inference be 'the absence of the yarns' (or destruction of the yarns) which are the loci of the destruction of the cloth? No! If the cloth is destroyed on the destruction of the yarns, the destruction of the cloth cannot be located in the yarns. This difficulty can be overcome by having a modified major term like, 'That which is capable of being the locus of the destruction of the cloth.' Even if in a certain case the yarns are not the loci they are capable of being so normally. But such a capability is present in the yarns even in respect of the cloth itself so that the inference cannot establish the presence of the destruction in the yarns. It may be contended against this that when the negation of a qualified entity like the negation of the yarns which are the loci of the cloth is made in an inference there necessarily is involved the negation of the qualifier namely, the cloth. But it has to be noted here that the negation or absence of the cloth is involved or entailed only as located in the yarns, not in the fibres. So it has to be admitted as a rule that all the necessary conditions of the cognition of a thing excluding itself are alone necessary for the cognition of the absence of the thing. In the presence of these conditions the absence can be cognised at any place or time. The cognition of the locus is not therefore necessary for the cognition of the absence located in the locus. When the conditions are present it is their perception that is needed for the absence-cognition but if the conditions are not present, then the absence-cognition which may be of the nature of recollection (inference etc.) needs only inferential, recollective or some other type of cognition of the conditions for its emergence.

In view of this the remarks occurring in the basic text of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* school that 'An absence is known (or identified) through the knowledge of two reals, namely its counter-positive and its locus' is to be taken as concerned with those absences only whose counter-positives are cognisable only through the cognition of both its relata. Conjunction is such a counter-positive because it is a relation. The cognition of the absence of conjunction cannot arise unless both the relata of conjunction are cognised. Even for the inference of absence the cognition of both its counter-positive and its locus is needed. But in the case of perceptual cognition of absence this rule does not hold. If the above remark is taken to emphasise the need of locus-cognition for absence-cognition then another remark of the basic text to the effect that, 'like the extinction of fire resulting from the burning out of fuel even non-eternity causing the destruction of all ephemeral things is itself destroyed' would have to be treated as erroneous. The destruction of fire cannot be known as located anywhere as the parts of fire are no longer existent when the destruction of fire takes place. It cannot be said that although the destruction of fire in the above case is not perceptible yet it can be inferred to occur on the basis of the prior occurrence of the destruction of the fuel which is the efficient cause of burning. Here the destruction of the efficient cause is set forth as the middle term in the inference. But there is no concomitance between the destruction of the efficient cause and the destruction of the effect. A pot is not destroyed by the destruction of the wheel with the help of which it is produced. Keeping these facts in view the above-quoted remark has to be interpreted differently as stating that an absence is cognisable even with the help of the cognition of the place where it appears. There is no need to cognise the locus of the counter-positive for an absence to be cognised. Like destructive absence the anterior absence also should be taken to be cognisable perceptually even without the cognition of the locus of its counter-positive. The cognisability (or perceptibility) of its counter-positive is sufficient for the perceptual cognisability of the destructive or anterior or absolute absence (of a thing). The mutual absence or difference however does not depend upon the perceptibility of its counter-positive for its perceptual cognition. The ghost, if it exists, is not perceptible yet the difference of the yonder pillar from the ghost is perceptible.

All the above is intended to prove the perceptibility of the destruction of sound. There are also inferences to prove the ephemeral nature of sound based on its originative character. Of course the recognition of the identity of articulate sounds goes against the inferential testimony but the recognition is found to be no more reliable than that in the case of the burning flame. Just as incompatible properties are detected in the apparently identical burning flame and so it is taken to differ from one moment to another, so in sounds also the presence of incompatible properties like high-pitchedness, low-pitchedness etc. are felt to be present. The incompatibilities in the two cases are found to match perfectly with each other. The naturalness of the changing properties of sounds cannot be called into question in face of clear perceptual evidence testifying that sounds do change their pitch and other properties. This does not mean that whatever properties are perceived to be present in a thing are intrinsic to it. A jaundiced person sees the white conch to be yellow-tinged but such a perception is contradicted by a subsequent perception and so it is adjudged to be illusory. But such is not the case with the perception of the changing properties of sounds. Could these properties be regarded as those belonging to inarticulate sounds? No! If they pertained to airy things they cannot be sensed by the ear. If air or airy things possessed properties sensed by the ear then even sounds would turn out to be airy in nature. If this is admitted then the said properties may pertain to composite entities or atomic entities. If the first is true then articulate sounds would be non-eternal and if the second is true then words would not be sensible at all. It may be contended that the properties belong to inarticulate sounds not the articulate ones and these are sensorily grasped by the ear along with the former (which may be taken to be airy objects). But common experience verbalised in expressions like 'this letter is accented, that letter is not accented' etc. do not attest that it is the inarticulate sound that is the referend of these expressions. If the properties belonged to inarticulate sounds then they would not appear as characterising words which they do. A thing and its characteristic property are always apprehended together. So the properties must be taken to belong to words (not inarticulate sounds) and apprehended as characterising them. They cannot be supposed to belong to inarticulate sounds but imposed upon words and apprehended as such in normal auricular cognition. This establishes the changing character of words and the falsehood of the recognition of the identity of words.

There can still be the following inference to prove the eternity of words. The inference goes like this: 'Words are eternal because they are

substantive entities having no such entities as their material causes.' In this inference the substantive nature of words is unproved. To prove it we may have another inference like, 'words are substantive entities because they are in direct contact with and directly sensed by the ear'. But unless it is already established that words are substance or that they are the attributes of the ear it cannot be admitted that they are in direct contact with the ear. However it can be proved that words are either substantive or qualitative entities on the ground that they cannot be identical with any of the remaining four entities namely movements, the generic universal, specificity and the relation of inherence. If words are substances they will have conjunction with the ear and if they are qualities they will have the inherence-relation with the ear. Neither of these can be indisputably established by means of the above inference. But there is an inferential proof against the substantialist view. The inference goes like this: 'words are not substances as they are endowed with the generic property which helps distinguish one sensory substance from another as do the properties like tastiness, smelliness etc. It is by means of its specific qualities alone that one externally-sensible substance is distinguished from another such substance. The various specific qualities which help distinguish one substance from another are endowed with generic properties like tasteness, smellness etc., which are also externally sensible.' Since potness, treeness etc. are also externally sensible although they do not characterise any quality, they have to be eliminated by qualifying the middle term as 'not visually sensible'. Potness, treeness etc. are visually sensible and so they are excluded by this qualified middle term. Thus once the qualitative character of articulate sounds is inferentially established the other inference based on 'immediate contact with the ear' trotted out to prove the substantive character of articulate sounds cannot serve any purpose.

It may be objected to the above that since articulate sounds are sensed by the ear they cannot be its qualities or, the ear being a sense-organ it cannot sense its own quality as the nose does not sense its own smell and thus articulate sounds are proved to be other than qualities. This objection is fallacious. Being the quality of a sense-organ like the nose is irrelevant to its inability to sense its own smell. It is the insensibility of a quality to a certain sense-organ that is responsible for its not being sensed by that sense-organ. The condition that afflicts the first of the above inferences is 'the absence of a property concomitant with qualityhood and sensible by the ear'. This condition is pervasive of the major term viz., 'not being the quality of the ear' but it is non-pervasive of the middle term viz., 'being sensible by the ear'. The second inference is af-

flicted by the condition, 'Not having a quality sensible to'. The major term in the second inference is 'Not being the cogniser of its own quality,' Whatever is such an entity is devoid of qualities which are sensible to it. The middle term in the inference is 'being a sense-organ'. Not every sense-organ is devoid of a quality which is sensible to it. So the definition of conditionality is fulfilled by the condition mentioned. If nothing sensed its own quality then even the self will not experience its pleasure, pain etc. or because these are experienced by the self they will not be its qualities or because the qualities belong to the self they will not be experienced by it like its destiny of which the self is unaware.

Could it be urged against this that although articulate sounds are substances they need a sense-organ like the ear to sense them? No! A substance cannot be sensed without some specific quality of it being sensed. The substance cannot be sensed by itself (without the sense sensing its specific quality). If such a thing happened then the self could be introspected even during sound sleep or something devoid of bright colour could be visible as there would be no need to apprehend the specific qualities of these things for their apprehension.

Many other similar possible inferences seeking to prove articulate sounds eternal like, 'words are eternal because they are the attributes of the eternal sky like its ubiquitous dimension', or 'articulate sounds are eternal because they are perceptible like the generic property soundness (which is sensed along with the articulate sounds by the ear and is eternal)' are all riddled with the fallacy of conditionality. Counter-inferences like these seeking to prove the attributes of self like pleasure, pain etc. eternal on grounds similar to the above can also be trotted out.

It may yet be argued that although articulate sounds originate yet they need not be non-eternal, they may go on existing and so be endless. This is just like the endlessness of destruction. This argument is easily refuted. Origination is not naturally opposed to destruction; many things which come into being are found to go out of being. So if certain things are supposed to exist always it may be because the causes of the destruction of the things are separated from them. This separation may be natural or caused. The first cannot be true. The second is possible but if the destructible thing and the causes of its destruction come together before the cause of the separation intervened then there cannot be anything to prevent the occurrence of the destruction, Thus the destructibility of articulate sounds cannot be denied.

Now another line of attack on the non-eternity-view is being adopted by the opponent. It is urged by him that non-eternal articulate sounds or words cannot be conventionally associated with their denotends unless the eternal universals are taken to be the denotends. The individuals characterised by the universals though not conventionally associated with words—are yet imported into the word (or sentence)—meaning through entailment. This entailment however is not inference because the concomitance between the universal and the innumerable individuals cannot be apprehended. The concomitance under the general form of individuality and the universal also cannot be apprehended because there is no general individuality. If there were, then the particular individual meant by a word in a sentence cannot be imported into the word-meaning. Even by means of presumption the individuals cannot be meant by a word because there is no presumptive relation between the universal and the individual. The universal can and does subsist without the individual. Nor is the cognition of the universal invariably dependent upon the cognition of the individual. The opponent himself has maintained that words denote only the universal which means that in the verbal cognition universals figure by themselves. It may be urged that the universals cannot be syntactically connected with other word-meanings in a sentence and so the individual has to be imported into the sentence-meaning. But the individuals cannot enter into the sentence-meaning unless the universal is directly meant by a word. Thus there arises the fallacy of mutual dependence in this view. No other satisfactory account of individual-meaning is available on this view.

In this overly long section the author is concerned to refute the well-known Mīmāṃsā view that words, letters etc. are eternal. Its doctrine of the beginninglessness of the scriptures is propped upon the doctrine of the eternity of words by Mīmāṃsā. Nyāya is quite against this view as it regards God as the author and perpetuator of the scriptures from one cycle of creation to another. At first, the common experience, of words coming into being with their utterance and going out of being with the end of their utterance is cited as proof for the ephemeral nature of words. Here it should be noted that commonly a word and its utterances by the same or different persons are regarded as identical. This, in the view of Mīmāṃsā, engenders the illusion that words are ephemeral. Utterance is the activity of the speech-organ whose transitory nature is not disputed by any school. But the object of utterance or what is uttered is regarded differently by Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā. The letters, the words, the sentences etc. of the scriptures are eternal according to Mīmāṃsā, while Nyāya treats them as non-eternal. However, ordinary words, sentences etc. which are the artificial sequences of letters, words etc. created by men are not eternal even in the view of Mīmāṃsā. Only the roots of these sequences viz., the letters, which occur in common

and scriptural words alike, are eternal in the Mīmāṃsā view. How the scriptural sequences of eternal letters constituting scriptural words, sentences etc. came into existence is not a proper question for Mīmāṃsā. Such sequences have eternally been in existence according to it, although no satisfactory explanation is forthcoming from this school for the supposedly radical difference between scriptural words and words of common parlance. Having adduced the evidence of perceptual experience to prove that words are ephemeral entities the author here goes on to cite inferential evidence to confirm the perceptibility of this fact. The inference seeks to prove that words are non-eternal because their destruction is perceptible, it being the destruction of perceptible entities. The author enters into an elaborate discussion and defence of the view that the destruction or absence of words is perceptible although its locus is the sky which is not perceptible. Now this is a queer procedure to adopt. The facts that the destruction of words is perceptible is sought to be proved by the author by means of an inference! This means that even perceptual cognition needs to be mediated by inference. That for establishing the validity of perceptual cognition inference of validity is needed need not be disputed. But if even for the conviction that one has perception, inference were needed then perception cannot be direct cognition.

In the course of the discussion the author has very strongly defended the view that the perceptual cognition of an absence does not always require the cognition of its locus as a precondition. The cognition of the mere counter-positive of the absence is sufficient for the occurrence of the cognition of the latter. This is a rather strange view to take. If absence could be cognised without its locus being cognised, how can the absence-cognition be determinate? Cognition which is determinate involves a qualificand characterised by a qualifier. In the cognition of absence (or destruction) absence will be the qualifier but if no locus of the absence is cognised there cannot be any qualificand in the cognition. In the determinate cognition of the absence of pot for example, the place where the absence is noticed is the qualificand. Such a locus is not available for the absence of words. The sky which is the actual locus of the absence is invisible according to Nyāya and so it cannot be a qualificand in the perceptual determinate cognition of the absence of words. But the evidence of common experience of the form 'There is no word to be heard here' or 'Your words are not audible here' etc. in which both a qualifier and qualificand are cognised cannot be disputed. If the invisible sky cannot be the qualificand what is the experiential qualificand in the above cognition? Obviously it is the sky as circumscribed by the place where the absence of words is felt by the ear. All places and spatial objects are the circumscribers or limitors of the ubiquitous sky and as such they appear to be the loci of words and their absence, when actually it is the sky in the Nyāya view, which is such a locus. The perception of unlocalised words or their absence cannot be envisaged at all. No absence whatsoever can be perceived as unlocalised. The compulsion that Nyāya feels in maintaining the perception of absence as unlocalised is due to its metaphysical assumption that the invisible sky is the material cause of words and so the destruction of words can have only the sky as its locus. But as we have just seen, the different limiting places and objects circumscribing the sky appear to be the loci of words and their absence when words or their absence is cognised. Nyāya's account of such cognition is that it is the sky as circumscribed by the places and objects, which is the real locus of words and their absence. Localisation of absence in its cognition is a fact of experience. It cannot be denied or dubbed as illusory in the interest of a metaphysical assumption.

An interesting argument to defend the unlocalised perception of absence is here advanced by Nyāya. The argument is that the destruction of a composite entity caused by the destruction of its components or the destruction of qualities by the destruction of their loci cannot be known if unlocalised absence cannot be supposed to be knowable. Since the loci of these destructions are nonexistent at the time the destruction takes place they cannot be known as localised. To illustrate this let us take the destruction of a pot caused by the destruction of the potsherds which are the inherent or material causes of the pot. If the potsherds are destroyed prior to the destruction of the pot there is left no locus for the latter. This argument is not either convincing or commonsensical. Potsherds cannot be destroyed without destroying the pot. In fact potsherds come into being or make their appearance when the pot is destroyed. There cannot be any potsherds to be destroyed so long as the pot remains intact. Similar is the case of the destruction of qualities.

While discussing the above issue the author brings forward certain inferential arguments to prove that there can be absence or destruction of sound in musical instruments when they are not played. It is not clear here whether the author is defending the Nyāya view or Mīmāṃsā view. Certainly Mīmāṃsā is opposed to the view that words are non-eternal. Why should then the author criticise the argument? Is it just to maintain that word-destruction is perceptible only and not inferrible? Even granting that word-destruction is directly perceptible how can its

inferribility be denied? Even perceived or perceptible entities are inferrible (at least) if there is strong desire to infer them.

The last issue taken up for consideration above by the author concerns the Mīmāṃsā doctrine of word-meaning. According to this doctrine every common noun directly means the generic property characterising the class of objects which commonly the word is supposed to stand for. The word 'cow' for example means 'cowness', not individual cows or the class of cows. There are reasons for holding such a view which the opponents of Mīmāṃsā cannot ignore. If individual cows are meant by the word 'cow' then it will have to be explained whether all individual cows or some individual cows or a particular individual cow is meant by the word. The first is not possible as nobody can have knowledge of all individual cows. The second is not possible because even some of the individual cows meant by the word 'cow' may be unknown to the hearer of the word and further, one cannot identify the few cows meant by the word. The third alternative too is not acceptable as the word does not specify the individual meant by it. Mīmāṃsā holds that both the utterances of words and the thing meant by them being ephemeral, there cannot obtain the conventional relation between them which is supposed to remain constant (and unchanging). The word is not its different utterances. It is different from them and eternal. That which is meant by such a word is also not the changing things but their unchanging generic character. How then is the individual brought into the sentence-meaning? Mīmāṃsā's answer to the question is that the generic universal brings in its wake the individual which is part and parcel of the sentence-meaning. The generic character cannot be connected directly with any other part of the sentence-meaning. The author calls into question the process by which the generic meaning is supposed to import the individual into the sentence-meaning. But there is nothing questionable in urging that the generic meaning of words requires the individual meanings to yield the complete sentence-meaning or verbal knowledge. The only question that can be raised here is whether the process of importing individual meaning is inferential or postulational.

Even Nyāya has to face the problem of the meaning of words. All the individuals meant cannot be known and no particular individual can be supposed to be meant by every utterance of a word like 'cow'. Nyāya's solution to this problem is to take 'the individual as characterised by the generic property' as the meaning of a word like 'cow', 'tree' etc. Both the generic property and the individual are on this view, the meanings of words but these are different types of meaning. The individual is meant denotatively while its generic character is meant connotatively. It is not necessary to know all the individuals meant by a word to understand this kind of meaning of a word. The individual as characterised by its generic character is meant by the word. The generic character determines the mode of meaning belonging to the individual. So even if both the generic character and the individual are meant by a word the former is the determinative meaning and the latter the determined meaning. In other words the individual meaning can be described as the primary meaning while the generic meaning is describable as the secondary meaning. In the Mīmāṃsā view the generic meaning is primary and the individual meaning is secondary. In fact the individual is not really meant by a word according to Mīmāṃsā. Even without being meant the individual is imported into the sentence-meaning as without it the sentence cannot lead to verbal knowledge. The syntactical relation of words has much to do with this importing of individual-meaning. Even Nyāya has to admit that it is by means of syntax that the meanings of different words composing a sentence constitute sentence-meaning. If Mīmāṃsā can do with syntax in explaining the individual-meaning and along with it the complete sentence-meaning then the Mīmāṃsā-view of meaning would be preferable to that of Nyāya because the individual-meaning separate from the generic meaning is not acceptable to Mīmāṃsā. But this is not possible. From the generic character to the individuals characterised by it and from amongst the individuals a particular individual intended by the utterance of a word, the transition involves two different processes (only the latter of which could be regarded as verbal).

Since eternity in the usual sense of the word could not be defended by the Mīmāṃsist he now switches over to a different sense of eternity. According to this sense eternity consists in the uninterrupted succession of the teaching-tradition carried on by teachers and disciples through beginningless time. Such an eternity can well be ascribed to the scriptures. The Naiyāyika does not concede even this modified eternity because according to him interruptions in traditions do occur on account of the periodical nature of creation and annihilation.

But it may be asked, since 'each day is preceded by the day previous to it so there is no first day of creation, the merits and the demerits of different living beings mature and consummate at different times and so they cannot all be exhausted simultaneously' (so that annihilation could take place at a certain time); there being no human beings belonging to different castes at the start of creation the progeny of later times cannot belong to any caste (as the progeny of different castes belong to these castes); since there are no teachers to inculcate the knowledge of verbal convention at the start of creation nobody will have any means to know

the conventions and there being no teachers to impart the knowledge of different crafts when the world was created the crafts would remain unknown to everybody and since such is not the actual situation in the world how can it be admitted that there is creation or destruction of the world?

Justification of the possibility of the occurrence of creation and annihilation

TEXT: वर्षादिवत्-भव-उपाधिः वृत्ति-रोधः सुषुप्तिवत्।
उद्भित्-वृश्चिकवत् वर्णाः मायावत् समयादयः॥

तत्-पूर्वकत्व-मात्रे सिद्धसाधनात् अनंतर-पूर्वकत्वे अप्रयोजकत्वात्। वर्षादि-दिन-पूर्वक-तत्-दिन-नियम-भंगवत् उपपत्तेः। राशि-आदि-विशेष-संसर्ग-रूप-काल-उपाधि-प्रयुक्तं हि तत्। तत्-अभावे एव व्यावृत्तेः। तथा इह अपि सर्ग-अनुवृत्ति-निमित्त-ब्रम्हाण्ड-स्थिति-रूप-काल-उपाधि-निबंधनत्वात् तस्य तत्-अभावे एव व्यावृत्तौ को दोषः? न च तत्-अनुत्पन्नं, अ-नश्वरं वा अवयवित्वात्। वृत्ति-निरोधस्य अपि सुषुप्ति-अवस्थावत् उपपत्तेः। नि हि अनियत-विपाक-समयानि कर्माणि इति तदानीं कृत्स्नानि एव भोग-विमुखानि। न हि अचेतनः कश्चित् भोगः नाम। विरोधात्। कः तर्हि तदानीं शरीरस्य उपयोगः? तं प्रति न कश्चित्। तर्हि किं अर्थं अनुवर्तते? उत्तर-भोग-अर्थं, चक्षुरादिवत्। प्राणिति किं अर्थम्? श्वास-प्रश्वास-संतानेन आयुषः अवस्था-भेद-अर्थम्। तेन भोग-विशेष-सिद्धेः। एकस्य एव तत् कथंचित् उपपद्यते। न तु विश्वस्य इति चेत्? अनंततया अनियत-विपाक-समयतया उपमर्द्य-उपमर्दक-स्वभावतया च कर्मणां, विश्वस्य एकस्य वा कः विशेषः येन तत् न भवेत्? भवति च सर्वस्य एव सुष्वापः। क्रमेण, न तु युगपत् इति चेत्? न। कारण-क्रम-आयत्तत्वात् कार्य-क्रमस्य। न च स्व-हेतु-बल-आयातैः कारणैः क्रमेण एव भवितव्यम्। अनियतत्वात् एव। सर्व-ग्रासवत्। ग्रहाणां हि अन्यदा समागम-अनियमे अपि तथा कदाचित् स्यात्। यथा कलादि-अनियमे अपि सर्व-मंडल-उपरागः स्यात्। त्रिदोष-संनिपातवत् वा। यथा हि वात-पित्त-श्लेष्मणां चय-प्रकोप-

प्रशम-क्रम-अनियमे अपि एकदा संनिपातः स्यात् तदा देह-संहारः, तथा कालानल-संहार-पवन-महार्णवानां संनिपाते ब्रम्हाण्ड-देह-प्रलय-अवस्थायां युगपत् एवं भोग-रहिताः चेतनाः स्युः इति कः विरोधः? तथापि विदेहाः कर्मिणः इति दुर्घटं इति चेत्? किं अत्र दुर्घटम्? भोग-निरोधवत् शरीर-इन्द्रिय-विषय-निमित्त-निरोधात् एव तत्-उपपत्तेः। वृश्चिक-तंडुलीयकादिवत् वर्णादि-व्यवस्था अपि उपपद्यते। यथा हि वृश्चिक-पूर्वकत्वे अपि वृश्चिकस्य गोमयात् आद्यः, तंडुलीयक-पूर्वकत्वे अपि तंडुलीयकस्य तंडुल-कणात् आद्यः, वन्हि-पूर्वकत्वे अपि वन्हेः अरणेः आद्यः, एवं क्षीर-दधि, घृत, तैल, कदली-कांडादयः। तथा मानुष-पशु-गो-ब्राम्हण-पूर्वकत्वे अपि तेषां प्राथमिकाः तत्तत्-कर्म-उपनिबद्ध-भूत-भेद-हेतुकाः एव। सः एव हेतुः सर्वत्र अनुगतः इति सर्वेषां तत्-सांतानिकानां समान-जातीयत्वं इति किं असंगतम्? गतं तर्हि गो-पूर्वकः अयं-गोत्वात् इत्यादिना। न गतम्। योनिजेषु एव व्यवस्थापनात्। मानसाः तु अन्यथा अपि इति। गोमय-वृश्चिकादिवत् इदानीं अपि किं न स्यात् इति चेत्? न। काल-विशेष-नियतत्वात् कार्य-विशेषाणाम्। न हि वर्षासु गोमयात् शालूकः इति हेमंते किं न स्यात्? समयः अपि एकेन एव मायाविना इव व्युत्पाद्य-व्युत्पादक-भाव-अवस्थित-नाना-काय-अधिष्ठानात् व्यवहारतः एव सुकरः। यथा हि मायावी सूत्र-संचार-अधिष्ठितं दारू-पुत्रकं इदं आनय इति प्रयुंक्ते, सः च दारु-पुत्रकः तथा करोति तदा चेतन-व्यवहारादिवत् तत्-दर्शी बालः व्युत्पाद्यते तथा इह अपि स्यात्। क्रिया-व्युत्पत्तिः अपि ततः एव कुलाल-कुविन्दादीनाम्।

सर्गादौ एव किं प्रमाणं इति चेत्? विश्व-संतानः अयं दृश्य-संतान-शून्यैः समवायिभिः आरब्धः, संतानत्वात् आरणेय-संतानवत्। वर्तमान-ब्रम्हाण्ड-परमाणवः पूर्वं-उत्पादित-सजातीय-संतान-अंतराः, नित्यत्वे सति तत्- आरंभकत्वात् प्रदीप-परमाणुवत् इत्यादि। अवयवानां आवाप-उद्वापात् उत्पत्ति-विनाशौ च स्यातां संतान-अ-विच्छेदः च इति कः विरोधः इति चेत्? न। एवं तर्हि घटादि-संतान-अविच्छेदः अपि स्यात्।

विपर्यय: तु दृश्यते। कर्त्रादि-भोग-विशेष-संपादन-प्रयुक्त: असौ इति चेत्? न। द्व्यणुकेषु तत्-अभावात्। तथा च तत्-अवयवानां अपगम-अभावे अनादित्व-प्रसङ्गे द्व्यणुकत्व-व्याघात:। तस्मात् यत् कार्यं यत्-निबंधन-स्थिति, तत्-अपगमे तत्-निवृत्ति:। यत् यत्-हेतुकं तत्-उपगमे तस्य उत्पत्ति:। न च कार्यस्य स्थिति-निबंधनं नित्यं एव। नित्य-स्थिति-प्रसङ्गात्। न च नित्य: एव हेतु:। अ-कादाचित्कत्व-प्रसङ्गात्। तत् अति-निस्तरंगं एतत्।

ईदृश्यां च वस्तुस्थितौ भोग: अपि कर्मभि: एवं एव वस्तु-स्वभाव-अन्-अतिक्रमेण संपादनीय: इति द्व्यणुकवत् पिपालिका-अंडादे: ब्रम्हाण्ड-पर्यंतस्य अपि विश्वस्य इयं एव गति: इति प्रतिबंध-सिद्धि:। तथा च ब्रम्हाण्डे परमाणुसात्-भवितरि परमाणुषु च स्वतंत्रेषु पृथक् आसीनेषु-तत्-अंत: पातिन: प्राणि-गणा: क्व वर्तंताम्? कुपित-कपि-कपोल-अंतर्गत-उदुंबर-मशक-समूहवत्, दव-दहन-दह्यमान-दारु-उदर-विघूर्णमान-घूर्ण संघातवत्, प्रलय-पवन-उल्लासनीय-और्वानल-निपाति-पोत-सांयात्रिक-सार्थवत् वा इति।

TRANS.: (All the foregoing objections against the thesis of creation and annihilation of the world can be easily met). As the first rainy day in the rainy season is not preceded by another rainy day (but it succeeds only the last day of summer) so every day in the history of the world need not be preceded by another similar day. It may as well succeed the day or period of destruction. The succession of similar days in world-history is determined not because it is a succession of limited periods of time but because it takes place during the continuance of the world-process. The simultaneous cessation of the processes of the consummation of the merits and demerits resulting from the actions of different selves, during the annihilation of the world is also justifiable on the analogy of sleep when all the different mental modes (or the qualities of the self) cease to occur (although they are revived later during the waking-state). The processes are held in abeyance during annihilation and they are revived as soon as the next creation takes place. The origination of men of different castes at the start of creation when there are no human beings at all can also be explained on the analogy of the origination of certain plants and the scorpion. (It is seen that certain plants and certain scorpions originate from out of wet rotting cow-dung but later these plants and the scorpions themselves give birth to similar plants and scorpions. Similar could be the origin of men of different castes, the first ancestors of these being the progeny not of human couples. The knowledge of verbal convention, different arts, crafts etc. also could be imparted by God himself assuming the forms of different individuals and using words, sentences etc., on appropriate occasions to make the first-born individuals to understand verbal conventions etc.). This is just like using puppetry for communicating the meaning of words to those who are ignorant of them.

To explain the above: If it is sought to be proved that every day must be preceded by some day (in order to prove the continuity of the world-process) then the proof amounts to a truism. (According to the non-eternalist every creation is preceded by another creation). The fallacy of proving the already proved infects the proof. If however immediate precedence of one day by another is sought to be proved then the proof is found to be infected by conditionality. The middle term in the inferential proof viz., 'being a day' is irrelevant to the occurrence of the above major in the above minor. Just as the first rainy day of the rainy season is not preceded by another rainy day so it cannot be the case that any day is preceded immediately by another day. If a rainy day precedes another rainy day it is because of the fact that the sun transits the zodiacal sign which marks the onset of the rainy season. (The first rainy day in the rainy season is not preceded by a rainy day it being the last day of summer). As soon as the solar transit of the particular zodiacal sign is over there is no rain and therefore no rainy day. So the period marked by the solar transit is the determining condition of the wetness of the day preceding a rainy day. Likewise in the case of a day, its being immediately preceded by another day is determined by the existence of the universe which sustains the creative cycle. (Only as long as the universe exists the sequence of days goes on uninterruptedly; when the annihilation sets in there are no days or nights). The universe being a composite entity it is neither beginningless nor endless.

As to the contention that the cessation of the process of consummation of the merits and demerits of the different selves cannot occur during annihilation because different merits and demerits mature at different times, the reply is that as during deep sleep, all mental states cease to function, so, all the different merits and demerits may stop maturing simultaneously during annihilation. The self during sleep is unconscious, how then can it be affected by any mental state (or mode. The states are really the qualities of the self)? Unconsciousness and experience (of

pleasure, pain etc.) do not go together. 'But if this is so, what purpose does the body serve for the self during the sleep-state?' None! 'Then, why is the bodily existence continued during sleep?' 'For sustaining the experiences of the self following its unconscious state'. It is just like the continued inactive existence of the eye and the other organs during sleep (after which they become active). 'But then why does breathing go on during sleep if it is not conducive then or later, to any experience of the self? 'It may be asked. The answer is that the continued inhalation and exhalation in the body, both during and after sleep produce different states like adolescence, adulthood etc. in the body which are conducive to different experiences appropriate to these states. Could it be urged regarding this, that such experiential changes may occur only in certain individuals, but not in the universe as a whole? No! There is no difference in the destinies of individuals or the whole universe in respect of the characteristics like infinite plurality, diversity etc. of the times of their consummation and their mutual hostility. (Individual and universal destinies are alike in this respect). So, if the destiny of one self can be held in abeyance during annihilation, the destinies of the whole universe too can remain inoperative during annihilation. So the whole universe may go to sleep during annihilation. But wouldn't this occur only sequentially and not simultaneously? No, not necessarily, because the sequential character of effects depends only upon the sequential character of the causes. But there is no necessity that different causes should be brought into being by their respective causes, only in a certain order, as the causes do not occur in a predetermined sequence or order. This is just like the occurrence of the total eclipse of a large number of planets which do sometimes come together in the same zodiacal sign although they move in different orbits and with different velocities. Different facets of the planets may appear in the sky at different times but the whole of a planet may yet get eclipsed at some time (by the transit of the other planets in the same sign). Even the simultaneous aggravation of the three basic components of the living organism, viz., the wind, the bile and the phlegm is a phenomenon similar to the above. Just as the intensity, aggravation and normality of these basic components do not occur in any regular sequence yet a simultaneous aggravation of these is immediately followed by the death of the body composed of these, so also the simultaneous aggravation of the elements of the universe can lead to the destruction of the universe and the cessation of all the experiences of all selves. The elements corresponding to the wind, bile and phlegm of the body, in the universe as a whole are the universal conflagration, the raging storm and the great oceans. There

is thus no inconsistency in the views maintained above. 'But how can destiny subsist in a self if there is no body to sustain it (in annihilation)'? One may ask. The answer is that just as no experience in the self occurs in the absence of its causes during annihilation, so in the absence of its causes, the body also cannot come into being, with the result that destiny would subsist in the self by itself.

The genesis of men of different castes can also be explained on the analogy of the genesis of scorpions, certain vegetable plants etc. (Scorpions first originate from the rotting cow dung and subsequently the scorpions of the later generation are born of scorpion-parents alone. Similarly certain vegetable-plants originate from paddy-seeds but later specimens of these plants are produced only by their own seeds). Scorpions are normally born of scorpions and yet the first scorpion is born of rotting cow-dung. Certain vegetable plants originate from the seed of the parent plant and yet the first specimens of these plants are produced by the paddy-seed, one fire is produced by another fire and yet the first fire results from the churning of a fire-stick by another fire-stick. Similar is the case with the origination of milk, fried butter and banana-stems etc. Likewise in the case of man, beasts, the Brahmins etc., it is found that while the later progeny of these different species are born of their respective parents, the first ancestors of these were born only of the special elemental structures resulting from the different destinies of different selves. These elemental structures being common to all the different objects of creation, these will be similar in nature. There is nothing inconsistent in this. As to the biological rule that a creature of a certain species is born of parents of the same species and inferences based upon this rule like 'This creature is born of a cow because it is a cow', it is a fact that the rule holds good only in the case of sexual reproductions. Mental progeny have even non-mental ancestry. But then why does non-sexual genesis (of human beings) like that of the scorpions from the cow-dung take place even today? The answer is that certain types of effects occur (by nature) only at certain times (not always). The mushroom for example grows only in rainy season but not in winter. As to the instruction in verbal conventions it is easy to convey through the divine incarnation in different living human bodies, playing the roles of the instructor and the instructed and then using the words whose conventional meaning is to be communicated. This is just like the wire-puller in a puppetry-show ordering a doll strung on a wire to bring a yonder thing and the latter executing the action ordered whereby a child noticing these various movements guesses the meanings of the words uttered by the wire-puller. The instruction in various crafts (at

the start of creation) to artisans like the potter, the weaver etc. may also be propagated in this very manner.

'But what is the proof for there being creation itself and the processes mentioned', it may be asked? (In reply some inferences may be set forth to prove that there is creation of the world). The first inference is like this: 'The world process must have originated from those inherees which have not already given rise to any visible products, that is to say, those which are in a pristine condition because it is a process 'just like the process of ignition which first originates from the rubbing of one stick with another perforated stick and not from its usual causes'. The second inference goes like this: 'The atoms generating the present universe are those very ones which had already generated in the past many other universes as the present one because they are eternal and the originators of the universe as are the atoms of the flame which is burning'. 'But can't the continuity of the creative process remain uninterrupted while the origination, destruction etc. of the parts of the universe caused by their mutual conjunction and disjunction go on simultaneously? No! If this were possible then even the uninterrupted continuity of the existence of common objects like pot, tree etc. could be maintained. But reality is just the reverse of this. Could one urge that the foregoing inferences are infected by the fallacy of conditionality as the periodical destruction of the world is due to its being of the nature of a process but its creation is determined by the object of catering to the experiences of different selves, (the universe has to serve the purposes of selves, its structure is determined by this need to serve this purpose)? No! This cannot be true of everything in the universe. The dyads which are not objects of experience are generated by the atoms. If therefore the dyads do not disintegrate because the disintegration does not serve any purpose then the dyads would turn out to be eternal and so cease to be dyads. So it has to be admitted that if an effect comes into being because of the coming together of certain causal conditions, then the absence of those conditions results in the absence of their effects. Likewise the presence of the causal conditions results in the emergence of the effect '(The various experiences pertaining to the effect have nothing to do either with its origination or destruction)'. If the originating conditions were eternal the effect too would be eternal and their occasional character would be jeopardised. Thus all this argumentation of the opponent is simply otiose. Such being the case even experiences of pleasure, pain etc. are produced only by destiny but without violating the causal nature of things. So like the dyads the whole universe starting from the minutest creatures and culminating in the vast cosmos also

undergo changes according to the causal law. This establishes the concomitance of the middle and major terms in the foregoing inference. Thus if the cosmos is reduced to the atomic state and the atoms subsist in isolation from each other, how can all the different creatures and the different inanimate objects subsist? (All these are bound to disintegrate completely). Examples for such inevitable destruction are the following: 'The flies infesting the udumber fruits are destroyed when they are devoured by an angry monkey, the bugs wriggling in the pores of a tree are burnt out when the tree itself is burnt out by a conflagration or all the voyagers gathered in a ship are consumed by the oceanic fire when it flares up at the time of world-annihilation (these examples show that the world cannot survive the process of destruction which is bound to take place at the appropriate time)

EXPL.: Now the author takes up the argument for God's existence advanced in the second quarter of the first verse of the section. It is stated in the argument that since there take place creation and annihilation of the universe periodically there has to be a Being who continues to exist throughout these processes so that the different castes may be brought into being and the knowledge of the various arts and crafts be propagated among people belonging to these castes. Every creation is a new beginning, there cannot be a biological or any other kind of continuity between the processes and products of one creative cycle with those pertaining to another cycle. Everything in a creative cycle has to start anew and this is not possible without divine providence and divine power. If it is argued that absolute destruction of the world is not conceivable the theist replies that seasonal and other changes like death, sound sleep etc. of living beings do take place in the world. There are abrupt changes. Continuity cannot therefore be regarded as an essential characteristic of the world-process. Besides, the world is a non-eternal entity. It is bound to disintegrate at some time and be reduced to atoms. A new beginning from these atoms cannot but take place as the unexhausted destinies of the innumerable selves inhabiting the earlier world need to be exhausted before the selves are released. This cannot happen unless there is a world which provides means of pleasurable and painful experiences to the selves. It cannot be expected that the destinies of all the selves would be exhausted in the duration of a single creative cycle. But even innumerable creative cycles cannot suffice to exhaust the destinies of all the selves. If this were possible then the creative process will come to an absolute end. This is not an admissible hypothesis.

Here an important question needs to be answered. If the destiny of a self is the result of the action of the body-mind-complex it inhabits, how is it sustained in existence during the period of annihilation when no self can retain its body which is non-eternal? No doubt destiny is an attribute of the self but its genesis and occurrence in the self are determined by its contact with the body, the mind, the senses etc. which pertain to the self (in a particular bodily incarnation). During annihilation the self is bereft of all its non-eternal appurtenances. The mind which is supposed to be eternal may remain associated with the self but the mind without body is incapable of engendering any experiences in the self or sustaining any of its body-dependent qualities. In other schools of thought it is mind and not the self which is regarded as the repository of the qualities which Nyāya ascribes to the self and mind is not taken to be eternal by these schools. So the question how destiny is sustained during annihilation is satisfactorily answerable in these schools. In still other schools the gross physical body is supposed to be survived by a subtle body and destiny is taken to have its seat in this subtle body. Nyāya cannot answer the above question satisfactorily but the difficulty it faces in attempting to tackle the question is genuine and serious. It is an empirical fact that the kind of experiences the self has in its embodied state are dependent upon the proper functioning of its body (or the body-mind-complex). Now when this complex disintegrates the main cause of the experiences including the destiny that results from the experiences is gone. How can then there be the experiences or the destiny in the state of annihilation?

Nyāya is confronted with another difficulty also in this connection. Nyāya maintains that the destinies of different selves are the necessary causal conditions conjointly with other conditions like time, space etc. of the genesis of the world. Now if some of the causes of the world like its physical components are in a state of disintegration while the destinies of different selves which are also the causes of the world are not operative, will the world disintegrate or somehow continue to exist? Neither alternative can be upheld by Nyāya. The world may be nearing annihilation yet it cannot be supposed to prevent the maturing of the destinies of some selves at least in a certain creative cycle. How can this be if the world itself is on the verge of perdition?

Proofs for annihilation

TEXT: अपि च-

जन्म-संस्कार-विद्यादेः शक्तेः स्वाध्याय-कर्मणोः।
ह्रास-दर्शनतः ह्रासः संप्रदायस्य मीयताम्॥

पूर्वं हि मानस्यः प्रजाः समभवन्। ततः अपत्य-एक-प्रयोजन-मैथुन-संभवाः। ततः काम-अवर्जनीय-संनिधि-जन्मानः। इदानीं देश-कालादि-अव्यवस्थया पशु-धर्मात् एव भूयिष्ठाः। पूर्वं चरु-प्रभृतिषु संस्काराः समाधायिषत, ततः क्षेत्र-प्रभृतिषु ततः गर्भादितः, इदानीं तु जातेषु लौकिक-व्यवहारं आश्रित्य। पूर्वं सहस्त्र-शाखः समस्तः वेदः अध्यगायि, ततः व्यस्तः तत, षट्-अंगः एकः, इदानीं तु काचित् एका शाखा इति। पूर्वं ऋत-वृत्तयः ब्राम्हणाः प्राद्योतिषत, ततः अमृत-वृत्तयः, संप्रति मृत-प्रमृत-सत्य-अनृत-कुसीद-पशुपाल्य-वृत्तयः भूयांसः। पूर्वं दुःखेन ब्राम्हणैः अतिथयः अलभ्यंत, ततः क्षत्रिय-अतिथयः अपि संवृत्ताः, ततः वैश्य-आवेशिनः अपि, संप्रति शूद्र-अन्न-भोजिनः अपि। पूर्वं अमृत भुजः, ततः विघस-भुजः, ततः अन्न-भुजः, संप्रति अघभुजः एव। पूर्वं चतुष्पात् धर्मः आसीत्, ततः तनीयमाने तपसि त्रिपात्, ततः म्लायति ज्ञाने द्विपात्, संप्रति जीर्यति यज्ञे दान-एक-पात्। सः अपि पादः दुरागतादि-विपादिका-शत-दुःस्थ-अश्रद्धा-मल-कलंकितः काम-क्रोधादि-कंटक-शत-जर्जरः प्रति-अहं अपचीयमान-वीर्यतया इतः-ततः स्खलन् इव उलपभ्यते। इदानीं इव सर्वत्र दृष्टात् न अधिकं इष्यते इति चेत्? न। स्मृति-अनुष्ठान-अनुमितानां शाखानां उच्छेद-दर्शनात्। स्वातंत्र्येण स्मृतीनां आचारस्य च प्रामाण्य-अनभ्युपगमात्। मन्वादीनां अतीन्द्रिय-अर्थ-दर्शने प्रमाण-अभावात्। आचारात् स्मृतिः, स्मृतेः च आचारः इति अनादिता-अभ्युपगमे अंध-परंपरा-प्रसङ्गात्। आ-संसारं अन्-आम्नातस्य च वेदत्व-व्याघातेन अनुमान-अयोगात्। उत्पत्तितः, अभिव्यक्तितः अभिप्रायतः वा अन्-अवच्छिन्न-वर्ण-मात्रस्य निरर्थकत्वात्। यदि च शिष्ट-आचारात् इदं हित-साधनं कर्तव्यं वा-

इति अनुमितं किं वेद–अनुमानेन? तत्–अर्थस्य अनुमानतः एव सिद्धेः। न च धर्म–वेदनत्वात् इदं एव अनुमानं अनुमेयः वेदः। प्रत्यक्ष–सिद्धत्वात्। अ–शब्दत्वात् च। अथ शिष्ट–आचारत्वात् प्रमाण–मूलः अयं इति चेत्? ततः सिद्ध–साधनम्। प्रत्यक्ष–मूलत्व–अभ्युपगमात्। तत्–असंभवे अपि अनुमान–संभवात्। नित्ये अ–ज्ञायमानत्वात् तत् अ–प्रत्यायकं कथं अनुमानं, कथं च मूलं इति चेत्? वेदः किं अ–ज्ञायमानः प्रत्यायकः अ–प्रत्यायकः एव वा मूलं येन जडतम! तं आद्रियसे? अनुमितत्वात् ज्ञायमानः एव इति चेत्? लिंगं अपि एवं एव अस्तु। अनुमेय–प्रतीतेः प्राक्तनी लिंग–प्रतीतिः अपेक्षिता, कारणत्वात्। न तु पाश्चात्–तनी इति चेत्? शब्द–प्रतीतिः अपि एवं एव। आचार–स्वरूपेण शब्द–मूलत्वं अनुमीयते। तेन तु शब्देन–कर्तव्यता प्रतीयते इति चेत्? न। आचार–स्वरूपस्य प्रत्यक्ष–सिद्धत्वेन मूल–अंतर–अनपेक्षणात्। तत्–कर्तव्यतायाः तु प्रत्यक्ष–अभावात् अ–प्रमिततया च शब्द–अनुमान–अनवकाशात्, प्रत्यक्ष–श्रुतेः अ–संभवात् शिष्ट–आचारत्वेन एव कर्तव्यतां अनुमाय तथा मूल–शब्द–अनुमानम्। तथा च किं तेन? तदर्थस्य प्राक् एव सिद्धेः। तथापि आगम–मूलत्वेन एव तस्य व्याप्तेः इति चेत्? अतः एव तर्हि तस्य प्रत्यक्ष–अनुमान–मूलत्वं अनुमेयम्। आदिमतः तत्वं स्यात् अयं तु अनादिः इति चेत्? आचारः अपि प्रथमः तथा स्यात्, अयं तु अनादिः विना अपि आगमं भविष्यति। आचार–कर्तव्यता–अनुमानयोः एवं अनादित्वं अस्तु किं नः छिन्नं इति चेत्? प्रथमं तावत् नित्य–अनुमेयः वेदः इति, द्वितीयं च देशना एव धर्मे प्रमाणं इति। अथ अयं आशयः? वैदिकाः अपि आचाराः राजसूय–अश्वमेधादयः समुच्छिद्यमानाः दृश्यंते, यतः इदानीं न अनुष्ठीयंते। न च एते प्राक् अपि न अनुष्ठिताः एव। तदर्थस्य वेदराशेः अप्रामाण्य–प्रसंगात्। समुद्र–तरण–उपदेशवत्। न च एवं एव अस्तु? दर्शादि–उपदेशेन तुल्य–योग–क्षेमत्वात्। एवं पुनः सः कश्चित् कालः भविता यत्र एते अनुष्ठास्यंते, तथा अन्ये अपि आचाराः समुच्छेत्स्यंते अनुष्ठस्यंते च इति न विच्छेदः। ततः तद्वत्–आगम–मूलता इति चेत्? एवं तर्हि प्रवाहादौ लिंग–अभावे

कर्तव्यत्व–आगमयोः अन्–अनुमान–दशायां असत्यां प्रत्यक्ष–श्रुतौ आचार–संकथा अपि कथं इति सर्व–विप्लवः। तस्मात् प्रत्यक्ष–श्रुतिः एव मूलं आचारस्य। सा च इदानीं नास्ति इति शाखा–उच्छेदः।

अधुना अपि अस्ति सा अन्यत्र इति चेत्? अत्र कथं नास्ति? किं उपाध्याय–वंशानां अन्यत्र गमनात्, तेषां एव उच्छेदात् वा, आहोस्वित् स्वाध्याय–विच्छेदात्? न प्रथम–द्वितीयौ। सर्वेषां अन्यत्र गमने उच्छेदे वा नियमेन भारतवर्षे शिष्टाचारस्य अपि उच्छेद–प्रसङ्गात्। तस्य अध्येतृ–समान–कर्तृकत्वात्। अन्यतः आगतैः आचार–प्रवर्तने अध्ययन–प्रवर्तनं अपि स्यात्। न तृतीयः। आध्यात्मिक–शक्ति–संपन्नानां अन्तेवासिनां अ–विच्छेदे तस्य असंभवात्।

तस्मात् आयुः–आरोग्य–बल–वीर्य–श्रद्धा–शम–दम–ग्रहण–धारण–शक्तेः अहः–अहः अपचीयमानत्वात् स्वाध्याय–अनुष्ठाने शीर्यमाणे कथंचित् अनुवर्तते। विश्व–परिग्रहात् च न सहसा सर्व–उच्छेदः इति युक्तं उत्पश्यामः।

गत–अनुगतिकः लोकः इति अप्रामाणिकः एव आचारः, न तु शाखा–उच्छेदः, अनेक–शाखा–गत–इति कर्तव्यता–पूरणीयत्वात् एकस्मिन् अपि कर्मणि अनाश्वास–प्रसङ्गात् इति चेत्? एवं हि महाजन–परिग्रहस्य–उपप्लव–संभवे वेदाः अपि गत–अनुगतिकतया एव लोकैः परिगृह्यंते इति न वेदाः प्रमाणं स्युः। तथा च वृश्चिक–भिया पलायमानस्य आशीविष–मुखे निपातः। एतं एव च काल–क्रम–भाविनं अनाश्वासं आशंकमानैः महर्षिभिः प्रतिविहितम्। अतः न उक्त–दोषः अपि। न च अयं उच्छेदः ज्ञान–क्रमेण येन श्लाघ्यः स्यात्। अपि तु प्रमाद–मद–मान–आलस्य–नास्तिवय–परिपाक–क्रमेण। ततः च उच्छेद– अनंतरं पुनः प्रवाहः, तत् अनंतरं च पुनः उच्छेदः इति सारस्वतं इव स्रोतः। अन्यथा कृत–हान–प्रसङ्गात्। तथा च भावि–प्रवाहवत् भवन् अपि अयं उच्छेद–पूर्वकः इति अनुमीयते। स्मरति च भगवान् व्यासः गीतासु–

यदा यदा हि धर्मस्य ग्लानिः भवति भारत।
अभ्युत्थानं अधर्मस्य तदा आत्मानं सृजामि अहम्॥

परित्राणाय साधूनां विनाशाय च दुष्कृताम।
धर्म-संस्थापन-अर्थाय संभवामि युगे युगे॥ इति

कः पुनः अयं महाजन-परिग्रहः? हेतु-दर्शन-शून्यैः ग्रहण-धारण-अर्थ-अनुष्ठानादिः। स हि अत्र न स्यात् ऋते निमित्तम्। न हि अत्र आलस्यादिः निमित्तम्। दुःखमय-कर्म-प्रधानत्वात्। नापि अन्यत्र सिद्ध-प्रामाण्ये अभ्युपाये अनधिकारेण अस्मिन् अन्-अन्य गतिकतया अनु-प्रवेशः। परैः पूज्यानां अत्र अप्रवेशात्। नापि भक्ष्य-पेयादि-अद्वैत रागः। तत्-विभाग-व्यवस्थापरत्वात्। नापि कुतर्क-अभ्यास-आहित-व्यामोहः, आ-कुमारं प्रवृत्तेः। नापि संभवत्-विप्रलंभ-पाषंड-संसर्गः। पित्रादि-क्रमेण प्रवर्तनात्। नापि योगाभ्यास-अभिमानेन अव्यग्रता-अभिसंधिः। प्राथमिकस्य कर्मकांडे सुतरां व्यग्रत्वात्। नापि जीविका। प्राक् उक्तेन न्यायेन दृष्ट-फल-अभावात्। नापि कुहक-वंचना, प्रकृते तत्-असंभवात्। संभवंति च एते हेतवः बौद्धादि-आगम-परिग्रहे। तथाहि भूयः तत्र कर्म-लाघवं इति अलसः। इतः पतितानां अपि अनुप्रवेशः इति अन्-अन्यगतिकाः। भक्ष्यादि-अ-नियमः इति रागिणः। स्व-इच्छया परिग्रहः इति कुतर्क-अभ्यासिनः। पित्रादि-क्रम-अभावात् प्रवृत्तिः इति पाषंड-संसर्गिणः। 'उभयोः अंतरं ज्ञात्वा कस्य शौचं विधीयते?' इत्यादि-श्रवणात् अव्यग्रता-अभिमानिनः। सप्त-घटिका भोजन-आदि-सिद्धेः जीविका इति अयोग्याः। आदित्य-स्तंभनं, पाषाण-पाटनं, शाखा-भंगः, भूत-आवेशः, प्रतिमा-भंजनं, धातुवादः इत्यादि-धंधनात् कुहक-वंचिताः। ततः तान् परिगृह्णंति इति संभाव्यते। अतः न ते महाजन-परिगृहीताः इति विभागः।

स्यात् एतत्। यदि एवं सर्व-कर्मणां वृत्ति-निरोधः न किंचित् उत्पद्यते, न किंचित् विनश्यति इति स्तिमित-आकाश-कल्पे जगति कुतः विशेषात् पुनः सर्गः? प्रकृति-परिणतेः इति सांख्यानां शोभते। ब्रम्ह-परिणतेः इति भास्कर-गोत्रे युज्यते। वासना-परिपाकात् इति सौगत-मतं अनु-धावति। काल-विशेषात् इति च उपाधि-विशेष-अभावात् अयुक्तम्। असतां च उपलक्षणानां न विशेषकत्वं, सर्वदा तुल्य-रूपत्वात्। न च

ज्ञानद्वारा। अनित्यस्य तस्य तदानीं अभावात्। नित्यस्य च विषयतः स्वरूपतः च अविशेषात् इति चेत्? न । शरीर-संक्षोभ-जनित-निद्राणां प्राणिनां आयुः-परिपाक-क्रम-संपादन-एक-प्रयोजन-श्वास-संतान-अनुवृतिवत्, महाभूत-संप्लव-संक्षोभ-लब्ध-संस्कारणां परमाणूनां मन्दतर-तमादि-भावेन काल-अवच्छेद-एक-प्रयोजनस्य प्रचय-आख्य-संयोग-पर्यंतस्य कर्म-संतानस्य ईश्वर-निःश्वसितस्य अनुवृत्तेः। कियान् असौ इत्यत्र अ-विरोधात् आगम-प्रसिद्धिं अनतिक्रम्य तावंतं एव कालं इति अनुमन्यते। ब्रम्हाण्ड-अंतर-व्यवहारः वा काल-उपाधिः। तत्-अवच्छिन्ने काले पुनः सर्गः। यथा खलु अलाबु-लतायां विततानि फलानि तथा परमेश्वर-शक्तौ अनुस्यूतानि सहस्रशः अण्डानि इति श्रूयते। तस्मात् एवं विच्छेद-समये कस्य केन परिग्रहः यतः प्रामाण्यं स्यात्? ज्ञापकः च अयं अर्थः न कारकः। ततः कारक-अभावात् निर्वतमानं कार्यं ज्ञापक-अभिमतः कथं-कारं आस्थापयेत्?

स्यात् एतत्। संतु कपिलादयः एव साक्षात्कृत-धर्माणः कर्मयोग-सिद्धाः, ते एव संसार-अंगारेषु पच्यमानान् प्राणिनः पश्यन्तः परम-कारुणिकाः प्रिय-हित-उपदेशेन अनु-ग्रहीष्यंति, कृतं परमेश्वरेण अनपेक्षित-कीटादि-संख्या-परिज्ञानेन इति चेत्? न। 'तदन्यस्मिन् अनाश्वासात्।' तथाहि अतीन्द्रिय-अर्थ-दर्शन-उपायः भावना इति अभ्युपगमे अपि न असौ सत्यं एव साक्षात्कारं उत्पादयति यतः समाश्वसिमः। प्रमाण-अंतर-संवादात् इति चेत्? न। 'अहिंसादि हित-साधनं' इत्यत्र तत्-अभावात्। आगमः अस्ति इति चेत्? न। भावना-मात्र-मूलत्वेन तस्य अपि अनाश्वास-विषयत्वात्। एकदेश-संवादेन अपि प्रवृत्तिः इति चेत्? न। स्वप्न-आख्यानवत् अन्यथा अपि संभवात्। न च अनुपलब्धे भावना अपि। चौर-सर्पादयः हि उपलब्धाः एव भीरुभिः भाव्यंते। न च कर्मयोगयोः हित-साधनत्वं कुतश्चित् उपलब्धम्। न च एतयोः स्वरूपेण उपलंभः क्वचित् उपयुज्यते। भावना साध्यः वा। न च अस्मिन् अन्वय-व्यतिरेकौ संभवतः। देहान्तर-भोग्यत्वात् फलस्य अ-प्रतीततया तदनुष्ठाने तत्-अभावात् च। न च अकर्तृ-भोक्तृ-रूप-उभय-देह-प्रतिसंधानात्

एव तत् उपपद्यते। तदभावात्। न हि एतस्य पूर्व-कर्मणः फलं इदं अनुभवामि इति कश्चित् प्रतिसंधत्ते। केचित् तथा भविष्यंति इति संभावना-मात्रेपि अनाश्वासात्। विनिगमनायां प्रमाणाभावात्। प्रतिपत्-निशीथ-निद्राण-प्रातः प्रबुद्ध-समस्त-उपाध्यायवत् अन्योन्य-संवादात् कपिलादिषु समाश्वासः इति चेत्? न। एक-जन्म-प्रतिसंधानवत् जन्मांतर-प्रतिसंधाने प्रमाणाभावात्। तथापि च अधिकारि-विशेषेण ब्राम्हणत्वादि-अ-प्रतिसंधाने अनुष्ठान-रूपस्य आश्वासस्य अभावात्। न हि पूर्व-जन्मनि मातापित्रोः ब्राम्हण्यात् उत्तरत्र ब्राम्हण्यं इति नियमः येन सर्गादौ वर्णादि-व्यवस्था स्यात्। ईश्वरवत् अदृष्ट-विशेष-उपनिबद्ध-भूत-विशेष-अनुपलंभात्। अतीन्द्रिय-अर्थ-दर्शित्वे च अनाश्वासस्य उक्तत्वात्।

एतेन ब्रम्हाण्डान्तर-संचारि-वर्ण-व्यवस्थया संप्रदाय-प्रवर्तनं अपास्तम्। संचार-शक्तेः अभावात्। वर्षांतर-संचारणं एव हि दुष्करं कुतः लोकोत्तर-संचारः कुतस्तरां च ब्रम्हाण्डान्तर-गमनम्? अणिमादि-संपत्तेः एवं अपि स्यात् इति चेत्? न। अत्र अपि प्रमाणाभावात् संभावनामात्रेण समाश्वास-अनुपपत्तेः। आद्य-महाजन-परिग्रह-अन्यथानुपपत्तिः एव अत्र प्रमाणं इति चेत्? न। एवंभूत-एकैक-कल्पनया एव उपपत्तौ भूयः कल्पनायां गौरव-प्रसङ्गात्। विदेह-निर्माण-शक्तेः अणिमादि-विभूतेः च अवश्य-अभ्युपगंतव्यात्। अस्तु एकः एव इति चेत्? न हि ईश्वरं अंतरेण अन्यत्र समाश्वासः इति।

कारं कारं अलौकिक-अद्भुतमयं माया-वशात् संहरन्।
हारं हारं अपि इन्द्रजालं इव यः कुर्वन जगत् क्रीडति॥
तं देवं निरवग्रह-स्फुरद्-अभिध्यान-अनुभावं भवं।
विश्वास-एक-भुवं शिवं प्रति नमन् भूयासं अंतेषु अपि॥

TRANS.: Besides know it to be a fact about all traditions that these suffer degeneration because of the degeneration in birth, training, learning, devotion to study, duty etc. To explain: Formerly all progeny was mental (mere wish was sufficient to produce offspring); thereafter the birth of offspring was due to copulation indulged in by the parents with

the object of having progeny; in a still later period the offspring were born of the unavoidable cohabitation of man and wife prompted by their lust. But in these times marked by lack of temporal and spatial and other kinds of restriction in behaviour, children are born just out of beastly contacts between man and woman.

Formerly the various edibles consumed by pregnant women were consecrated, thereafter the women were consecrated instead of the food consumed by them, still later the embryo growing in the womb of the woman was consecrated but now in conformity with secular conventions it is the born child that is consecrated. (The above are respectively illustrations of degenerations gradually setting in in the process of consecration). Formerly students used to memorise all the thousand recensions of the Vedas, later on only a few of these recensions used to be studied, still later only one recension along with its auxiliaries was studied but now rarely one recension is studied. (This is how degeneration in studies has occurred). Formerly Brahmins eked out their livelihood by means of paddy-grains collected from places where they were scattered. Lately Brahmins accepted unsought offerings of food which provided them livelihood, but now a large number of Brahmins live even by begging, doing business, charging interest on money and by animal husbandry or by serving others. Formerly Brahmin householders rarely had guests in their homes, later on they themselves accepted the hospitality of people belonging to the *Kṣatriya* and *Vaiśya* communities and now they don't hesitate to take food even from the *Śudras*. Formerly Brahmins consumed food used in sacrifices, later on they consumed food which was left over after their guests were properly fed, still later they consumed the food which was the residue after the servants were fed but now they consume food by themselves. Formerly religion stood on four legs namely, austerities, knowledge, sacrifices and charity, but with the gradual degeneration of austerities religion was sustained by three legs only, further when even knowledge degenerated only two legs remained to support religion; now when sacrifices are languishing only the last leg of charity is left to support religion. Even this leg is afflicted by the innumerable blisters caused by the tainted source of the money given in charity. It is also soiled by the blemish of disbelief and weakened by being pierced by innumerable shafts of lust, anger etc. Thus day by day the leg of charity is losing gradually its force and thus it appears to be tottering. Can one contend against this that the kind of degeneration in the scriptures, traditions etc. that is visible today has always been there and so it is not a new phenomenon? No! The Vedic recensions which are the scriptural bases of the religious practices sanctioned by the Smṛties are

known to have been lost. The practices and the Smṛties are not recognised as self-authoritative (they are dependent upon the Vedas for their veridicity). The authors of the Smṛties like Manu, Pārāśara etc. are not known to have the capacity to intuit the extrasensory efficacy of religious practices. The Smṛties and the religious practices cannot be supposed to validate each other as this would be tantamount to one blind person leading another blind person. Scriptural bases of religious practices cannot be regarded as always inferrible because what is not perpetuated through the oral-teaching tradition is not the Veda at all. Letters which are not ordered into a sequence (to constitute words) innately or as the manifestors of their utterer's efforts to pronounce them or intend some meaning through them, cannot bear any meaning. (The Veda cannot be composed of such a meaningless jumble of words).

If however the beneficent or obligatory character of certain actions is inferred on the basis of their being the actions of venerable people knowledgeable about the nature of the results of the actions (and on the basis of the inferred beneficence of the actions it is further inferred that the Smṛti-texts enjoining the actions are based upon certain Vedic texts not traceable now) it may be retorted that the inference of beneficence would render the inference of Vedic texts simply redundant. (There would be no need to have any supporting Vedic text if the beneficence of actions is inferred otherwise than through the authority of the Vedas. Perhaps the middle term, 'being the actions of venerable persons' in the inference of beneficence may itself be viewed as the Veda because it is by means of it that the obligatory character of the action is known.) But such a view cannot be entertained as the middle term is actually perceived while the relevant Vedic text is the object of inference (according to the followers of Prabhākara). Moreover Vedic texts are verbal while actions are nonverbal entities. The followers of Prabhākara may urge against this that instead of inferring the beneficence of religious activities they seek to infer the well-groundedness of these activities on the basis of their being pursued by decent knowledgeable people. This inference would entail the conclusion that the Veda is the ultimate ground or authority for the activities (as the well-groundedness of the activities cannot be accounted for unless the Veda is supposed to be such a ground). This inference is however vitiated by the fallacy of proving the already proved as according to Nyāya (divine knowledge which is of the nature of direct perception) is itself the ground of religious activities prescribed in the Veda. Even if divine knowledge (and divine existence are not admitted, religious activities can be proved to be beneficent and this is the thing that really needs to be proved) on the basis of the fact that the activities are pursued by decent people. (There is no need to infer any scriptural ground for the activities). It may be urged that if the relevant (scriptural texts remain unknown, they cannot lead to the specific knowledge of the beneficence of actions, and therefore they cannot be the basis of the conviction that the actions are obligatory or moral). It has to be conceded that the well-groundness sought to be proved by inference amounts only to groundedness in the scriptures themselves. By way of retort to this it may be asked, 'Is the scriptural text not specifically identified but only generally known by inference as providing or not providing information about the beneficence of actions, to be regarded the basis of this beneficence? (If Prabhākara can hold such a view the opponent also can hold the foregoing view). 'But isn't the untraceable scriptural text inferrible?' The follower of Prabhākara may now ask. If it is so then the same can be said of the middle term in the opponent's inference. It may be urged against this that the middle term should be cognisable before the cognition of the major because the two are related as cause and effect. Now certain actions are inferred to be beneficent because they are the actions of decent persons knowledgeable about the results of the actions. If this latter fact is known only on the basis of the beneficence of the actions then the middle is not known before the major is known. How can then the inference proceed? In reply the opponent can urge that even without the inferred scriptural text the obligatory character of actions can be ascertained by other means of cognition (like perception). (The attempted inference of the scriptural text is rendered superfluous). Prabhākara may defend his view against this reply by maintaining that on the basis of the special nature of action, scriptural text as the basis of the latter is inferred and on the basis of the text the obligatoriness of the action is further inferred. (But such a defence is too weak). The special nature of religious actions is directly perceived. It doesn't need any scriptural text to reveal it. So far as the obligatoriness of the action is concerned, it being imperceptible and so uncognised, no scriptural text as its basis can be inferred. There is also no perceptible text prescribing the action. So the obligatoriness of the action has to be inferred only on the basis of the fact that the actions are performed by decent people. When thus the obligatoriness of actions is established the scriptural text prescribing the action can be inferred by means of the obligatoriness. But then what will be the use of the inferred text if the obligatoriness is already established? If it is argued against this that there is concomitance between the properties of 'being the object of the pursuit of decent people' and 'being grounded in the scriptural text' (and that therefore obligatoriness

can be inferred on the basis of the inference of the former property inhering in religious actions) then since verbal testimony is ultimately based on perception and inference there has to be a being who can have immediate cognition of the contents of the scriptures. (Such a being is God). But isn't it the case that the truth of ephemeral statements alone calls for the support of perceptual and inferential confirmation while the scriptural statements are not ephemeral? 'Yes! But this can be said of all those religious rites which have been in vogue from immemorial times although there is no scriptural basis for them'. Let then there be no scriptural basis for certain religious rites; (let the obligatoriness of these rites be ascertainable on the basis of their observance by decent people. In every generation the practice of decent men of previous generation could be taken as the proof for the obligatoriness of the rites). If such a view is held how does it compromise the position regarding the eternal inferribility of the scriptural text? So the follower of Prabhākara may retort against the foregoing rejoinder. The reply to the retort is that, first, the theory that certain scriptural texts are only inferrible will have to be discarded and next the theory that only scriptural injunctions are the valid source of the information about religious rites will also have to be discarded if the above view about the obligatoriness of religious rites is accepted. It is however likely that the followers of Prabhākara mean something like the following through their theories. It is a fact that even the rites like the *Rājasūya* and other sacrifices are found to have been discontinued but it is not the case that they were not in vogue in former times. If it were so, the scriptural texts prescribing their performance would be rendered invalid like the injunction to cross the ocean (which can never be implemented). Since the texts prescribing *Rājasūya* etc. are just like those prescribing rituals like those called *'Darśa-pūrṇamās'* and these latter are still in vogue the former cannot be treated as invalid. Now there might come a time when the discontinued practice of *Rājasūya* and such other sacrifices would be resumed while some other rituals which are in vogue (since long), would be discontinued or even perpetuated. Thus continuity and discontinuity both characterise the various rituals prescribed by scriptures; it cannot therefore be maintained that the obligatoriness of rituals is grounded in the fact of their continual performance by decent people. The only ground of these cannot be other than the scriptural text, if not overt then covert which needs to be inferred.

However this justification of the view of inferred scriptural texts breaks down in the case of those rituals which have ceased to survive the wholesale depredation which is brought about by the periodical annihilation of the world. Certain rituals simply go out of existence during the annihilation and they are not revived in the new creation coming after the annihilation. Such rituals cannot be inferred to be obligatory through their continuity. Nor any overt scripture supporting them can be traced, so how can one even think of there being ritualistic practices when everything is wiped out of existence? Thus actual scriptural texts alone can be the basis of ritualistic practices and if they are not available then it has to be admitted that the concerned text has been disrupted.

Can one say that the disrupted text may be in vogue elsewhere (in some other country)? Well! If so why isn't the text available in this country (which is the place of its origin)? Is it because the school of teachers of the scriptures migrated to other countries or all the teachers in this country had died or though living these teachers stopped teaching? Of these the first and second alternatives are not acceptable inasmuch as in the absence of teachers due to migration or death all decent religious activity in this country would have ended as it is these teachers who initiate and also engage in activities prescribed in the scriptural texts which they teach. Immigrants from other countries into this country could not be expected to initiate certain specific religious activities as then these people could even impart instruction in the scriptures. The third of the above alternatives too is not acceptable. If students richly endowed with mental capacity continue to pursue scriptural studies the scholastic tradition concerned with these studies cannot be disrupted. It has therefore to be admitted that due to continuing degeneration in longevity, health, strength, power, self-control restraint, understanding, retention and other mental powers, devotion to studies and duties has suffered great degeneration and somehow it obtains now in a very weakened form. Since followers of the scriptural teachers are spread all over the world, if at some places the scriptural studies and religious practices are on the wane elsewhere they are not so.

It may be contended against this that there is no disruption of scriptures at all because if such a thing happened then, since the different conditions of religious actions happen to be described in different recensions of the scriptures, if a single one of these recensions is disrupted no religious action could be properly carried out for want of conviction in its fruitfulness. So certain religious rites laid down by the Smṛties can be treated as devoid of any scriptural basis although their pursuit by many decent people can be explained on the basis of the common assumption that men by nature stick to common modes of conduct. But if this contention is approved then the practice of decent people being given up as a sure guide to good conduct even the author-

ity of the scriptural injunctions would have to be supported on the basis of the common instinct to stick to socially-established mode of behaviour. This is just like the falling of a man into the jaws of a python after running away from an on rushing scorpion. (The admission of the disruption of certain scriptural recensions and the consequent contingency of abandoning certain religious rites supposed to be based on the recension is the scorpion-bite and the denial of the authority of all scriptures is the jaw of the python in the simile mentioned).

Suspecting the possibility of the lack of conviction in the efficacy of certain religious rites mentioned above the great sages of yore composed the *Kalpasūtras* and other works to provide information about the religious rites (not mentioned in scriptures). Thus the unfavourable possibility of failure to carry out religious rites is also avoided. Certainly the disruption referred to above is not like the disruption of all activities brought about by the gradual maturation of knowledge so that it may be regarded desirable. It grows out of the gradual intensification of the emotions of nonchalance, vanity, haughtiness, lethargy, atheism etc. So this disruption is followed by creation which in its turn is followed by another disruption and this alternation goes on and on like the discontinuous stream of the river Saraswatī. If this is not admitted then actions performed before disruption would be wasted (as there would be no world after the disruption). So like the future creation, the present one also is inferred to be preceded by a disruption. The sage Vyāsa recalls in the *Gītā* pronouncements of the Lord (about disruption) thus: 'Whenever, O, descendant of Bharata, there is decline of the good and the upsurge of evil, at all those times I incarnate myself in the human form. In every cycle of creation I incarnate myself in order to protect the good people and destroy those who are wicked'.

'What then is this (aforesaid) adherence (to the authority of the scripture) by venerable people?' It is grasping, retaining and practising etc. of the teachings of the scriptures by people, without any ulterior motive. These cannot occur without any cause. Lethargy etc. cannot be the cause as the grasping etc. of the Vedic lore entails a lot of strenuous activity. None is allowed access to the Vedic lore because he is disqualified to follow the well-established Buddhist doctrine. Even those persons who are venerated by Buddhists are not admitted in the Vedic fold. Nor also the indiscriminate craving for all kinds of food and drink attracts one to the Vedic cult as great importance is attached in this cult to discrimination in regard to eatables and potables. Also no confusion engendered by the practice of sophistory turns one to the Vedic practices as these are inculcated in a person right from his childhood. Even

association with fraudulent hypocrites, does not attract a person towards the Vedas because the attraction is inherited by the latter from his ancestors themselves.

Nor again is the fascination of the Veda due to the desire to have concentration with a view to practice the *Yogic* discipline, as in the primary bachelor's stage of life the follower of the Vedic cult is preoccupied with all kinds of rituals. Even the desire for earning livelihood cannot turn a man to the Veda as the pursuit of the Vedic cult does not yield any empirical result. Cheating by charlatans also cannot be supposed to draw a man to the Veda as no misleading statements are met with in the Veda. However all these suggested conditions can be cited as possible cause of espousing the Buddhist cult. To explain: Since in the Buddhist fold none is required to work hard even lethargic persons can thrive by espousing Buddhism. Again Buddhism provides asylum to those rejected by the Vedic cult which shows that the former is the refuge of all those who have nothing else to fall back upon. There being no restriction on the kind of food consumed in Buddhism, gourmets are tolerated by this cult. Since one may enter the Buddhist fold at one's sweet will (without any reason for doing so) irrational people seem to be welcome in the fold. Since there is no hereditary following of Buddhism, attachment felt for it by some persons can be due only to the influence of hypocrites. There are also those persons who following the precept contained in the well-known remark that 'if the body is filthy and the soul surrounded by the body is absolutely pure, then realising their radical difference one cannot decide which of these two is to be purified; do not bother about piety, straightaway adopt Buddhism'. There are again those incompetent people who for the sake of the mess of pottage are drawn towards Buddhism which allows free board at all hours of the day and the night. Some others are deluded by the gimmicks of Buddhists, like the obstruction of sun's movement in the sky, crushing boulders, snapping strong tree-branches, possessing others' bodies, making statues articulate, transforming iron into gold and gold into iron, which are the attempts of cheats. Thus Buddhism welcomes all such persons in its fold and so it is never espoused by decent cultured people which fact sets it apart from the Vedic cult.

Now a neutral observer in the above debate asks, 'If as explained above, in the state of annihilation the capacity of all actions or destiny to produce any result is obstructed and so nothing comes into or goes out of being and the universe is at a standstill like the serene firmament, then how does fresh creative activity giving rise to a new world start? That this activity is due to the transformation of *Prakṛti* is in consonance with the

Sāṃkhya theory. The followers of Bhāskara the founder of a great Vedāntic school explain creation as the transformation of Brahman; according to the Buddhist view creation is due to the maturation of certain transcendental dispositions. Nyāya philosophers hold that due to a certain time (or speciality of time) a new cycle of creation takes place after annihilation, but this view is not sensible as during annihilation there exists no (ephemeral) condition to specify time. As to nonexistent (during annihilation) conditions, they cannot specify or qualify anything as they are nonexistent. The eternal time remains absolutely unaffected by such a (so-called) condition. Nor can this condition qualify time through its cognition (that is to say, even if the said condition like conjunction or disjunction did not exist during annihilation its cognition may exist then) because cognition too is ephemeral and so it cannot exist during annihilation. If the cognition is supposed to be eternal then its nature and relation to its object will always be alike so that its existence during annihilation cannot make any difference to time (with the result that creation would take place even during annihilation). Thus all the above explanations of the re-emergence of the world after its periodical destruction seem to be flawed by some defect or other. (The proper explanation of the re-emergence of the creative process is this): During sleep which is induced by fatigue in the living body the process of exhalation and inhalation—whose sole object is the gradual dissipation of the span of life of the body—goes on (as long as the body is destined to live). Likewise the motion of the atoms (which are the ultimate constituents of the universe) generated by the impact of the disintegrating process on the four major elements of the universe, has as its sole object the determination of the duration of annihilation. The atomic motion taking place during annihilation is of the nonproductive kind and it increases or decreases accordingly as the annihilation-process is near or far from its end. This motion is often described as God's inhalation and exhalation. The duration of annihilation is admitted to be the same as is stated in ancient literature. Thus the last of the series of movements taking place in atoms during annihilation is the specific condition of time which may be taken to be the cause of new creation. Even the usage relating to the emerging universe may be taken as the time-specifying condition. Creation is contemporaneous with this usage. Just as innumerable gourds in different stages of growth and decay hang on the branches of a gourd-creeper so innumerable worlds are ensconced in the might of God. Thus, it being established that annihilation takes place periodically how can it be maintained that the scripture is eternally venerated by knowledgeable people and that on this basis the validity of the scripture can be upheld? Moreover veneration by knowledgeable people is only the means of apprehending validity not its producer or cause, so in the absence of the producer or cause, validity cannot be produced by its apprehender.

Let then be this contention: The great sages like Kapila who have direct vision of (virtue or) transcendental realities and who attained great powers of mind by means of their activities and *yogic* practices and are extremely compassionate by nature, being overwhelmed by pity on seeing creatures writhing with agony in the fire of worldly life may shower their grace upon them (and extricate them from all agony). Why need then the providence of God who is supposed to be endowed with unwanted knowledge of innumerable insects among other things? The answer to this contention is provided in the third quarter of the stanza occurring at the beginning of this section. The answer is that none other than God can be depended upon. The fact is that even admitting that contemplation is the means of cognising extrasensory objects it does not invariably produce immediate cognition of the latter, so that we may depend upon it. If it is urged that contemplation does yield immediate cognition as other means of valid cognition (cohering with it) confirm this fact, the reply is that in the case of the apprehension of temporal matters like the beneficence of nonviolence, this coherence or confirmation is not available. 'But isn't scriptural confirmation available for contemplative knowledge?' It may here be asked. Yes! But even scriptural statements have the support of contemplative knowledge only. Perhaps one may meet this difficulty by fixing upon the partial coherence obtaining between scriptural and empirical statements (certain scriptural statements state empirical facts so scriptural statements can be treated as valid). But this explanation is not acceptable. Even dreams and imaginary tales happen to be partially true but they are not viewed as means of valid cognition. Moreover an unknown thing cannot even be contemplated. The thief, the serpent etc. are contemplated with fear by cowards, only when they are observed. But the beneficence of *yogic* and religious practices (which is supposed to be contemplated) is never directly observed. The knowledge of the mere nature of the activities etc. apart from their beneficence is however of no use nor is it attainable by means of contemplation. Positive and negative association of the activities with their beneficent consequences is also not ascertainable as generally the results of actions performed in one incarnation are realised in subsequent incarnations and if without the knowledge that a certain action gives rise to a certain result one performs the action one does not get the result. But can't one ascertain the said associa-

tion if he or she realises that the different bodies, one of which engaged in the action while the other reaped the benefit of the action belonged to one's own self? No! This is not possible at all. The mere guess that there may be such people who have this realisation cannot engender belief in the association. There is no definite proof for this. Can it be urged here that just as certain teachers, who having gone to sleep at dead of night on a holiday (the first day of a fortnight) wake up the next morning on a working day and start discussing subjects which were totally off their minds on the previous day, so also sages like Kapila may recall experiences of their earlier incarnation and this may produce belief in the utterances of these sages? No! There is no valid proof for connecting those utterances to be of the same incarnation. But for certain responsible persons it is necessary to know that they are Brāhmins, or Kṣatriyas etc. At the beginning of creation however it is not possible to have this knowledge. There is no such rule that a person who is born of Brahmin parents in an incarnation was a Brahmin even in his previous incarnation. In the absence of such rule how could the parentage of the first-born of creation be determined? Even the sages could not visualise like God the atoms conjoined by the influence of certain destinies which brought into being the first Brahmins etc. of the universe. It has already been stated that there is no ground for believing that Kapila and other sages possessed the capacity to visualise extrasensory entities. By this rejoinder stands rebutted the possible view that certain Brahmins, Kṣatriyas etc. inhabiting other worlds could have migrated to our world and established here the caste system. There is no such capacity of migration. Migration even to other continents is so difficult. What to say of migration to other worlds and what at all to say of migration to some other universe! But isn't such migration possible by means of supernatural powers like getting reduced to atomic size, getting magnified to infinitely large size etc.? No! There is no evidence that one can attain such sizes. Mere guesses can't be convincing. Couldn't it be argued against this that the upholding of scripture by the first-born venerable people is itself the evidence for the possession of certain supernormal powers by sages inhabiting other worlds? (Unless such persons of super-normal powers came down to this world, scriptures would not have been upheld). But the law of parsimony demands that only a single such being possessed of all kinds of super-normal power, instead of many such beings need be assumed. The reality of such powers and the power of creation without being embodied has got to be accepted. Let us then have only one such being. Unless this being is God himself none can repose faith in such a Being.

The author now ends up the prolonged discussion of this section by offering prayer to God in the following terms:

> May I, be full of devotion even at the end of my life, to the Lord Śiva who creates again and again this extraordinary and wonderful universe with the help of the destinies of all living beings, and thereafter also destroys the universe repeatedly, thus toying with it as a magician does with his magical creations, whose will holds an undisputed sway over the whole universe and who is the ultimate cause of the universe.

EXPL.: The author now seeks to prove the reality of God as the resuscitator of the scriptures which—because of all-round deterioration in peoples' lives—gradually cease to be studied and as a result, are totally forgotten. They are not available as offering support for the various religious and ritualistic practices which different people follow. God alone can and does revive the scriptures from the state of oblivion to which they are consigned due to general negligence and cultural decay. An inevitable condition that contributes to the disruption of the scriptural tradition (of teaching and learning them and practising the rituals prescribed by them) is the regular sequence of annihilation and creation. Every destructible entity, excluding the unexhausted destinies of individual selves is destroyed during annihilation. So naturally the scriptures also are swallowed up along with other things during annihilation. At the start of the new creation following annihilation God revives the scriptures so that their injunctions and prohibitions may be followed by all and sundry. God is the author of the scriptures according to Nyāya. This view is not acceptable to Mīmāṃsā according to which scriptures are eternal and therefore have no origin, human or non-human. Prabhākara who is the founder of one of the three Mīmāṃsā schools, though agreeing with the other two schools of Mīmāṃsā in regard to the eternal character of the scriptures holds the special view that there is never complete disruption of the scriptural tradition for, many ritualistic practices that are apparently sanctioned by Smṛties are ultimately based on scriptural texts—which even if untraceable are real and inferrible. The author who is a spokesman of the Nyāya viewpoint does not agree with this view. He maintains that the scriptural authority if unavailable for some prevalent practices then the authority of the Smṛties, the sūtra-literature etc. has to be sought. There is no need to infer scriptural texts which can never be traced. Prabhākara is not prepared to admit that scriptural tradition is ever disrupted but he is insistent on

regarding certain scriptural texts as eternally inferrible. This obviously means that these texts are not ever going to be directly procured. This is a rather strange view to take unless it is made clear whether certain texts are innately inferrible and if so why. If it is due to certain accidental circumstances that the inferred texts are not available and so are inferrible then this is tantamount to admitting that the texts or the scriptural recensions in which they are contained are disrupted. This is precisely what Nyāya says. But the Nyāya view is also not quite satisfactory. Presently there is disruption of scriptural tradition in respect of certain ritualistic activities for which the authority of Smṛties alone is available. But if thus the continuity of the scriptural tradition can be preserved and upheld what is the need of God? Scriptures can be replaced by Smṛties, Smṛties by *Kalpasūtras, Dharmasūtras* etc. these again by commentaries on Smṛties etc. In view of this fact it does not seem quite correct to maintain—as the author does—that actual scriptural texts alone can provide authoritative basis for ritualistic practices untraceable in available scriptural texts. Of course there is the annihilation which destroys every destructible thing including the scriptural and other literature. The possibility of such annihilation is disputed by Prabhākara on certain grounds. For example the unexhausted destinies of living beings cannot be put on hold during the tenure of annihilation and thereafter activated in the new world succeeding annihilation. Besides annihilation too is a significant cosmic event in the origination of which the destinies of all human beings must play some part. So destinies cannot remain dormant during annihilation. They cannot also be partially dormant and partially active. The analogy of the slumber of living beings trotted out by the author to explain the nature of annihilation and also provide some kind of justification for its occurrence is rather unsatisfactory. During sleep the metabolic activity of the body of the sleeper goes on uninterruptedly and this is—at least partly—due to the operation of destiny. So destiny cannot be supposed to be absolutely inactive either when the body is alive or when it is dead. 'Nyāya may urge against this that destiny is only one of the causal conditions of the self's varied experiences, body, mind etc. being the other conditions whose cooperation is needed by destiny to engender pleasure, pain, aversion etc. in the self. But for the production and preservation of the body and other things in the world the continued and regular occurrence of a certain type of activity in the atoms—which are the ultimate constituents of the world—is needed. If this activity ceases and a different type of (destructive activity takes places in the atoms) then the world along with the bodies etc. inhabiting it is gradually destroyed. This process culminates

in annihilation. So long as this annihilation lasts the selves remain in a sleep-like condition.

The flaw in this explanation is that destiny has to be treated as one of the conditions even of the occurrence of annihilation. It cannot therefore be supposed to be dormant either before or during annihilation, but it is inconceivable how self's destiny may work for a condition in which it will be left without any experience and without any body. It is still more inconceivable that innumerable selves in different stages of their empirical career should all of a sudden suffer a temporary interruption in their empirical career and again start all of a sudden a fresh empirical career in quite different situations.

The view that God resurrects the world and the scriptures after annihilation, maintained by Nyāya is also not quite defensible. It is not necessary that God should revive the same scripture in every creative cycle. He can as well compose new scriptures in each cycle of creation and along with the new scripture new varieties of rituals to be practised could well come into existence. If this happened then the duties prescribed in the obsolete scriptures could well be discarded. So there cannot obtain any continuity between the old and the new religious duties and codes.

It is rather strange and also contrary to the accepted view in Nyāya that except God none can have immediate cognition of extrasensory entities. *Yogic* perception has past, future and present extrasensory entities as its objects and *yogins* are credited with the capacity to have such perception. The author denies that even sages like Manu and Kapila had this capacity.

THIRD BUNCH OF FLOWERS
(of arguments)

Criticism of atheistic arguments based on God's non-cognition

TEXT: ननु एतत् अपि कथं, तत्र बाधक-संभवात्। तथा हि, यदि स्यात् उपलभ्येत। अयोग्यत्वात् सन् अपि न उपलभ्यते इति चेत्? एवं तर्हि शश-शृगं अपि अयोग्यत्वात् न उपलभ्यते इति स्यात्। शृंगस्य योग्यतया एव व्याप्तत्वात् इति चेत्? चेतनस्य अपि योग्य-उपाधिमत्तया एव व्याप्तत्वात् तत्-बाधे सः अपि बाधितः एव इति तुल्यम्। व्यापक-स्वार्थादि-अनुपलंभेन अपि अनुमीयते नास्ति इति। कः हि प्रयोजनं अंतरेण किंचित् कुर्यात् इति? उच्यते-

योग्य-अदृष्टिः कुतः अयोग्ये प्रतिबंदिः कुतस्तराम्?
क्व अयोग्यं बाध्यते शृगं क्व अनुमानं अन्-आश्रयम्॥

स्व-आत्मा एव तावत् योग्य-अनुपलब्ध्या प्रतिषेद्धुं न शक्यते, कुतः तु अयोग्यः परमात्मा? तथा हि, सुषुप्ति-अवस्थायां आत्मानं अन्-उपलभमानः नास्ति इति अवधारयेत्। कस्य अपराधेन पुनः योग्यः अपि आत्मा तदानीं न उपलभ्यते? सामग्री-वैगुण्यात्। ज्ञानादि-क्षणिक-विशेषगुण-उपधानः हि आत्मा गृह्यते इति अस्य स्वभावः। ज्ञानं एव कुतः न जायते इति चिंत्यते। पश्चात् वा कथं उत्पत्स्यते इति चेत्? मनसः अनिन्द्रिय-प्रत्यासन्नतया अ-जननात्, तत्-प्रत्यासत्तौ च पश्चात् जननात्।

मनः-वैभव-वादिनां इदं अ-संमतम्। तथा हि मनः विभु, सर्वदा स्पर्श-रहित-द्रव्यत्वात्, सर्वदा विशेष गुण-शून्य-द्रव्यत्वात्, नित्यत्वे सति अन्-आरंभक-द्रव्यत्वात्, ज्ञान-अ-समवायिकारण-संयोग-आधारत्वात् इति चेत्? न। सर्वेषां आपाततः स्वरूपासिद्धत्वात्। तथा हि, यदि

रूपादि-उपलब्धीनां नित्यत्वेन करणतया मनः-अनुमितिः न तदा द्रव्यत्व-सिद्धिः। अद्रव्यस्य अपि करणत्वात्। अथ आसां एव साक्षात्कारितया इन्द्रियत्वेन तत्-अनुमातव्यम् ? तथापि व्यापकस्य निरुपाधेः न इन्द्रियत्वं इति उपाधिः वक्तव्यः। तत्र यदि कर्ण-शष्कुलीवत् नियत-शरीर-अवयवस्य उपाधित्वं तदा तावत् मात्रे वृत्तिलाभः। तत्-दोषे च वृत्ति-निरोधः श्रोत्रवत् प्रसज्येत। ततः शरीरमात्रं उपाधिः अवसेयः। तथा च तत्-अवच्छेदेन वृत्ति-लाभे, शिरसि मे वेदना, पादे मे सुखं इत्यादि अ-व्याप्य-वृत्तित्व-प्रतीति-विरोधः। अ-समवायिकारण-अनुरोधेन विभु-कार्याणां प्रादेशिकत्व-नियमात्। शरीर-तत्-अवयवादि-परमाणु-पर्यंत-उपाधि-कल्पनायां कल्पना-गौरव-प्रसंगः नियम-अनुपपत्तिः च इति ततः अन्यत् एव एकं सूक्ष्मं उपाधित्वेन अतीन्द्रियं कल्पनीयम्। तथा च तस्य एव इन्द्रियत्वे स्वाभाविके अधिक-कल्पनायां प्रमाणाभावात् धर्मि-ग्राहक-प्रमाण-बाधः। अथ ज्ञान-क्रमेण इन्द्रिय-सहकारितया तत् अनुमानं, ततः सुतरां प्रागुक्त-दोषः। यदि च मनसः वैभवे अपि अदृष्ट-वशात् क्रमः उपपाद्येत, तदा मनसः अ-सिद्धेः आश्रय-असिद्धिः एव वैभव-हेतूनां इति। अथ यत्र अदृष्टस्य दृष्ट-कारण-उपहारेण उपयोगः, तत्र तत्-पूर्णतायां कार्यं उत्पद्यते एव। अन्यथा अंत्य-तंतु-संयोगेभ्यः अपि कदाचित् पटः न जायेत, जातः अपि वा कदाचित् निर्गुणः स्यात्। बलवता कुलालेन दृढ-दण्ड-नुन्नं अपि चक्रं न भ्राम्येत। यत्र तु दृष्ट-अन्-उपहारेण अदृष्ट-व्यापारः तत्र तत्-वैगुण्यात् कार्य-अनुदयः, यथा परमाणु-कर्मणः। तत् इह अपि यदि विषय-इन्द्रिय-आत्मनां समवधानं एव ज्ञान-हेतुः तदा तत्-सद्भावे सत् एव कार्यं स्यात्। न हि एतत्-अतिरिक्तं अपि अदृष्टस्य उपहरणीयं अस्ति। न च सदा एव ज्ञान-उदयः। ततः अतिरिक्तं अपेक्षितव्यम्। तत् च यद्यपि सर्वाणि एव इन्द्रियाणि व्याप्नोति तथापि करण-धर्मत्वेन क्रिया-क्रमः संगच्छते। अ-कल्पिते तु तस्मिन् अयं न्यायः। प्रतिपत्तुः अकरणत्वात्, चक्षुरादीनां अनेकत्वात् इति चेत्? ननु एवं अपि युगपत् ज्ञानानि मा भूवन्, युगपत्-ज्ञानं तु केन वार्यते? भवति एव समूह-

आलबंनं एकं ज्ञानं इति चेत्? न। एक-इन्द्रिय-ग्राह्येषु इव नाना-इन्द्रिय ग्राह्येषु अपि प्रसङ्गात्। तेषु अपि भवति एव इति चेत्? न। व्यासंग-काले ज्ञान-क्रमेण विवाद-विषये क्रम-अनुमानात्। बुभुत्सा-विशेषेण व्यासंगे क्रिया-क्रमः इति चेत्? मा एवम्। न हि एष बुभुत्सायाः महिमा यद् बुभुत्सिते विषये ज्ञान-सामग्र्यां सत्यां अपि न ज्ञानं अपि तु न तत्र संस्कार-अतिशय-आधायकः प्रत्ययः स्यात्। यदि तु अ-बुभुत्सिते विषये सामग्रीं एव सा निरुंध्यात्, घटाय उन्मीलितं चक्षुः पटं न एव दर्शयेत्। तस्मात् बुभुत्सा अपि इन्द्रिय-अंतरात् आकृष्य बुभुत्सित-अर्थ-ग्राहिणि इन्द्रिये मनः निवेशयंती युगपत्-ज्ञान-अनुत्पत्तौ उपयुंज्यते न तु स्वरूपतः। विभुनः अपि मनसः व्यापार-क्रमात् क्रमः इति चेत्? न। तस्य संयोग-अतिरिक्तस्य कर्म-रूपत्वे वैभव-विरोधात्। गुण-रूपत्वे नित्यस्य क्रम-अनुपपत्तेः। अनित्यस्य च नित्य-एक-गुणस्य अ-विभु-द्रव्य-संयोग-समवायि-कारणकत्वेन तत्-अंतरेण अनुपपत्तेः। तदपि कल्पयिष्यते इति चेत्? तदेव तर्हि मनः स्थाने निवेश्यतां लाघवाय। तस्मात् अणु एव मनः इति।

तथा च तस्मिन् अनिन्द्रिय-प्रत्यासन्ने निरुपाधानत्वात् आत्मनः सुषुप्ति-अवस्थायां अनुपलंभः। एतत् एव मनसः शीलं इति कुतः निर्णीतं इति चेत्? अन्वय-व्यतिरेकाभ्याम्। न केवलं तस्य, किंतु सर्वेषां एव इन्द्रियाणाम्। न हि विशेषगुणं अनपेक्ष्य चक्षुरादि अपि द्रव्ये प्रवर्तते। स्वाप-अवस्थायां कथं ज्ञानं इति चेत्? तत्तत्-संस्कार-उद्-बोधे विषय-स्मरणेन स्वप्न-विभ्रमाणां उत्पत्तेः। उद्-बोधः एव कथं इति चेत्? मन्दतर-तमादि-न्यायेन बाह्यादीनां एव शब्दादीनां उपलंभात्। अंततः शरीरस्यैव ऊष्मादेः प्रतिपत्तेः। यदा च मनः त्वचं अपि परिहृत्य पुरीतति वर्तते तदा सुषुप्तिः।

स्यात् एतत्। परमात्मा तु कथं परस्य अयोग्यः? न हि साक्षात्कारि-ज्ञान-विषयतां एव अयं न प्राप्नोति। स्वयं अपि अदर्शन-प्रसङ्गात्। न अपि ग्रहीतुः एव अयं अपराधः। तस्य अपि हि ज्ञान-समवायिकारणतया एव तत्-योग्यता। नापि करणस्य। साधारणत्वात्। न हि आ-संसारं

एकं एव मनः एकं एव आत्मानं गृह्णाति इत्यत्र नियामकं अस्ति। स्वभावः इति चेत्? तर्हि मुक्तौ निः स्वभावत्व-प्रसङ्गः। तत्-एकार्थतया अपायात् इति। न। भोजक-अदृष्ट-उपग्रहस्य नियामकत्वात्। यत् हि मनः, यत् शरीरं, यानि इन्द्रियाणि यस्य अदृष्टेन आकृष्टानि, तानि तस्य एव इति नियमः। तदुक्तं 'प्रत्यात्म-नियमाद् भुक्तेः' इति। एतेन पर-बुद्ध्यादयः व्याख्याताः। तदेवं योग्यानुपलब्धिः परमात्मादौ नास्ति। तत्-इतरा तु न बाधिका इति तव अपि संमतम्। अतः किं अधिकृत्य प्रतिबन्दिः? न हि शशशृंगं अ-योग्यानुपलब्ध्या कश्चित् निषेधति। न च प्रकृते योग्यानुपलब्धिं कश्चित् मन्यते। अथ अयं आशयः 'अयोग्य-शशशृंगादौ अनुपलब्धिः न बाधिका स्यात्', इति? ततः किम्? तत् सिद्ध्येत् इति चेत्? एवं अस्तु यदि प्रमाणं अस्ति। पशुत्वादिकं इति चेत्? पर-साधने प्रतिबन्दिः तर्हि न तत्-बाधने। तत्र एव भविष्यति इति चेत्? तत् किं तत्र प्रतिबन्दिः एव दूषणम्? अथ कथंचित् तुल्यन्यायतया योग्या एव पर-आत्म-बुद्ध्यादयः ते च बाधिताः एव इति अपहृत-विषयत्वम्? न प्रथमः। अव्याप्तेः। न हि पशुत्वादेः शशशृंग-साधकत्वेन कार्यत्वादेः कर्तृमत्वादि-साधकत्वं व्याप्तं, येन तस्मिन् असति तत् प्रतिषिद्ध्येत। न द्वितीयः। मिथः अनुपलभ्यमानत्वस्य वादि-प्रतिवादि-स्वीकारात्। तथापि पशुत्वादौ कः दोषः इति चेत्? न जानीमः तावत्। तत्-विचार-अवसरे चिंतयिष्यामः।

स्यात् एतत्। यत्-प्रमाण-गम्यं हि यत्, तत्-अभावः एव तस्य अभावं आवेदयति। यथा रूपादि-प्रतिपत्तेः अभावः चक्षुरादेः अभावम्। काय-वाक्-व्यापार-एक प्रमाणकः च परात्मा। तदभावः एव तस्य अभावे प्रमाणं अंकुरादिषु। तत् न। तदेक-प्रमाणकत्व-असिद्धेः। अन्यथा सुषुप्तः अपि न स्यात्। श्वास-संतानः अपि तत्र प्रमाणं इति चेत्? न। निरुद्ध-पवनः अपि न स्यात्। काय-संस्थान-विशेषः अपि तत्र प्रमाणं इति चेत्? न। विष-मूर्छितः अपि न स्यात्। शरीर-उष्मा अपि तत्र प्रमाणं इति चेत्? न। जल-अवसिक्त-विष-मूर्छितः अपि न स्यात्। तस्मात् यद्यत्-कार्यं-उपलभ्यते तत्तत्-अनुगुणः चेतनः तत्र सिद्ध्यति। न च

कार्यमात्रस्य क्वचित् व्यावृत्तिः इति। न च त्वत्-अभ्युपगतेन एव प्रमाणेन भवितव्यं न अन्येन इति नियमः अस्ति। न च प्रमेयस्य प्रमाणेन व्याप्तिः। सा हि कार्त्स्न्येन वा स्यात् एकदेशेन वा स्यात्। न प्रथमः। प्रत्यक्षादि-अन्यतम-असद्भावे अपि तत्-प्रमेयत्व-स्थितेः। न द्वितीयः। पुरुष-नियमेन सर्व-प्रमाण-व्यावृत्तौ अपि प्रमेय-अवस्थितेः। अ-नियमेन असिद्धेः। न हि सर्वस्य सर्वदा सर्वथा अत्र प्रमाणं नास्ति इति निश्चयः शक्यः इति। कथं तर्हि चक्षुरादेः अभावः निश्चेयः? व्यापक-अनुपलब्धेः। चरम-सामग्री-निवेशिनः हि कार्यं एव व्यापकं, तत्-निवृत्तौ तथा भूतस्य अपि निवृत्तिः। योग्यमात्रस्य कदाचित् कार्यं, तत्-निवृत्तौ तथाभूतस्य अपि निवृत्तिः। अन्यथा तत्र अपि संदेहः। प्रकृते अपि व्यापक-अनुपलब्ध्या तत्-प्रतिषेधः अस्तु। न। आश्रय-असिद्धत्वात्। न हि ईश्वरः तत्-ज्ञानं वा क्वचित् सिद्धम्। आभास-प्रतिपन्नं इति चेत्? न। तस्य आश्रयत्व-अनुपपत्तेः। प्रतिषेध-अनुपपत्तेः च।

TRANS.: (Questioning the conclusion of the last discussion in the previous section that, only through God the Vedic tradition gets propagated at the start of every cycle of creation the atheist critic poses now an objection): 'How can even this be true that God is the author of the Vedas when there can be a proof opposed to the theistic view?' To explain: If God exists then, He should be perceptually cognisable. (This is a negative proof against God's existence). (If it is urged against this that) even though existent, God is not cognised because He is uncognisable (there being no rule that every existing entity should be cognised) then even the hare's horn (which is nonexistent) may be said to be uncognised because it is not cognisable. But this is not the case. Horns are cognisable by nature (as they have perceptible size and visible colour). The concomitance between hornness and cognisability is noticeable in the case of cow's horns. (So on the basis of this concomitance even hare's horn, if it existed, should be supposed to be cognisable. Since it is not cognised, it is not cognisable and therefore it is nonexistent. In the case of God also a similar argument can be pressed). It is a fact that every sentient entity is endowed with a visible body because sentience is caused by body-sense-object-contact. But God is regarded by theists as bodiless. Therefore God as a sentient being cannot be admitted at all. Further every agent of action has some object to achieve by means of his actions;

God is supposed to be eternally fulfilled and so devoid of any object to achieve. So it is inferred that God does not exist. God cannot engage in any creative or destructive activity relating to the world as without any object to gain none engages in any activity. In reply to the above we say as below:

> The proof based on 'the non-cognition of the cognisable' cannot apply to God who is not cognisable (or perceptible). So far as the non-cognition of the hare's horn is concerned how can it be treated as 'the non-cognition of the uncognisable' (like that of God) if the hare's horn is (recognised as) cognisable though not cognised? Certainly it is not the uncognisable hare's horn whose cognition is denied. So far as the foregoing inferences seeking to disprove God's existence are concerned, they cannot be formulated at all as 'God' the minor term in the inference is nonexistent.

Commenting on the above the author says as follows:

By means of the instrument (of cognition, namely) 'non-cognition of the cognisable' even one's own self cannot be negated, what to say of God who is not cognisable at all. To explain: If non-cognition of the cognisable were by itself the means of cognising the absence of the cognisable then the non-cognition of one's own self in the sleep-state would induce one to negate one's own self. By whose fault is it that one does not apprehend one's own self during one's sleep? The answer is that absence of the totality of relevant causal conditions is responsible for the non-cognition of the self during the sleep of the body which the self inhabits. The self is cognised always as a being endowed with such momentary qualities as cognition, conation, aversion etc. Such is its very nature. But why is it that during sleep there is no cognition or why is there cognition only afterwards on awakening? The answer is that when the mind (which is the internal sense-organ) is not in contact with the external sense-organs no cognition arises but when there is this contact cognition arises. But those who take the mind to be ubiquitous (and therefore always in contact with everything) do not admit that mind can be in contact with only one sense-organ at a time. These thinkers set forth inferences with different middle terms to prove the ubiquity of mind. The inferences are: 'Mind is ubiquitous because it is a substance without the touch (quality), or is a substance which is always devoid of any special quality, or is a substance which is eternal and is not productive of any substance, or is the inheree of the conjunction which is the non-material cause of cognitions'. The inferences are however riddled apparently by the fallacy of unestablished middle term. To explain: if

the cognitions of colour, smell etc., (which are caused by mind-sense-contact) are treated as certain kinds of movements and the mind is inferred as an entity instrumental in causing the movements then it cannot be proved to be a substantive entity. An instrument of action is not necessarily a substance as even non-substantial entities are found to be of the nature of instruments. It may however be contended that since the cognitions of colour, smell etc., are perceptual in character, mind is inferred as the sense-organ instrumental in producing these cognitions and as a sense-organ mind cannot but be a substance. But since mind is on this view ubiquitous therefore it is necessary to admit a limiting condition (which delimits the scope of the cognition produced by mind) without which mind cannot be a sense-organ. Now if like the eardrum for the auditory sense-organ if a certain definite portion of the body is taken to be the limiting condition of mind then it can function only through that portion and if that portion is affected mind's functioning through that portion will be (affected or) obstructed. It will be like the functioning of the auricular organ through the ear. Since such is not the ease, the body as a whole needs to be regarded as the said limiting condition. But if the mind is supposed to function through the whole body—as its limiting condition, then expressions like 'My head aches' or 'I have a pleasant sensation in my feet' which manifest the partial nature of the feelings of pain, pleasure etc. would contradict the pervasive nature of the bodily condition. It is a rule that the products (mainly transitory qualities) of ubiquitous entities are conditioned in their existence (or occurrence) by their non-material causes, that is to say, these products occur in the material cause with which the non-material cause is connected. (So if the whole body is the medium of mental functions then the sensations of pleasure, pain etc. ought to be experienced throughout the body and not in some parts of it. But often only parts of the body are felt as pleasurable or painful). If to avoid this difficulty the whole body as well as its parts and so on right up to the atoms are regarded as the limiting conditions of mind then the sensations of pleasure, pain etc. would be felt irregularly in different parts of the body as well as the whole body. Besides such a view would go against the law of parsimony. So something quite different from this and quite subtle in nature will have to be reckoned as the limiting condition. If this subtle entity itself is endowed with the characteristics of sense-organs there is then no need and no proof for postulating extra entities as the delimiting condition of the mind. Thus the assumption of mind's ubiquity is contradicted by this proof of mind's subtlety. It is however possible to infer mind as the causal condition cooperating with sense-organs in the production of sensory cognition only one at a time so that it is not possible to regard mind as ubiquitous as then its contact with all the senses being always present all sensations would arise simultaneously. If the non-simultaneity of sensations despite the (supposed) ubiquity of mind is explained on the assumption that it is destiny that determines which sensations arise, at what time, and since it is mainly to account for the non-simultaneity of sensations that the reality of mind is admitted there now remains no need to admit the reality of mind. Destiny will serve the purpose of mind. Thus all the middle terms adduced to prove mind's ubiquity are rendered baseless as there is nothing of which ubiquity can be inferred.

It may here be argued that when the unseen destiny can be of use (as cause) to an effect through the collocation of its perceptible (known) causes then if all the known causes have assembled the effect is bound to come into being. If it were not so then even if the last yarns in a piece of cloth have been woven together the cloth would not be ready or even if ready it would turn out to be qualityless. Likewise the wheel set in motion even by a strong potter would remain unmoving and so the pot would not be produced. But where destiny operates without the collocation of any perceptible cause, and by itself, there the non-occurrence of the effect is due mainly to the absence of destiny. For instance the movement of atoms which gives rise to dyads is brought about by destiny alone. (There being no other known cause for it). In the present case also if the collocation of the object, the sense-organ and the self alone is the cause of the cognition (of the object) then whenever the collocation is present the object should be cognisable (which is not the case). But cognition does not arise whenever there is collocation of the objects, and the sense-organ. So something more is needed for the cognition. This additional cause, which is mind and which is regarded as ubiquitous does certainly pervade all the sense-organs. But it being the main cause of cognition the serial nature of the resulting cognition is dependent upon it (that is to say the main cause produces only one cognition in one locus at one time). The mind is postulated mainly to account for the segmental character of cognition. The self and the sense-organs are not postulated entities. So they cannot be taken to determine the sequential character of cognitions. The cognitive self is not the main or instrumental cause and sense-organs being many none of them can be taken as the said determinant.

This defence of mental causality of cognitions is not sustainable. Granting that more than one cognition cannot occur simultaneously it may yet be asked why several objects are not cognised simultaneously by the

same cognition. If it is replied that such cognitions having many things as their objects do arise then it may be asked further why like sensory cognitions having different entities sensed by the same sense-organs, cognitions having entities of different senses as their objects do not arise. (There could arise simultaneously sensory cognition of smell. taste, feel etc.) Like Sāṃkhyans one cannot admit the possibility of simultaneous cognition of diverse sensory entities. It is a known fact that although several objects are often conjoined with the senses and the self yet only one of then is sensed at one time which shows that the emergence of cognitions is a serial phenomenon; so in disputed cases too the serial character of cognitions may be inferred (and the appearance of simultaneity could be treated as illusory). May it be urged against this that although several objects are present to the senses and the mind yet the strong desire to cognise a particular one of those objects leads to the cognition of that object alone first and the other objects are cognised subsequently? No! This cannot be true. The strong desire to cognise a certain object is not strong enough to prevent the emergence of the cognition of an unwanted object if the cause or conditions of the cognition are present. The strong desire may only obstruct the emergence of a cognition of the unwanted object leaving behind a strong impression upon the mind. If the said desire simply obstructed the causes (of the cognition of the unwanted object) from producing the cognition then a man opening his eyes with the expectation to see a pot would not be able to see the piece of cloth lying before him (in place of the pot). So it has to be admitted that even the desire to cognise a thing determines its cognition by withdrawing the mind from the sense-organ which apprehends a different object and impelling the mind towards the sense-organ which apprehends the desired object and promotes thus the non-simultaneity of cognitions. The desire does not by itself determine the non-simultaneity of cognitions. 'But can't the seriality of cognitions be due to the serial nature of the process initiated even by the ubiquitous mind? No! This so-called process cannot be of the nature of conjunction as the ubiquitous mind will be in conjunction with every sense-organ. If the process is of the nature of motion then it would be contrary to the ubiquitous nature of mind. A ubiquitous thing cannot move. If therefore the said process is supposed to be of the nature of a quality then it may be an eternal or a non-eternal quality. If it is the first then it cannot determine the serial nature of cognitions. If the quality is supposed to be non-eternal then an eternal ubiquitous entity, like mind cannot be the inheree of this quality unless some non-ubiquitous entity is its non-material cause. So to account for the serial emergence of cognitions it would be necessary to postulate a non-ubiquitous and non-eternal entity as the non-material cause of the said quality which is taken to be the process of mind. If even such a non-material cause is postulated then this very cause may be substituted for the mind for the sake of parsimony. (There is no need to admit an ubiquitous mind and a quality of it having a non-ubiquitous cause). So it has to be conceded that mind is not ubiquitous at all but is atomic in size. When the mind is not in contact with sense-organs in the state of sound sleep no cognition is produced in the self. The self is then in an unconditioned state and as such it is not cognised in the sleep-state. But how is it ascertained that only a conditioned self is cognised by mind? The answer is 'by positive and negative association'. Not only of mind, even of all the sense-organs this is the nature. (They apprehend their respective objects only as qualified by certain qualities). Certainly without the help of its special quality no object is cognised even by visual and other sense-organs. 'If so how does a cognition arise in the sleep state?' It may here be asked. The answer is that on the revival of the traces of past impressions the objects of these impressions are recollected and as a result the illusory dream-cognitions are engendered during sleep. 'But how in the absence of any cognition the traces of past impression are revived?' The answer is that external stimuli like sounds, colours etc., of higher or lower intensity continue to affect the mind even during the sleep-state (when it is not profound), when these stimuli are absent there is at least the sensation of warmth associated with the body which acts as the stimulus. When however the mind entirely leaves the tactual region of the body and enters the 'puritat' region then there is sound sleep characterised by total absence of cognition, conation etc.

Alright! There is then this objection against the above. If one can cognise one's self in the waking state why doesn't one cognise another's self too? Certainly it is not unintrospectible by nature. If it were so then it would not be introspectible to the person to whom it belongs. Nor is there some defect in the person other than the cogniser which prevents him or her from introspecting the other person's self. The cognisability of the introspectible self too consists in nothing other than its being the inherent cause of cognition. (It is cognised only as endowed with cognition). Nor is there any defect in the mind—the instrumental cause—as it is common to all selves. Certainly there is nothing to bind a single mind to a single self throughout the existence of the world. It cannot be supposed to be the very nature of mind for, then in the state of the release of self from bondage the mind associated with the self will forfeit its nature as it would not then be working for the self with which it

was associated earlier. This objection however is easily met. The destiny which caters to the pleasure-pain-experiences of a particular self is the condition which binds a certain mind to that self. It has already been remarked earlier that 'different experiences of pleasure-pain etc. are tied down to different selves; whichever mind, whichever body and whichever sense-organ are drawn towards whichever self by the destiny of that self, it is to that self only that they all belong. This is the rule. One man's cognition etc. are not apprehended by any other man.

Thus the non-cognition of other selves as also that of God is not the non-cognition of the cognisable (other selves or not cognisable or perceptible). Any other kind of non-cognition is not opposed to the reality of a thing and this is admitted even by the opponent. So what is the basis for the counter-argument? Certainly no one negates the hare's horn on the basis of the negation of the uncognisable. (The hare's horn—as explained earlier is cognisable though uncognised). Nor does any (sensible) person admit in the case of God the absence of the cognition of the cognisable. It may however be urged by the opponent that since the horn of the hare is not cognised it is uncognisable and so the absence of such an entity can not disprove its reality. But what does this prove? If it is the reality of the hare's horn then there has to be some evidence for it. Can it be the animality of the hare by means of which the reality of the hare's horn could be inferred? Well! This kind of counter-argument would be directed against the proof for the reality of God not its disproof and if it is admitted to be such then two questions may be asked, namely, whether the counter-argument is itself the disproof of God's existence and whether because the supreme self is cognisable but not cognised therefore it is not real. The answer to the first question is this. The relation between producedness and the existence of God (the middle and major terms in the inference of God) has no relation of concomitance with the relation between animality and the reality of hare's horn so that if the latter is absent the former will be absent. (So the counter-argument is irrelevant to the proof for God's existence). As to the second question its answer is that it is not a non-cognition of the cognisable as both the parties to the dispute admit that no self is perceptible to another self. So God is not a perceptible entity so that His nonperception might entail His nonexistence. But then one may ask how the above inference for the reality of the hare's horn is fallacious. (If this is fallacious then the inference of God's reality will also be fallacious for the same reason). In reply the author says that for the present the question is shelved and it will be considered later in the fifth section of the treatise.

Let then be this proof for the nonexistence of God: 'whatever is knowable by means of a certain valid means of cognition is proved to be nonexistent if there is not that means of cognising it. For example the nonoccurrence of the cognition of colour, proves the nonexistence of the visual sense-organ (in a blind person). Now the existence of the other self and that of God too are known only by means of the movements of the body of the self or God. The absence of bodily movement among the burgeoning saplings which God is supposed to bring into being is itself the proof for the nonexistence of God. This proof however is fallacious. The bodily movements are not known to be the sole proof of God's existence. If they were then during sleep the self of the sleeping person would go out of existence. If the breathing movement is cited as proof for the continued existence of self during sleep then if breathing is stopped for some time by a person his self would disappear. The peculiar metabolic condition of the living organism also cannot be the required proof as in the state of unconsciousness produced by the poisoning of the body the bodily metabolism undergoes radical change. The bodily heat too cannot be the condition. If the poisoned unconscious body is drenched by water it is devoid of heat.

So it is clear that according to the observed nature of an effect a sentient cause with a corresponding nature is inferrible. There are different types of causes for different types of effect but it is not the case that in the absence of special types of effect the inference for God's existence based on general causality relating to products in their generality cannot proceed. Moreover there is no rule that as per your assumption only bodily movement should be taken as the proof for sentience. There can be other proofs also for sentience (so God need not be an embodied being in order to be the creator).

Nor is there a concomitance between valid means of cognition and the knowable (so that every knowable would have to be known by certain predetermined means of cognition). If however the concomitance is (dogmatically) maintained it may relate to the totality of the means of cognition or to some one or more of these means. The first alternative cannot be true because despite the non-availability of any of the means of cognition like perception for cognising an object it does not forfeit its realistic status. The second alternative too is not true. If none of the means of cognition is available to a particular person the object sought to be known does not lose its reality (which may remain unknown to the ignorant person). If however no restriction is placed on the user of the means of cognition then nothing can be said about the availability or otherwise of any means of cognition for cognising a thing. There are

innumerable people in the world, many of these may not use a certain means of cognition properly. But because of these exigencies an object of cognition will not cease to be real. Certainly not all people can make sure about any thing that there is no means of validly cognising it. It may be asked, 'If there is no concomitance between objective reality and means of cognition how do we find out the absence of the visual sense-organ, for example, from the absence of the cognition of colour (in a blind person)?' The answer to the question is that it is by means of the non-cognition of the pervader that the absence of the pervaded, in the above case, the visual organ, is known. The fact is that it is the effect which is the pervader of the causal collocation, which is the ultimate and sufficient cause of the effect. The absence of this pervader or the effect entails the absence of the pervaded or the causal collocation which includes all the causal conditions. So even a particular causal condition may be entailed by the effect which pervades the whole collocation. (Thus the visual organ being the main cause forming part of the causal collocation producing the cognition of colour and form the absence of this cognition entails the absence of the visual organ). Some causal condition like the material cause (however) may remain unproductive and so not form part of the productive causal collocation. (For instance yarns not woven into cloth do not constitute the warp and woof which form part of the finished cloth. Yet these yarns are capable of producing the cloth. So the absence of the cloth entails the absence of such unproductive yarns. If there is the least doubt about a (so-called) causal condition forming part of the causal collocation productive of an effect then it is doubtful that the absence of the effect would entail the absence of such a causal condition.

If this is so then in the present case too it may be contended that the absence of personal interest (which usually pervades all the voluntary activities of a human being) in God entails the absence of all activity in Him and since God is inferred as the creator of the universe, absence of activity would entail the absence of the very existence of God. But this is not true. If God's reality is not admitted there cannot be any inference having God as the minor term. Such an inference would suffer from the fallacy of 'unknown minor term' as neither God nor His cognition is established as minor term before the inference. There cannot be an illusory being of God, such an illusory being cannot be the locus of the major term in the inference. Nor can such a being be negatable (by contrary inference).

EXPL.: (Now the author takes up the third objection against the transcendental cause or God's reality mentioned in the first verse, viz., that there are valid proofs for the nonexistence of God or the transcendental cause). The simple such proof is that if God and the transcendental cause exist they should be perceptible but there is no perception of such entities, so there are no such entities. Of course the mere non-perception of these so-called entities is not a proof for their unreality. It is the non-perception of the perceptible. This is why the non-perception of ghosts at a place is not regarded as a proof for their nonexistence at the place. Ghosts—if they exist—are not supposed to be perceptible. But the non-perception of the absence of ghosts at a place is not to be taken as a proof for their existence at the place. One may object to this explanation by citing the case of the hare's horn, the barren woman's son etc. which are not perceptible like ghosts or God. If God is to be taken as existent despite this non-perceptibility then the hare's horn etc. also should be treated as existent. This objection is met by the reply that unlike God hare's horn etc. are perceptible because like the horns of other animals the horns of the hare too, if it had them, should be perceptible. We can have an inference like, 'The horns of the hare must be perceptible, because they are horns, just like the horns of the cow, buffalo etc.' Can such an inference pass muster? The author has ruled out a similar inference of the opponent on the ground that its minor term is unreal. If the hare's horn is unreal how can it be the minor term in the inference of its perceptibility? If it is perceptible how can it remain unperceived? Of course a thing is recognised as perceptible, only if it is perceived or even if there is nothing in the nature of the thing obstructing its perception. For example the atomic size of the atoms or the absence of vivid colour or form in the air prevents the perception of these things. There is nothing in the nature of the hare's horn—if they existed—which may obstruct their perception. We can have a contrafactual conditional like, 'If the hare had horns they would be perceptible'. It is in fact the continued non-perception of horns in hares that supports this conditional argument. In the case of God however this non-perceptibility is not considered by theists to be due to the continued non-perception of God. Theists maintain that God is imperceptible by nature because He is quite unlike all other perceptible things.

It is argued by some theists that since God as conceived by theists is a sentient being who is credited with the creatorship of the world and since these properties always go along with embodiment it is inconsistent to ascribe reality to God—a supposedly bodiless being. God cannot be an embodied being as embodiment imposes many limitations and

God is conceived to be absolutely limitless. Moreover all creative activity is purposeful but God the greatest creator is regarded as a being who has no unfulfilled purpose. How then can creatorship be ascribed to God? To all these arguments it is first answered that non-cognition of the cognisable is not always an effective means of ascertaining the non-existence of a thing. It fails in the case of one's own self as during sound sleep one is unaware of the existence of oneself but on awakening self-awareness suddenly emerges in one's mind. But the absence of the reality of this awareness during the sleep-state does not make one deny one's self. The reason for this is that during sleep the cognition, conation, volition or any other so-called mental state (which is in fact a quality of self) cannot come into being as the mind, whose contact with a sense-organ is needed for this occurrence remains isolated from all sense-organs. Of course pure self-awareness does not depend upon objective-awareness but according to Nyāya theory of self-cognition, every cognition of self necessarily involves the cognition of it as endowed with one of its qualities. Whatever the quality like volition, aversion etc. the self may be cognised as endowed with, such a self would be cognised when the cognition emerges as a quality in the cognised self. But mind being atomic in size in the Nyāya view it cannot come in contact with more than one sense-organ at a time and so cognitions of different objects cannot arise simultaneously. The followers of the Kumārila school of Mīmāṃsā do not admit mind to be atomic in size. According to them mind is ubiquitous and to prove this they adduce the reasons that mind is a substance devoid of any special quality or it is an eternal substance which is not productive of any substance or it is a substance which is the non-material cause of cognition. In all these reasons it is presupposed that mind is a substance but if cognition is viewed as a kind of activity and mind the instrument of this activity then the above presupposition will be falsified and the reason stultified. If however cognitions are viewed as different kinds of perceptions then mind could be inferred as an internal sense-organ causing the perceptions and as such its substantive character would not be jeopardised. But since mind is regarded as ubiquitous by the followers of Kumārila some condition limiting the functioning of the mind would have to be postulated. This condition cannot be some limb of the organism like the tymphanum in the ear, for then if this limit were defective then the mind's functioning as a whole would be adversely affected. But if to avoid this difficulty the whole body is regarded as the condition of mind then sense-experiences confined to different parts of the body like headache, backache etc., cannot be explained. If the whole organism and its several parts, parts of these parts

etc. are all treated as the limiting conditions of mind's functioning then the sensory experience pertaining to any part of the body would be felt in any other part or the whole of the body indiscriminately.

It may be urged by the opponent that destiny may be supposed to control the functioning of mind. So, which experience pertains to which part of the body may be taken to be determined (at least partly) by destiny. In this connection it may be noted that destiny determines the occurrence of an effect in two different ways, viz., either by bringing together all the known causes of the effect or by itself. For example if the stick, the wheel, the clay and the potter are all present then the production of the pot—the effect of this causal collocation—cannot suffer any delay. The production cannot be supposed to await the presence of destiny when the known causal collocation is already present. Those who regard destiny as the common cause of all effects have to treat it as the cause which operates simply by bringing together the known causes of effects. But there are also cases of production where destiny acts by itself for producing the effect. For example the motion of the atoms which is productive of dyads is due mainly to the influence of destiny. The destinies of the living beings which benefit or suffer from the things resulting from the productive movements of atoms are taken to be the sole determinants of the latter.

Now in the case of cognitions and other experiences it is found that nothing other than the object, the sense-organ and the self have to come together for the cognitions and other experiences to arise. Destiny—if it is an additional cause of experiences—does not make any difference to the known causal collocation but although the contact of the self, the sense-organ and the object is present most of the times it is not followed by the experience of objects. There has therefore to be some entity whose presence or absence in this causal collocation makes a difference to the production of the effect. This entity which is mind, may be taken to be endowed with the capacity to determine the occurrence of cognitions and other experiences only serially (and not all at once). 'But why is it that despite the ubiquity of mind (in the Mīmāṃsā view) collective cognition of different sensory objects does not arise when object-mind-self-contact with different senses at the same time is available?' One may ask. The Sāṃkhyans do not deny the possibility of such cognitions. However, since in the cases of concentrated perception it is found that the object of concentration is alone perceived it may be taken as a rule that all sensory (and other) cognitions occur only one after another. Perhaps the keen desire to apprehend a particular object may be supposed to be the determinant of the prior occurrence of the cognition of that

object and the later occurrence of the cognition of other objects. The desire to know is not the determinant of seriality in cognitions; it only helps strengthen the impression of the resulting cognition on the cogniser's mind. If the keen desire to cognise a thing from out of a conglomeration of many things prevented the cognition of other things by obstructing their causal collocation then a person expecting and eager to meet his friend, for example, cannot see some other person standing before him by turning his eyes towards him. Perhaps the process initiated by mind may be taken to delimit the functioning of the mind supposed to be ubiquitous. But this process cannot be of the nature of movement or quality. A ubiquitous thing cannot move and a quality belonging to an eternal and ubiquitous thing cannot have limited functioning unless it has a non-ubiquitous entity as its non-material cause. So instead of postulating a novel non-ubiquitous thing to account for the limited functioning of mind it is parsimonious to treat mind itself as of the absolutely limited atomic dimension.

So, since the mind of the atomic size cannot ever be in contact with more than one sense-organ at a time and since during the sleep-state the mind is not in contact with more than one sense-organ no two cognitive experiences arise simultaneously or any cognition or experience arises during sleep. Of course dream-experiences do occur during half-sleep-like-states. Certain external or bodily stimuli help revive the traces of past experiences in the self during half-sleep on account of which illusory cognitions or experiences emerge in the self in the form of dreams. The self however is experienced always as endowed with some experience or other by mind. Even external objects are cognised or experienced always as endowed with some special quality like colour, smell etc., by the external sense-organs. The bare object, the substance can never be sensed by a sense-organ because it is always some special quality like colour, smell etc. that is sensed by a sense-organ. The object being the locus of the sensed quality it is invariably sensed along with its sensed quality. Mind of course is not like the external sense-organs each of which has its own corresponding sensory quality as object. All the special qualities of the self are apprehended by the mind. In the apprehension of the special qualities of external objects also mind plays a part. But the cognition of the self which is generated by the self as endowed with its contact with mind is the quality of the self and so the self as cognised by the mind has to be the self as endowed with the cognition. However here there is a subtle difference between the sensory cognition of the external object and the mental cognition of the self. A pot for example cannot be cognised unless its colour is cognised. So the

sensory cognition of the pot has both the colour and the pot as its objects. The mental cognition of the self, unlike the cognition of the external object does not have both the self and its cognition as its objects. Only when there arises the cognition of a special quality of the self in introspection this quality is cognised along with the self.

So far we were concerned with mind's atomic dimension and its role in the apprehension of external objects with their qualities and the self and its qualities. Unlike the individual self God the universal self is not perceptible. In this respect it is just like one self to other selves. If it is asked why God is not perceptible it is not the right answer to say that there is no particular mind associated with God which may give rise to the perception of God. God being ubiquitous and minds being eternal according to Nyāya every mind may be taken to be associated with God. But doesn't each self have a special relationship with a mind which is regarded as its own? No! If every mind were such by nature then, when the self—its invariable associate—is released it would forfeit its nature, being permanently dissociated from the self associated with it. It is in fact the destiny responsible for a self's pleasure, pain etc. which connects a particular mind with it and not any other mind. So each self and its experiences are accessible only to one mind and not all minds. Thus God the supreme self cannot be regarded as perceptible to any mind associated with any empirical self. The imperceptibility of God is therefore not that of a being perceptible by nature and so cannot be treated as a proof for God's nonexistence.

'But if the imperceptibility of the unperceived God is not regarded as evidence of God's nonexistence then the similar imperceptibility of the unperceived hare's horn may also be disregarded as evidence of the latter's unreality?' It may be urged by the atheist. In the absence of contrary evidence the atheist may go further and seek to show that even the reality of the horn of the hare can be established on the ground that the hare is an animal. By means of this counter-argument the atheist may seek to cast aspersion on the theistic proof for the existence of God. The argument amounts to the contention that since the hare's horn is not real despite its being the horn of an animal so God too is not a real being despite (the assumption of) his being the creator of the world. The snag in this argument is that there is no concomitance whatsoever between the evidential character of animality as middle term in relation to the reality of the horn and the evidential character of the createdness of the cosmos in relation to God the creator, so that the denial of one could entail the denial of the other. However the counter-argument is intended to show that just as the horn of the hare is not real despite the

hare being an animal simply because the horn is not perceived, so God is not real mainly because He is never perceived. But on this score even the selves of the disputants in this debate may be taken to be imperceptible to each other and thus they may be persuaded to deny each other's existence leading to the very termination of the debate. So far as the positive proof for the reality of the hare with the horn is concerned the issue will be taken up for consideration in a subsequent section.

The atheist may still argue that since all other selves are inferred only on the basis of the observed movements of their bodies God too—being a different self—must be inferrible by means of His bodily movements involved in the creation of the world or things like shoots of sapling, but no bodily movement precedes the genesis of the shoot of a sapling or the cosmos. This argument is however invalid. Bodily movement is not the only proof for the reality of other selves. A sleeping person's body remains immobile yet his self is not nonexistent. Inhalation and exhalation, a certain condition of bodily metabolism, bodily temperature etc. also cannot be cited as the bases of the inference of the self's existence for each of these is found to fail in some case or other. In the state of unconsciousness, breath-control or poisoning of the body or when the body-temperature has gone down, none of the above signs is found to be present yet the self is not dissociated from the body. So each type of effect produced leads to the inference of the sentient cause that corresponds in nature to that effect. Though producible, all effects are not of identical type and therefore all causes also are not of identical type. The world or the shoot of a sapling is not a product like a pot which needs a bodily creator like the potter. The world or the shoot needs a bodiless creator. It is not the case that the existence of other selves and specially the existence of God is inferrible only through bodily activity. There is no concomitance between an object and a proof for its existence. If the concomitance is maintained then it may be supposed to hold between all kinds of proof and the object or some proofs or proof and the object. The first cannot be true because even in the absence of a perceptual or a certain non-perceptual proof for an object its reality is admitted. The second too cannot be true because if a proof—as available to a certain person (or persons)—is supposed to establish the reality of an object then even if no proof is available to a person the reality sought to be proved of the object would not be affected in the least. If the proof is not specified as known to a certain person then nothing can be supposed to be beyond proof. It cannot ever truthfully be decided that nobody has, had or will have any proof for the reality of a certain object.

It may now be asked, 'If there is no relation of concomitance between a means of cognition and the object of cognition how can one infer, for example, the absence of the visual sense from the absence of colour (and form) sensation? The sensation may exist even if there is no eye.' The answer to the question is that since the effect is invariably present where the collocation of its causal conditions is present and the eye being the essential constituent of the collocation giving rise to the colour-sensation, the absence of the latter which as the pervader leads to the cognition of the absence of the pervaded which is the visual sense. The cause that is not directly productive of the effect is also pervaded sometimes by the effect and therefore the absence of the effect entails the absence of such a cause too because the remote cause is also a constituent of the causal collocation. If it is not so then there can be doubt about the causality of such a remote causal condition.

'But since God is supposed to have no unfulfilled desire and purpose to achieve it may be argued that 'God cannot be engaged in any creative activity.' The argument however is rendered otiose as, there being no God (according to the atheist) the argument or inference for God's unreality is devoid of any minor term. If an imaginary entity be substituted for the minor term then its negation would not serve the purpose of denying the reality of God.

In all the above discussion it should be kept in mind that the non-cognition of the cognisable which has been adduced by the atheist as proof for the nonexistence of God is not the absence of any kind of cognition of God. There are inferences to prove God's existence. It is another thing that the atheist may try to fault the inferences by pointing out fallacies in them. The said non-cognition is simply non-perception and the proof for the non-perception of God is that mind is the instrument of the cognitions both external and internal, pertaining to that self alone with whose destiny it is bound. There is thus a special bond between a particular mind and a particular self which makes the mind to cater experiences only to the latter and not to any other self. Besides, the mind functions in a body. God has no body and there is no bond like destiny between God and any mind. So there is no possibility of God being perceptible by means of any mind. But then how can the hare's horn be said to be perceptible? It is a horn no doubt but if it were like the horns of other animals it could have been perceived. Only because it is quite unlike other horns that it is never perceived and so it is not perceptible. The non-perception of such an imperceptible entity cannot entail its nonexistence. This problem will be taken up for consideration in the last section of this treatise.

To the atheist's possible contention that although God is nonexistent a negative inference denying creatorship to God or affirming God's nonexistence can be had, the following stanza gives a reply by elucidating the concepts of the epistemic qualificand and the counter-positive of a negation.

Definition of the epistemic qualificand and the counter-positive of negation

TEXT: व्यावर्त्य-अभाववत्ता एव भाविकी हि विशेष्यता।
अभाव-विरह-आत्मत्वं वस्तुन: प्रतियोगिता॥

न च एतत् आभास-प्रतिपन्नस्य अस्ति इति कुत: तस्य निषेध-अधिकरणत्वं निषेध्यता वा इति? कथं तर्हि शशश्रृंगस्य निषेध:? न कथंचित्। न च अयं अ-पारमार्थिक-प्रतियोगिक: परमार्थ-अभाव: नाम। न च अ-पारमार्थिक-विषयं प्रमाणं नाम इति।

TRANS.: The nature of the epistemic qualificand (of an epistemic qualifier) consists really in the latter being the locus of the absence of the exclusion of the epistemic qualifier. And the nature of the counter-positive of a negation consists in its being identical with the negation of the negation of itself. (As per these definitions of the epistemic qualificand and the counter-positive no illusory nonexistent entity can be either an epistemic qualificand or a counter-positive of any negation. So God, an illusory entity cannot be the minor term in any inference. God's non-creatorship cannot be a major term in any inference). Neither can God be denied to be real nor any real property can be denied of God if God is supposed to be an unreal entity. But how can then the nonexistent hare's horn be negated (or cancelled)? No! It cannot be negated at all. The apparent negation or cancellation of the hare's horn is nothing but the negation of the horn in the hare. Certainly it is not a real negation of an unreal entity. Nor is it a proof for the reality of an unreal thing.

EXPL.: To explain why the inference of nonexistence or non-creatorship with God as an illusory entity in the place of the minor term is fallacious the author defines the terms, 'the epistemic qualificand' and 'the counter-positive'. The epistemic qualificand of an epistemic qualifier is the

locus of the absence of the excludent of the epistemic qualifier. For example in the determinate cognition of 'the floor as having a pot on it' the epistemic qualifierness of the pot in relation to the floor consists in the floor being the locus of the absence of all that is excluded by the qualifier pot. In simple terms this means that the floor as the qualificand in the determinate cognition excludes everything that is excluded by the pot—the qualifier. Likewise the counter-positiveness of the negated entity in relation to its negation consists in the negated entity being identical with the excluder to its negation. In simple terms this means that because the negated excludes its negation it is the counter-positive of the negation. Both these definitions stress the point that only a real entity can be either the epistemic qualificand or the counter-positive. So if God is nonexistent no inference even of nonexistence or non-creativity about God is possible. 'But then how is the unreal like the hare's horn negated if the object negated is nonexistent?' One may ask Nyāya's answer to the question is that the unreal is never the object of negation. In the apparent denial of the hare's horn what is actually denied is the inherence of the horn in the hare or the horn being a part of the hare's body. This denial appears to be just like the denial say, of the red colour in a blue piece of cloth. But are these denials of the same type? The blue piece of cloth could quite well have been of red colour but could the hare have been endowed with horns as cow and buffalo are? Perhaps one may not mind giving an affirmative answer to the question. Let us therefore take the example of the denial of the square-circle'. When we say that 'there cannot be a square-circle' do we deny the inherence of circularity in the square' just as we deny for example the inherence of the property of visibility in a figure? Certainly not. The negation of the red colour in a blue piece of cloth is not an absolute negation but the negation of circularity in the square is an absolute negation which means that the square can never have circularity. In other words this negation implies that squareness is opposed by nature to circularity. The common negation called 'relational negation' in Nyāya terminology does not bring out this natural opposition between two things; unless a different type of negation which cancels the very reality of its counter-positive is admitted a satisfactory account of the denial of the nonexistent cannot be given.

Explanation that the unreal cannot be even the object of negation

TEXT: अपि च-

इष्ट-उपलंभ-सामग्री शशशृंगादि-योग्यता।
न तस्यां न उपलंभः अस्ति नास्ति सा अनुपलंभने॥

केन च शशशृंगं प्रतिषिध्यते? सर्वथा अनुपलब्धस्य योग्यत्व अ-सिद्धेः। तत्-इतर-सामग्री-साकल्यं हि तत्। ननु उक्तं आभास-उपलब्धं हि तत्? अतः एव अशक्य-निषेधं इत्युक्तम्। अनुपलंभ-काले आभास-उपलंभ-सामग्र्या अभावात्, तत्-काले च अनुपलंभ-अभावात् इति। कः तर्हि शशशृंगं नास्ति इत्यस्य अर्थः? शशे अधिकरणे विषाण-अभावः अस्ति इति।

TRANS.: It has been explained that (the illusory unreal entity cannot be the counter-positive of any negation. Now the author goes on to explain that the unreal cannot even be the object of negation). Moreover there is no non-cognition of the cognisable in the case of the unreal hare's horn. The cognisability of an object consists in the collocation of all causes of the cognition of the object excluding itself. Such a collocation is not available for the unreal-cognition. If there is illusory unreal-cognition then the collocation leading to it consists of certain defective conditions. When such a collocation is present there is no non-cognition of the unreal and so the negation of the unreal is not perceptible. But if there is no unreal-cognition then there is also no causal collocation resulting in the cognisability of the unreal.

Commenting on the above the author remarks as below:

How can one negate the hare's horn? That which is totally uncognised cannot be a cognisable entity. Cognisability of an entity consists in the collocation of the causal conditions excluding the entity (the entity itself is one of the conditions of its cognition). But hasn't it been stated above that the hare's horn can be illusorily cognised and so it is cognisable in the above sense of 'the cognisable?' Yes, but it has also been already stated that the hare's horn if illusorily cognised is not deniable. So long as there is the illusory cognition there is no non-cognition and when there is non-cognition the causal collocation leading to the illusory cognition is absent. (Thus there being no non-cognition of the cognisable in the case of the hare's horn its absence cannot be taken to be perceptible). 'If this is so then what is the meaning of the expression, 'There is no hare's horn? One may ask. The answer is that the expression means that there is no horn on the head of the hare.

EXPL.: Above it is stated that the illusory unreal cannot be denied or anything denied of it. This very point is now being elucidated. The unreal may appear as real due to some defect in the causal conditions of perception. When such an illusory perception of the unreal arises there is no non-perception of it. So there is no perception of the absence of the unreal. But if there is non-perception of the unreal it implies that the unreal is not even illusorily apprehended.

An atheistic argument and its rebuttal

TEXT: स्यात् एतत्। यद्यपि ईश्वरः न अवगतः, यद्यपि च न आभास-सिद्धेन प्रमाण-व्यवहारः शक्य-संपादनः, तथापि आत्मानः सिद्धाः तेषां सार्वज्ञं निषिद्ध्यते, क्षित्यादि-कर्तृकत्वं च इति। तथा हि, मत्-इतरे न सर्वज्ञाः चेतनत्वात् अहं इव। न च ते क्षित्यादि-कर्तारः पुरुषत्वात्, अहं इव। एवं वस्तुत्वादेः अपि इति। तदेतत् अपि प्राक् एव परिहृतम्। तथा हि-

इष्ट-सिद्धिः प्रसिद्धे अंशे हेतु-असिद्धिः अ-गोचरे।
न अन्या सामान्यतः सिद्धिः जातौ अपि तथा एव सा॥

प्रमाणेन प्रतीतानां चेतनानां पक्षीकरणे सिद्धसाधनम्। ततः अन्येषां असिद्धौ, हेतोः आश्रय-असिद्धत्वम्। आत्मत्वमात्रेण सः अपि सिद्धः इति चेत्? कः अस्य अर्थः? किं आत्मत्वेन उपलक्षिता सा एव वस्तुगत्या सर्वज्ञ-विश्व-कर्तृ-व्यक्तिः अथ तत् अन्या, आत्मत्वं एव वा पक्षः? सर्वत्र पूर्व दोष-अनिवृत्तेः। अथ अयं आशयः, आत्मत्वं न सर्वज्ञ-सर्वकर्तृ-व्यक्ति-समवेतं, जातित्वात्, गोत्ववत् इति। तत् असत्। निषेध्य-असिद्धेः निषेधस्य अ-शक्यत्वात्। तथा च अप्रसिद्ध-विशेषणः पक्षः इति आश्रय-असिद्धिः इति सः एव दोषः।

TRANS.: Let then be this argument (to prove the nonexistence of God). Even though there is no knowledge of God and also no veridical usage about God can be carried on just on the basis of the illusory cognition of God yet we deny omniscience and the creatorship (of the world) of selves (in general) which are established entities. The denial is of the following form: 'Selves other than myself are not omniscient or creators of the world because they are sentient or human or simply beings like me.' Such inferences too have been discarded above on the ground that they are afflicted by the fallacy of unknown minor term. To explain: If the above is sought to be inferred in relation to known selves then it amounts to inferring the obvious. If the inference is in relation to the unknown specimens (of selves) then the presence of the middle term in the latter remains unknown. If inference of the above in a term under the generic character of selfhood is intended even then the fallacy of inferring the obvious arises. If the generic term itself is treated as the minor term in the inference then the fallacy of absence of middle in the minor arises.

Elaborating the above the author says as follows:

If selves or sentient entities that are known by valid means of cognition are taken as the minor terms in the inference then the inference proves what is already known. If unknown selves are taken as the minor term then the inference suffers from the fallacy of unknown minor term. If (to avoid these difficulties) the inference is made with regard to selves as selves or under the genus selfhood then this may mean either the supreme being which is recognised by Nyāya as omniscient and as the creator of the universe and as known to be endowed with selfhood or some being other than this. In either case the inference is sure to be afflicted either by the fallacy of proving the obvious or the unknown minor term. Selfhood itself also cannot be taken as the minor in the inference. The major is never present in this minor. Selfhood has nothing to do with omniscience or world-creatorship. The inference however may be reformulated thus: 'selfhood is not inherent in any omniscient or omnicreator being because it is a genus like cowness etc.' (The above difficulties do not seem to beset this inference). This inference is however faulty. The opponent does not admit the reality of omniscience or omnicreatorship even as properties; so the object of negation in the major term being unreal the negation too is unreal. As a result the minor in the inference is devoid of a real major and thus the inference is afflicted by the fallacy of unestablished minor.

EXPL.: To circumvent the difficulty pointed out above in the proof for God's existence it is now suggested by the atheist Mīmāṃsaka that omniscience, omnipotence etc. which are supposed to be the distinctive properties of God can be denied of selves. If this is established then the nonexistence of an omniscient creator of the world is automatically established (there being no omniscient, and omnipotent self). Nyāya's reply to such a proof is that if only all known selves are taken as the minor term in the inference then the fallacy of proving the already proved besets the inference. If the unknown selves are included in the scope of the minor term then nothing being known about these there arises the fallacy of unestablished minor or middle. Even if selfhood which is a common property of known as well as unknown selves is inserted as the minor term in an inference with 'non-inherence in an omniscient creator' as the major term then again the properties of omniscience and omnipotence themselves being nonexistent (in the Mīmāṃsā view) the above-mentioned fallacy of unestablished minor or middle arises.

A defence of the proof for God's nonexistence and its rebuttal

TEXT: त्वत्-अभ्युपगमैः लोक-प्रसिद्ध्या च प्रसिद्धस्य-एव-ईश्वरस्य अ-सर्वज्ञत्वं अ-कर्तृत्वं च साध्यते इति चेत्? न।

आगमादेः प्रमाणत्वे बाधनात् अनिषेधनम्।
आभासत्वे तु सा एव स्यात् आश्रयासिद्धिः उद्धता॥

निगद-व्याख्यातं एतत्।

TRANS.: Can't non-omniscience and non-creatorship be proved of God as popularly known or as conceived by Nyāya? No! If popular notions or the scriptural statements affirming God's existence and creativity which Nyāya considers authoritative are valid then the inference of the nonexistence etc. of God stands contradicted. On the other hand if popular notions etc. are invalid then obviously the minor term in the inference becomes unestablished. All this is quite obvious.

EXPL.: 'If illusory notions of God cannot do for the inference then God as imagined by common people or conceived by Nyāya on the basis of scriptural statements can be utilised for the inference of nonexistence,'

so goes a fresh contention of Mīmāṃsaka. The above is the reply to this contention.

A Cārvāka retort to the above

TEXT: चार्वाकः तु आह–किं योग्यता–विशेष–अग्रहेण? यत् न उपलभ्यते तत् नास्ति, विपरीतं अस्ति। न च ईश्वर आदयः तथा। ततः न संति इत्येव ज्यायः। एवं अनुमानादि–विलोपः इति चेत्? न इदं अनिष्टम्। तथा च लोक–व्यवहार–उच्छेदः इति चेत्? न। संभावना–मात्रेण तत्–सिद्धेः। संवादेन च प्रामाण्य–अभिमानात् इति।

TRANS.: Now the Cārvāka comes forward with the contention that a non-cognition need not be qualified as the non-cognition of the cognisable, to be a proof of the nonexistence of the uncognised. Whatever is not cognised is not existent and the opposite of this is existent. God etc. are not cognised or perceived so it is best to conclude that these hypothetical entities are nonexistent. 'Doesn't such a view lead to the denial of inference etc. as sources of valid cognition?' It may be asked. Cārvāka replies that he does not bother about this. 'But doesn't this go against common practice based on inference etc.?' It may be asked again. Cārvāka's reply to this is that all common practice is based on mere probability and if there is general agreement in the practices of different people then the ideas on which the latter are based are regarded as valid.

EXPL.: The materialist Cārvāka is also an atheist like the Mīmāṃsaka. He is not bothered whether the non-cognition in the case of God is the non-cognition of the cognisable or the non-cognisable. Every kind of non-cognition is for Cārvāka a proof for the nonexistence of the uncognised. If it is urged against such a view that what is not perceptually cognised is inferentially or otherwise cognised and therefore its existence can be maintained Cārvāka's retort is that no non-perceptual type of cognition is acceptable as absolutely valid to him. Such cognitions unsupported by perception are always suspect. The knowledge yielded by non-perceptual means of cognition is of probability not certainty. Common people mistake probability for certainty and are guided in their conduct mostly by probability. So nothing can be regarded as cognisable unless it is actually cognised.

Reply to the Cārvāka contention

TEXT: अत्र उच्यते–

दृष्टि–अदृष्ट्योः क्व संदेहः भाव–अभाव विनिश्चयात्?
अ–दृष्टि–बाधिते हेतौ प्रत्यक्षं अपि दुर्लभम्॥

संभावना हि संदेहः एव। तस्मात् च व्यवहारः तस्मिन् सति स्यात्। सः एव तु कुतः? दर्शन–दशायां भाव–निश्चयात्। अदर्शन–दशायां अभाव–निश्चयात्। तथा च गृहात्–बहिर्गतः चार्वाकः वराकः न निवर्तेत। प्रत्युत पुत्र–दार–धनादि–अभाव–अवधारणात् स–उरः–ताडं शोक–विकलः विक्रोशेत्। स्मरण–अनुभवात् न एवं इति चेत्? न। प्रतियोगि–स्मरणे एव अभाव–परिच्छेदात्। परावृत्तः अपि कथं पुनः आसादयिष्यति? सत्वात् इति चेत्? अनुपलंभ–काले अपि तर्हि संति इति न तावत्–मात्रेण अभाव–अवधारणम्। तदा एव उत्पन्नाः इति चेत्? न। अनुपलंभेन हेतूनां बाधात्। अ–बाधे वा सः एव दोषः। अतः एव प्रत्यक्षं अपि न स्यात् तत्–हेतूना चक्षुरादीनां अनुपलंभ–बाधितत्वात्। उपलभ्यंते एव गोलकादयः इति चेत्? न। तत्–उपलब्धेः पूर्वं तेषां अनुपलंभात्। न च यौगपद्य–नियमः। कार्यकारणभावात् इति।

एतेन न परमाणवः संति अनुपलब्धेः। न ते नित्याः निर्–अवयवाः वा, पार्थिवत्वात् घटादिवत्। न पायसीय–परमाणु–रूपादयः नित्याः, रूपादित्वात्, दृश्यमान–रूपादिवत्। न रूपत्व–पार्थिवत्वादि नित्य–अकार्य–अतीन्द्रिय–समवायि, जातित्वात्, शृंगत्ववत्। न इन्द्रियाणि संति योग्यानुपलब्धेः। अयोग्यानि च शशशृंग–प्रतिबंदि–निरसनीयानि इत्येवं स्वर्ग–अपूर्व–देवता निराकरणं नास्तिकानां निरसनीयम्। मीमांसकः च तोषयितव्यः भीषयितव्यः च इति।

यद्येवं अनुपलंभेन–अदृश्य–प्रतिषेधः न इष्यते अनुपलभ्य–उपाधि–प्रतिषेधः अपि तर्हि न एष्टव्यः। तथा च कथं तथा–भूत–अर्थ–सिद्धिः अपि, अनुमान–बीज–प्रतिबंध–असिद्धेः। तदभावे शब्दादेः अपि अभावः। प्रामाण्य–असिद्धेः। इयं उभयतः पाशा–रज्जुः।

अत्र कश्चित् आह-मा भूत् उपाधि-विधूननं, चतुः-पंच-रूप-संपत्ति-मात्रेण एव प्रतिबंध-निर्वाहात्। तस्याः च सपक्ष-असपक्ष-दर्शन-अदर्शन-मात्र-प्रमाणकत्वात्। यत्र तु तत्-भंगः तत्र प्रमाण-भंगः अपि आवश्यकः। न हि अस्ति संभवः दर्शन-अदर्शनयोः अ-विप्लवे हेतुः उपप्लवते इति। अप्रयोजकः अपि तर्हि हेतुः स्यात् इति चेत्? भूयो-दर्शन-अविप्लवे कः अयं अ-प्रयोजकः नाम? न तावत् साध्यं प्रति अकार्यं अकारणं वा। सामान्यतो-दृष्ट-अनुमान-स्वीकारात्। नापि सामग्र्यां कारण-एकदेशः। पूर्ववत् अभ्युपगमात्। नापि व्यभिचारी। तत् अनुपलंभात्। व्यभिचार-उपलंभे वा सः एव दोषः। न च शंकित-व्यभिचारः। निर्बीज-शंकायाः सर्वत्र सुलभत्वात्। नापि व्याप्य-अंतर-सहवृत्तिः। एकत्र अपि साध्ये अनेक-साधन-उपयोगात्। नापि अल्प-विषयः। धूमादेः तथा भावे अपि हेतुत्वात्। ननु धूमः वन्हिमात्रे अप्रयोजकः एव, तत्-निवृत्तौ अपि तदनिवृत्तेः। आर्द्रेन्धनवंतं वन्हि-विशेषं प्रति तु प्रयोजकः, तत्-निवृत्तौ तस्य एव निवृत्तेः इति एतत् अपि अयुक्तम्। सामान्य-प्रयोजकतायां विशेष-साधकत्व-अयोगात्। तदसिद्धौ तस्य असिद्धि-नियमात्। सिद्धौ वा सामान्य-विशेषभाव-अनुपपत्तेः। नापि कृप्त-सामर्थ्ये अन्यस्मिन् कल्पनीय-सामर्थ्यः अ-प्रयोजकः। नाशे कार्यत्व-सावयवत्वयोः अपि हेतुभावात् इति।

तत् एतत् अ-पेशलम्। कथं हि विशेष-अभावात् कश्चित् व्यभिचरति कश्चित् च न इति शक्यं अवगंतुम्? अतः निर्णायक-अभावे सति साहित्य-दर्शनं एव शंका-बीजं इति क्व असौ निर्बीजा? एवं सति अतिप्रसक्तिः अपि चार्वाक-नंदिनी न उपालंभाय। स्वभावात् एव कश्चित् किंचित् व्यभिचरति कश्चित् च न इति स्वभावः एव विशेषः इति चेत्? केन चिन्हेन पुनः असौ निर्णयः इति निपुणेन विभावनीयम्। भूयो-दर्शनस्य शतशः प्रवृत्तस्य अपि भंग-दर्शनात्। यत्र भंगः न दृश्यते तत्र तत् तथा इति चेत्? आपाततः न दृश्यते इति सर्वत्र काल-क्रमेण अपि न द्रक्ष्यते इति कः नियंता इति? तस्मात् उपाधि-तत्-विरहौ एव व्यभिचार-अ व्यभिचार-निबंधनं, तत्-अवधारणं च अशक्यं इति।

ननु यः सर्वैः, प्रमाणैः, सर्वदा अस्मदादिभिः यद्वत्तया न उपलभ्यते न असौ तद्वान्? यथा बकः श्यामिकया। न उपलभ्यते च वन्हौ धूमः उपाधिमत्तया इति शक्यं इति चेत्। न। अस्य अपि अनुमानतया तदपेक्षायां अनवस्थानात्। 'सर्वादृष्टेश्च संदेहात् स्वादृष्टेः व्यभिचारतः', सर्वदा इति असिद्धेः।

तादात्म्य-तदुत्पत्तिभ्यां नियमः इति अन्ये। तत्र तादात्म्यं विपक्षे-बाधकात् भवति। तदुत्पत्तिः च पौर्वापर्येण प्रत्यक्ष-अनुपलंभाभ्याम्। न हि एवं सति शंका-पिशाची अवकाशं आसादयति। आशंक्यमान-कारणभावस्य अपि पिशाचादेः एतत्-लक्षण-अविरोधेन एव तत्व-निर्वाहात् इति। न। एवं अपि उभय-गामिनः अव्यभिचार-निबंधनस्य एकस्य अ-विवेचनात्, प्रत्येकं च अव्यापकत्वात्। कुतः च कार्य-आत्मानौ कारणं आत्मानं च न व्यभिचरतः इति?

TRANS.: Probability is based on doubt but if something is actually perceived its reality cannot be doubted. If on the other hand there is no perception of a thing then also there cannot be any doubt about the reality of the thing (as bare non-perception is proof of unreality or non-existence for the Cārvāka). Moreover even perception of things would be rendered difficult on the above view as the cause of perception—the visual sense-organ is itself imperceptible.

If probability is nothing but doubt and the common man's usage is supposed to be based on probability then this means that some or other doubt precedes every usage of the common man. But how can this be the case? If the object of a usage is actually perceived, then there is certainty about its existence, but if it is not perceived then there is certainty about the absence of the object with the result that if the poor Cārvāka goes out of his house he would not return to it. Instead he would beat his breast and cry hoarse because he would not be able to see his children, wife, wealth etc. while out of the house. May it be urged against this that although not seen, one's wife, children etc. are certainly remembered by a person when he or she is out of the house? No! This is not the right explanation. Even for the perception of the absence of a thing the recollection of the counter-positive of the absence is necessary. Not only this, even nonexistent destroyed things are recollected. (So existence does not always go along with recollection). How

then can one make sure that on returning to one's home one would find existing there one's family members, and one's property? But aren't all these existent even during the man's outing? Yes! But this means that even during a man's absence in his house his family members etc. continue to exist unperceived in the house. So non-perception cannot be a proof of nonexistence. Can then one say that the family-members etc. come into existence at the very moment when they are perceived? No! No cause of the origination of these is observed when they are observed. If despite their non-perception the causes are supposed to be existent (and therefore these are taken to produce the things which are taken to have gone out of existence when unobserved) then non-perception cannot be the proof of nonexistence. For this very reason even perception cannot be regarded as the proof of existence. The visual organ which is the cause of perception is imperceptible, so it has to be taken as nonexistent; how then can perception, the effect of visual contact with an object come into being? 'But isn't the circular physiological limb known as the eye actually seen?' One may ask. Yes! But the object being one of the causes of its cognition the cognition of the visual organ must be preceded by the organ. This however is not possible as only perception is supposed to ensure the existence of the perceptual object. This difficulty cannot be avoided by treating the cognition and its object as of simultaneous occurrence because these are related as effect and cause (which do not come into being together).

By the above-mentioned rebuttals stand rebutted inferences like the following (which are set forth by Cārvākas and others): 'There are no atoms, they are neither eternal nor non-composite because they are earthy in nature (this is true of earth-atoms only) like pots; the colour etc. of the water-atoms are not eternal because they are colours like the visible colours of other non-atomic objects; colourness, earthness etc. do not inhere in eternal unproduced and extrasensory objects because they are generic universals like hornness which inheres in ephemeral, and sensible entities only; there are no sense-organs because though cognisable they are not cognised; if even uncognisable sense-organs are admitted to exist then this admission can be controverted by precipitating the contingency of having to admit the existence even of the hare's horn (on similar ground).' Rebuttals similar to those adduced against the various arguments for the nonexistence of God are to be addressed against each of the above arguments as well as those intended to disprove the reality of the other world, the unseen destiny, the deities etc. advanced by the atheists. So far as the Mīmāṃsaka is concerned, he being the advocate of the reality of the other world etc. he needs to be commended for his view, but since he is opposed to theism he is also to be condemned.

It may now be asked, 'If it is not admitted that mere non-perception of a thing entails its nonexistence (though it is unperceived) then in the case of inference the nonexistence of unperceived conditions determining the middle term of the inference should also not be admitted. If this is conceded then no inference can proceed as the invariable concomitance which is the basis of all inference cannot be established. In the absence of inference even verbal testimony would be rendered ineffective as its validity cannot be established. Thus we have here a double-bind. Some thinkers faced with this difficulty suggest the following strategy to overcome it. 'Let there be no elimination of conditionality of the middle term. The invariable concomitance of the middle and the major can be established even if four or five characteristics of a valid middle term are found to characterise the middle term in the inference under consideration. This can be veridically ascertained merely by means of the perception and non-perception of the middle in the minor and the contra-minor respectively. If in a certain case such perception and non-perception are not available then the ascertainment of the concomitance is also not possible in that case. Certainly it is impossible that if the perception and non-perception of the middle as explained are available then the middle is not concomitant with its major. But can't such a middle be irrelevant to the major? Well! What can be the nature of this irrelevance when there is no failure of coexistence between the major and the middle? Certainly the irrelevance cannot be the non-causality or non-effectuality of the middle in relation to the major. There are inferences accepted by Nyāya in which the major and the middle are not causally related but are concomitant (one with the other). Nor is it the case that the middle is just one of the causal conditions of the major and so it is irrelevant to it as a causal condition is irrelevant to the effect which is the product of the whole causal collocation. The Nyāya has accepted even those inferences as valid of which the middle terms happen to be the causal conditions of their major terms. (So such middle terms cannot be treated as irrelevant to their majors). The irrelevant middle cannot also be the deviant term as irrelevant middle terms are not found to be deviant. (So irrelevance cannot be equalled with deviance). If in a certain inference the irrelevant middle is found to be deviant also then deviance will be the fallacy afflicting the inference. Nor can irrelevant middle term be identified with one of suspected deviance as baseless suspicions of deviance are possible in the case of every

middle. The irrelevant middle cannot also be equated with one which is coexistent with another middle concomitant with the major because there can be many middle terms to prove a single major. Nor lesser scope of the middle in comparison to that of the major makes the former irrelevant to the latter. Smoke etc. pervade fewer loci than fire etc. yet the former do lead to the inference of the latter. But isn't the presence of smoke irrelevant to the presence of fire as even in the absence of smoke there is no absence of fire? In fact the presence of smoke is relevant only to the presence of that fire which is kindled by wet fuel only as in the absence of smoke there is also the absence of the fire burning wet fuel. This contention however is incorrect. If something is not needed for another thing generically it will not be needed for the thing specifically. (Smoke is needed for fire generically so it is needed for certain special kinds of fire like the fire produced by wet fuel). If this rule did not hold then the distinction between general and specific natures of things would disappear. (Smoke for example is needed for a certain kind of fire only because it is needed for fire in general). If thus the above definitions of the irrelevant are faulty then another definition viz., that 'the irrelevant is other than the entity whose causal capacity in relation to an effect is already established, and therefore it is one whose causal capacity is simply postulated' is also faulty. Producedness is known to be relevant to or determinative of destruction but compositeness too is relevant to destruction.

(The foregoing contention of certain Nyāya experts that absolute absence of conditionality in the middle term of inference is not essential for valid inference) is not proper. How can it be ascertained that a certain middle term is deviant while another is not so if the middle is devoid of some special feature (like absence of conditionality in the case of an invalid middle term)? If there is nothing to determine the conditionality or otherwise of a middle term then the mere coexistence of the major and middle terms is itself the basis of the doubt of deviance of the middle term. So it is not correct to say as above that there is no basis for the doubt. Such being the case the unfavourable contingency precipitated against the Cārvāka that, if despite repeated perception of coexistence of the middle and major terms doubt regarding their concomitance persists then it can never be removed and so the middle can always be suspected of deviance, cannot fault the Cārvāka. (Inference is not a valid means of cognition for the Cārvāka). 'Can't one urge against this that it is the very nature of a certain thing to be concomitant while the nature of a different thing is to be non-commitant with another?' Well! This may be true but by what mark of a thing—the middle term—

this nature is to be determined as deviant or otherwise is the main problem which needs to be considered carefully. Perception of the coexistence of the middle and major terms is often found to mislead and so it cannot provide the clue to concomitance. But can it not be maintained that in the cases where the perception of coexistence does not fail, there, the coexistence itself is the indicator of concomitance? No! This cannot be true because the repeated perception of concomitance in cases where it obtains may just be a coincidence and so how can it be determined that the coexistence may not fail in course of time in all cases (where coexistence has been frequently observed)? So it has to be admitted that the presence and absence of conditionality in the middle do alone determine respectively the deviance or validity of the latter and this determination is impossible if mere non-cognition is treated as proof of nonexistence as per the view of Cārvāka.

It may seem possible to ascertain the unconditionality of the middle term in the following way; one should find out if a term is ever known by any valid means of cognition to be endowed with a certain feature. If it is not, then it is not endowed with that feature, as for example the stork is never seen to be black or smoke is not known to be endowed with conditionality in its concomitance with fire. But this way of ascertaining unconditionality is a mode of inference which itself depends upon the establishment of the unconditionality of its own middle term. Thus there would result an infinite regress if unconditionality of a middle term is sought to be established inferentially. As is remarked elsewhere (by the author) the unknownness of the conditionality of a middle term is doubtful while unknownness of it to one person at all times cannot be proved (even if the conditionality is not known presently it can be known later.)

Others viz., the Buddhists opine that identity and causality help determine the unconditionality of the middle term. Identity (of middle and major terms) is known through opposition in nature of the contraminor and the middle. As to causality, it is ascertained by means of the apprehension of positive and negative association of the cause and the effect. When these conditions are present the spectre of doubt regarding conditionality does not have any legs to stand upon. If even a ghost is suspected to be included in the causal collocations of the effect it can be only if it fulfils the conditions of causality, not otherwise. This view however does not bear scrutiny because there is no one determinant of unconditionality or concomitance which is common to identity and causality and each one of the two by itself does not account for concomitance of both kinds. Moreover what can be the basis of the non-deviance of the effect or itself—the middle term—from its cause or itself

except the absence of conditionality in the middle? (So if we have to come back to the absence of conditionality itself as the ultimate determinant, the above view is bound to give rise to the fallacy of, self dependence.)

EXPL.: Criticising the Cārvāka doctrine that perception is the only valid means of cognition and that all common usage and behaviour are based on probability—which is nothing but a degree of uncertainty or doubt, the author says that no doubt about the object of usage or behaviour can coexist with either of them. If the object is perceived it is cognised indubitably but if it is not perceived it is not cognised at all. How can then there be doubt about the existence of the object? Once an object goes out of view it goes out of existence as non-cognition is proof of nonexistence for the Cārvāka. The recollection of unperceived things cannot however be taken as the proof of their continued existence. Such recollection is needed for the cognition even of the absence or nonexistence of a thing. Unless the counter-positive of an absence is cognised or recollected the absence is not cognised. Perhaps the Cārvāka may hazard the suggestion that things go out and come into existence as these are alternately ignored and then taken note of. But even to spring into being with their cognitions things have to have their causal collocations. These collocations too cannot come into being or exist if they remain uncognised, so there has to be simultaneous cognition of things as well as their causes. The causes in their turn need their own causes for their origination. But if these causes of causes remain uncognised they cease to exist. In this manner the cognition of one thing would drag in its wake the cognition of everything even remotely connected with it in the causal chain. Besides objects being the objective causes of their cognition they have to preexist their cognition. How can this be if things come into being only when they are cognised? Thus mere non-perception cannot be taken as a valid proof of the nonexistence of the thing not perceived and so God's existence cannot be discarded just because it is not the object of perception.

Like God atoms also cannot be denied to be real because of their imperceptibility. So an inference like 'Atoms are unreal because they are not perceived' is vitiated by fallacy as mere non-perception is not a proof of nonexistence. Another inference like, 'Atoms are not eternal or non-composite because some of them are earthy' seeking to prove non-eternity and compositeness of atoms is vitiated by the fallacy of unestablished minor term. The atom if established as a real entity is also established as an eternal and non-composite entity. Other inferences

like, 'The colour of the water atoms is not eternal because it is colour, like the colour of ephemeral objects', 'There are no sense-organs because they are cognisable and yet uncognised;' are also riddled with the fallacies of unestablished minor or middle. The non-cognition of the sense-organs is not the non-cognition of the cognisable or the perceptible. Sense-organs are not perceptible entities.

Thus it is established that mere non-cognition or non-perception of a thing is no proof of its nonexistence. This gives rise to a serious problem. If unperceived entities also may exist then unperceived conditions of middle terms in valid inferences may also exist and if they exist the concomitance between the major and minor term cannot be established. Some Nyāya thinkers seek to resolve the problem by urging that there is no need to apprehend the unconditionality of the middle term in order to have valid inference from it. It is enough if the middle is observed to pervade all cominors and exclude contra-minors. If it is objected that a middle which is not known to be unconditionally associated with the major could be irrelevant to the major's presence in the minor, then the nature of this irrelevance would have to be specified, as the middle is coexistent with the major in all cominors. The irrelevant is not the deviant; if the middle is deviant then deviance itself will be the fallacy afflicting the irrelevant middle. No other possible account of irrelevance applies to the middle which pervades the cominors and excludes the contra-minors. It may perhaps be urged that the irrelevant middle leads to the inference of a particular specimen of the major but not of the major as a whole. For example smoke leads to the inference of fire kindled by wet fuel but not to fire as such and so the presence of the smoke is not relevant to the presence of fire as such. But this is not correct. Unless smoke's presence is relevant to the presence of fire generally it cannot be relevant to the presence of a special type of fire. Thus the apprehension of unconditionality of the concomitance of the middle with the major need not be regarded as essential for inference according to some Nyāya thinkers.

But a majority of Nyāya thinkers are opposed to the above view. They urge that in the absence of any clinching evidence it cannot be ascertained that a certain middle is deviant in relation to its major while another middle is not, as the mere coexistence of the middle and the major is not capable of removing the doubt regarding the concomitance of these terms.

Even unconcomitant terms are found to be coexistent. In fact the coexistence itself would engender doubt about concomitance. But since this doubt can be dispelled by the elimination of conditionality in the

middle term the unfavourable contingency of all concomitance being suspect (trotted out by the Cārvāka) does not cast aspersion on the Nyāya view of concomitance. If certain things are supposed to be concomitant with certain others by nature while others are not so supposed then the basis of this supposition has to be found out. Repeated perception of coexistence of certain things cannot lead to the apprehension of this hypothetical nature as even frequently-perceived coexistences are found to fail. Even in cases where coexistence is not found to fail nothing can ensure that it will never fail. So the absolute absence of conditionality alone has to be taken as the guarantee for concomitance but it is impossible to ascertain the absolute absence of conditionality in any middle term.

The Buddhists opine that identity or causal relation obtaining between the middle and major terms is the basis of their concomitance and these can easily be ascertained. Identity is directly perceptible while positive and negative association lead to the apprehension of concomitance. The drawback of this view is that there is nothing common to both the identical and the causally-related and each one of these does not characterise all kinds of middle terms. Moreover the reason why the identical or the effect is not deviant in relation to itself or its cause is nothing but the unconditionality of their relation, so willy-nilly we come back to unconditionality as the main ground of concomitance.

Justification of inference and reply to Cārvāka objections

TEXT: अत्र उच्यते-

शंका चेत् अनुमा अस्ति एव न चेत् शंका ततस्तराम्।
व्याघात-अवधिः आशंका तर्कः शंका-अवधिः मतः॥

काल-अंतरे क्वचित् व्यभिचरिष्यति इति कालं भाविनं आकलय्य शंक्येत तत्-आकलनं च न अनुमानं अवधीर्य कस्यचित्। मुहूर्त-याम-अहोरात्र, पक्ष-मास-ऋतु-अयन-सवत्सरादयः हि भाविनः भवन् मुहूर्तादि-अनुमेयाः एव। अन्-अवगतेषु स्मरणस्य अपि अन्-आशंकनीयत्वात्। अन्-आकलने वा कं अश्रित्य व्यभिचारः शंक्येत? तथा च सुतरां अनुमान-स्वीकारः। एवं च देश-अंतरे अपि वक्तव्यम्।

स्वीकृतं अनुमानम्। सुहृद्-भावेन पृच्छामः। कथं आशंका निवर्तनीया इति चेत्? न। यावत्-आशकं तर्क-प्रवृत्तेः। तेन हि वर्तमान-उपाधि-कोटौ तत्-आयत्त-व्यभिचार-कोटौ वा अ-निष्टं उपनयता इच्छा विच्छिद्यते। विच्छिन्न-विपक्ष-इच्छः च प्रमाता भूयोदर्शन-उपलब्ध-साहचर्य-लिंगं अन्-आकुलं अधितिष्ठति। आधिष्ठितात् च करणात् क्रिया-परिनिष्पत्तिः इति किं अनुपपन्नम्?

ननु तर्कः अपि अविनाभावं अपेक्ष्य प्रवर्तते ततः अनवस्थया भवितव्यम्? न। शंकायाः व्याघात-अवधित्वात्। तदेव हि आशंक्यते यस्मिन् आशंक्यमाने स्व-क्रिया-व्याघातादयः दोषाः न अवतरंति इति लोक-मर्यादा। न हि हेतु-फल-भावः न भविष्यति इति शंकितुं अपि शक्यते। तथा सति शंका एव न स्यात् सर्वं मिथ्या भविष्यति इत्यदिवत्। तथापि अतीन्द्रिय-उपाधि-निषेधे किं प्रमाणं इति उच्यतां इति चेत्? न वै कश्चित् अतीन्द्रिय-उपाधिः प्रमाण-सिद्धः अस्ति यस्य अभावे प्रमाणं अन्वेषणीयम्। केवलं साहचर्ये निबंधन-अंतर-मात्रं शंक्यते। ततः शंका एव फलतः स्वरूपतः च निवर्तनीया। तत्र फलं अस्याः विपक्षस्य अपि जिज्ञासा तर्कात् आहत्य निवर्तते। ततः अनुमान-प्रवृत्तौ शंका-स्वरूपं अपि इति सर्वं सुस्थम्। न च एतत् अन्-आगमं, न्याय-अंगतया तर्कं व्युत्पादयतः सूत्रकारस्य अभिमतत्वात्। अन्यथा तद्-व्युत्पादन-वैयर्थ्यात्।

तत् अयं संक्षेपः यत्र अनुकूल-तर्कः नास्ति सः अप्रयोजकः। सः च द्विविधः। शंकित-उपाधिः निश्चित-उपाधिः च। यत्र इदं उच्यते-

यावत् च अव्यतिरेकित्वं शत-अंशेन अपि गम्यते।
विपक्षस्य कुतः तावत् हेतोः गमनिका-बलम्?॥

तत्र उपाधिः तु साधन-अव्यापकत्वे सति साध्य-व्यापकः। तत् धर्म-भूता हि व्याप्तिः जवा-कुसुम-रक्तता इव स्फटिके, साधन-अभिमते चकास्ति इति उपाधिः असौ उच्यते इति। तत् इदं आहुः-

अन्ये पर-प्रयुक्तानां व्याप्तीनां उपजीवकाः।
तैः दृष्टैः अपि न एव इष्टा व्यापक-अंश-अवधारणा॥ इति।

तत् अनेन विपक्ष-दण्ड-भूतेन तर्केण सनाथे भूयोदर्शने कार्यं वा कारणं वा ततः अन्यत् वा समवायि वा संयोगि वा अन्यथा वा भावः वा अभावः वा सविशेषणं वा निर्विशेषणं लिंगं इति निः शंकं अवधारणीयम्। अन्यथा तत्-आभासः इति रहस्यम्। तादात्म्य-तदुत्पत्त्योः एतदेव बीजम्। यदि कार्य-आत्मानौ कारणं आत्मानं च अतिपतेतां तदा तयोः तत्वं व्याहन्येत। अतः एव सामग्री-निवेशिनः चरम-कारणात् अपि कार्यं अनुमिमते सौगताः अपि। तस्मात् विपक्ष-बाधकं एव प्रतिबंध-लक्षणम्। तथा हि,शाकादि-आहार-परिणति-विरहिणि मित्रा-तनये न किंचित् अनिष्टं इति न असौ तस्य व्यापिका। व्यापिका तु श्यामिकायाः। कारणत्व-अवधारणात्। कारणं च तत् तस्य तत् अतिपत्य भवति च इति व्याहतम्। एवं अन्यत्र अपि ऊहनीयं इति।

क्व पुनः अप्रयोजकः अन्तभर्वति। न क्वचित् इति एके। यथा हि सिद्धसाधनं न बाधित-विषयं, विषय-अपहार-अभावात्। नापि निर्णये सति पक्षत्व-अतिपातात् अ-पक्षधर्मः। कालातीत-विलोप-प्रसङ्गात्। न च अनेकान्तादि। व्यभिचारादि-अभावात्। तथा अयं अपि। सूत्रं तु उपलक्षण परं इति।

तत् असत्। विभागस्य न्यून-अधिक-संख्या-व्यवच्छेद-फलत्वात्। क्व तर्हि द्वयोः अन्तर्निवेशः? असिद्धे एव। तथाहि व्याप्तस्य हि पक्षधर्मता-प्रतीतिः सिद्धिः, तदभावः असिद्धिः। इयं च व्याप्ति-पक्षधर्मता-स्वरूपाणां अन्यतम-अ-प्रतीत्या भवंती यथासख्यं अन्यथासिद्धिः, आश्रयासिद्धिः, स्वरूपासिद्धिः इति आख्यायते। मध्यमा अपि आश्रय-स्वरूप-अ-प्रतीत्या, तत्-विशेषण-पक्षत्व-अ-प्रतीत्या वा इति द्वयी। तत्र चरमा सिद्धसाधनं इति व्यपदिश्यते। व्याप्ति-स्थितौ पक्षत्वस्य आहत्य विघटनात्। न तु एवं बाधे। व्याप्तेः एव प्रथमं विघटनात् इति विशेषः। यत्तु अप्रयोजकः सन्दिग्ध-अनैकांतिकः इति अनैकांतिके अंतभर्व्यिते, तत् असत्। व्याप्ति-असिद्ध्या हि निमित्तेन व्यभिचारः शंकनीयः, अन्यथा वा। प्रथमे असिद्धिः एव दूषणं उपजीव्यत्वात्। न अनैकांतिकम्। उपजीवकत्वात् अन्यथा शंका तु अदूषणं एव। निर्णीते तत्-अनवकाशात् इति।

TRANS.: If there is doubt about the unconditional concomitance of the middle and major terms in an inference then there definitely is inferential cognition (and its validity has got to be admitted). But if there is not the above doubt then the existence of inference is so much more certain. All doubts are dispelled by the precipitation of unfavourable epistemic contingency or what is called the contra-factual conditional. But even this conditional is based on concomitance whose unconditionality may be subject to doubt. This doubt (or the series of doubts following it) are dispelled by the realisation of the contradiction between one's actions and the doubt expressed by oneself.

That a certain middle term which is known to be concomitant now with the major term in an inference may yet deviate from the major on some future occasion is a possible doubt which can be entertained only if the future time which is not now, is taken into consideration. For this it is necessary to take recourse to inference. The future time which is made up of different larger and larger slices of temporal epochs known as one hour, one eighth of a day, the whole day, the fortnight, the month, the season, the solstices, the year etc. is only inferred to be a future existent on the basis of the reality of the present temporal periods; unless these are known there cannot be any recollection of them. If there is no knowledge at all of future periods of time what will be the basis of the possible doubt of deviance of the middle (from the major)? (Only deviance in future time can be suspected). So (even for entertaining the foregoing doubt) one has got to admit inference as a valid form of cognition. Even the places different from the one under observation have to be admitted on the basis of inference for the above doubt to occur. (If the middle exists with the major at one place it may or may not coexist with the latter at other places).

'Alright! We accept inference as valid cognition, but we ask you in friendly spirit, 'How is the foregoing doubt to be eliminated?' So queries now the critic (of inference). (The answer to the query is as follows): The (contra-factual) conditional argument is there to eliminate the doubt. The argument is pressed further and further till the doubt is completely eliminated. The argument through its formulation precipitates an unfavourable contingency in the thesis of conditionality and that of deviance (of the middle term) depending upon the latter. As a consequence of this the proponent of these loses interest in upholding them (so as to oppose the validity of inferences). Instead the disillusioned and sober cogniser takes recourse to the middle term whose concomitance with the major has been apprehended by means of its repeated observation. From the apprehension of this middle term there

results the valid inferential cognition of the major term. So there is no inconsistency in this account. But doesn't even the counterfactual conditional proceed by means of (or is based on) concomitance (which as shown above, itself depends upon the counterfactual conditional) and isn't thus there bound to be infinite regress in establishing concomitance? No! (It is not a rule that the cognition of concomitance is always attended by doubt. The terminus of all doubt is the contradiction which the doubter inflicts upon the doubt by his or her actions. The practical convention is that people entertain only such doubts as do not lead them to fallacies like contradicting them by their own action. For example it cannot be doubted at all that there is cause-effect relationship, for then the doubt itself—which is an effect—would have to be nonexistent, The doubt is just like believing that everything is unreal.

But shouldn't (the defender of concomitance) adduce some proof that there are no invisible conditions affecting the middle term in an inference? No! No invisible condition is validly ascertained so that attempt may be made to discard it. The doubt regarding conditionality is raised mainly to find out if the concomitance of the middle and the major is natural or dependent upon some external condition; only such a doubt and its result need both to be dissipated for facilitating the emergence of inference. The result of the doubt is the disposition to regard the minor as the contra-minor (because the concomitance of the middle and the major has become suspect) which is once for all dissipated by the counterfactual conditional. Thereafter arises the inference and then the doubt itself is dissipated. Thus the occurrence of inference is properly explained.

Nor all this is devoid of any basis in the aphorisms (of Gotama, the founder of the Nyāya school). When the author of the aphorisms explained that the counterfactual conditional is the instrument of the syllogistic inference he admitted all that is explained above, otherwise the elucidation of the conditional in the aphorisms would have been wasted. The sum and substance of the above is this. The middle term which is not supported by a favourable conditional is irrelevant to its major. Such a middle term is of two kinds viz., that whose conditionality is suspect and that whose conditionality is certain. This is explained in the verse which states that:

> 'So long as the invariable concomitance of the middle is subject to the slightest doubt so long, the middle having association with the contra-minor cannot have the capacity to lead to the inference of the major'.

As to the definition of condition it is this: 'Whatever pervades the major term without pervading the middle term is the condition qualifying the middle term.' (The presence of this condition in the middle is a major fallacy of inference). Just as when a white crystal is placed near a flower of hibiscus the crimson colour of the hibiscus is reflected by the crystal and so it appears to belong to it, so a condition being concomitant with the major term in an inference, the concomitance appears in the conditioned middle term (for example in the invalid inference of smoke from fire, conjunction with wet fuel is a condition which is concomitant with smoke. This concomitance appears to characterise fire which is qualified by the condition as it is only the fire kindled by wet fuel which emits smoke. The etymological meaning of the Sanskrit term *'Upādhi'* for the condition is (That which transfers its property to an object lying near it). This fact is stated as below in *Ślokavṛtikā,* a famous Mīmāṃsā treatise thus:

> Other (conditioned) middle terms (which by themselves are not concomitant with the major) depend upon the concomitance of the condition for their own concomitance. So even if such middle terms are observed the major is not inferred by means of the observation.

Thus when the repeated observation of the coexistence of the middle with the major is accompanied by the counterfactual conditional which suppresses the opposite inference then the effect, the cause or something other than these two, the inherent, the conjunct or something other than these two, a positive entity or absence of a qualified or unqualified entity etc. can be a middle term in the inference. One should not have the least doubt about this fact. A middle term which does not conform to the above description is fallacious. This is the essence of the whole discussion. Even identity and causality (which are the bases of concomitance according to Buddhists) are supported by the counterfactual conditional only. The conditional supporting identity and causality may be formulated thus: 'If the effect or the self deviated respectively from the cause or itself then it would forfeit its very nature'. Since it is the conditional which (by rebutting the contrary theses) supports concomitance, therefore even the Buddhist (who admits only two kinds of inference) concedes the possibility of inferring the effect even from the single causal condition which enters the causal collocation (just before the emergence of the effect. This single cause is not the causal collocation yet the effect cannot come into being without it). So elimination of the contrary thesis which is the work of the conditional is, that by means of which the concomitance of the middle and the major is

ascertained. (On this account the concomitance itself is denoted by the Sanskrit word denoting contradiction) namely, *Pratibandha*.

(To explain how a condition of the middle works: 'in the inference of a certain child being dark-complexioned because it is the offspring of a lady called Mitrā (who occasionally consumed spicy food), 'being the partial product of the consumption of spicy food' is the condition affecting the middle term. Not all offspring of Mitrā are affected by Mitrā's consumption of spicy food, so the condition does not pervade the middle term but the dark complexion of the child that is dark is certainly caused by the spicy food. The causal relation between the complexion and the spicy food is establishable by a counterfactual condition like, 'if the dark complexion were not produced by the consumption of spicy food then this would cease to be a causal entity or the dark complexion would come into being of itself'. In other instances of conditional inferences also the pervasion and non-pervasion of the major and middle respectively by the condition of the middle has to be taken note of.

Now going back to a question which was discussed at some length but left unanswered earlier, the author asks, 'How to categorise the irrelevant middle? (If it is a fallacy it must be quite other than the five fallacies listed in Nyāya treatises). Some Nyāya scholars are of the view that the irrelevant cannot be included among fallacies as is the case with the fallacy of 'proving the already proved'. (This does not find place among the five known fallacies). It isn't concerned with the contradicted major as the denial of major in the minor is not the object of this fallacy. Nor does the denial of the minorness of the minor forfeit its nature which consists in its being the locus of a doubtful major. Even the established fallacy of absent major entails the deprivation of its nature in the minor term. As the major is known to be absent in the minor, there remains no doubt about the presence of the major in the minor when the fallacy of absent major arises in an inference. The fallacy cannot be treated as a variety of deviation as the middle afflicted by this fallacy does not deviate from its major. Thus 'proving the already proved' is a fallacy over and above the five listed fallacies. Irrelevance is also like this fallacy—a new fallacy. This listing of only five fallacies in the aphorism is to be taken as a pointer only.

This view is not correct. A classification—as that found in the aphorism is intended to deny either a lesser or a larger number of entities of the type classified. In what are class then the above two fallacies to be included? Only in the class of 'the unestablished or the unknown', is the reply to the question.

To explain: The apprehension of the concomitant middle term as located in the minor is what is known (technically) as 'establishing'. The absence of this is 'non establishment'. This non-establishment occurs if any one of the three features of the middle term, namely the concomitance, the minor and the property of being located in the minor and its own nature is not apprehended. According to these three different non-apprehensions there arise three different (corresponding) types of non-establishments. These are respectively known as 'the non-establishment of relevance; of the locus and of the nature of the middle term. The second of these is of two kinds viz., that in which the very nature of the locus (or the minor) is unknown and that in which the qualifier of the locus namely the property of minorness is unknown. The second of these two is known as the fallacy of 'proving the already proved'. It is so known because when it obtains the middle remains concomitant with the major but the property of minorness of the minor (which consists in the occurrence of the major in the minor being suspect) gets disrupted. Such however is not the case if an inference is afflicted by the fallacy of absent major, as under this affliction the very concomitance of the middle term stands disrupted. This is the difference between the two fallacies (Irrelevance has to be included in the first type of non-establishments).

There is a view according to which the irrelevant middle is one whose concomitance with the major is suspect and so it is to be classed as deviant. This view is however incorrect. The middle may be suspected to be deviant either because its concomitance is unestablished or even when it is established. If the first is the case then the fallacy in the inference is non-establishment and not deviance which is the effect of the latter. But when the second is the case then the concomitance being established doubt about it cannot arise at all.

EXPL.: Replying to the objection preferred by the Cārvāka that the doubt about the future possibility of deviance of the middle term can never be eliminated, the author says that even such a doubt (about the validity of inference) depends upon inference. The future time beyond the present perceptible moment has only to be inferred. It doesn't matter if it is a remote future or immediate future. So even the perceptualist Cārvāka cannot do without inference. Not only the future time even places other than the near perceptible ones are only inferrible. But can inference dispel all doubt? Well! There is the counterfactual conditional to remove the doubts one after another, Every doubt can be removed by one or other conditional. In fact there are two kinds of doubt that may beset

an inference, one is the doubt about conditionality and the other the doubt about the deviance of the middle caused by conditionality. Both these doubts are removed by the conditional (argument). It may be contended against this that the conditional argument itself depends upon concomitance which too may be subject to doubt of conditionality and the attempt to remove this doubt by another conditional would meet the same fate as the attempt to vindicate the concomitance of the middle and the major. Thus there is sure to result infinite regress. This difficulty can be overcome if the doubter is asked to justify his action following the doubt and contradicting it. If the doubter's doubt regarding the concomitance is sincere his action would not belie his doubt. One can never seriously doubt that there is no causality at all for then this doubt itself, being uncaused, would not have come into existence. Still the doubt regarding the existence of invisible conditions of the middle may be supposed to persist but unless the possibility of such a doubt is rationally justified there is no reason to take steps to dispel it. The need to take recourse to counterfactual conditional arises only because the possibility of conditionality in a given middle term requires to be eliminated for its validation. Many middle terms are found on careful scrutiny, to be conditioned. So it needs to be ascertained if the concomitance of a given middle is also conditioned.

The upshot of the above discussion is this. The middle not supported by a conditional argument is irrelevant to its major and it is of two kinds, viz., that whose conditionality is assured and that which is of doubtful conditionality. A middle whose concomitance is subject even to slightest doubt does not have the capacity to lead to the inference of the major. The condition is defined to be the pervader of the major and non-pervader of the middle. It is like the hibiscus flower whose proximity to a white crystal causes the crimson colour of the flower to appear as characterising the crystal on account of the latter reflecting the colour of the flower. For example in the invalid inference of smoke from fire, 'being produced by wet fuel' is the condition affecting the middle term. It is this condition which is concomitant with smoke, the major term but the condition transfers its concomitance to the middle term fire (which however is not concomitant by itself with smoke). The property of being produced by wet fuel pervades smoke without pervading fire. The etymological meaning of the Sanskrit term *'upādhi'* for a condition, viz., 'that which by its proximity to a thing transfers its characteristic property to it' is fulfilled by the condition 'being produced by wet fuel' in the inference of smoke through fire. Thus when the repeated perception of the coexistence of the middle and the major is accompanied by the

conditional argument then the middle, which may be an effect, a cause, an inheree, a conjunct, a positive or a negative, a qualified or an unqualified entity, can lead to the inference of the corresponding major term. The Buddhists regard only the identity-relation or the causal relation of a thing with itself or its cause or effect to be the basis of inference. On this view some of the inferences mentioned above would have to be ruled out as invalid. For instance the inference that 'the table is a conjunct therefore there must be some object placed upon it' is an inference neither by identity nor by causality. If invariable concomitance of the middle and the major is the basis then the above specimens of inference have to be admitted as valid.

But even in the Buddhist view the necessity of the conditional argument to remove doubts of conditionality etc. of concomitance is necessary. On this account the relation of concomitance has also been given the Sanskrit name *'Pratibandha'* which really means opposition. This relation is sustained by its opposition to doubts of conditionality etc.

Now arises the question, 'If the irrelevant middle is not conditioned what kind of fallacy afflicts it?' None of the known five fallacies afflicts the irrelevant. Any fallacy over and above the five listed by the author of Nyāya aphorism cannot be admitted. But isn't 'proving the already proved' a sixth fallacy as unlike in the absent major there is no denial of the major in the minor involved in this fallacy? No! This is not true as the fallacy is to be reckoned as the fallacy of non-established locus. There are three varieties of non-establishment viz., the non-establishment of concomitance, of the locus and of the nature of the middle. The second of these is of two kinds. One is that which is due to the non-establishment of the nature of the locus of the middle and the other is that which is due to the non-establishment of the property of minorness of the minor. The above fallacy is to be treated as the second of the second variety of non-establishment as the occurrence of the major in the minor being already known prior to inference there is no uncertainty about it which constitutes the minorness of the minor. In the fallacy of absent major also there is non-occurrence of the certain major but the middle is not concomitant with the major. But this is not so in the case of 'proving the already proved'. As to the fallacy of irrelevance it comes under the first type of unestablished terms as the concomitance between the irrelevant middle and major is never established.

The main point to be noted in the somewhat rambling discussion above is the method of eliminating the doubt about the conditionality of the middle term. The author says that the doubter's actions themselves, which follow his or her doubt contradict them. Therefore the

doubt cannot be serious, and so there is no need to make any attempt to resolve the doubt. This answer does not seem to be very satisfactory. First, the definite action following the doubt need not have been prompted by the certain knowledge of the object at which it may be directed. Very often mere probability of things prompts people to action. As the celebrated author Vācaspati says at one place, the farmer sows the seed with the uncertain belief that there may be good rainfall and the seeds may produce abundant harvest. This may be true. But should this make one deny that there are actions which are prompted by certain knowledge? Perhaps the denial is true because an action is always directed at what is in the future and to be attained by it and so there can never be certain knowledge about it. If this is the truth then knowledge as such would be of no use to action. However the question may be posed as one concerning the justification of knowledge or true belief on which action is generally based. That we feel quite certain about things which we claim to know may be granted but the justification or ground of this claim is unknown to us. The psychological justification or ground of this claim is stated and elaborated by the author. It amounts to the simple confession that one cannot seriously and sincerely doubt what one aims at attaining by means of one's action. The example of the farmer mentioned above is not quite convincing. That the seeds produce sprout is an absolutely undeniable fact about which the farmer does not entertain the least doubt. What he doubts and is uncertain about is the occurrence of the collocation of all conditions that are needed for the burgeoning of the sprout from the seed. If the farmer doubted the very (specific) causality of the seed in producing sprout then he may even sow some thing other than the seed for producing the sprout. So there is not at all absolute uncertainty about everything in the mind of the farmer. As a matter of fact absolute doubt or uncertainty is an impossibility. Every doubt is a cognitive episode having an epistemic qualificand and two epistemic qualifiers which are mutually exclusive. The qualificand is an entity which as qualificand is definitely known. Also known definitely are the natures of the qualifying properties. What is not definitely known in doubt is, which qualifier characterises the qualificand. If the qualificand and the qualifiers were quite unknown in a doubt then the doubt would simply not occur. It follows from this that there can be definite knowledge of many things and that all action does not issue from doubt.

The logical justification or ground of the claim referred to above is however a different matter. Nyāya does not distinguish logical justification of the said claim from its empirical justification. For example a particular column of smoke is seen to be concomitant with a particular fire. The generic concomitance of smokes with fires is also a matter of perception although the perception is generated by a certain transcendental contact of the sense-organ with the whole class of certain objects. Sometimes such a perception may be misleading because every entity is endowed with different kinds of genera which determine different aspects of these entities; for example smoke is concomitant as smoke (or as an entity endowed with smokeness) with fire, but only as an earthy entity the smoke is endowed with odour. The smoke may be perceived both as a specimen of the genus smoke or the genus earthiness. If a certain episode of the perception of smoke goes along with the perception of its peculiar odour then it is the earthy nature of smoke which would determine its odorous aspect (or quality). But as an earthy object smoke is not concomitant with fire, the concomitance is determined by smokeness only and not by a property like earthiness although it too is inherent in smoke. The inductive knowledge of the concomitance of smoke as such with fire as such resulting from the perception of a single instance or a few instances of the concomitance of smoke and fire is according to Nyāya, of the nature of transcendental perception produced by the transcendental contact of the eye with all the different concomitances of different smokes with different corresponding fires. The medium of this contact is the smoke-genus which is common to all smokes. Since every entity happens to be endowed with many different properties any one of which could be perceived on any occasion, if the conditions of the perception were present then, it is necessary that we selectively focus our attention on that property of the entity which is determinative of its concomitance with the major. The repeated observation of the coexistence of smoke and fire and the non-observation of a single occurrence of smoke without fire helps focus the observer's attention on smokeness to the exclusion of other properties inherent in smoke.

Analogical evidence not against divine existence

TEXT: उपमानं तु बाधकं अन्-आशंकनीयं एव, विषय-अन्-अतिरेकात् इति केचित्। तथा हि, न तावत् अस्य विषयः सादृश्य-व्यपदेश्यं पदार्थ-अंतरं एव संभावनीयम्।

परस्पर-विरोधे हि न प्रकार-अंतर-स्थितिः।
न एकता अपि विरुद्धानां उक्ति-मात्र-विरोधतः॥

न हि भाव-अभावाभ्यां अन्यः प्रकारः संभावनीयः। परस्पर विधि-निषेध-रूपत्वात्। न भावः इति भाव-निषेध-मात्रेण एव अभाव-विधिः। ततः तं विहाय कथं स्व-वचनेन एव पुनः सहृदयः निषेधेत् न अभावः इति? एवं न अभावः इति निषेधः एव भाव-विधिः। ततः तं विहाय स्व-वाचा एव अन्-उन्मत्तः कथं पुनः निषेधेत् न भावः इति? अतः एवं-भूतानां एकता अपि अशक्य-प्रतिपत्तिः। प्रतिषेध-विध्योः एकत्र असंभवात्। तस्मात् भाव-अभावौ एव तत्वम्। भावत्वे अपि गुणवत् निर्-गुणं वा इति द्वयं एव पूर्ववत्। तत्र उत्तरं समवायः एव। अनवस्था-भयात्। आश्रितं तु सामान्य-वत् निः सामान्यं च इति पूर्ववत् द्वयं एव। तत्र प्रथमं अपि स्पंदः अ-स्पंदः इति द्वयं एव। एतत् च यथासंख्यं कर्म, गुणः इति व्यपदिश्यते। निः सामान्यं, निर्-गुणं आश्रितं तु एक-आश्रितं अनेक-आश्रितं वा इति प्राक् इव द्वयं एव। एतत् अपि यथासंख्यं विशेषः सामान्यं च इति अभिधीयते। तत् एतत् सादृश्यं एतासु एकां विधां आसादयत् न अतिरिच्यते। अनासादयत् न पदार्थीभूय स्थातुं उत्सहते। एतेन-शक्ति-संख्यादयः व्याख्याताः। ततः अभावेन सह सप्त एव पदार्थाः इति नियमः। अतः न उपमान-विषयः अर्थान्तरं इति।

स्यात् एतत्। भवतु सामान्यं एव सादृश्यम्। तदेव तस्य विषयः स्यात्। तत्-सदृशः अयं इति प्रत्ययः न इन्द्रिय-जन्यः। तत्-आपात-मात्रेण-अनुत्पत्तेः इति चेत्? न। पूर्व-पिण्ड-अनुसंधान-रूप-सहकारि वैधुर्येण अनुत्पत्तेः। सः अयं इति प्रत्यभिज्ञानवत् इति।

ननु एतत्-सदृशः सः इति न इन्द्रिय-जन्यम्? तेन तस्य अ-संबधात्। न च इदं स्मरणम्? तत्-पिण्ड-अनुभवे अपि विशिष्टस्य अन्-अनुभवात्। न च एतदपि। अयं सः इति विपरीत-प्रत्यभिज्ञानवत् उपपादनीयम्। तत्ता-इदन्ता-उपस्थापन-क्रम-विपर्यये अपि विशेष्यस्य इन्द्रियेण संनिकर्ष-अविरोधात्। तस्य संनिहित-वर्तमान-गोचरत्वात्। प्रकृते तु तदभावात्। तस्मात् तत्-पिण्ड-स्मरण-सहायं एतत्-पिण्ड-वृति-

सादृश्य-ज्ञानं एव तथाविधं ज्ञानं उत्पादयत् उपमानं प्रमाणं इति। एतदपि नास्ति।

TRANS.: (Perception and inference having been shown to be not against the reality of God, it is now the turn of analogy to be shown that it too is not opposed to God's existence): As to analogy it cannot at all be suspected to be opposed to the theistic proposition as the objects of this means of knowledge are no different from those pertaining to the other such means (like perception, inference and verbal testimony). For sure, there cannot be an object called 'similarity' other than the similar seven objects with which analogy may be supposed to deal. (Here the author is referring to the view of certain thinkers according to whom analogy is an independent means of knowledge having its own object. If this view could be upheld then it would be difficult to maintain divine existence. Every known thing is similar to some other thing but there is nothing to which God—as conceived by theists—may be regarded as similar. Therefore God's existence may be ruled out by the analogical means of knowledge. Hence refutation of similarity as an independent category of real is being attempted here).

(Refuting the independent reality of 'similarity' it is stated in the following verse that an entity which is supposed to be both positive and negative in nature cannot be envisaged). Between the positive and the negative which are contradictory of each other there cannot obtain a third alternative which is other than these two. The positive and negative cannot also be identical as they are mutually opposed. Their opposition is quite evident from the very words used to refer to them. (One is referred to as *'Bhāva'* and the other a *'Abhāva'* meaning 'that which is opposed to *Bhāva'*. So similarity cannot be both positive and negative).

To explain: Certainly there cannot obtain an alternative to the positive and the negative as these are by nature mutual contradictories. The very negation of the positive amounts to the affirmation of the negative. So how can a sensible person deny this affirmation and contradicting one's own expression which refers to the negative maintain that the latter is not negative but is positive? Similarly the negation (or denial) of negation is itself the affirmation of the positive. So disregarding this affirmation (of the positive) how can a sober person deny through one's own words that the object of affirmation is not a positive entity? Entities of such mutually-opposed natures cannot be treated as identical. Negation and affirmation can never go together. The truth therefore is that there are two different kinds of entities there, namely the positive and

ogy to the author. The criticism by the author of the view that similarity is an entity over and above the seven listed by Nyāya is not very convincing. The basis of positing generic universal as an entity apart from the particulars they inhere in is more or less the same as that which is required for positing similarity as an entity in its own right. The uniformity-cognition relating to objects of the same class which is said to be the basis of admitting the generic universal is also the basis of admitting similarity. Just as the generic universal is an irreducible entity so similarity also is an irreducible entity. Of course the universal may be thought reducible to similarity if the individual differences of things supposed to belong to the same class are stressed. A similar reductionistic view about similarity however cannot be reasonably upheld. The face which is likened to the moon for example is not supposed to belong to the same class with the moon. The crisscrossing of the differing similarities of different pairs or groups of objects supposed to belong to the same class can be equated with the generic universal corresponding to the class. It is a bit surprising that not a single argument has been advanced to show that similarity cannot be an independent category of reality except that if it is an entity it cannot be both positive and negative. This is a very flimsy argument. Similarities characterising positive entities may be regarded as positive and those characterising negative entities may be regarded as negative in nature.

Rebuttal of Mīmāṃsā defence of analogy as means of knowledge

TEXT: साधर्म्यं इव वैधर्म्यं मानं एवं प्रसज्यते।
अर्थापत्तिः असौ व्यक्तं इति चेत् प्रकृतं न किम्?॥

यदा हि एतत्-विसदृशः असौ इति प्रत्येति तत्र अपि तुल्यं एतत्। न हि तत् प्रत्यक्षं, अ-संनिकृष्ट-विषयत्वात्। न स्मरणम्, विशिष्टस्य अनुभवात्। न उपमानं, अ-सादृश्य-विषयत्वात्। ननु एतत्-धर्म-अभाव-विशिष्टत्वं एव तस्य वैधर्म्यं, तत् च अभाव-गम्यं एव इष्यते? न च प्रकृते अपि तथा अस्तु सादृश्यस्य भाव-रूपत्वात् इति चेत्? न। इतः व्यावृत्त-धर्म-विशिष्टतायाः अपि वैधर्म्य-रूपत्वात्। तस्य च भाव-रूपत्वात्।

स्यात् एतत्। तत्-धर्माः इह न संति इति अवगते अर्थात् आपद्यते इह अ-विद्यमानाः तत्र संति इति। न हि तत्-विधर्मत्वं एतस्य उपपद्यते यदि एतत्-वि-धर्मा असौ न भवति इति चेत्? एवं तर्हि प्रकृतं अपि अर्थापत्तिः एव। न हि तत्-सादृश्य-विशिष्टत्वं एतस्य प्रत्यक्ष-सिद्धं अपि तस्य एतत्-सादृश्य-विशिष्टत्वं विना उपपद्यते।

एतेन दृष्ट-अ-संनिकृष्ट-प्रत्यभिज्ञानं व्याख्यातम्। तत्र अपि तत्-धर्म-शालित्वं तस्य स्मरण-अभिव्यक्तं अनुपपद्यमानं तत्-इदन्ता-आस्पदस्य एकतां व्यवस्थापयति। तस्मात् न उपमानं अधिकं इति।

TRANS.: If the foregoing defence of analogy as a means of valid cognition were to be accepted then dissimilarity also being a unique object of knowledge, dis-analogy, the likely instrument of the cognition of dissimilarity, would also have to be treated as an independent means of cognition. If dissimilarity is supposed to be known by postulation or presumption then similarity too may be taken to be known by this very instrument of cognition. (Explaining this the author says as follows):

When a man's cognition of a thing is of the form, 'That is dissimilar to the thing at hand', then his cognition of dissimilarity is just like his cognition of similarity. Certainly the cognition cannot be perceptual as its object is not present to the sense-organ. Nor is it recollection, as its object is a determinate entity present elsewhere whose determinant is dissimilarity Such an object was never experienced in the past; how then can such an entity be recollected? The cognition of dissimilarity cannot be analogical as its object is not similarity. Could it be urged that dissimilarity of one thing to another is nothing other than its being the locus of the absence of the property or properties belonging to the other thing and so this fact can very well be apprehended by means of the means of cognition known as non-cognition? This cannot be urged in the case of similarity as similarity is a positive entity and non-cognition does not produce the cognition of a positive entity. Well! Even dissimilarity can be treated as a positive entity if it is analysed as the property of 'being the locus of a property or properties excluded from that entity which is dissimilar'. This property is positive in nature. Could one urge against this that when by means of non-cognition (an instrument of cognition) it is cognised that certain properties do not reside in a thing not present to the sense, then the cognition that the properties, qualities etc. of the thing present to the sense do not reside in the thing dissimi-

lar to the latter is obtained by postulation itself (without help from analogy)? 'Yes, this may be conceded but then the cognition of similarity also could be supposed to be obtained by postulation itself instead of by analogy. Certainly the similarity to another thing of a thing present to the sense is or is not explicable without the other thing being similar to the present thing. (The one similarity implies another similarity). This explanation (by means of postulation) applies even to the case of the recognition of the identity of a person (or thing) seen some time back, and being seen now after a long interval marked by the absence of seeing him. The similarity of certain salient features of the man's behaviour before and after the interval are not explicable without the postulation of identity between the person as seen earlier and as seen now. Unless the remembered and the presently-seen persons are regarded as identical the conspicuous common features of the earlier and later appearances of the person are simply inexplicable. Thus on the aforementioned ground the independent instrumentality to valid cognition of analogy cannot be established.

EXPL.: Against Kumārila's foregoing defence of analogy as an instrument of cognition it is argued here that like similarity dissimilarity of things is also cognised. This cognition requires another (and an opposite type of) instrument of cognition. The dissimilarity of a thing present (to the sense) to one not present, can be perceptible as the locus of dissimilarity which is the primary epistemic qualificand in the cognition is perceptible. But the cognition of the dissimilarity of an absent object to one that is present before oneself cannot be said to be perceptual as the primary qualificand of the cognition is imperceptible. The cognition cannot be recollective either. The absent person is certainly recollected but the present one cannot be the content of recollection as the absent person was not perceived as unlike the present one at any time in the past. So this cognition needs to be reckoned as of a unique kind requiring a new instrument of cognition to generate it. It may be argued here that since the object of this said cognition is absence of similarity it can as well be produced by non-cognition of the cognisable (which Nyāya does not regard as an independent means of cognition) so that no new instrument of cognition would have to be posited for accounting for the said cognition. But if dissimilarity is understood as a positive property like similarity then the need for a new instrument of cognition cannot be pressed. It may yet be argued that the dissimilarity of an absent thing to the present one is postulationally cognisable from the perceived dissimilarity of the present thing to the absent one. The two dis-

similarities are mutually implicated. But this can be said of similarity too. The similarity of the present to the absent cannot obtain unless the converse similarity of the absent to the present obtained. So even similarity can be supposed to be postulationally known.

Defence of analogy as means of knowledge according to Nyāya

TEXT: एवं प्राप्ते अभिधीयते–

संबंधस्य परिच्छेदः संज्ञायाः संज्ञिना सह।
प्रत्यक्षादेः असाध्यत्वात् उपमान-फलं विदुः॥

यथा गौः तथा गवयः इति श्रुत-अतिदेश-वाक्यस्य गो-सदृशं पिण्डं अनुभवतः स्मरतः च वाक्य-अर्थं अयं असौ गवय-शब्द-वाच्यः इति भवति मतिः। सा इयं न तावत् वाक्य-मात्र-फलम्। अनुपलब्ध-पिण्डस्य अपि प्रसङ्गात्। नापि प्रत्यक्ष-फलम्। अ-श्रुत-वाक्यस्य अपि प्रसङ्गात्। नापि समाहार-फलम्। वाक्य-प्रत्यक्षयोः भिन्न-कालत्वात्। वाक्य-तदर्थयोः स्मृति-द्वारा उपनीतौ अपि गवय-पिण्ड-संबंधेन अपि इन्द्रियेण तद्गत-सादृश्य-अनुपलंभे समय-परिच्छेद-असिद्धेः। फल-समाहारे तु तत्-अंतर्भावे अनुमानादेः अपि प्रत्यक्षत्व-प्रसङ्गः। तत् किं तत्-फलस्य तत्-प्रमाण-बहिर्भावः एव? अंतर्भावे वा कियती सीमा? तत्तत्-अ-साधारण-इन्द्रियादि-साहित्यम्।

अस्ति तर्हि सादृश्यादि-ज्ञान-काले विस्फारितस्य चक्षुषः व्यापारः? न। उपलब्ध-गो-सादृश्य-विशिष्ट-गो-पिण्डस्य वाक्य-तदर्थ-स्मृतिमतः काल-अंतरे अपि अनुसंधान-बलात् समय-परिच्छेद-उपपत्तेः।

TRANS.: (The knowledge of the conventional relation obtaining between a word (noun) and the object denoted by it is the result of the analogical means of knowledge only. It cannot be produced by any other means of knowledge. Explaining this the author says that: if a person who has been told about the similarity of the yak to the cow happens to perceive an animal looking like the cow and then remembers the de-

scriptive statement about the yak, he does have the apprehension that the yonder animal is the denotend of the word 'Yak'. This apprehension does not result from the descriptive sentence alone as then even a person who does not see the yak could have the apprehension (if he remembers the statement). (Nor does the apprehension result from perception alone as one who has not heard the statement may also have the apprehension). Perception and the statement together also do not give rise to the apprehension as the communication of the statement and the perception occur at different times. Even if both the statement and its meaning are recollected at the time when the Yak is perceived, the conventional relation of the word 'Yak' and the animal being seen cannot be apprehended unless the similarity of the yak to the cow is noticed by the percipient. (It is not necessary that the similarity though present in the yak would be noticed; only the Yakness of the yak would necessarily be noticed along with the yak as it constitutes its being). One may argue that, since both perception and the recollection of the descriptive statement are needed for the genesis of the apprehension that the yonder animal is called 'Yak', the apprehension is subsumable under verbal or perceptual cognition. But a similar argument can be addressed against inference too as it depends upon the perception of the middle in the minor. On this ground inference can be subsumed under perception. Other established modes of cognition too may thus be shown subsumable under perception. Should one then treat the cognition resulting from a certain mode of cognition as different in nature from the latter (so that the cognition of the conventional relation though resulting from perception and words would not be subsumable under these)? If this rule is adopted then the determinate perceptual cognitions resulting from the indeterminate cognition of an object would have to be regarded as non-perceptual. But if such resulting cognitions are subsumed under the type of those that cause them then how should one draw the line between subsumable and non-subsumable cognitions? The answer to this question is that it is the collocation that determines the type under which the cognition can be subsumed. (The knowledge of the conventional relation needs specifically the cognition of similarity over and above the perception and the recollection as stated above. So it cannot be treated as perceptual or recollective).

But isn't it a fact that while noticing the similarity in the yonder animal the percipient gazes with wide open eyes at it which enables him to realise that it is a Yak? Yes, this may be true but if in a case where a person recalls his earlier perception of the similarity of the yak to a cow as also the descriptive statement, without actually seeing the Yak even then he may have the apprehension of the conventional relation.

EXPL.: Arguing against the *Vaiśeṣika* criticism of analogy as an independent source of knowledge the author says that mere perception or mere recollection cannot yield the knowledge of the conventional relation of a word and its denotend. But because both these kinds of cognition are needed for the knowledge of the conventional relation it cannot be treated either as perceptual or as recollective. What determines the special nature of a cognition is the nature of the specific causal collocation needed for its genesis. Perception and recollection by themselves do not produce the cognition of convention. Analogical cognition has to be there over and above perception and recollection for the genesis of the cognition of convention and if it is present the other conditions may even be absent without jeopardising the genesis of the latter.

An objection and its reply and the counter-objection of Vaiśeṣika

TEXT: ननु च वाक्यात् एव अनेन समयः परिच्छिन्नः, गो-सदृशस्य गवय-शब्दः संज्ञा इति, केवलं इदानीं प्रत्यभिजानाति अयं असौ इति? प्रयोगात् वा अनुमितः, यः यत्र असति वृत्ति-अंतरे वृद्धैः प्रयुज्यते सः तस्य वाचकः यथा गौ-शब्दः एव गोः। प्रयुज्यते च अयं गो-सदृशे इति किं उपमानेन इति? न।

सादृश्यस्य अ-निमित्तत्वात् निमित्तस्य अ-प्रतीतितः।
समयः-दुर्-ग्रहः पूर्वं शब्देन अनुमया अपि वा॥

न हि गवय-शब्दस्य सादृश्यं प्रवृत्ति-निमित्तम्। अ-प्रतीत-गूनां अ-व्यवहार-प्रसङ्गात्। न च उभयं अपि निमित्तम्। स्वयं प्रतीत-समय-संक्रान्तये अतिदेश-वाक्य-प्रयोग-अनुपपत्तेः। गवयत्वे हि अयं व्युत्पन्नः वृद्ध-व्यवहारात् न सादृश्ये। कथं एतत् निर्धारणीयं इति चेत्? वस्तु-गतिः तावत् इयम्। तत् आपाततः संदेहे अपि न फल-सिद्धिः। गंधवत्वं इव पृथिवीत्वस्य गो-सादृश्यं गवय-पद-प्रवृति-निमित्तस्य उपलक्षणं,

इदं एव वा निमित्तं इति अ-निर्धारणात्।

स्यात् एतत्। पूर्वं निमित्त-अनुपलब्धेः न फल-सिद्धिः। इदानीं तु तस्मिन् उपलब्धे तदेव वाक्यं स्मृति-समारूढं फलिष्यति। अध्ययन-समय-गृहीतः इव वेदराशिः अंग-उपांग-पर्यवदातस्य कालांतरे। न च वाच्यं वाक्येन स्वार्थस्य प्राक् एव बोधितत्वात् प्राक् एव पर्यवसितं इति। गो-सादृश्यस्य उपलक्षण-निमित्तत्वयोः अन्यतरत्र तात्पर्ये संदेहात्। इदानीं तु गवयत्वे अवगते तर्क-पुरस्कारात् सादृश्यस्य उपलक्षणतायां व्यवस्थितायां गङ्गायां घोषः इतिवत् अन्वय-प्रतिपत्तिः इति चेत्? न।

TRANS.: It may yet be contended that the convention that the word 'Yak' denotes the yak is known by means of the descriptive statement only, what the percipient does when he comes across the yak is to recognise that the yonder animal is a yak. Or it may even be contended that the convention can be known by means of an inference like this: 'when a word is used to refer to a thing by knowledgeable people in the absence of a conventional relation other than denotation between the word and the thing then that word is the denoter of that thing, as for instance the word 'cow' is the denoter of a cow and such is the word 'yak'. Why then have analogy as an independent means of knowledge? The answer to these contentions is a flat No! Similarity to the cow is not the connotation of the word 'Yak' (though the yak is similar to the cow). That which is the connotation of the word, namely, 'yakness', is not known through the descriptive statement so the conventional meaning of the word 'yak' cannot be known prior to the perception of the yak either through words or inference.

To explain: Certainly similarity to the cow is not the connotation of the word 'yak'. If it were, then those who have not seen the cow cannot identify the yak. Nor are both yakness and similarity to the cow the connotations of the word 'yak' so that a forester can identify the yak simply by noticing its generic feature. If the forester were to communicate his knowledge of the yak to a city-dweller visiting him he would not use the similarity-statement. He has learnt the use of the word 'yak' with the help of his observation of the general usage of senior people, not by means of similarity. 'But how to determine that 'yakness' and not 'similarity to the cow' is the connotation of the word 'yak'?' It may here be asked. The answer is that this is just a matter of fact. But even if it is doubted whether yakness or similarity is connoted by the word 'yak', the *Vaiśeṣika's* objective (to subsume analogy under inference or perception) is not going to be fulfilled. Just as, if one says that the earth has smell it does not become clear whether having smell is the connotation of the word 'earth' or it is just an accidental property of the earth, so in the present case too if there is the above doubt one cannot be sure what the connotation of the word 'yak' is. Unless it is known that similarity is the connotation the *Vaiśeṣikas* cannot prove that analogy is a species of inference.

The *Vaiśeṣika* may meet the above criticism thus: Earlier when the similarity is not observed the knowledge of connotation does not arise but later when there is similarity-perception the recollected previous descriptive statement itself may give rise to the knowledge. It is just like the detailed knowledge of the Vedic lore by a person who had earlier studied the Vedas alone but later supplemented these studies by the study of all the auxiliaries of the Vedas. One shouldn't argue against the above that the earlier descriptive statement has already conveyed whatever information it could on the previous occasion itself (and so it is incapable of making any contribution to the knowledge arising later). Despite the information provided by the statement there persists the doubt whether similarity is or is not the connotation of the word 'yak'. As a result (of this doubt) the exact import of the descriptive statement remains doubtful. But when the yakness of the yak is perceived similarity to the cow is realised as an accidental property of the yak on the basis of a counterfactual conditional. So as in the case of the sentence, 'The cow-shed is on the Ganges itself' (the word Ganges is taken to have the indirect meaning of the bank of the Ganges and the whole sentence then yields the indirect meaning that the cow-shed stands just near the Ganges) the descriptive sentence may yield the meaning that the yak has the accidental property of being similar to the cow. (Thus there is no need to admit analogy as an independent means of cognition).

EXPL.: Replying to the foregoing objection of the *Vaiśeṣika* the author says that the denotend of the word 'yak' is not an animal similar to the 'cow' so that this could be apprehended through the descriptive sentence or an inference. Even if similarity is taken as one of the two connotations of the word there will remain the doubt whether similarity is just an accidental property of yak or the connotation itself of the word. It may however be urged that this doubt can be dispelled by perceiving the yak as also by the counterfactual conditional argument that if cow-similarity were the connotation of the word 'yak' then the animal also should be called 'yak'. Thus the earlier descriptive statement itself may yield the knowledge of the convention.

Reply to the above

TEXT: श्रुत-अन्वयात् अन्-आकांक्षं न वाक्यं हि अन्यत् इच्छति।
पदार्थ-अन्वय-वैधुर्यात् तत्-आक्षिप्तेन संगतिः॥

गो-सदृशः गवय-पद-वाच्यः इति सामानाधिकरण्य-मात्रेण अन्वय-उपपत्तौ विशेष-संदेहे अपि वाक्यस्य पर्यवसितत्वेन मान-अंतर-उपनीत-अनपेक्षणात्। रक्त-अरक्त-संदेहे अपि घटः भवति इति वाक्यवत्। अन्यथा वाक्य-भेद-दोषात्। न च गङ्गायां घोषः इतिवत् पद-अर्थाः एव अन्वय-अयोग्याः, येन प्रमाण-अंतरोपनीतेन अन्वयः स्यात्? प्रतीत-वाक्य-अर्थ-बल-आयातः अपि अर्थः यदि वाक्यस्य एव, दिवा-भोजन-निषेध-वाक्यस्य अपि रात्रि-भोजनं अर्थः स्यात्। तस्मात् यथा गवय-शब्दः कस्यचित् वाचकः, शिष्ट-प्रयोगात् इति सामान्यतः निश्चिते अपि विशेषे मान-अंतर-अपेक्षा, तथा गो-सदृशस्य गवय-शब्दः वाचकः इति वाक्यात् निश्चिते अपि सामान्ये विशेष-वाचकत्वे अस्य मान-अंतरं अनुसरणीयं इति।

अस्तु अनुमानम्-तथाहि, गवय-शब्दः गवयस्य वाचकः असति वृत्ति-अंतरे अभियुक्तैः तत्र प्रयुज्यमानत्वात्। गवि गो-शब्दवत् इति चेत्? न। असिद्धेः। न हि असति वृत्ति-अंतरे तत्-विषयतया प्रयोगः संगतिं अ-विज्ञाय ज्ञातुं शक्यते। सामानाधिकरण्यात् इति चेत्? न। पिण्ड मात्रे सिद्धसाधनात्। निमित्ते च असिद्धेः। सादृश्यस्य अनिमित्तत्वात् इत्युक्तम्। ननु व्याप्ति-परं इदं वाक्यं स्यात्-यः गो-सदृशः सः गवय-अर्थः इति। तथा च वाक्यात् अवगत-प्रतिबंधः अनुमिनुयात्,'अयं असौ गवयः, गो-सदृशत्वात्, अतिदेश-वाक्य-अवगत-पिण्डवत् इति'। न। विपर्ययात्। न हि गो-सदृशं बुद्धौ आरोप्य अनेन पृष्टः 'सः किं शब्द-वाच्यः' इति। किंतु सामान्यतः गवय-पदार्थं अवगम्य 'सः कीदृक्' इति। तथा च यत्-योग-प्राथम्याभ्यां तस्य एव व्याप्यत्वं ततः किं तेन? प्रकृत-अनुपयोगात्।

अथ किं-लक्षणकः असौ इति प्रश्न-अर्थः? तदा व्यतिरेक परं स्यात्। लक्षणस्य तथाभावात्। तथा च 'गो-सदृशः गवयः' इत्यस्य अर्थः 'यः

गवयः इति न व्यवह्रियते न असौ गो-सदृशः इति। एवं च प्रयोक्तव्यम्-अयं असौ गवयः इति व्यवहर्तव्यः, गो-सदृशत्वात्, यः तु न तथा, न असौ गो-सदृशः, यथा हस्ती। न च हस्त्यादीनां विपक्षत्वे प्रमाणं अस्ति। सर्व-अप्रयोगस्य दुर्-अवधारणत्वात्। कतिपय-अव्यवहारस्य च अनैकांतिकत्वात्।

ननु लिंगमात्रे प्रश्नः भविष्यति-'कीदृक् किं-लिंगं इति?' न। न हि अनेन लिंगं अविज्ञाय गवय-शब्दस्य वाचकत्वं कस्यचित् वाच्यत्वं वा अवगतं येन तदर्थः प्रश्नः स्यात्ः, प्रवृत्ति-निमित्त-विशेष-लिंगे प्रश्नः, येन निमित्तेन गवय-शब्दः प्रवर्तते तस्य किं लिंगं इति चेत्? न। न हि तत् अवश्यं अनुमेयं एव इति अनेन निश्चितं यतः इदं स्यात्। ज्ञान-उपाय-मात्र-प्रश्ने तत्-विशेषेण उत्तरं इति चेत्? न। अविशेषात् इन्द्रिय-संनिकर्षं अपि उत्तरयेत्। पर्याय-अंतरं वा-यथा 'गवयं अहं कथं जानीयां' इति प्रश्ने, 'वनं गतः द्रक्ष्यसि' इति। यथा वा 'कः पिकः' इत्यत्र कोकिलः इति। तस्मात् निमित्त-भेद-प्रश्नः एव अयम्, 'गवयः गवय-पद-वाच्यः केन किं-निमित्तेन?' इति युक्तं उत्पश्यामः।

तस्य च निमित्त-विशेषस्य साक्षात् उपदर्शयितुं अशक्यत्वात् पृष्टः तत्-उपलक्षणं किंचित् आचष्टे। तत् च उपमान-सामग्री-समुत्थापनं एव। तस्य च प्रमाणस्य सतः तर्कः सहायतां आपद्यते? सादृश्यस्य एव निमित्ततायां कल्पना-गौरवम्। निमित्त-अंतर-कल्पने च क्लृप्त-कल्प्य-विरोधः इति तदेव निमित्तं अवगच्छति इति। लक्षणं तु अस्य-अनवगत-संगति-संज्ञा-संज्ञि-समभिव्याहृत-वाक्य-अर्थस्य संज्ञिनि अनुसंधानं उपमानम्। वाक्यार्थः च क्वचित् साधर्म्यं, क्वचित् वैधर्म्यं अतः न अ-व्यापकम्। तस्मात् नियत-विषयत्वात् एव न तेन बाधः, न तु अनतिरेकात् इति स्थितिः।

TRANS.: The earlier descriptive sentence yields a complete meaning, it does not call for supplementation of its meaning by means of the elimination of a doubt as mentioned above. 'In the case of the sentence "The cow-shed is on the Ganges",' the meanings of the component words in

the sentence do not cohere, so the coherence of indirect meanings of words is sought to make the sentence-meaning coherent.

In the sentence 'The animal similar to the cow is denoted by the word "yak"' there is coordination between the meanings of the component words and so without depending upon any imported indirect meaning the sentence yields complete meaning although there may be doubt as to the identity of the animal that is described as similar. The sentence can yield the definite general meaning that the animal similar to the cow is called 'yak'. The sentence is just like the sentence, 'There is pot there' which yields a definite meaning even if there may be doubt whether the pot is red or not red. If a sentence having made a general predication about something also made a specific predication and if this was apprehended after the former was apprehended then this would lead to the fallacy of sentence-diversity (the same sentence making different predications about different subjects). May it be that as in the sentence 'There is the cow-shed on the Ganges, the component word-meanings in the above sentence are irreconcilable with each other?' If such were the case then by means of some content imported by some nonverbal means of valid cognition the word-meanings in the sentence could have been reconciled with each other. But if even the imported content pertained to words then the meaning implied by the direct sentence-meaning in the sentence, 'Devadutta does not eat in the day', viz., 'the absence of eating by Devadutta during daytime' would come to mean 'Devadutta's eating in the night'. So, just as on the basis of the usage of decent people the word 'yak' is known to mean something, yet the specific meaning of the word is ascertained only by means of some other means of cognition, so even when it is known through the descriptive sentence that the word 'yak' denotes an animal similar to the cow the knowledge that the word denotes the yak is produced only by a different means of cognition viz. analogy.

'Alright! Let there be an inference to prove the conventional relation. The inference will go like this: 'The word 'yak' denotes the yak, because knowledgeable people use the word to denote yak, there being no non-conventional meaning-relation between the word and the yak, as the word 'cow' denotes the animal cow'. This inference is however afflicted by the fallacy of unestablished middle term. To know that there is no non-conventional relation between the word and its meaning it is necessary to know the conventional relation (which is the subject of negation). But can't the said conventional relation be known through the coordinate use of the words 'yak' and the phrase 'similar to the cow' (from which it will be known that the yak is similar to the cow)? No! The knowledge that the word 'yak' denoted the individual yak may be had through coordination and it is not new but that the word connotes yakness and denotes yaks cannot be known through coordination. The connotation of the word 'yak' is not 'similarity to the cow', it is 'yakness', but that yakness is the connotation is not already known and this fact has already been mentioned.

It may however by urged that the statement 'The yak is similar to the cow' is in fact the statement of invariable concomitance of 'similarity to the cow' and 'being the meaning of the word "yak".' The concomitance is statable as 'whatever is similar to the cow is meant by the word 'yak'.' On the basis of this one can have an inference like this: 'This yonder animal is the denotend of the word "yak" because it looks like the cow as is for example the yak referred to by the similarity-statement ("The yak is like the cow").' But this cannot be a valid inference. The relation of concomitance has been reversed in the above contention; certainly the person interested in the yak does not first have in his mind the idea of 'an animal similar to the cow' and then ask 'what the name of such an animal is?' Instead he has a general idea of the animal 'yak' and then asks, 'what this animal is called?' On account of this, in the statement of concomitance what is referred to by the first word as well as by the demonstrative term (indicating generality) is the pervaded term only. So in the above it is the meaning of the word 'yak' which is the pervaded term; it cannot be of use for the inference of the yak being the meaning of the word 'yak'.

It may still be urged that the person interested in the yak may want really to know what the definition of the yak is (and the statement of similarity is in fact the definition of yak in terms of its similarity to cow). This means that the definition is intended as the middle term in a negative inference in which the yak—the defined entity is sought to be differentiated from entities which are not yak. This is the purpose of a definition. So the meaning of the similarity-statement would be that the animal which is not called 'yak' is not similar to the cow. The negative inference has therefore to be formulated thus: 'This yonder animal is to be called 'yak' because it is like a cow, whichever animal is not yak is also not like a cow as is for instance the elephant'; but there is no valid proof that the elephant and other animals are never called 'yak' because it is impossible to ascertain that nobody uses the word 'yak' for these animals. The absence of such usage by some people is of course not concomitant with the absence of cow-similarity (thus jeopardising the negative concomitance).

Can it be urged that it is in reply to the likely question 'how the meaning of the word 'yak' is to be known?' that the similarity-statement is made? (The statement may be taken to provide the middle term for a general inference of the meaning of the word). No! This is not admissible, unless this middle is already ascertained, it cannot be known that the word 'yak' is denotative or something is denoted by it and unless this fact is already known the above question cannot be raised. But can't there be a question regarding the special connotation of the word 'yak' (even if it is known generally that the word is denotative or is the basis of the said connotation)? Yes! The question is possible but it has not been settled that the connotation can only be inferred so that the citing of a middle term for the cognition of the connotation would be called for. But isn't a general question about cognition answerable by the mention of a special means of cognition like inference? Yes! But then even sense-object-contact could be cited as the means of cognising the connotation or there can be an alternative like this: 'If it is asked how the yak is identified it can be replied that one can identify it by looking for it in a forest'. Another way of identifying a yak like that used in identifying a cuckoo is to be told that it is a bird called *'Kokilā'* in Sanskrit. So the said question is really the basis of the usage pertaining to the word 'yak' (and not the definition etc. as suggested above). This basis cannot be pointed out directly and so some property characteristic of the yak is mentioned. This is nothing but drawing attention to the causal collocation of analogical cognition. That this is analogical cognition and not a certain verbal cognition is proved by the conditional argument. It is parsimonious to regard 'yakness' and not 'cow-similarity' as the connotation of the word 'yak'. If some altogether different property is treated as the said connotation then it would amount to discarding an established property and postulating a new one.

As to the formulation of a definition of the analogical cognition it is this: 'The cognition by means of which the synthesis of the meaning of a sentence containing a word whose denotation is not known, with the thing denoted by it is known is called analogical cognition'. The meaning of such a definition covers all cases of analogy. So analogy being concerned with two kinds of properties alone, it has nothing to do with the rebuttal of divine existence. It is not because analogy and inference are the same that analogy does not provide a rebuttal of God's existence as the *Vaiśeṣikas* maintain.

EXPL.: Disputing the *Vaiśeṣika* contention that the recollection of the verbal account of the cow-similarity of the yak coupled with its perception in the forest is adequate to give rise to the knowledge that the word 'yak' stands for the yak, the author says that the purpose of the similarity-statement is fulfilled by stating the similarity of the yak to the cow. The function of the statement does not stretch beyond this to remove a possible doubt whether cow-similarity is just an accidental or a real property of the yak. (According to the *Vaiśeṣika* the statement supported by the conditional argument can remove the doubt and in consequence lead to the knowledge that the yonder animal is denoted by the word 'yak'). No statement can be supposed to mean what is only implied by the truth of what it states; so even if it were known generally that the word 'yak' is denotative by means of the familiar means of knowledge, the specific knowledge that the word means the yonder animal (and other animals like it) can be had only by means of analogy.

It may be suggested that an inference like the following can yield the knowledge of a word's denotation. 'The inference goes like this: ' The word 'yak' denotes the yak, because even if there is no non-conventional relation between the word and the animal, experts in word-usage use the word to denote the animal'.'Now if it is not known at all that there is a conventional relation between the word and the animal, how can it be known that there is no non-conventional relation between the two? Of course the similarity-statement yields the general information that an animal similar to the cow is denoted by the word 'yak' but that an animal endowed with the generic property of yakness is the denotation of the word is not already known.

Can it then be suggested that the similarity-statement is the statement of concomitance between cow-similarity and being denoted by the word 'yak' on the basis of which it is possible to infer that the yonder animal is the denotend of the word 'yak'? No! Such a suggestion is contrary to fact. It is not regarding what is similar to the cow that one asks the question, 'what is it called?' The question concerns an animal which is generically known as 'yak' but it is not specifically known (which knowledge is provided by the similarity-statement).

One more likely suggestion on the above issue is that the similarity statement may be viewed as the statement of definition, so it may be taken to mean that the yak is definable as an animal similar to the cow or that the animal which is called 'a yak' is similar to the cow. Whichever animal is not similar to the cow is not called a yak as is the elephant. Since the object of a definition is distinguishing the defined entity from other entities the defining property has to be taken as the middle term in the negative inference of distinction. This inference too is flawed because unless it is known that the yak alone is known as 'yak' it cannot be known that

elephants etc. are not and cannot be called 'yak'. Besides like the yak, even other animals can be similar to cows in certain respects.

Can therefore the similarity-statement be treated as indicative of the sign by which the meaning of the word 'yak' is to be ascertained? No!, without the knowledge that the word 'yak' is denotative or that the yak is denoted by some word the question about the meaning of the word 'yak' cannot be raised which may be answered by means of the inference having similarity as its middle term.

The crux of all the above criticisms is this. The knowledge that the word 'yak' denotes the yonder animal (and other animals like it) arises only as the result of the combination of different kinds of knowledge, namely, the recollection of the similarity-statement and the perception of the yak endowed with yakness. The perceived yakness gets then connected with the recollected cow-similarity. As a result we have the knowledge that the yonder animal is called a yak. Analogy plays here a crucial part because the identification of the yonder animal as 'a yak' is the result of the perception of analogy or similarity only. This knowledge cannot be subsumed under inference, recollection, verbal knowledge or even perception. So analogy has to be regarded as an independent means of knowledge.

The Vaiśeṣika view of verbal testimony and its criticism

TEXT: शब्दः अपि न बाधकं अनुमान-अनतिरेकात् इति वैशेषिकादयः। तथाहि- 'यद्यपि एते पदार्थाः, मिथः संसर्गवंतः वाक्यत्वात्' इति व्यधिकरणं, 'पदार्थत्वात्' इति च अनैकांतिकं, 'पदैः स्मरितत्वात्' इत्यपि तथा, यद्यपि च 'एतानि पदानि स्मारित-अर्थ-संसर्गवंति, स्मारकत्वात्' इत्यादौ साध्य-अभावः; न हि अत्र मतुप् अर्थः संयोगः, समवायः, तादात्म्यं विशेषण-विशेष्यभावः वा संभवति। ज्ञाप्य-ज्ञापक-भावः तु स्वातंत्र्येण अनुमान-अतंर्भाव-वादिभिः न इष्यते। न च लिंगतया ज्ञापकत्वम्। यत् लिंगस्य विषयः तदेव तस्य, परस्पराश्रय-प्रसङ्गात्। तत्-उपलंभे हि व्याप्ति सिद्धिः, तत्-सिद्धौ च तत्-अनुमानं इति। तथापि आकांक्षा-दिमद्भिः पदैः स्मारितत्वात्, गां अभ्याज इति पदार्थवत् इति स्यात्। न च विशेष-असिद्धिः दोषः? संसर्गस्य संसृज्यमान-विशेषात् एव विशिष्टत्वात्। यद्वा एतानि पदानि स्मारित-अर्थ-संसर्ग-ज्ञान-पूर्वकाणि,

आकांक्षाहिमत्वे सति तत्-स्मारकत्वात्, गां अभ्याज इति पदवत्। न च एवं अर्थ-असिद्धिः? ज्ञान-अवच्छेदकतया एव तत्-सिद्धेः। तस्य च संसृज्यमान-उपहितस्य एव अवच्छेदकत्वात् न विशेष-अ-प्रतिलंभः इति। अत्र उच्यते-

अनेकांतः परिच्छेदे संभवे च न निश्चयः।
आकांक्षा सत्तया हेतुः योग्यासत्तिः अ-बंधना॥

एते पदार्थाः, मिथः संसर्गवंतः इति संसृष्टाः एव इति नियमः वा साध्यः, संभावित-संसर्गाः इति वा? न प्रथमः। अन्-आप्तोक्त-पद-कदंब-स्मारितैः अनैकांतात्। आप्तोक्त्या विशेषणीयं इति चेत्? न। वाक्यार्थ-प्रतीतेः प्राक् तदसिद्धेः। न हि अ-विप्रलंभकत्व-मात्रं इह आप्त-शब्देन विवक्षितं, तदुक्ते अपि पदार्थ-संसर्ग-व्यभिचारात्। अपि तु तत्-अनुभव-प्रामाण्यं अपि। न च एतत् शक्यं अ-सर्वज्ञेन सर्वदा सर्व-विषये सत्य-ज्ञानवान् अयं इति निश्चेतुम्। भ्रान्तेः पुरुष-धर्मत्वात्। तत्र क्वचित् आप्तत्वं अनाप्तस्य अपि अस्ति इति न तेन उपयोगः। ततः अस्मिन् अर्थे अयं अ-भ्रान्तः इति केनचित् उपायेन ग्राह्यम्। न च एतत् संसर्ग-विशेषं अ-प्रतीत्य शक्यम्। बुद्धेः अर्थ-भेदं अंतरेण निरूपयितुं अशक्यत्वात्। पदार्थ-मात्रे वा भ्रान्तत्व-सिद्धौ न किंचित्। अनाप्त-साधारण्यात्। एतेषां संसर्गे अयं अ-भ्रान्तः इति शक्यं इति चेत्? न। एतेषां संसर्गः इति अस्याः बुद्धेः एव असिद्धेः। अन्-अनुभूतचरे स्मरण-अयोगात्। तदनुभवस्य लिंग-अधीनतया तस्य च विशेषण-असिद्धत्वेन अनुपपत्तेः इति।

नापि द्वितीयः। योग्यता-मात्र-सिद्धौ अपि संसर्ग-अनिश्चयात्। वाक्यस्य च तदेक-फलत्वात्। योग्यता-मात्रस्य प्रागेव सिद्धेः। अन्यथा तदसिद्धौ आसन्न-साकांक्ष-पद-स्मारितत्वात् इत्येव हेतुः स्यात्। तथा च अग्निना सिंचेत् इत्यादिना स्मारितैः अनेकांतः। तथाविधानां सर्वथा संसर्ग-अयोग्यत्वात् इति।

द्वितीये अपि प्रयोगे हेतुः आकांक्षादिमत्वे सति इति। तत्र का इयं आकांक्षा नाम? न तावत् विशेषण-विशेष्यभावः, तस्य संसर्ग-स्वभावतया

साध्यत्वात्। नापि तद्योग्यता। योग्यतया एव गतार्थत्वात्। नापि अविनाभाव:। नीलं सरोजं इत्यादौ तदभावे अपि वाक्यार्थ-प्रत्ययात्। तत्र अपि विशेष-आक्षिप्त-सामान्ययो: अविनाभाव: अस्ति इति चेत्? न।'अहो विमलं जलं नद्या: कच्छे महिष: चरति' इत्यादौ वाक्य-भेद-अनुपपत्ति-प्रसङ्गात्। नापि प्रतिपत्तु: जिज्ञासा। पट: भवति इत्यादौ शुक्लादि-जिज्ञासायां रक्त: पट: भवति इत्यस्य एकदेशवत् सर्वदा वाक्य-अ-पर्यवसान-प्रसङ्गात्।

गुण-क्रियादि-अशेष-विशेष-जिज्ञासायां अपि पद-स्मारित-विशेष-जिज्ञासा आकांक्षा। पट: इत्युक्ते किंरूप:, कुत्र, किं करोति इत्यादि रूप-जिज्ञासा। तत्र भवति इत्युक्ते किं करोति इति एषा एव पद-स्मारित-विषया। न तु किंरूप: इत्यादि: अपि। यदा तु रक्त: इत्युच्यते तदा किंरूप: इति एषा अपि स्मारित-विषया स्यात् इति न किंचित् अनुपपन्नं इति चेत्? एवं तर्हि चक्षुषी निमील्य परिभावयतु भवान्। किं अस्यां जातायां अन्वय-प्रत्यय: अथ ज्ञातायां इति। तत्र प्रथमे न अनया व्यभिचार-व्यावर्तनाय हेतु: विशेषणीय:। मन:-संयोगादिवत् सत्ता-मात्रेण उपयोगात्। आसत्ति-योग्यता-मात्रेण विशिष्ट: तु निश्चित: अपि न गमक:।'अयं एति पुत्र: राज्ञ: पुरुष: अपसार्यतां' इत्यादौ व्यभिचारात्। द्वितीय: तु स्यात् अपि यदि अनुमानांतरवत् तत्-सद्भावे अपि तत्-ज्ञान वैधुर्यात् अन्वय-प्रत्यय: न जायेत। न तु एतत् अस्ति। आसत्ति-योग्यता-मात्र-प्रतिसंधानात् एव साकांक्षस्य सर्वत्र वाक्यार्थ-प्रत्ययात्। निवृत्त-आकांक्षस्य च तदभावात्।

कथं एष निश्चय: साकांक्ष एव प्रत्येति न तु ज्ञात-आकांक्ष: इति चेत्? तावत्-मात्रेण उपपत्तौ अनुपलभ्यमान ज्ञान-कल्पना-अनुपपत्ते:। अन्यत्र तथा दर्शनात् च। यदा हि दूरात् दृष्ट-सामान्य: जिज्ञासते 'क: अयं' इति, प्रत्यासीदन् च स्थाणु: अयं इति प्रत्येति तदा अस्य 'ज्ञातुं अहं इच्छामि' इति अनुव्यवसाय-अभावे अपि 'स्थाणु: अयं' इति अर्थ-प्रत्यय: भवति। तथा इहापि अविशेषात् विशेष-उपस्थान-काले संसर्ग-अवगति: एव जायते न तु जिज्ञासा-अवगति: इति। न च विशेष-

उपस्थानात् प्रागेव जिज्ञासा-अवगति: प्रकृत-उपयोगिनी। तावत्-मात्रस्य अनाकांक्षत्वात्। न च एवंभूत: अपि अयं अनैकांतिक: हेतु:। यदा हि 'अयं एति पुत्र: राज्ञ: पुरुष: अपसार्यतां' इति वक्ता उच्चारयति, श्रोता च व्यासंगादिना निमित्तेन 'अयं एति पुत्र:' इति अ-श्रुत्वा एव 'राज्ञ: पुरुष: अपसार्यतां' इति श्रृणोति, तदा अस्ति आकांक्षादिमत्वे सति पद-कदंबकत्वं, न च स्मारित-अर्थ-संसर्ग-ज्ञान-पूर्वकत्वं इति। स्यात् एतत्। यावत्-समभिव्याहृतत्वेन विशेषिते हेतौ नायं दोष:। तथाविधस्य व्यभिचार-उदाहरण-अ-संस्पर्शात्। कुत: तर्हि कतिपय-पद-श्राविण: संसर्ग-प्रत्यय:? अलिंगे एव लिंगत्व-अध्यारोपात्। एतावान् एव अयं समाभिव्याहार: इति तत्र श्रोतु: अभिमान:। न। तत्-संदेहे अपि श्रुत-अनुरूप-संसर्ग-अवगमात्। भवति हि तत्र प्रत्यय: 'न जाने किं अपरं अनेन उक्तं एतावत् एव श्रुतं, यत् 'राज्ञ: पुरुष: अपसार्यतां' इति। भ्रान्ति: असौ इति चेत्? न तावत् असौ दुष्ट-इन्द्रियजा, परोक्ष-आकारत्वात्। न लिंग-आभासजा, लिंग-अभिमान-मात्रे अपि जायमानत्वात्। एतादृक्-पद-कदंब-प्रतिसंधानं एव तां जनयति इति चेत्? यद्येवं, एतदेव अदुष्टं सत् अभ्रान्तिं जनयत् केन वारणीयम्? व्याप्ति-प्रतिसंधानं विनापि तस्य संसर्ग-प्रत्यायने सामर्थ्य-अवधारणात्, चक्षुरादिवत्। नास्ति एव तत्र संसर्ग-प्रत्यय:, अ-संसर्ग-अग्रह-मात्रेण तु तथा व्यवहार: इति चेत्? तर्हि यावत्-समाभिव्याहारेण अपि विशेषणे न अ-प्रतीकार:। तथा-भूतस्य अनाप्त-वाक्यस्य संसर्ग-ज्ञान-पूर्वकत्व-अभावात्। असंसर्ग-अग्रह पूर्वकत्वमात्रे साध्ये न व्यभिचार: इति चेत्? एवं तर्हि संसर्ग: न सिद्धयेत्। आप्त-वाक्येषु सेत्स्यति इति चेत्? न। सर्व-विषय-आप्तत्वस्य-असिद्धे:। यत्र क्वचित् आप्तत्वस्य अनैकांति-कत्वात्। प्रकृत-विषये च आप्तत्व-सिद्धौ संसर्ग-विशेणस्य प्रागेव सिद्धि-अभ्युपगमात् इत्युक्तम्।

न च सर्वत्र जिज्ञासा निबंधनम्। अजिज्ञासो: अपि वाक्यार्थ-प्रत्ययात्। आकांक्षा-पदार्थ: तर्हि क:? जिज्ञासां प्रति योग्यता। सा च पद-स्मारित-तदाक्षिप्तयो: अ-विनाभावे सति श्रोतरि तदुत्पाद्य-संसर्ग-अवगम-

प्रागभावः। न च एवं अपि ज्ञानं अपेक्षते, प्रतियोगि-निरूपण-अधीन-निरूपणत्वात्। तदभाव-निरूपणस्य च विषय-निरूप्यत्वात् इति।

TRANS.: 'Verbal testimony also does not go against divine existence as it has already been shown to be not opposed to the reality of God', thus say the *Vaiśeṣika* and other thinkers. To explain: the inference (supposed to establish the inferential character of verbal testimony) like, 'These word-meanings in a sentence are mutually related because they are sentences' is flawed by the fallacy of absent middle term (as word-meanings are not sentences) and the same inference with 'being word-meanings' as middle term is flawed by the fallacy of deviance of the middle as unsynthesised word-meanings are not mutually-related. If the above middle is replaced by the property of 'being suggested by words' as middle, even then the fallacy of deviance cannot be avoided (as even unsynthesised words suggest meanings which are not mutually related). The inference may however be reformulated thus: 'These words mean things which are mutually-related because they suggest them.' In this inference the major is absent in the minor, because the Sanskrit suffix *'vat'* used here means four different kinds of relation, none of which holds between the words and the relations of word-meanings. The said relations are conjunction, inference, identify and qualifier-qualifiedhood. The relations of word-meanings are not conjoined or identical with or inherent in or qualifiers of words so that any of these relations could hold between them. As to the relation of 'being the object and the means of cognition', this too cannot hold between words and the relation because the cognition whose means and the object respectively the words and the relation are supposed to be, is the very inferential cognition by which, the above relation is sought to be established. So before the inference has taken place, the relation—which is the major term in the inference cannot be supposed to hold good by the *Vaiśeṣikas* as they do not admit that words produce the cognition of the relation of their meaning otherwise than through inference. But then can't words be taken to be the means of the said cognition in the capacity of the middle term in the above inference (by which the subsumption of verbal cognition under inference is sought to be proved) and so the object of the said cognition and also the inference be taken to be the same entity? No! Such an assumption would entail the fallacy of mutual dependence because only when words are known to lead to the cognition of the said relation, the concomitance of the middle and the major will be known

and only when the concomitance is known the relation of the object and means of cognition will be known.

The foregoing difficulties of the inference can be avoided if the word-meanings themselves are taken as the minor term in the inference and 'being suggested (through recollection) by words having syntactical and other relations with each other' as the middle term; sentential combinations of words, like 'Drive the cow' would be the example instantiating the concomitance of the middle and the major term in the inference. The major term or that which is to be proved of the word-meanings is their mutual relationship (conducive to the generation of the sentence-meaning). Now there are different relations among word-meanings; if the specific relation intended by the speaker of the words is not established by the inference it will be of no use in producing the verbal cognition. This difficulty can be got over if the specific relation of word-meanings is deduced on the strength of the specific nature of the related entities viz., the word-meanings and the words. (The inference though general may yield a special conclusion).

Another possible form of the inference is this. 'These words (the words in a certain sentence for example) are based on certain suggested meaning-relation because they are syntactically and otherwise mutually related and also suggest the latter, just as the words in the sentence 'Drive the cow' are. (In this inference words are the minor term, but meaning-relations are not the major term, so the above difficulty concerning the nature of the relation of the major and the minor is easily avoided). Of course the meanings of words are not established directly by this inference but as the determinants of their (recollective) cognition which is a part of the major term, the meanings can be taken to be established by the inference. The specificity of the meanings and their relations is ensured by the fact that the relation which is the objective determinant of its recollection is the relation relating certain specific objects.

With regard to the above inference we say as under: In the above inference if the major term—the existence of mutual relation among word-meanings is treated as necessary then the middle term is deviant as the words or statements of an un-dependable person do not have mutually-related meanings. If the mere possibility of the relations is predicated of the minor then the cognition resulting from the inference cannot be definite. If therefore the inference with words—not their meanings—as the minor term is adopted then syntax cannot be the qualifying condition of the middle term as syntax (the desire to know the relation of meanings) is by itself the cause of verbal cognition, but since the cognition of the middle term is needed for the inference even syntax as

the condition of the middle would have to be known for the inference to take place. If therefore competence and proximity are substituted for syntax as the qualifiers of the middle term then it is found that these two alone do not determine the validity of verbal cognition.

To explain the above remark: In the inference, 'These word-meanings are mutually-related' the major may be definitely present or just expected to be present in the minor. It cannot be the first because the meanings of a combination of words uttered by an unreliable person are not mutually related, (as the statement made by the latter may turn out to be false). If to avoid this difficulty the qualification 'uttered by a reliable person' is added to the minor term then before the verbal cognition has taken place it cannot be known if the utterer of the words is a reliable person or not (and so the inference would have to be preceded by the verbal cognition). Can this difficulty be overcome by taking the word 'reliable' to mean 'just a person who is not a cheat?'!; Even an honest speaker may utter a false statement of whose falsehood he is not aware and so the meanings in such a statement would not be mutually-related. So the word 'reliable' should include in its meaning 'the validity of the cognition', leading to the utterance of the reliable person' as an additional qualification. But to know about a person that he is always knowledgeable about all that he talks about is possible only to an omniscient being because false cognition or illusion is a common human phenomenon. Moreover sometimes even an unreliable person speaks the truth, so it is no use to know that a certain person is absolutely reliable even if such knowledge can be had. So to know that a person is reliable it has to be ascertained that the person is knowledgeable about the things, that he claims to know. This is not possible unless the specific relations of things spoken are known because all knowledge is determined by the different relations of the objects known. Mere knowledge about the natures of objects is of no use as such knowledge is common to both the reliable and the unreliable person. But can't the cognition that 'a person is knowledgeable regarding the mutual relation of the things (that he speaks about) suffice to determine the person's reliability? No! The very cognition that 'this is the relation of the things meant' cannot arise without the cognition of the reliability of the speaker which itself cannot arise without the inference). The said cognition cannot also be recollective as only what is experienced is recollected but the experience or cognition of reliability being dependent upon inference or the cognition of the middle term in an inference it cannot be had unless the qualifier of the middle term—viz., 'reliability of the utterer of words' is first cognised.

Even the second alternative mentioned above namely, that the mere-possibility of the occurrence of the major in the minor is sufficient for the inference, cannot be upheld. Even if the mere possibility or capacity of being related is proved of the word-meanings, these are not known to be actually mutually related, but a sentence has only such knowledge and not its mere possibility as its object. The capacity to be related, of the meanings is known even before the inference and so the inference would be proving what is already known. If it were otherwise then excluding capacity or competence only proximity and syntax would figure as qualification in the body of the middle term. As a consequence the word-combination like 'one should sprinkle with fire' would instantiate the deviance of the middle term as the things meant by the words in the combination are ever incapable of being mutually-related.

In the second of the above inferences viz., the one having words as the minor term, the middle term is 'the property of being endowed with syntax etc.' Now what is this syntax? It cannot be the qualifier-qualifiedhood because it is of the nature of relation and so it is what is sought to be proved in the inference. Nor is it the capacity of being related as qualifier and qualified because this capacity is no other than competence which along with syntax is included as the qualifier of the middle term. It is also not the same as invariable existence. In a sentence like 'it is a blue lotus' the blue and the lotus are of mutually variable occurrence yet the words denoting these are syntactically related and do convey their meaning. But isn't here too invariability in occurrence between the general properties respectively implied by the specific entities viz., the lotus and the blue colour, as substanceness implied by locus, and qualityness implied by 'blue' are invariable in their occurrence? Well! If this is the definition of syntax then, the combination of words like 'Oh, how limpid is the water of the river, the buffalo is grazing on the bank of the river' which is known to comprise two sentences could be treated as one sentence. The word 'river' in the first sentence and the word 'bank' in the second sentence have mutual expectancy and so they can be supposed to be syntactically related'. Can then syntax be defined as the desire of the hearer (of the words of a sentence) to know something about a thing denoted by a word (in the sentence)? No! If on hearing the words 'there is a piece of cloth' the hearer asks, 'what colour is the cloth! the answer would be, say ' red! Thus the sentence is syntactically related to the word 'red' and so along with the word the sentence constitutes one sentence. Thus 'the combination of words, "There is a piece of cloth" would never constitute a complete

sentence by itself' as the desire to know the quality etc. of the cloth can always be there.

The *Vaiśeṣika* may overcome this difficulty by redefining syntax thus. Syntax is the desire to know the specific object denoted by a word in a sentence even when there may be desires to know about all kinds of details regarding qualities, actions etc. (of things). For example if the words 'A piece of cloth' are uttered then the hearer of the words may desire to know what the colour of the cloth is or where it is or what it does. But if the verb ' there is' is added to the above words then the desire which this addition satisfies is that about what the cloth does. This desire is concerned with what the words denote. It is not concerned with the colour of the cloth. If the word ' red' is also added to the above words then the addition satisfies the desire to know also the colour of the cloth which is denoted by the word. Thus syntax can be redefined so that there is no inconsistency at all.

If this is the view maintained by the *Vaiśeṣika* then he should consider with open eyes whether syntax by itself leads to the cognition of meaning-relation or its cognition is needed for the latter. If the first alternative is upheld then to avoid the fallacy of deviance in the middle it should not be qualified by syntax (as the cognition of the middle is needed for inference). Like the contact of mind with senses etc. syntax itself and not its cognition is needed for the inference. If the middle is qualified only by the conditions of proximity and compatibility excluding syntax then the definite cognition of such a qualified middle does not invariably lead to the knowledge of the meaning-relation as is found in the case of the sentence 'oh, here comes the son of the king the man may be removed from here'. In the Sanskrit version of this double sentence mere proximity and compatibility of certain words in the sentence do not yield any definite connected meaning. The second of the above alternatives may be upheld if it were the case that, as in the case of the concomitance of the middle and the major, its mere presence in the middle does not lead to the cognition of the meaning-relation. But this is certainly not the case. Syntactically related words which are known to be proximate to and compatible with each other do produce the cognition of the meaning of sentences. If there is no mutual expectancy among words (engendering the syntactic relation among them, then there is no cognition of sentence-meaning.)

But how is it ascertained that the mere presence of expectancy in words, not its cognition is needed for the cognition of the meaning-relation? Well, if the mere presence of the expectancy can explain the relation-cognition it is irrational to postulate the causality of the cogni-

tion of the former which is not usually present (on the occasion of the cognition of the meaning-relation). Elsewhere also such postulation is not made. For example when looking at a distant object and apprehending it in a general way as some real object a percipient becomes curious to know what the object is and so approaching it notes that it is the stump of a tree then in spite of his not having the introspective cognition of his desire to know the identity of the object he identifies the object. Likewise in the present case too when the specific meanings are presented by the words (in a sentence), their relations are directly known (when the desire to know them is there) although there is no cognition of the desire to know. As to the cognition of the desire to know generally the qualities, actions etc. meant by words, it may of course precede the cognition of the specific meanings presented by words, but since the desire to know these is really the syntactical relation the precedence of the former does not serve any purpose. And even if the proposed middle term 'being presented by words' as qualified by mutual syntax, proximity and compatibility is used for inference, the fallacy of deviance cannot be avoided. For example in the Sanskrit sentence above referred to, if the hearer, because of his preoccupation with some thing or other does not hear the earlier part of the sentence but hears only the latter part of the sentence meaning 'remove the king's men' then, even the said middle term is not observed to be present in the minor despite the word-meanings of the first part of the sentence being syntactically and otherwise related with each other. The speaker may utter the sentence with the meaning 'Here comes the son of the king' but the hearer inattentively coupling the word-meaning 'of the king' with the word for 'man' gets quite a different meaning from the sentence. This meaning is not presented by the combination of words as uttered by the speaker.

Let then be this solution of the above difficulty. The term 'words' in the middle term may be qualified as 'all (in the sentence) taken together'. The middle so qualified cannot be afflicted by deviance as the earlier part of the foregoing sentence referring to the king's son remains unheard by the hearer. But then how come the hearer apprehends the meaning-relation in the sentence although he does not hear all the words in the sentence? The answer is that such an apprehension is caused by taking a part of the sentence as the whole of it or what is not the middle as the middle in the inference. The hearer mistakes the partial combination as the complete combination. This however is not the case. Even if there is doubt about the totality of the words, the meaning-relation of the words of the partial sentence is certainly apprehended.

This is confirmed by the retrospective awareness of the hearer expressed thus: 'I do not know what else the speaker said, I heard only the sentence stating, 'remove the king's man'. But isn't the said awareness illusory? Yes! But it is not caused like common illusions by defective sense-organs as the awareness is non-perceptual. Nor is it caused by a fallacious middle term because even if there is no awareness of the middle as middle the illusion arises. But can't the mere cognition of the partial combination of the words as a complete one itself cause the illusion? Well! If so then a non-defective combination of these words may as well be supposed to cause a veridical cognition as despite the absence of the cognition of any concomitance the combination produces the cognition of meaning-relation as is found in the case of sense-organs like the eye. Can't it be urged that there is no cognition of relations at all in the sentence, the relation-usage is based only on the non-cognition of the absence of relation? Well! If this is so then even qualifying the middle term as above cannot help overcome any difficulty because the meaning-relation cannot thus be established and so the utterances, even of the unreliable person cannot be supposed to be caused by the cognition of meaning-relation although these utterances produce verbal cognition. If the major term in the inference is replaced by the term 'caused by the non-cognition of the absence of relations' then this difficulty can be avoided but then the meaning-relation cannot be established by the inference. (To avoid this difficulty it may be assumed that the utterances of the reliable person are caused by the cognition of the meaning-relation although those of unreliable persons are caused by the non-cognition of the absence of relation and so) the middle in the inference may be qualified as 'inference' presented by words uttered by a reliable person. But such a device cannot help as no one can be treated as absolutely reliable for all his utterances. Partial reliability however would lead to deviance as everybody is partially reliable. If reliability in respect of present utterances is taken as qualification of the middle term then since such reliability entails the proper knowledge of the relations of the meanings of words uttered, this knowledge cannot result from the inference, but will have to be there even before the inference.

If the desire to know is not the cause of the cognition of sentence-meaning as, even one who has not this desire is able to know the sentence-meaning then one who has not this desire should not know the sentence meaning. Granting then that the desire to know is not needed for the knowledge of the sentence-meaning what is this syntax? It is the capacity to have the desire to know. The capacity is defined as 'the prior absence of the knowledge of the relation of the meanings presented by

words in the mind of the hearer, if the meanings or what are entailed by them are invariably related with each other. (Meanings are here qualified as invariably related because in the sentence 'There is a piece of cloth' the actual piece of cloth and its colour say red, being invariably related, the sentence would have to be supposed to be syntactically related to the word 'red' as in the sentence, 'There is a red piece of cloth'. The other qualification 'What is entailed by them' is introduced in the definition because even if the specifically-meant entities may not be invariably related with each other yet the substantive and attributive natures entailed respectively by them are certainly so related). Certainly the cognition of this prior absence is not the cause of the cognition of the meaning-relation as absence-cognition being always dependent upon the cognition of the absent (or the counter-positive) the cognition of meaning-relation would have to be supposed as caused by itself. This would lead to the fallacy of mutual dependence. This being the case syntax cannot qualify the middle term by means of which verbal meaning is sought to be inferred. Even the relation of invariability holding amongst meanings is dependent upon the cognition of meanings (not their relations) for its own cognition. So there cannot obtain the cognition of meaning-relations before the sentence-meaning is cognised.

EXPL.: Continuing the criticism of the *Vaiśeṣika* attempt to assimilate verbal cognition to inference the author remarks that in the inference 'These word-meanings are mutually related', the major cannot be necessarily related to the minor. The contents of the statement of an unreliable person are not mutually related and nobody is absolutely reliable about everything that he speaks of. Besides only an omniscient being can know about such reliability of any person. So reliability only with regard to what a person is saying needs to be ascertained. But this ascertainment is impossible without the knowledge of the relation of the things meant. If this knowledge has to precede inference what is to be achieved by it? If therefore the mere possibility of the occurrence of the major in the minor is supposed to be inferred then actual relation of meanings cannot be proved on the basis of the mere possibility of these relations being there.

Further, syntax which is a qualification included in the middle term of the inference cannot be the desire to know something specific regarding the meanings of words as for example, when the words 'a piece of cloth' are uttered there is the curiosity to know the colour of the piece of the cloth. Such a desire cannot be taken to qualify the middle term as syntax by itself is needed for verbal cognition while it is the

cognition of the middle term that is needed for the inference. If therefore syntax is excluded from the body of the middle term and only proximity etc. are taken as the qualifications of the middle term then in the Sanskrit sentence mentioned above, although there are two component sentences in the sentence, yet because the words पुत्र and राज्ञः are proximate and compatible in meaning with each other the two sentences should have to constitute a single-sentence.

The view of Prabhākara that only Vedic sentences are valid means of cognition

TEXT: प्राभाकराः तु लोक-वेद-साधारण-व्युत्पत्ति-बलेन अन्वित-अभिधानं प्रसाध्य वक्तृ-ज्ञान-अनुमान-अनवकाशात् संसर्गे शब्दस्य एव स्वातंत्र्येण प्रामाण्यं आस्थिषत। लोके तु अनुमानतः एव वक्तृ-ज्ञान-उपसर्जनतया संसर्गस्य सिद्धेः। अन्वित-अभिधान-बल-आयाते अपि प्रतिपादकत्वे अनुवादकतामात्रं वाक्यस्य इति निर्णीतवंतः। तत् अति-स्थवीयः।

निर्णीत-शक्तेः वाक्यात् हि प्रागेव अर्थस्य निर्णये।
व्याप्ति-स्मृति-विलंबेन लिंगस्य एव अनुवादिता॥

यावती हि वेदे सामग्री, तावती एव लोके अपि भवंती कथं इव न अर्थं गमयेत्? न हि अपेक्षणीय-अंतरं अस्ति। लिंगे तु परिपूर्णे अपि अवगते व्याप्ति-स्मृतिः अपेक्षणीया अस्ति इति विलंबेन किं निर्णेयम्? अन्वयस्य प्रागेव प्रतीतेः। लोके वक्तुः आप्तत्व-निश्चयः अपेक्षणीयः इति चेत्? न। तत्-रहितस्य अपि स्वार्थ-प्रत्यायने शब्दस्य शक्तेः अवधारणात्। अन्यथा वेदे अपि अर्थ-प्रत्ययः न स्यात् तदभावात्। न च लोके अन्यानि एव पदानि येन शक्ति-वैचित्र्यं स्यात्। आप्त-उक्तौ व्यभिचार-दर्शनात् तुल्या अपि सामग्री संदेहेन शिथिलायते इति चेत्? न। चक्षुरादौ व्यभिचार-दर्शनेन शंकायां अपि सत्यां ज्ञान-सामग्रीतः तदुत्पत्ति-दर्शनात्।

ज्ञायमानस्य अयं विधिः यत् संदेहे सति निश्चायकं यथा लिंगम्। चक्षुरादि तु सत्तया इति चेत्? न। वाक्यस्य निश्चितत्वात्। फल-प्रामाण्य-संदेहस्य

च फल-उत्तर-कालीनत्वात्। आप्त-उक्तत्वस्य च अर्थ-प्रत्ययं प्रति अनंगत्वात्। लोके अपि च आप्तत्व-अनिश्चये अपि वाक्यार्थ-प्रतीतेः। भवति हि वेद-अनुकारेण पठ्यमानेषु मनु-आदि-वाक्येषु अपौरुषेयत्व-अभिमानिनः गौड-मीमांसकस्य-अर्थ-निश्चयः। न च असौ भ्रान्तिः। पौरुषेयत्व-निश्चय-दशायां अपि तथा निश्चयात् इति।

स्यात् एतत्। न आप्त-उक्तत्वं-अर्थ-प्रतीतेः अंगं इति ब्रूमः, किंतु अनाप्त-उक्तत्व-शंका-निरासः। सः च क्वचित् आप्त-उक्तत्व-अवधारणात् इति चेत्? तत् किं अपौरुषेयत्वस्य अ-प्रतीतौ संदेहे वा वेद-वाक्यात् विदित-पदार्थ-संगतेः अर्थ-प्रत्ययः एव न भवेत्, भवन् अपि वा न श्रद्धेयः? प्रथमे सत्यादयः एव प्रमाणम्। न च असंसर्ग-अग्रहे तदानीं संसर्ग-व्यवहारः, बाधकस्य अत्यंतं अभावात्। तथापि तत्-कल्पनायां अन्य-अन्वय-उच्छेद-प्रसङ्गात्। द्वितीये तु अश्रद्धा प्रत्यक्षवत् निमित्त-अंतरात् निवर्त्स्यति इति वेदे यदि, लोके अपि तथा स्यात् अविशेषात्। अन्यथा वेदस्य अपि अनुवादकता-प्रसङ्गः। तदुच्यते-

व्यस्त-पुं-दूषण-आशंकैः स्मारितत्वात् पदैः अमी।
अन्विताः इति निर्णीते वेदस्य अपि न तत् कुतः?॥

यदा हि अपौरुषेयत्व-निश्चयात् प्राक् वेदः न किंचित् अभिधत्ते इति पक्षः तदा आप्त-उक्तत्व-निश्चय-उत्तर-कालं लोकवत् वेदे अपि अपौरुषेयत्व-निश्चयात् पश्चात् अनुमान-अवतारः। इयान् तु विशेषः यत् अत्र पदार्थान् एव पक्षीकृत्य निरस्त-पुं-दोष-आशंकैः आकांक्षादिमद्भिः पदैः स्मारितत्वात् आप्त-उक्त-पद-कदंबक-स्मारित-पदार्थवत् संसर्ग एव आहत्य साध्यः। बुद्धि-व्यवहितः तु इतरत्र इति फलतः न कश्चित् विशेषः इति। तथा च अन्वित-अभिधाने अपि जघन्यत्वात् वेदस्य अनुवादकता-प्रसङ्गः। न च एवं सति तत्र प्रमाणं अस्ति। विशिष्ट-प्रतीति-अन्यथानुपपत्त्या हि शब्दस्य तत्र शक्तिः परिकल्पनीया। सा च अनुमानेन एव उपपन्ना इति वृथा प्रयासः। तस्मात् लोके शब्दस्य अनुवादकता इति विपरीत-कल्पना इयं आयुष्मताम्।

TRANS.: The followers of Prabhākara propound the theory of the connected meaning of sentences to explain the meanings of both the Vedic and the common sentences. But in the case of the Vedas which have no human origin the inference to the knowledge of an author of the Vedas who knows their contents is not possible. So the Vedas are independent means of valid cognition of these contents. As regards common speech however the relation of their contents is known only inferentially as the determinant of the speaker's knowledge of the contents of his speech. So although, as per the common theory of connected meaning sentences of common speech are meaningful yet they convey the meaning only inferentially. So these sentences are not independent means of cognition.

But such a view is very crude because when the denotative capacity of words in a sentence is known then the meaning of the sentence is immediately known without waiting for the recollection of the concomitance of the middle and major terms. So the words are independent means of cognition while the inference is only a rerendering of the contents of the verbal cognition. To explain: Whatever collocation of causes produces cognition of the Vedic Sentences also produces cognition of common sentences, no other causal condition is needed for the latter cognition; why then should it not produce cognition of common sentences? As to the possibility of the inferential cognition of verbal contents, it is to be noted that despite there being the full knowledge of the middle term the recollection of its concomitance is needed for the inference. But in the case of common verbal cognition what is to be known by waiting for this knowledge? The relation of meanings is known quite before this knowledge arises. Can't it be contended that for the knowledge of the meaning of common sentences the reliability of the utterer of the sentences has to be known? No! Even in the absence of this the common sentences do communicate their meanings. If it were not so then, there being no author of the Vedas their sentences too would cease to be meaningful. Certain Vedic and common words are not different from each other. But isn't there the possibility of doubt regarding the meaningfulness of common sentences caused by the falsification of the sentences uttered by an unreliable person? No! Very often the eye, the ear etc. cause erroneous perceptions yet if the collocation of visual or other condition is present then the corresponding cognition does arise. May it be contended against this that like the middle term in the inference the sentence conveys its meaning only as known; (and when there is doubt about the presence of the major in the minor the presence of the middle in the minor dispels the doubt)? So there

has to be the inference to dispel doubt regarding the reliability of the speaker of a sentence before it can convey the meaning. The mere presence of the sentence cannot convey its meaning as the mere presence of the eye can produce the visual cognition. No! This contention cannot be upheld. So far as doubt is concerned the sentential nature of the sentence cannot be doubted. As to the doubt about the validity of the cognition produced by the sentence, it can arise—if at all—only after the cognition of the meaning has arisen. Being uttered by a reliable speaker is not the condition of the cognition of the meaning of a sentence. Even in common parlance sentences do convey their meaning even though it is not definitely known that they are the utterances of reliable persons. This is why a Mīmāṃsaka belonging to the Gauḍa country regards even Manu's statements as Vedic statements and meaningful if they are recited like the latter. This meaning-cognition cannot be dismissed as illusory because even if the statements are recognised to be of human origin they do not appear as meaningless.

Alright! We don't maintain (The Mīmāṃsaka urges) that being the utterance of a reliable person is a condition determining the meaningfulness of a sentence. Only the dispelling of the doubt that the sentence may be the utterance of an unreliable person is needed for it to convey meaning. In the case of the Vedic sentence the doubt is dispelled by the knowledge of the Vedas being authorless, while in the case of the sentences of common speech the doubt is dispelled by the knowledge that the sentences are uttered by reliable persons. Does this mean that if the Vedas are not known to be authorless or there is doubt about this then despite one's having the knowledge of the conventional meanings of the words of Vedic sentences one does not understand their meanings or even understanding them one does not have faith in them? The first alternative is obviously false; one who does not know that the Vedas are authorless does understand the meanings of Vedic sentences like 'अग्निमीडे पुरोहितम्' It cannot be contended that when the authorlessness of the Vedas is not known it is the non-cognition of the absence of relation amongst the meanings of the Vedic words which caters to the understanding of Vedic sentences. There is absolutely no obstruction to the understanding of the meaning-relation of the Vedic words. If despite this non-cognition is posited as the condition then nowhere the cognition of meaning-relation would be possible.

As to the second alternative it cannot be entertained because the causes which dispel disbelief in the case of the Vedic statements are available in the case of common statements also. If this is not admitted

then the Vedas too would have to be regarded as purveyors of known truths like common statements. All this is summarised in the (verse) stating that:

> 'If the meaning-relations in Vedic statements are ascertained only on the basis of the inference that the meanings are presented by words which cannot be suspected to be tainted by any human defects (because they have no human origin) then the Vedas too may be regarded as the purveyors of empirically known facts only (and as such they may forfeit their validity)'.

To explain: If it is maintained that, unless it is known that the Vedas have no human origin, Vedic statements cannot be known to be meaningful, then as the meanings of common statements are supposed to be inferentially known the meanings of Vedic statements too would have to be supposed to be inferentially known. (This will jeopardise their validity.) There is only one difference between the inferential cognitions in the two cases. In the case of the Vedic statements the inference has the Vedic words as the minor term, the combination of words uttered by reliable persons is the illustrative term and the occurrence of meaning-relation is directly inferred in the minor by means of the middle term which is the property of 'being presented by words endowed with various conditions like proximity etc. determining meaningfulness'. In the case of words of common speech however the relation as intended by the speaker of the words appears in the major term of the inference. There is however no difference in respect of the cognition of the relation generated, as it is inference in both cases. So even on the connected-meaning-view the contingency of the Vedas being only secondary sources of information cannot be avoided. If so there is no ground for accepting this view as words are regarded the denoters of action-associated things only to explain the emergence of the connected meanings of sentences which can be had by means of inference itself. Thus Prabhākara's contention that common speech is a secondary source of information gives a distorted account of empirical meaning.

EXPL.: The followers of Prabhākara hold the view that common statements are known to be significant only when it is first ascertained that they are spoken by reliable persons. Thus common statements purvey information which in the first instance is obtained by means of inference based upon the fact of the statements being the utterances of reliable persons. In the case of Vedic statements no inference is needed to establish their validity. The statements having no human origin no human defect can he supposed to infect them. This view is flawed by the obvious truism that neither in the case of the Vedic nor in that of the common statements the cognition of the meaning-relation of words or the meaning of statements is it necessary to know beforehand that the statements are uttered by reliable persons. There can be doubt about the reliability of the speaker of a common sentence and this doubt may affect the validity of the sentence-meaning. But it cannot prevent the sentence from being meaningful. Besides it is not always necessary to establish inferentially the reliability of the speaker of the sentence whose meaning is sought to be understood. If there is nothing to cause suspicion about the credentials of a speaker then the knowledge of the speaker's reliability is already there when the sentence is uttered by him or her.

Discussion and rebuttal of the connected-meaning view

TEXT: किं च इदं अन्वित-अभिधानं नाम? न तावत्-अन्वित प्रतिपादनमात्रम्। अ-विवादात्। नापि स्वार्थ-अभिधाया: तत्र तात्पर्यम्। अ-विवादात् एव। नापि संगति-बलेन तत्-प्रतिपादनम्। वाक्यार्थस्य अ-पूर्वत्वात्। नापि स्वार्थ-संगति-बलेन। तस्य स्वार्थे एव उपक्षयात्। नापि सा एव संगतिः उभय-प्रतिपादिका। प्रतीति-क्रम-अनुपपत्तेः। यौगपद्य-अभ्युपगमे तु योग्यत्वादि-प्रतिसंधान-शून्यस्य अपि पदार्थ-प्रत्ययवत् वाक्यार्थ-प्रत्यय-प्रसङ्गात्। नापि सा एव संगतिः स्वार्थे निरपेक्षा, वाक्यार्थे तु पदार्थ-प्रतिपादन-अवांतर-व्यापारा इति युक्तम्। तस्याः स्वयं अ-करणत्वात्। संगतानि पदानि हि करणं न तु-संगतिः। तथापि तत्-प्रतिपादन-अनुगुण-संगति-शालीनि पदानि इति चेत्? न तावत् वाक्यार्थ-प्रतिपादन-अनुगुणता संगतेः तत्-आश्रयत्वेन, सामान्य-मात्र-गोचरत्वात् तद्वत्-मात्र गोचरत्वात् वा। नापि तत्-अनुगुण-व्यापारवत्त्वेन। अकरणत्वात् इत्युक्तम्। तत्-अनुगुण-करण-व्यापार-उत्थापकत्वात् तत्-अनुगुणत्वे न नः विवादः।

अन्वित एव शक्तिः इति चेत्? उक्तं अत्र वाक्यार्थस्य अ-पूर्णत्वात् प्रतीति-क्रम-अनुपपत्तेः च इति। स्मृत-क्रिया-अन्विते कारके स्मृत-

कारक-अन्वितायां च क्रियायां संगतिः अतः न उक्त-दोष-अवकाशः। नापि पर्यायता-आपत्तिः। प्राधान्येन नियमात्। नापि पौनरुक्त्यं, विशेष-अन्वये तात्पर्यात्। नापि इतरेतर-आश्रयत्वम्। स्वार्थ-स्मृतौ अनपेक्षणात्। नापि वाक्यभेद-आपत्तिः। परस्पर-पदार्थ-स्मृति-सनिधौ तदितर-अनपेक्षणात् इति चेत्? न। अन्विते संगति-ग्रहः इति कः अर्थः? यदि यत्र संगतिः तत् वस्तुगत्या पदार्थ-अन्वितं न किंचित् प्रकृत-उपयोगी इति। नहि यत्र चक्षुषः सामर्थ्यं अवगतं तत् वस्तुगत्या स्पर्शवत् इति तद्वत्ता अपि तस्य विषयः। अथ अन्वित तया एव तत्र व्युत्पत्तिः इत्यर्थः? तदसत्। प्रमाणाभावात्। अन्वित-अर्थ-विषयस्य-अन्यथानुपपत्तिः इति चेत्? न। अन्-अन्वित-अभिधानेन अपि उपपत्तेः। आकांक्षा-अनुपपत्तिः अस्तु न हि सामान्यतः अन्वित-अनवगमे अन्वय-विशेषे जिज्ञासा स्यात्। न। दृष्टे फल-विशेषे रस-विशेष-जिज्ञासावत् आक्षेपतः अपि उपपत्तेः। शब्द-महिमानं अंतरेण यतः कुतश्चित् अपि स्मृतेषु पदार्थेषु अन्वय-प्रतीतिः स्यात्। न च एवम्। अतः शब्द-शक्तिः अवश्यं कल्पनीया इति चेत्? कुतः तर्हि कवि-काव्यानि विलसंति? न हि संसर्ग-विशेषं अ-प्रतीत्य वाक्य-रचना नाम। न च स्व-उत्प्रेक्षायां प्रत्यक्षं, अनुमानं, शब्दः तत् आभासाः वा संभवंति अन्यत्र चिंता-वशेन स्मरणेभ्यः। असंसर्ग-अग्रहः असौ इति चेत्? मम तावत् संसर्ग-ग्रह एव असौ। तथापि सा एव पदावली क्वचित् अन्वये पर्यवस्यति क्वचित् अन्-अन्वय-अग्रहे इति कुतः विशेषात्? आप्त-अनाप्त-वक्तृकतया इति चेत्? किं तथा विधेन वक्त्रा तत्र कश्चित् विशेषः आहितः, आहो वक्ता एव अवच्छेदकतया विशेषः? प्रथमे अभिहित-अन्वय-वादिनां इव तव अपि शक्ति-कल्पना-गौरवम्। द्वितीये तु वक्तुः इव पदानां अपि अवच्छेदकतया एव विशेषकत्वं अस्तु। एवं तर्हि पदानां अन्वय-प्रतीतौ अस्ति उपयोगः। कः संदेहः? परं पदार्थ-अभिधानेन। न तु अन्यथा। यथा तव एव आप्तस्य संसर्ग-परतया पद-समभिव्याहार-मात्रेण, न तु अन्यथा। अन्यथा तु गुरुमत-विदां एव श्लोकः आप्त-पद-प्रक्षेपेण पठनीयः

प्राथम्यात् अभिधातृत्वात् तात्पर्य-उपगमात् अपि।
आप्तानां एव सा शक्तिः वरं अभ्युपगम्यताम्॥ इति।

तस्मात् प्रकार-अंतरेण संसर्ग-प्रत्ययः भवतु मा वा, पदार्थानां आकांक्षादिमत्वे सति अभिहितानां अवश्यं अन्वयः इति कुतः अतिप्रसङ्गः? न च एवं सति पदार्थाः एव करणम्? तेषां अनागतादि-रूपतया कारकत्व-अनुपपत्तौ तत्-विशेषस्य करणत्वस्य अयोगात्। तत्-संसर्गे प्रमाण-अंतर-अ-संकीर्ण-उदाहरण-अभावात् च। पदानां तु पूर्वभाव-नियमेन पदार्थ-स्मरण-अवान्तर-व्यापारवत्तया तत्-उपपत्तेः। व्यापारस्य अ-व्यवधायकत्वात् इति कृतं प्रसक्त-अनुप्रसक्त्या।

TRANS.: What again is this property of connected meaning? It is not just the property of denoting that which is connected or related. There is no dispute about this. Nor again is it the denotative intention as related to the connected entity. This too is beyond dispute. Nor is it the fact of denoting the connected entity with the help of the cognition of the denotative capacity of the word. The sentence-meaning is not the same as word-meaning. It is unique (not the aggregation of word-meanings) and not conveyed by the words themselves. It cannot be urged that words, while conveying their meanings also convey the sentence-meaning or the connected meaning (as the two are not quite distinct from each other). The denotative capacity of words is exhausted by conveying their own separate meanings. Can the same capacity be effective in conveying both the separate meanings and the connected sentence-meaning? No. If it can, then there cannot be the sequential relation between the two kinds of meaning. (The sentence-meaning is known only after the word-meanings are known). If both the meanings are supposed to be known simultaneously then just as a hearer of the words of a sentence understands the meanings of the words of the sentence even without the knowledge that the words are mutually proximate, compatible etc., he should in the same condition understand the meaning of the whole sentence. May it be urged that the denotative capacity of words is effective by itself in conveying its own meaning but in respect of the communication of the sentence-meaning it depends upon the auxiliary process of the presentation of its own separate meanings (so that only after all the word-meanings are presented the sentence-meaning comes to be known)? No! (Such is not the truth of the matter). The denotative capacity is not itself the cause of the cognition of the sentence-meaning.

It is the words as endowed by the denotative capacity that are such causes. However can't it be supposed that the words have the denotative capacity which is conducive to the presentation of the sentence-meaning? Well, this conduciveness of the denotative capacity is not determined by its being located in the sentence-meaning (as its qualificand) because it is concerned with general properties only or entities characterised by general properties only. Nor is the conduciveness determined by its initiating the process leading to the cognition of the sentence-meaning. It has been stated above that the denotative capacity has nothing to do with the presentation of any meaning. If this conduciveness is the process of the auxiliary cause which leads to the apprehension of the sentence-meaning then there is no cause for dispute (as only on learning word-meanings the sentence-meaning is learnt).

Can one urge against the above that only the connected (with action) entity is meant by a word? No! It has already been clarified that the sentence-meaning is unique (not reducible to word-meanings and its apprehension follows that of word-meanings. The above difficulty however can be got over if nouns are taken to denote things associated with action and verbs are taken to denote actions associated with things (so that the sequential character of the apprehensions of word-meaning and sentence-meaning can be upheld). Nor can there arise the unfavourable contingency of the synonymy of all words (as they all denote action) as the main meanings of words (an entity, a certain type of action etc.) differ from each other. Nor again there is the possibility of all sentences being tautological because, though separately words stand for generalities, their syntactical use in sentences makes them mean special meaning-relations. There is however the possibility of the fallacy of mutual dependence on this view as both nouns and verbs would depend upon each other for presenting their respective meanings. The noun denotes a particular entity specifically while it denotes the action associated with the entity generally; the verb on the other hand denotes action specifically while denoting the entity associated with the action generally. Thus arises the fallacy of mutual dependence. This fallacy does not affect the presentation of their own separate meanings by the individual words. There is also no possibility of the occurrence of the undesirable contingency of the split-sentence. When the meanings of different words in the sentence are presented in close proximity with each other without calling in the aid of other word-meanings to constitute a complete sentence-meaning, there cannot arise the fallacy of the split-sentence.

But in this view it needs to be explained what precisely is meant by saying that 'the connected entity is meant by a word.' If, what is intended

by this remark is that 'what is denoted by a word is as a matter of fact connected with other meanings', then this is quite irrelevant to the present dispute. Certainly the fact that, that which the eyes are known to have the capacity to sense is endowed with the quality of touch does not make the tactual quality also the object of the visual sense. If then the above remark is taken to mean that only the connected entity is denoted by words then there is no evidence for such a view. But can't the inexplicability of connected meaning in a sentence (if every word denoted its own unconnected meaning) be itself the evidence for the above view? No! Even the denoting of unconnected meanings by words can explain sentence-meaning. 'But how can there be mutual expectancy among words (if they denoted unconnected entities)? Certainly there cannot arise the desire to know the specific meaning-relation unless the meanings are known to be generally related'. Well, the desire to know the specific relation can arise from the knowledge of the meanings just as seeing a certain fruit one becomes curious to know how it tastes. But if such were the case then in a sentence even things undenoted by any word in the sentence but somehow recalled could be meant as mutually-connected. Since this does not happen in sentences, words have to be admitted as denotative of connected meanings. Well! If this is so then how can there be the imaginative work of poets? Certainly no poetic composition is possible without the cognition of the meaning-relation of words which are parts of the poetic composition. Nor are perception, inference, verbal testimony—true or false etc., of any relevance in the creations of the poet which spring from his imagination and are in reality the images of things which are not actually present. But can't this be due just to non-cognition of the absence of meaning-relation (and not the cognition of the meaning-relation)? Well, in the Nyāya view the cognition is the cognition of relation itself. In the opposite view the same set of words leads to positive cognition in some cases and to non-cognition of non-relation in other cases. What can be the ground of this discrimination? Can't being and not being the utterance of reliable persons be this ground? Well, if so, does the reliable person instil some distinctive property in the meaning-relation or is the reliable person himself as the speaker and the determinant of the utterance the ground of the distinction? On the first alternative the followers of Prabhākara who criticised the view of Bhaṭṭa will have to admit as many capacities in words as they charge the latter of doing. (The former argue that if Bhaṭṭa's view that the connection of the meant is stated in sentences is upheld then three different capacities will have to be admitted, namely the capacity of words to denote their meanings, the ca-

pacity of word-meanings to be mutually related and another capacity of words engendering the capacity of word-meanings to be mutually related). The capacities are, first, the capacity of words to denote the entities meant and next the capacity to denote the connection of the meaning and next to this the capacity or distinctive quality instilled in words by the reliable speaker. On the second alternative mentioned above words themselves may be taken to be the determinants (like the speaker) of the meaning-relation (there is no need to treat the connected entity as the meaning of the word or admit some specific quality of excellence instilled by the speaker in the meanings). But if this is so then won't words too be needed for cognising meaning-relation? Yes, there is no doubt about this. But words are needed only for presenting their meanings, not for any other purpose (just as in the view of Prabhākara the reliable person is needed only to utter words with the object of communicating the relation of their meanings). If this were not so then the well-known verse of Śālikanātha—an expert in Prabhākara's philosophy—may be read with a slight alteration to say that:

> 'Because of priority (in presentation), denotedness, and being the repository of intention, the reliable persons themselves may be regarded as endowed with the capacity to produce meaning-relation or sentential meaning'.

Since Prabhākara considers the utterance by a reliable person to be conducive to the meaningfulness of common sentences the reliable person himself may be supposed to possess the competence to make the sentence meaningful. As this cannot be accepted it has to be conceded that in whatever way the meaning-relation in sentences is cognised the meanings related are conveyed by words only. Thus the view of the followers of Kumārila (opposed to the above view advocated by Prabhākara) that the meanings conveyed by words and endowed with mutual proximity, expectancy etc. get related with each other to yield the sentence-meaning is found to be free from aforementioned fallacies. It may be objected to this that if the things meant, get mutually related, and yield the sentence-meaning then there is no involvement of words in the process of communicating the sentence-meaning. This is however not true. Things meant may be in future or past and so non-existent when the sentence is uttered. As such things cannot have any kind of agency, least of all the agency, which is of a special type recognised as immediate causality. Moreover there is no instance to illustrate the possibility of things getting related with each other without their

being presented by any valid means of cognition like words etc. But words are necessarily present before the things meant by them get mutually related. What is needed for words to convey meaning-relations is the intermediate process of giving rise to the recollection of their meanings, which being just a process does not cause any interruption in the causal operation of words. So enough is enough!

EXPL.: Criticising Prabhākara's view regarding the primary and secondary mode of significance of the Vedic and the common statements respectively the author argues that, if like common statements (which are inferred to be significant and true because of their being the utterances of reliable persons), Vedic statements also are known to be true and significant only when they are known to have no human origin then they must be supposed to have secondary import only. If this is so then the theory of secondary meaning propounded by Prabhākara is rendered superfluous. The view is set forth to account for the connected meanings of Vedic and non-Vedic statements. But inference takes care of both these kinds of statements. The author has pointed out certain difficulties also in defining precisely the concept of connected meaning which are elaborated above. One difficulty which the author has not discussed but is serious enough to be taken note of is this: Every word in a sentence cannot include in its meaning connection with activity; the verb, the preposition etc. cannot include activity-connection in their meanings. Besides, the connected meaning denoted by each word would have to be connected with such meanings of other words. How are these meaning-connections to be imported into sentence-meaning? If the mutual expectancy of words in a sentence is supposed to give rise to these connections then the meaning-connections forming part of the word-meanings would be rendered redundant.

An objection to the thesis of the omniscient creator

TEXT: अस्तु तर्हि शब्दःएव बाधकं सर्वज्ञे कर्तरि? तथाहि
प्रकृतेः क्रियमाणानि गुणैः कर्माणि सर्वशः।
अहंकार-विमूढ-आत्मा कर्ता अहं इति मन्यते॥
इत्यादि पठंति। न पारमार्थिकं केवलस्य कर्तृत्वं अस्ति। आभिमानिकं

तु तत्। न च सर्वज्ञस्य अभिमानः। न च अ-सर्वज्ञस्य जगत्-कर्तृत्वं अस्ति। उच्यते–

TRANS.: Let then words themselves (which are proved above to be an independent means of knowledge) be proof against the reality of an omniscient creator of the world. For example, there is the verse of the *Gītā* which says that the sentient self is not really the agent of any action. The experienced agency of the self is only apparent or delusive. But the omniscient being (conceived by Nyāya thinkers) has no delusion nor can any non-omniscient Being be the world-creator. In reply to this we say as below:

The utterances of an unreliable person cannot be veridical. So the above remark cannot have been made by an unreliable person. If the author of the remarks is a reliable person then he must have had the knowledge of what he has stated in the remark and since the statement is concerned with extrasensory and transcendental entities the author of the remark must be an omniscient being and also the creator because he has authored the scriptures. Since it has been explained earlier that there have been disruptions of the scriptural tradition, scriptures must have an author who creates them at the start of every creative cycle. Moreover it needs to be noted that scriptural statements are not all assertive of the nonexistence of the omniscient being. In many scriptural statements it is the existence of God which is clearly asserted. This will be explained in the sequel. This being so if some statements in the scripture appear to be denying absolutely the existence of God then they cannot be veridical. 'But then can't the statements asserting existence also be denied to be veridical? Yes! This is apparently true. But when it is realised that the scriptural statements declaring absence of agency in the self are really intended to convey the absolute absence of all special qualities—like pleasure, pain, cognition etc.—in the self then it can be understood that the real import of the negative statements is not to deny the reality of the self and also that the positive statements are alone veridical. That these statements do not have a different import will be made clear in the sequel.

Well! If the scriptures are not opposed to the reality of God then postulatory evidence is certainly so. The postulation is like this—If God were omniscient and competent enough to prompt people to do right things he would not have cared to exhort them through scriptures. But

since there are the scriptural exhortations it may be presumed that either there is no being who is competent enough to prompt people to right actions or there is such a being but he is indifferent to common interest. The reply to this argument is that the occurrence of exhortations can be explained quite otherwise No effect comes into being without its cause. So if there is no means of valid cognition there cannot be any disposition to action. Even in the theory of the universal causality of action accepted by Mīmāṃsā this is the answer to any argument similar to the above. The point is that whether there is destiny—(the result of action) or not, the utility of exhortation imparted in the scriptures cannot be denied. To explain: The disposition to action is invariably preceded by knowledge. In the present case even knowledge cannot be produced without exhortation as only this is the cause of the former. 'But can't God produce the activitistic disposition in a man simply by possessing him?' Yes, he could have done so if that produced the result. But it does not, How is it known? Only because of the exhortations. Even in the view that all disposition is caused by destiny the above criticism applies. If there is destiny causing disposition, exhortation is simply redundant but if destiny is not there then exhortation is useless as destiny is not available to generate the disposition. But isn't the scriptural exhortation perennial and so beyond criticism? Yes, the exhortation isn't being criticised; it is in fact the Mīmāṃsaka who upholds the utility of exhortations and investigates the scriptures in which the latter are contained, is being criticised here.

EXPL.: A trivial objection is raised and answered in the above passage. The objection is that if God is all-powerful he needn't compose the Vedas to impart knowledge of transcendental matters to common people. Even without the Vedic exhortation God can make people act because he is all-powerful. The reply is that God, despite his infinite power cannot bypass the natural causal operation. All disposition to action is caused by the knowledge of the object of action. Even God cannot influence a man's disposition to action without the assistance of his knowledge which needs to be communicated through the scriptures.

Now the author turns to a detailed critical consideration of presumption or postulation as an independent means of knowledge as maintained by Mīmāṃsā. Nyāya is opposed to the independent validity of postulation as it subsumes it under inference treating it as a variety of inference.

Criticism of postulation or Arthāpattī as an independent means of knowledge

TEXT: न च अर्थापत्तिः अनुमानतः भिद्यते, लोके तत् अ-संकीर्ण-उदाहरण-अभावात्। प्रकार-अतंराभावात् च। तथाहि-

अनियम्यस्य न अ-युक्तिः न अ-नियंता उपपादकः।
न मानयोः विरोधः अस्ति प्रसिद्धे च अपि असौ समः॥

जीवन् चैत्रः गृहे नास्ति इति अन्-उपपद्यमानं असति वन्हि-सद्-भावे तं आपादयति इति उदाहरंति। तत्र चिंत्यते-किं अनुपपन्नं जीवतः गृह-अभावस्य इति। न हि अ-नियम्यस्य अ-नियामकं विना किंचित् अनुपपन्नम्। अतिप्रसङ्गात्। ननु स्वरूपं एव तत्; न तावत् बहिः सत्वेन कर्तव्यं, तत्-अकार्यत्वात् तस्य। स्थितिः एव अस्य तेन विना न स्यात् इत्यस्य स्वभावः इति चेत्? एवं तर्हि तत्-नियत-स्वभावः एव असौ, व्याप्तेः एव व्यतिरेक-मुख निरूप्यायाः तथा व्यपदेशात्। कथं वा बहिः सत्वं अस्य उपपादकम्? नहि अ-नियामकः भवन् अपि अ-नियम्यं उपपादयति। अति-प्रसङ्गात् एव। स्वभावः अस्य यत् अनेन बहिः-सत्वेन गेह-अ-सत्वं क्रोडीकृत्य स्थातव्यं इति चेत्? सा इयं व्याप्तिः एव अन्वय-मुख-निरूप्या तथा व्यपदिश्यते इति। न वयं अविनाभावं अर्थापत्तौ अपजानीमहे, किंतु तत्-ज्ञानम्, न च असौ सत्ता-मात्रेण तत्-अनुमानत्वं आपादयति इति चेत्? न। अनुपपत्ति-प्रतिसंधानस्य अवश्य-अभ्युपगंतव्यत्वात्। अन्यथा तु अतिप्रसङ्गात्। अर्थापत्ति-आभास-अनवकाशात् च। यदा हि अन्यथा एव उपपन्नं अन्यथा अनुपपन्नं इति मन्यते तदा अस्य विपर्ययः न तु अन्यथा इति। तथापि कथं अत्र व्याप्तिः गृह्येत इति चेत्? यदा अहं इह तदा न अन्यत्र, यदा अन्यत्र तदा न इह इति सर्व-प्रत्यक्ष-सिद्धं एतत्। का तत्र अपि कथंता? सर्व-देश-अप्रत्यक्षत्वे तत्र अभावः दुर्-अवधारणः इत्यपि नास्ति। तेषां एव संसर्गस्य आत्मनि प्रतिषेधात्। अयोग्यानां प्रतिषेधे का वार्ता इति चेत्? तत्-अवयवानां तत्-संसर्ग-प्रतिषेधात् एव

अनुमानात्। अन्येषां न काचित्। न हि अ-कारणीभूतेन परमाणुना न इदं संसृष्टं इति निश्चेतुं शक्यं इति। न च अविनाभाव-निश्चयेन अपि गमयन् अ-पक्षधर्मः अर्थापत्तिः इति युक्तम्। पक्षधर्मतायाः अ-निमित्तत्व-प्रसङ्गात्। अविशेषात्, व्यधिकरणेन अविनाभाव-निश्चय-अयोगात् च। यत्, यत्र, यदा इति प्रकार-अनुपपत्तेः।

प्रमाणयोः विरोधे अर्थापत्तिः अ-विरोध-उपपादिका, न तु एवं अनुमानं इत्यपि नास्ति। विरोधे हि रज्जु-सर्पादिवत् एकस्य बाधः एव स्यात् न तु उभयोः प्रामाण्यम्। प्रामाण्ये वा न विरोधः। स्थूलं इदं एकं इतिवत् सह-संभवात्। चैत्रः अयं, अयं तु मैत्रः इतिवत् वा विषय-भेदात्। प्रकृते क्व अपि अस्ति इति सामान्यतः गेहस्य अपि प्रवेशात् एक-विषयता अपि अस्ति इति चेत्? यदि एवं क्वचित् अस्ति, क्वचित् नास्ति इति वत् न विरोधः। अत्र अपि विरोधः एव इति चेत्? एकं तर्हि भज्येत। न भज्येत, अर्था पत्त्या उभयोः अपि उपपादनात् इति चेत्? किं अनुपपद्यमानम्? विरोधः एव अन्यथा अनुपपद्यमानः विभिन्न-विषयतया व्यवस्थापयति इति चेत्? अथ अभिन्न-विषयतया एव किं न व्यवस्थापयेत्? व्यवस्थापनं अविरोध-आपादनम्। एक-विषयतया एव च अनयोः विरोधः। सः कथं तया एव शमयितव्यः? न हि यः यत् विष-मूर्छितः सः तेन एव उत्थाप्यते इति चेत्? एक-विषयतया अनयोः विरोधः इत्येव कुतः? विभिन्न-देश-स्वभावतया एव सर्वत्र उपलंभात् इति चेत्? ननु इयं व्याप्तिः एव। तथा च घट्ट-कुट्यां प्रभातं इति। धूमः अपि वा अनुपपद्यमानतया एव वन्हिं गमयेत्। न हि तेन विना असौ उपपद्यते। विरोधः अपि। धूमात् वन्हिना भवितव्यं अनुपलब्धेः च न भवितव्यं इति। तथा च अनुपलब्धेः अर्वाक्-भाग-व्यवस्थापनं, धूमस्य च व्यवधानेन अनुपलभ्य-वन्हि-विषयत्व-स्थितिः अर्थापत्तिः इति कुतः अनुमानम्? वन्हिमान् अयं इति अनुमानं व्याप्तेः। अन्यथा अनुमान-अभावे विरोध-असिद्धेः। अर्वाक्-भाग-अनुपलब्धि-विरोधेन परभागे अस्य वन्हिः इति अर्थापत्तिः एव इति चेत्? न। व्याप्ति-ग्राहकेन प्रमाणेन विरोधस्य उक्तत्वात्। नापि उत्तरा अर्थापत्तिः। अन्यथा पाण्डरत्वस्य

अ-पालालत्व-विरोधेन पालालत्व-स्थिति: अपि अर्थापत्ति: एव स्यात्। तत्-विशिष्टस्य तेन एव व्याप्ते: न एवं इति चेत्? यदि एवं अर्वाक्-भाग-अनुपलभ्यमान-वन्हित्वेन विशिष्टस्य धूमस्य तेन एव व्याप्ते: कथं एवं भविष्यति इति तुल्यम्। केवल-व्यतिरेकि-अनुमानं पर-अभिमतं अर्थापत्ति: अन्वय-अभावात् इति चेत्? एवं तावता विशेषेण अनुमाने अर्थापत्तिं न वारयाम:। तत्र अनुमान-व्यवहार: कुत: इति चेत्? अविनाभूत-लिंग-समुत्थत्वात्। साध्य-धर्मेण विना हि अभवनं अन्वयिन: इव व्यतिरेकिण: अपि अ-विशिष्टम्। तत्-निश्चय: च अन्वय-व्यतिरेकाभ्यां अन्यतरेण वा इति। तस्मात् अर्थापत्ति: इति अनुमानस्य पर्याय: अयं, तत्-विशेष-वचनं वा पूर्ववत्-आदिवत् इति युक्तम्।

TRANS.: Certainly postulation does not differ from inference. No example instantiating postulation excluding inference is available in common experience. Nor is there any difference in the causal collocation productive of inference and that known to produce postulatory cognition. To explain: What is not concomitant is not inexplicable (without that which is supposed to be its explicator); the non-concomitant is also not the explicator; there is also no conflict between valid cognitions; if such were not the case then all this description may be taken to apply to inference too. In the stock-example of postulatory cognition, the fact of the absence at home of Chaitra who is alive—which is not explicable without his existence out of home, precipitates (logically or entails) his out-of-home-existence. Let us consider in this case what is inexplicable about the absence at home of Chaitra who is alive. Certainly nothing is inexplicable about a thing (or fact) without the assumption of another thing or fact which is not concomitant with the former. If this is not admitted then anything could be treated as the explicator of any other thing. May it be the case that the very nature or being of a person absent from home is generated by his outside-existence? No! The outside-existence of Chaitra does not produce his absence at home. Could it then be the case that the very being of Chaitra who is absent from home cannot subsist without his outside-existence? Well, if this is so then this determination of the nature of Chaitra's absence at home by his outside-existence is due to concomitance only. It is the negative concomitance (holding between the absence of the major term and the absence of the middle which is expressed in the manner in which postulation is stated above). If the concomitance as stated did not obtain how can outside-existence explain nonexistence at home? Certainly that which is non-concomitant with a fact cannot explain it as then any fact can explain any other fact. But isn't it the very nature of Chaitra that he should exist during his lifetime by combining outside-existence with nonexistence at home? Well! Such a mode of existence is nothing but concomitance which is stated in a positive manner. Alright! We do not deny that there obtains invariable coexistence between the explicator and the explicated, but we maintain that for postulation mere invariable coexistence and not its cognition is needed. This distinguishes it from inference for which the cognition of coexistence is needed. But this is not true. Even for postulation it is necessary to be explicitly aware of the nature of inexplicability (which is not possible without the cognition of the invariable coexistence). If the knowledge of inexplicability were not needed for postulation then a true postulate cannot be distinguished from a false one. A false postulation is one in which what is explicable otherwise than by means of a certain postulate is taken to be not so explicable. Alright! But how in the present case the said concomitance is apprehended? The answer is this: I know that when I am here I am not there and when I am there I am not here. Form this common perceptual fact the said concomitance is ascertained. 'But if all the places other than home are not perceptible while one is at home how can one's absence at all those places be cognised?' It may be asked. The answer is that it is the absence in oneself of conjunction with other places that alone needs to be cognised. (For such a cognition there is no need to cognise all other places individually). 'But how are the imperceptible infinitely-minute spaces known to be absent in one's place?' One may ask. In reply it may be said that if the perceptible composite entity or its space is known to be absent then its atomic components though imperceptible can be inferentially known to be absent in one's place. If the atoms or the atomic space is not the material constituent of any composite entity then of course its absence cannot be known but there is no need to know the absence of such with which a person is not likely to be ever conjoined. The Mīmāṃsaka may however contend that though the cognition of invariable coexistence is needed for postulation as for inference, yet the middle term in postulation (treated as a variety of inference) is not located in the minor. (The inferential form of postulation in the above examples is this: Chaitra exists out of his house because the house is without him). The reply to the contention is that if really the middle in postulation is not located in the minor then 'location in the minor' of the middle would cease to be a condition of postulation and if

this happened to be true then the invariable coexistence of the middle and the major or the explicator and the explicated will never be possible. But this coexistence is admitted to obtain and it is expressed in a generalised form using terms like 'whatever, whenever' etc. (to indicate general coexistence). May one now urge in defence of postulation that wherever there is conflict between the testimonies of two different cognitions it is postulation not inference which helps remove the conflict (and so postulation is not subsumable under inference)? No. This contention is not sustainable, if there is genuine conflict between the said testimonies as is found for example between the cognitions of the rope and the snake relating to an identical entity then one of the two cognitions is sure to be erroneous. Both the cognitions cannot be regarded as veridical. If they are treated as veridical then there cannot be any opposition between them. The two cognitions will be like the cognitions, 'This is single and perceptible' or 'this is Chaitra but this other person is Maitra'. Each of these two cognitions has two different objects. It may yet be argued that the mere existence qualifying Chaitra (in the stock example) encompassing even existence in the house does conflict with nonexistence in the house which is perceptually cognised (and postulation may be taken to remove this conflict). But this conflict is only apparent as it amounts to the fact that Chaitra exists somewhere and does not exist somewhere else. 'But aren't these two propositions opposed to each other?'. Well, if this is so then one of these two will stand contradicted. 'But isn't it a fact that postulation helps reconcile the opposed propositions?' Well, in that case what is inexplicable? If it is the conflict itself that is not explicable otherwise than by treating the conflicting alternatives as concerned with different unrelated contents then it may be asked why the same content is not assigned to the two alternatives to remove their conflict? One may argue against this that the alternatives can be reconciled when their conflict is dissipated but the conflict arises only because the alternatives are concerned with the same entity or fact, so how can the conflict be removed if the content of the alternatives remains identical? Certainly no one who has lost consciousness by swallowing a certain poison is revived by being given the dose of the same poison. But how at all is it decided that the alternatives are mutually-opposed? If the answer is that this is known because the alternatives (in the stock example, the properties 'presence in the house' and 'the existence outside the house') are known to be by nature differently located then this is nothing but concomitance differently expressed (what is located in one place is not located in another place unless it is dislocated from the previous place). Thus starting from a different point

in his argument the Mīmāṃsaka has arrived at the very conclusion which the Naiyāyika maintains (it is like the eventual arrival of a traveller at the very checkpost from which he traversed a long distance away).

If despite concomitance and location in the minor of the middle being available, inexplicability is considered to be the basis of postulation then even inference can be subsumed under postulation. In the instance of the inference of fire though the observation of smoke it can well be contended that it is on the basis of the inexplicability of the observed presence of smoke on the hill that the presence of fire on the hill is postulated as without the latter the former cannot be explained. There is also a conflict here to be resolved. Since smoke is present there has to be fire there but it is not observed to be present. The conflict between the observed presence of smoke and the unobserved presence of fire (which is known to be invariably associated with smoke) is resolved by the postulation that the presence of fire on the hill is veiled by the observed presence of the column of smoke arising from the hill and the evidence of the non-observation of fire applies to all those spots on the hill which are devoid of fire. (Thus both presence and absence of fire on the hill suggested by different means of cognition are reconciled with each other).

The Mīmāṃsaka may meet this argument by maintaining that the postulation cannot render inference redundant. In the above example the cognition that 'the hill is fiery' following the observation of smoke on the hill cannot but be inferential. Postulation comes in only after this cognition has taken place, when the non-observation of fire near smoke engenders conflict between the expected observation and the perceived non-observation of fire. The conflict is resolved by postulation by conceiving the fire to be present beyond smoke and as veiled by it from the percipient's eye. But this defence of inference coupled with postulation is not sustainable. The said conflict is engendered by the cognition of concomitance itself followed by the non-observation of fire along with smoke on the hill. Further, the conclusion that the fire is present beyond smoke which is engendered by the apparent conflict of observation and non-observation is also not postulational. If it were so then the specific conclusion that the fire on the hill is that which has resulted from the burning of dry grass, which is arrived at by the observation of the conflict between whiteness (of smoke) and 'not being produced by the burning of dry grass' may also be regarded as postulational. But isn't concomitance between white smoke and 'fire produced by the burning of dry grass' operative here to determine the inferential character of the above conclusion? Yes! But then in the inference of fire also

the smoke which is associated with fire which is not present in the visible portion of the hill is concomitant only with the latter and so this cannot be a case of postulation. Can then it be urged that the purely negative inference admitted by Nyāya thinkers is postulation as positive concomitance which is the main cause of inference is not of use for such inference? Well, if simply because positive concomitance is ineffective in the case of negative inference the inference is called postulation, one needn't object to the appellation. 'But why call such a cognition inference?' One may ask. The answer is that the cognition is termed inference because it results from the cognition of the middle term which is invariably associated with the major. Middle terms in both positive and negative inferences do not deviate from their major terms although the knowledge of this non-deviation of the middle is obtained either though the cognition of both positive and negative concomitances or either of them. So the word 'postulation' may be regarded as a synonym of the word 'inference' or postulation like certain types of inference may be taken as a certain variety of inference only (it cannot be taken to be an independent means of knowledge).

EXPL.: Now the author takes up postulation to consider whether it can be treated as an independent means of knowledge or it is subsumable under inference. The features which seem to set apart postulation from inference are: conflict between certain given facts or conclusions entailed by certain evidences and the resolution of the conflict by means of a certain postulate suggested by the conflicting facts. The nature of inference to which Nyāya seeks to assimilate postulation is quite different from that of postulation. There is never any conflict to be resolved in inference. The inferential conclusion follows from the inferential premises. The conclusion does not encompass its premises as the postulate encompasses the conflicting alternative in postulation. Refuting the above contention of Mīmāṃsā the author sets forth certain common features of postulation and inference, like the relation of invariable concomitance holding between the postulate and the apparently conflicting alternatives or their attempted synthesis which suggests the postulate, and the presence of the synthesis in the subject of conflict. Further the author contends that there cannot be any real conflict between the conclusions of true evidences or facts (of course insufficiently-ascertained or partial facts may conflict with each other). If there is genuine conflict between certain conclusions then these cannot be factual at all. Moreover the talk of resolving the conflict by means of the postulate does not make any sense. What does the postulate do to the conflicting alternatives? Does it show that the alternatives have nothing to do with each other (so that they might not appear conflicting)? This cannot be the case because the postulate is supposed to bring about reconciliation between the alternatives. This is not possible unless the alternatives have at least a partial common content. Besides these criticisms of postulation the author adduces certain negative arguments which show that if postulation is admitted to be an independent means of knowledge then inference can be assimilated to it. Thus both postulation and inference cannot be admitted to be mutually independent instruments of knowledge. It is however conceivable that instead of postulation being subsumed under inference, inference itself is subsumed under postulation. But since there cannot be any positive concomitance (which is known only after the postulation is made) the inference based on positive concomitance cannot be subsumed under postulation.

There is however an important distinction between postulation and inference which cannot be explained away in terms of the known conditions of inference. The transition from the apparently conflicting facts to the postulatory fact is not like that in the positive or negative inference. Neither positive nor negative concomitance of the conflicting facts and the reconciliatory postulatory facts is known prior to postulation. It is contended by the author that the transition from the conflicting facts to the postulatory facts is through negative concomitance. But is even negative concomitance between say, the absence of outside-existence and absence of nonexistence in the house coupled with existence of Chaitra, in the stock example, already known prior to postulation? In the examples of negative inference usually quoted, like, 'the earth differs from the eight known substances because it is endowed with smell', the absence of difference from known substances and the absence of smell are known to coexist in the known substances. In the above case however such coexistence of the absences of the major and minor terms is not known. So the transition from the conflicting facts to the postulate is purely logical. The reconciling fact is intuited and afterwards it is logically tested for its capacity to resolve the conflict of the given facts. We may thus treat postulation as the method of discovery or what is called 'स्वार्थानुमानं' or inference for oneself in Indian Logic.

Criticism of non-cognition as an independent means of knowledge

TEXT: अनुपलब्धिः तु न बाधिका इति चिंतितम्। न च प्रत्यक्षादेः अतिरिच्यते। तत् उच्यते-

प्रतिपत्तेः अ-पारोक्ष्यात् इन्द्रियस्य अन्-उपक्षयात्।
अ-ज्ञात-करणत्वात् च भाव-आवेशात् च चेतसः॥

न हि साक्षात्कारिणी प्रतीतिः स-इन्द्रिय-करणिका यथा रूपादि-प्रतीतिः। तथा इह भूतले घटः नास्ति इत्यपि। साक्षात्कारित्वं अस्याः असिद्धं, इति चेत्? न। एक-जातीयत्वे ज्ञात-अज्ञात करणत्व-अनुपपत्तेः। न हि तस्मिन् एव कार्ये तदेव करणं एकदा ज्ञातं अज्ञातं च एकदा उपयुज्यते। लिंग-इन्द्रिययोः-अपि व्यत्यय-प्रसङ्गात् ज्ञानस्य अकारणत्व-प्रसङ्गात् च। न हि तत् अतिपत्य अपि भवतः तत्-कारणत्वं, व्याघातात्। तस्मात् ज्ञात-अनुपलब्धि-जन्यस्य असाक्षात्कारित्वात् तत्-विपरीत-कारणकं इदं तत्-विपरीत-जातीयं इति न्याय्यम्।

ननु क्व नाम ज्ञात-अनुपलब्धिः असाक्षात्कारिणीं अभाव-प्रतीतिं जनयति? तत् यथा 'निपुणतरं अनुसृतः मया मन्दिरे चैत्रः न च उपलब्धः' इति श्रुत्वा श्रोता अनुमिनोति 'नूनं न आसीत् एव' इति। एतेन प्राक्-नास्तिता अपि व्याख्याता। ननु तथापि अवान्तर-जाति-भेदः अस्तु, अज्ञात-अनुपलब्धि-जन्ये साक्षात्कारः तु कुतः इति चेत्? कारण-विरोधात् कार्य-विरोधेन भवितव्यं इति उक्तं एव। अन्-अन्यत्र-उपक्षीण-इन्द्रिय-व्यापार-अनन्तर-भावित्वात् च। अधिकरण-ग्रहणे तदुपक्षीणं इति चेत्? न। अंधस्य अपि त्वगिन्द्रिय-उपनीते घटादौ रूप-विशेष-अभाव-प्रतीति-प्रसङ्गात्। अस्ति हि तस्य अधिकरण-ग्रहणं, अस्ति च प्रतियोगि-स्मरणं, अस्ति च श्यामे रक्तत्वस्य योग्यस्य अभावः अनुपलब्धिः च। अधिकरण-ग्राहक-इन्द्रिय-ग्राह्य-अभाव-वादिनः अपि समानं एतदिति चेत्? न। प्रतियोगि-ग्राहक-इन्द्रिय-ग्राह्य अभावः इति अभ्युपगमात्। मम अपि प्रतियोगि-ग्राहक-इन्द्रिय-गृहीते अधिकरणे अनुपलब्धिः प्रमाणं इत्यभ्युपगमः इति चेत्? न। वायौ त्वगिन्द्रिय-

उपनीते रूपाभाव-प्रतीति-अन्-उदय-प्रसङ्गात्। तथापि तत् तत्र संनिकृष्टं इति चेत्? हन्त एवं अन्-अन्यत्र चरितार्थं इन्द्रियं अवश्यं अपेक्षणीयं रूपाभावेन।

स्यात् एतत्। तथापि वस्तु-अंतर-ग्रहे एव तस्य उपयोगः इति चेत्? न। तस्य तं प्रति अकारणत्वात्। कारणत्वे वा महा-अंधकारे कर-परामर्शेन स्पर्शवद्-द्रव्य-अभावं न प्रतीयात्। प्रतीयात् च पुरः-विस्फारित-अक्षः पृष्ठ-लग्नस्य अ-श्यामत्वम्। आर्जव-अवस्थानं अ-व्यधिकरणस्य उपयुज्यते इति चेत्? तर्हि नयन-संनिकर्षः अपि उपयोक्ष्यते तदेक-सहकारि-प्रभा-संनिकर्ष-अपेक्षणात्। अन्यथा वातायन-विवर-विसारि-कर-परामृष्टे अपि अधिकरणे तदुपलंभ-प्रसङ्गात् च।

तथापि योग्यता-आपादन-उपक्षीणं चक्षुः। यत् इतर-सामग्री-साकल्ये हि अनुपलभ्यमानस्य अभावः निश्चीयते तत् च चक्षुषि अधिकरणे-सति स्यात् इति चेत्? ननु परिपूर्णानि कारणानि एव साकल्यम्? तथा च किं कुत्र उपक्षीणम्? अथ अन्योन्य-मेलकं मिथः-प्रत्यासत्ति-आदि-वाच्यं तदुपक्षयः? न तर्हि क्वचित् चक्षुः कारणं स्यात् इति। न हि रूपादि-उपलब्धिं अपि अ-संनिकृष्टं एतत् उपजनयति। अथ अधिकरण-समवेत-किंचित्-उपलंभः अपि तत्-विषय-अभाव-ग्रहे अनुपलब्धेः अपेक्षणीयः? ततः तत्र इदं चरितार्थम्। वायु-आदिषु तु रूपाभाव-प्रतीतिः आनुमानिकी। तथा हि अनुपलब्ध्या हि अनुमीयते-'अयं नीरूपः वायुः' इति। न। असिद्धेः। न हि उपलंभ-अभावः भवतां अभाव-उपलंभः, उपलंभस्य अतीन्द्रियत्व-अभ्युपगमात्। प्राकट्य-अभावेन अनुमेयः इति चेत्? न। वायौ रूपवत्ता-प्राकट्य-अभावस्य अपि असिद्धेः। रूपाभावेन समानत्वात्। व्यवहार-अभावेन अनुमेयः इति चेत्? न। काय-वाक्-व्यापार-अभावे अपि उपेक्षा-ज्ञान-अभाव-अभ्युपगमात्। मूक-स्वप्न-उपपत्तेः च। न च व्यवहार-अभाव-मात्रेण अनुमातुं अपि शक्यते। अनैकांतिकत्वात् असिद्धेः च।

तद्विषयः तु व्यवहारः तद्विषय-ज्ञान-जन्यः वा तद्विषय-ज्ञान-जनकः वा तदाश्रय-धर्म-जनकः वा? तदभावः च तत्-ज्ञान-तदाश्रय-धर्म-

अभाव-अतंर्भूतः एव इति अशक्य-निश्चयः एव। आत्माश्रय-इतरे-तराश्रय-चक्रक-प्रवृत्ति-प्रसङ्गात्। न च अज्ञातस्य उपलंभ-अभावस्य लिंगता। न च प्राकट्य-अभावः सत्ता-मात्रेण उपलंभ-अभावं आवेदयति इति युक्तम्। लिंग-अभावस्य तथात्वे अतिप्रसङ्गात्। अविनाभाव-बलेन तु नियमे तत्-प्रतिसंधान-आपत्तेः। न हि अविनाभावः सत्तामात्रेण ज्ञान-हेतुं नियमयति, धूमादौ अपि तथा-भाव-प्रसङ्गात् इति। ज्ञान-प्रत्यक्षत्वेन त्वत्-दिशा भविष्यति इति चेत्? न। शब्द-ध्वंसादिना उक्त-उत्तरत्वात्। अपि च प्रतियोगि-ग्राहक-इन्द्रियेण अधिकरण-धर्म-प्रतीतिः अनुपलब्धेः अंगं इति, तत्-रहितायाः तस्याः कार्य-व्यभिचारादि अवस्थाप्येत व्याप्ति-बलात् वा? न तावत् उक्त-रूप-अनुपलब्धिः तां विना अभाव प्रत्ययं अ-जनयंती दृश्यते। नापि व्याप्तेः। तथा सति वायौ रूपाभाव-प्रत्ययः तां आक्षिपेत्। एवंभूतत्वात्। अनाक्षेपे वा न तत्-कारणकः भवेत् न वा भवेत्। ततः न भवति एव। लिंगात् तदुत्पत्तिः इति चेत्? ननु लिंगं अपि सा एव, न तत्व-अंतरम्ः यथा योनि-संबंधः अलिंग-दशायां-इन्द्रिय-संनिकर्षं अपक्षते, लिगं-दशायां तु तदनपेक्षः एव ब्राम्हण्य-ज्ञाने, तथा एतत् स्यात् इति चेत्? कार्य-जाति-भेदात् तदुपपत्तेः। प्रकृते च तत् अनभ्युपगमात्। पारोक्ष्य-अपारोक्ष्ये विहाय अन्यथा अपि असौ भविष्यति इति चेत्? न। अनुपलंभात्। संभाव्यते तावत् इति चेत्? संभाव्यताम्। न तु एतावता अपि तं आश्रित्य कारण-नियम-निश्चयः।

अज्ञात-करणत्वात् च। यत् अज्ञायमान-करण-जं ज्ञानं तत् साक्षात् इन्द्रिय-जं यथा रूप-प्रत्यक्षम्। तथा च 'इह भूतले घटः नास्ति' इति ज्ञानं इति। यथा वा स्मरणं अज्ञायमान-करण-जं साक्षात् मनो-जन्म। कुतः तर्हि न साक्षात्कारि-अनुभव-रूपम्? संस्कार-अतिरिक्त-संनिकर्ष-अभावात् इति वक्ष्यामः। तथापि भाव-विषये इयं व्यवस्था। अभाव-ज्ञानं तु अज्ञात-करणत्वे अपि न साक्षात् इन्द्रिय-जं भविष्यति इति चेत्? न। उत्सर्गस्य बाधक-अभावेन संकोच-अनुपपत्तेः। अन्यथा सर्व-व्याप्तीनां भाव-मात्र-विषयत्व-प्रसङ्गः अविशेषात्। तथापि विपक्षे

किं बाधकं इति चेत्? ननु इदं एव तावत्। अन्यत् अपि उच्यमानं आकर्णय। तत् यथा अकारणक-कार्य-प्रसङ्गः रूपादि-उपलब्धीनां अपि वा अनिन्द्रिय-करणत्व-प्रसङ्गः। न हि अनुमित्यादिभिः उपलभ्यमान-करणिकाभिः चक्षुरादि-व्यवस्थापनम्। अपि तु अनुपलभ्यमान-करणिकाभिः रूपादि-उपलब्धिभिः एव। यद्यपि साक्षात्कारिता अपि तत्र एव पर्यवस्यति तदापि प्रथमतः अनुपलभ्यमान-करणत्वं एव प्रयोजकं चक्षुरादि-कल्पने। न हि उपलभ्यमाने करण-अंतरे साक्षात्कारिणीषु अपि तासु चक्षुरादि अनुपलभ्यमानं कश्चित् अकल्पयिष्यत्। अतः एव साक्षात्कारित्वे अपि स्मृतेः मनः एव करणं उपागमन् धीराः। संस्कारः तु अर्थ-विशेष-प्रत्यासत्तौ उपयुज्यते। इन्द्रियाणां प्राप्य-कारित्व-व्यवस्थापनात्।

'भाव-आवेशात् च चेतसः।' सर्वत्र हि बाह्यार्थ-अनुभवे जनयितव्ये भाव-भूत-प्रमाण-आविष्टं एव चेतः उपयुज्यते न अतः अन्यथा इति व्याप्तिः। तथा एव शक्तेः अवधारणात्। न हि अनुपलब्धि-मात्र-सहाये तदभावे अपि अनुभवं आधातुं उत्सहते। शब्द-लिंगादेः अपेक्षा-दर्शनात्। न च यत्र यत्-अपेक्षं यस्य जनकत्वं उपलब्धं तदेव तस्यैव तदनपेक्षं जनकं इति न्याय-सहम्। आर्द्रेन्धन-संबंधं अंतरेण अपि दहनात् धूम-संभावना-आपत्तेः। तथा च गतं कार्य-कारण-भाव-परिग्रह-व्यसनेन।

TRANS.: It has already been discussed that non-cognition is not opposed to theism. This (means of cognition) does not differ from perception. This is explained as follows:

> 'Because of immediacy of cognition generated, because of the capacity of the (concerned) sense-organ not being effective (otherwise), because of the intrinsic (and not known) causality of its causes and because of the positive nature of the instrumentality of mind in its generation, the cognition of absence is not different from perception.'

To explain the above: The cognition which is direct and perceptual is immediately caused by a sense-organ as it is the sensory cognition of colour, taste etc. So is the cognition of the form, 'Here on the ground there is no pot'. But how is it known that this cognition is perceptual?

Well, if all cognitions of absence were non-perceptual then its immediate cause cannot be sometimes the non-cognition itself and sometimes the cognition of it. (Perception is caused by the sense-organs themselves whereas non-perceptual cognitions are caused by the cognitions of concomitance, words etc.). Certainly the same effect cannot be produced by the same cause either in its intrinsic capacity or as known, at different times. If such a thing happened then the senses, as known may produce perception and the middle term in inference may cause inference as unknown. Moreover (such a diverse causality of the same entity) would jeopardise the causality of cognition in all cases because, if in some cases at least the cause itself and not its cognition produced the effect then the cognition would forfeit its casual character. So whichever absence-cognition is produced by a cognised non-cognition it is non-perceptual while the absence-cognition produced by non-cognition itself is perceptual. But is there any instance where a non-perceptual cognition of absence is produced by a known non-cognition? Yes, there is. For example, hearing a certain person say, 'I searched very carefully for Chaitra in the temple but I did not come across him there', the hearer concludes inferentially that certainly Chaitra was not present in the temple some time back (this cognition of the hearer is based on the cognised non-cognition of Chaitra). Anterior absence of things is also perceptually or non-perceptually cognised accordingly as it is caused by unknown or known non-cognitions respectively. 'Alright! Let the absence-cognition generated by an unknown non-cognition differ from that which is generated by a known non-cognition but why should the latter be regarded as perceptual?' It may be asked. The answer is that if a certain cause is opposed in nature to another cause then correspondingly its effect also would be opposed in nature to the effect produced by the other cause. Besides the said cognition of the non-cognition is produced by the sense-organ whose operation is not exhausted in producing any effect other than the perception of the non-cognition. 'But isn't the sense-organ preoccupied with the production of locus-perception?' No! If this were the case then even a blind person should be able to sense the absence of a certain colour in objects such as pot which are tactually apprehended by him. The blind person has the tactual sensation of the pot and also in a general way the recollection that the pot is coloured. (This is a very questionable remark of the author. How can a blind person recollect things as coloured if he can't see them at all?). Besides there is absence of redness, say, which is a sensible property residing in the dark colour of a black pot. Thus all the conditions of the perception of non-cognition except the sense-object-contact are present in the above instance. But yet a blind person does not sense the absence of redness of the dark colour of the pot. But doesn't this contingency affect even the view that absence is apprehended by the sense-organ which apprehends the locus of absence? The loci pot, cloth etc. are sensed by the tactual sense, and the absence of a particular colour is a qualifier of the former and thus the indirect relation of being the qualifier of that which is conjoined with the sense-organ obtains between the tactual sense of the blind person and the absence of a particular colour? Well, in reply to this we say that absence is in fact apprehended by the sense-organ which apprehends the counter-positive of the absence. (Since colour which is the counter-positive of the absence here is not sensed by the tactual sense the above contingency can be averted). Now can't the opponent also maintain that non-cognition is the means of valid cognition only in respect of the absence which is located in the locus that is sensed by the sense-organ apprehending the counter-positive of the absence? (In the foregoing case the tactual sense does not apprehend the colour which is the counter-positive of the absence of colour and so even if the loci pot, cloth etc. are tactually apprehended the absence of colour cannot be apprehended in them). Well, if the perceptual cognition of the locus of absence is needed for the valid cognition caused by non-cognition then the cognition of the absence of colour and form in air (even by means of non-cognition would not be possible. Air being the locus of the absence of colour and form it should be visible but it is not although it is perceptually cognised through the tactual sense. The counter-positive of the absence of colour and form are perceived by the eye, not by touch).' But isn't air conjoined with the eye (or the percipient) and if it is, why not admit mere conjunction with the eye sufficient for cognition through non-cognition of the absence of colour and form in the air? Alas! This contention implies that in the cognition of absence the need of the sense-organ which apprehends the counter-positive of the absence but is ineffective in the apprehension of anything else is unavoidable. Alright! Let us then say that the sense-organ is needed to sense anything over and above the counter-positive of the absence. In the foregoing instance the eye perceives the colour of other visible objects. It is not necessary that the eye should perceive the air also for the absence of colour characterising it to be cognised by non-cognition. This contention too is not acceptable simply because the perception by the eye of the colours of things other than air is of no use in the cognition of absence of colour in the air. If this is not admitted then a person moving about in pitch darkness cannot apprehend the absence of things that can be touched, (by means of groping) as no other object than the

one which is being sought after by the person is tactually sensed by him (this proves that for the tactual non-cognition of things the tactual cognition of some other thing is not at all required). Moreover on the above assumption a person who is looking with wide-open eyes at an object facing him should be able to visualise the absence of blackness in a red pot placed behind him. The above condition of non-cognition is fulfilled here as blackness which is the counter-positive of absence is perceived by the person in the objects present before him (but not in any one behind him. This argument shows the irrelevance of other perceptions by the sense for the non-cognitive cognition of absence). The opponent may argue against this that for the cognition of absence the suitable presence of the locus of absence before the percipient is also needed. But if this were so then the contact of the eye with the locus of absence would also be needed because without light no object is visible to the eye and light is the main accessory to visual perception. This has to be admitted because otherwise a person extending his hand through the hole of a ventilator-pipe should be able to perceive the absence of darkness in an object lying on the other side of the pipe as the object is present before him although (unseen by him) and is in tactual contact with him.

However it may be urged against the foregoing that the sense-organ needed for the cognition of a thing is needed for the cognition of its absence. Only the competent non-cognition is supposed to produce the cognition of absence by both Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā schools. Competence is defined as the collocation of all the conditions of the perception of a thing excluding itself—whose absence is sought to be cognised. (Sense-object-contact is included among the conditions). Only if the eye is in contact with the locus of an absence the collocation of the remaining conditions of the cognition of the absence provides competence to the non-cognition. So it can be maintained that the visual function is exhausted in providing competence to the non-cognition. It is not needed for the perception of the absence.

One can retort against the above rejoinder that the causal collocation of an effect comprises all the different conditions needed for the production of the effect. The sense-object-contact is included in the causal collocation determining the competence of non-cognition. As such there is no sense in saying that the functioning of the visual sense is exhausted in providing just a condition of competence. If by exhaustion of function is meant the collocation of all the conditions productive of an effect then the eye cannot be regarded as the cause even of the colour-and-form sensation as, only as conjoined with its object the

eye produces the sensation of the colour and form of the object. (The function of the eye is thus exhausted in getting involved in the conjunction).

(The Mīmāṃsaka now sets forth a different type of argument to defend the instrumentality of non-cognition). He says that the eye-function is exhausted in the perception of some characteristic property inhering in the locus of absence. The eye cannot therefore be of use in cognising non-cognition. As to the cognition of the absence of colour in air, it may be urged that it is inferential not perceptual. The inference is that the air is devoid of colour because no colour is seen in it. But the middle term in the inference is unknown as the absence of seeing or the visual cognition cannot be perceptual in the Mīmāṃsā view. All cognition is imperceptible according to Mīmāṃsā so the absence of seeing is also imperceptible. However if the absence of seeing is the seeing of absence then too the middle term remains unknown as all cognitions are invisible according to Mīmāṃsā. Even the absence of manifestness of colour in air cannot be taken as the middle term in the above inference as even the absence of the manifestation of colour in air is unknown unless the counter-positive of this absence, namely the manifestation is known. Can then the absence of the manifestation of colour in air be inferred on the basis of the absence of all usage regarding the colouredness of air? No, not all manifestations or cognitions are concomitant with bodily or oral activities or usages. The cognition of indifference pertaining to an object (that it is neither good nor bad) is not at all associated with any bodily activity or usage (generally when these activities or usages are absent, only then the cognition of indifference arises). Besides a dumb person does have dreams which he cannot express through his bodily or oral activities. Moreover there can be no inference of the absence of colour-cognition in air on the basis of the absence of certain specific usages (like those relating to the favourable or the unfavourable). If the usages happen to be one's own then the middle term becomes deviant as even in the absence of a certain person's usage there can be other usages. If all usages relating to colour-cognition are meant to be excluded by the middle term then the middle remains unknown as every usage cannot be known.

Further it may be asked whether the usage (not the indifferent one) relating to a thing is caused by the cognition of the thing, the cause of the cognition of the thing or the cause of a property resident in the thing. (The property referred to here is the property of 'manifestness' which, according to Mīmāṃsā, a thing acquires as a result of its being known). Now usage is not different from cognition but it is the cogni-

tion of a thing as such and such. So to infer absence of cognition (of colour in air) from absence of usage is nothing but inferring absence of cognition by itself. So the inference is afflicted by the fallacy of self-dependence. The fallacy of mutual dependence also afflicts the inference on the view that usage is caused by cognition. Just as in certain cases usage is caused by cognition, in certain other cases cognition is caused by usage. So there is mutuality in the causation of the absence of cognition and usage. If the third of the above alternative views is adopted then there arises the fallacy of circularity in the inference. The cognition or inference of non-cognition results from the cognition of non-manifestness, the cognition of non-cognition leads to the cognition of the absence of usage and this in its turn leads to the cognition of non-manifestness thus giving rise to the fallacy of circularity. In this manner the absence of usage being no other than or being included in the absence of cognition or the absence of the property of manifestness it is not possible to infer one from the other as the fallacies mentioned above beset the inference. Nor can the unknown absence of cognition or other things be the middle term in any inference. (This is stated here to controvert the likely suggestion of Mīmāṃsaka that if cognition proves the existence of a thing then the absence of cognition can prove the nonexistence of the thing. This is not correct. The presence of smoke is a proof for the presence of fire but the absence of smoke cannot be a sure indication of the absence of fire as fire exists without smoke. Besides only a known middle term can lead to the inference of its major). It is also not correct to think that the absence of manifestness by itself (without being known) yields the (inferential) cognition of the absence of cognition. (Manifestness or usage relating to colour for example is proof for its existence in a coloured object but this cannot be a ground for the absence of manifestness or usage relating to the nonexistence of colour in air to be proof for the latter. Just as an unknown entity cannot be the middle term in any inference so even the unknown absence of any entity cannot be the middle term in any inference). Moreover if a certain entity can be a valid middle term in the inference of a certain major term, the absence of the middle cannot be a valid middle term for inferring the absence of the said major term. If however invariable concomitance of the middle with the major term is supposed to determine the inferribility of the major from the middle then in the above instance the invariable concomitance between absence of colour and absence of manifestness has got to be ascertained, concomitance by itself does not determine the inferential causality of the middle term. If it did so then smoke etc. though concomitant with fire etc. may lead to the inference

of the latter even if the concomitance between the former and the latter terms is unknown. It is possible to meet the above difficulty (of inferring the absence of colour in air) by treating cognitions as accessible to perception. But this kind of rejoinder has already been repudiated earlier by the author while explaining the fact that the perceptual cognition of the absence of sound does not depend upon the perceptual cognition of the locus of the absence of sound. (So in the above instance even without the perception of air the absence of colour in it can well be taken to be perceptible).

Further it may be asked of the Mīmāṃsaka ; 'How is it ascertained by him that non-cognition as an independent means of knowledge of absence depends upon the sensory cognition of the characteristic property of the locus of the absence by the very sense-organ by which the counter-positive of the absence is cognised?' Is it because non-cognition unaccompanied by the said sensory cognition is not always effective or because there is concomitance between these two? The first alternative is not true because non-cognition is nowhere found to be unproductive of absence-cognition. (Earlier it has already been stated that even in the absence of the sensory cognition of the sky the fading or destruction of sound is cognised with the help of the cognition of sound). The second of the above alternatives too is incorrect. If non-cognition and sensory cognition were concomitant then the cognition of the absence of colour in air would call for the sensory cognition of airness or some other property of air (as its prerequisite). If it does not do so then it cannot have the sensory cognition as its cause or it may not arise at all. So it must be admitted that the cognition of the absence of colour does not ever arise from the said sensory cognition. Can the cognition be supposed to arise inferentially? Well, if the cognition is inferential then the middle term in the inference is non-cognition itself and so if this non-cognition is supposed to depend upon sensory cognition then the difficulty just stated would beset the inference too.

But as in the case of a person, his being of the Brahmin caste is known directly through his Brahmin parentage if he is present before a percipient while if he is not so present then the caste-affiliation of the person is inferred through his Brahmin parentage, so in the case of non-cognition too can't it be contended that when absence is inferred through non-cognition then the characteristic property of the locus of the absence does not need to be sensed; otherwise the operation of the sense-organ for the purpose is necessary? No! In the foregoing instance the cognitions in the two cases are different in nature, one being perceptual and the other inferential but in the case under consideration

such a distinction is not acceptable. But can't some distinction other than that of perceptuality and inferentiality characterise respectively the cognitions of the absence of colour in air and the absence of pot say, on the floor so that in one case sensory cognition of the locus would be a prerequisite while in the other case the sensory cognition would not be needed at all? No! No other distinction is noticeable in the two cognitions (of the absence of colour in air and common absences like the absence of pot on the ground). But isn't such a distinction possible? Well, let it be possible but the mere possibility cannot be allowed to determine that non-cognition is necessarily an independent means of cognition (as the Mīmāṃsaka is trying to do).

Explaining the argument in the third quarter of the verse-text the author says that the cause of the cognition of absence is not a cognition but the sense-organ which by itself produces the cognition of absence. (All cognitions which are generated by uncognised causes are generated by sense-organs) just as the sensory cognition of colour is generated by the eye and not its cognition. Similar is the cognition, 'There is absence of pot here on the floor,' which needs only visual contact with the absence to produce it. Similar also is recollection produced directly by mind. The immediate cause of recollection viz. the objective cognition preceding it is also the uncognised cause of the recollection. If so then why isn't recollection like any cognition of the form of sensory perception? It is not so because no usual sense-object-contact is involved in the recollective process. It is the residual impression of earlier cognition which acts as the contact between the mind and the recollected object. This will be explained later.

Alright! Let the above rule apply to positive entities only, why not admit that the cognition of absence although produced by an uncognised cause is not directly produced by the sense-organ? Well! The above rule is a common one, unless it is contradicted there is no reason why its scope should be restricted to positive entities only. If this were not so then in like manner all concomitances could as well be supposed to obtain amongst positive entities only so that like the perception of absence even its inference would have to be denied. 'But what goes against maintaining that the cognition of absence though uncaused by a known cause is not sensory?' One may ask. The answer is that the aforesaid contingency that absence cannot be inferred or verbalised is itself opposed to the contention. There are other considerations too opposed to the contention. For example, on the above view there will arise the contingency of the emergence of uncaused effects (as absence-cognition would not be caused by any sense organ) or the occurrence of the

perceptions of colour etc. without the immediate causality of a sense-organ. The senses are transcendental, their existence is inferred on the basis of the uncognised, intrinsic causality involved in the production of the perceptions of colour, touch etc. The inferential and other cognitions of colour, touch etc. are not produced by sense-organs and so the existence of these cannot be proved on the basis of the occurrence of non-perceptual cognitions of colour, touch etc.

It may be noted here that immediate perceptivity of the sense-organs also amounts to their non-cognised causality yet it is mainly the latter that leads to the inference of eye etc. as the uncognised causes of sensory cognition. If cognised entities were known as causes even of immediate perceptions then nobody would have inferred the uncognised eye, nose etc. as the causes of these perceptions (only by excluding the cognised entities the causality of the uncognised can be established. Thus sense-generatedness may be taken as determined by uncognised-generatedness). This is the reason why recollection though non-perceptual is regarded as mind (a sense-organ)-generated by learned people. But recollection is not treated as a variety of perception because mind's contact with the recollected object does not operate to produce recollection. The residual impressions of the earlier cognition does not connect the mind with the recollected object. The impression is required only to bring the image of the cognised object before the mind. Sense-organs are known to operate through their contact with objects, but in recollection there is no contact of mind with the recollected object.

Now the author turns to the fourth quarter of the verse-text. Elucidating the statement in the text the author says that while producing the cognition of any external object, mind functions only as accompanied by a positive instrument of valid cognition not otherwise. This is the rule and this is how mind's capacity is known to be effective. Certainly mind cannot engender cognition of the absence of an object simply with the help of the non-cognition of the absent object. Words, signs or middle term etc. are known to be needed besides the non-cognition to help generate the cognition of absence. Certainly it cannot be rational to regard a thing productive by itself of another when it is seen to produce it only as depending upon other things. (It is known that mind produces the cognition of absence only as accompanied by certain positive conditions of valid cognition. So the need of the sense-organ for the production of the cognition of absence cannot be ruled out). If this were not true then smoke may be produced by fire even if it is not kindled by wet fuel. If this is condoned then the attachment to the law of causality will be meaningless.

EXPL.: Now the author takes up the Mīmāṃsā view that non-cognition is an independent source of valid cognition for elaborate criticism. He starts by elucidating the distinction between known and unknown non-cognitions and it is the cognition of absence caused (partly) by the latter that must be perceptual according to the author. The sense-organ associated with the latter produces the perception of absence. So non-cognition is not an independent source of knowledge. Even if non-cognition is needed for the cognition of absence it is not needed as known. So the absence-cognition due to uncognised non-cognition must be perceptual. The non-cognition that is cognised for example when it is the middle term in an inference like say, 'I searched for Chaitra all over the house but I did not come across him', the absence of the uncognised Chaitra is inferred by means of the cognition of non-cognition, the middle term. This non-cognition does not lead to perceptual cognition as it is a known one. The author formulates an important rule pertaining to the causes of cognition, viz., that whatever cognition is generated by cognised causes is non-perceptual. Sense-organs produce sensory cognition by themselves without being cognised while the middle term in inference and word etc. produce inferential and other cognitions only through their respective cognitions.

It may be noted in this connection that when the absence-cognition arises both the Naiyāyika and Mīmāṃsaka admit that there are present sense-contact with the absence as well as the non-cognition of the counter-positive of the absence. The difference between the views of these disputants concerns only the primary causality of either of these two conditions. The Naiyāyika is of the view that though non-cognition is a necessary causal condition of absence-cognition, sense-contact with absence is the primary condition of the latter which is therefore a perceptual cognition. According to the Mīmāṃsaka however the sense-activity present before absence-cognition is not directly concerned with absence as it is mainly required to apprehend the locus of the absence. Against this contention the Naiyāyika argues that if sense-contact with the absence is unnecessary for absence-cognition then even a blind person should be able to cognise the absence of say, blackness in the red colour of a red pot lying before him. The blind person can touch the pot and recollect blackness—the counter-positive of the blankness—absence. It may be pointed out that this objection is mistaken as the blind person cannot remember blackness, having never seen it. Besides, the argument seems deliberately to ignore the point that the sense-organ concerned with the perception of the locus of absence must be the same that according to Naiyāyika—is concerned with the perception of absence. The author brings forward indirectly this point in Mīmāṃsaka's rejoinder to the argument when he says that the locus of absence has to be perceptible by the very sense by which the counter-positive is perceptible.

The objection preferred against this rejoinder on behalf of the Naiyāyika is very significent as it highlights the Nyāya contention discussed elsewhere earlier that the cognition of absence does not invariably depend upon the cognition of the locus of the absence. The cognition of the absence of colour and form in air is such a cognition as, despite the imperceptibility of the air absence of colour is perceived in it. This is however disputed by the Mīmāṃsaka who says that the absence of colour is inferred and not perceived in the air.

On an impartial view of the above argumentation it appears that the weight of evidence is more in favour of the Mīmāṃsaka then of the Naiyāyika. First, it is rather questionable to maintain that the locus-cognition is not always needed for absence-cognition. Such a view is upheld by Nyāya mainly to support its metaphysical theory that the invisible sky is the locus and the inherent cause of sound. Since sound is perceptible through the ear but the sky is imperceptible the absence of sound is also perceptible without its locus—the sky—being perceptible. This is the Nyāya position. This does not satisfactorily explain the prepositional character of the cognitions of sound or its absence having the form; 'There is absolutely no sound here'. The place indicated by the word 'here' in this proposition must be perceptible. It cannot be the imperceptible sky. To skirt this difficulty the Naiyāyika denies that the locus-cognition is needed for the cognition of the absence of sound. But is it so in the case of sound-cognition too? Can it be maintained that a sound can be heard without being localised? To say in reply to this that although the sky is not seen some or other object near which a sound occurs can be taken as its locative determinant is mere sophistry. Nyāya has got to admit that sound and its absence and all other absences are cognised perceptually or non-perceptually always along with their loci.

Secondly, Nyāya has to modify its view that absence is perceived by the sense-organ and so absence-cognition is perceptual. There is a good deal of justification for the Mīmāṃsaka's contention that the sense-activity involved in absence-cognition is not concerned with absence as its object. If we go strictly by the experiential testimony we find that a percipient notices the absence of a thing at a place only when, looking for the thing at the place he fails to find it there. The visual activity of the person is here mainly concerned with the locus where the thing was expected to be present. There is here no object other than the locus

with which the visual contact can take place. The thing sought for not being present it can be the object of recollection only. So the Mīmāṃsaka contends that the recollection of the object sought for coupled with the perception of the expected locus of the absence leads by itself to the cognition of absence. There is no need to postulate the additional activity of the sense-organ for coming in contact with absence in order to apprehend it, This means that absence is apprehended automatically as it were—when its expected locus is perceived and its counter-positive is recollected.

But can't there be deliberate perception of absence and if there it can be, can the above account apply to it? Let us take a specific example of such a possible perception. Suppose I want my rented house vacated by the tenant by a certain date. To make sure that the house has been vacated I go to the house on the appointed day. As soon as I see that the tenant is not present in the house I know that the tenant is absent there. The perception of the expected absence of the tenant in the house follows immediately the non-perception of his presence there. The succession is so quick that very often the non-perception is mistaken for the absence-perception. This is a suitable instance for the vindication of the Nyāya view that over and above non-cognition of the cognisable, sense-contact with absence is needed for its cognition. Can the Naiyāyika show here that a certain perception can be identified as the perception of the absence of the tenant if it is presupposed that the non-perception of the tenant is not the same as the perception of his absence? It is very difficult to answer the question in the affirmative. There is also a redundancy in the Nyāya view as it admits an additional activity of the sense-organ in getting related to absence in order to apprehend it when the non-perception itself suffices to account for the absence-cognition.

All this does not mean that the Mīmāṃsā view is free from difficulty. First Mīmāṃsā has to regard non-cognition which is just an absence as of the level of an independent means of valid cognition. Now this absence too will be in need of another non-cognition for its cognition. This will be the non-cognition of the non-cognition of the absent entity. This second non-cognition too will require a non-cognition to cognise it. Thus there is sure to arise an infinite regress in treating non-cognition as an independent source of knowledge.

Another difficulty of the Mīmāṃsā view is that it has to admit non-cognition of the absent as the means of cognising the present viz., the absence. This is a very queer supposition both because the actual object of this means of knowledge is other than absence and also because (as

stated above) non-cognition is just absence which is raised to the status of an independent source of knowledge.

Towards the end of the section dealing with non-cognition the author has entered into an elaborate discussion of the contention of Mīmāṃsā that the absence of colour and form in air is known only through inference. Nyāya is opposed to the view. According to it there cannot be a valid inference of absence of colour and form in air as no suitable and flawless middle term can be had for this purpose. Absence of empirical usage, absence of manifestness etc. as possible middle terms are ruled out for various reasons. Here it needs to be pointed out that the cognition of colour and form can in no way be treated as perceptual. If it is a determinate cognition then both the epistemic qualifier and the epistemic qualificand in this cognition must be perceptible which is not the case. The very inference by which air—an invisible entity according to Nyāya is proved to be a substance other than the known eight substances may be taken to establish the colourlessness also of air.

Further criticism of non-cognition as an independent means of knowledge

TEXT: अपि च–

प्रतियोगिनि सामर्थ्यात् व्यापार-अ-व्यवधानतः।
अक्ष-आश्रयात्वात् दोषाणां इन्द्रियाणि विकल्पनात्॥

यत् हि प्रमाणं यत्-भाव-अवगाहि, तत् तदभाव-अवगाहि यथा लिंगं शब्दः वा। घटादि-अवगाहि च इन्द्रियं इति। अन्यथा हि शब्दादिकं अपि न अभावं आवेदयेत्। भावे एव सामर्थ्य-अवधारणात्। न च एवं एव न्याय्यम्। 'देवदत्तः गेहे नास्ति' इति शब्दात् 'मया तत्र जिज्ञासमानेन अपि न दृष्टः मैत्रः इति अवगत-अनुपलब्ध्या-अनुमानात् अपि अवगतेः। ग्राहयतु च आश्रयं इन्द्रियं, तथापि न तेन इदं व्यवधीयते, व्यापारत्वात्। अन्यथा सर्व-स-विकल्पकानां प्रत्यक्षत्वाय दत्तः जलाञ्जलिः स्यात्। ननु एवं सति धूम-उपलंभः अपि अस्य व्यापारः स्यात्। तथा च गतं अनुमानेन अपि इति चेत्? यथा क्रियया विना यस्य यत्-कारणत्वं न निर्वहति, तं प्रति तस्याः एव व्यापारत्वात्। न च धूमादि-उपलब्धिं अंतरेण चक्षुषः वन्हि-ज्ञान-कारणत्वं न निर्वहति, संयोगवत् इति।

अस्ति च भाव-अभाव-विपर्ययः। सः अयं यस्य दोषं अनुविधत्ते तदेव अत्र कारणं इति न्याय्यम्। न च अनुपलब्धिः स्वभावतः दुष्टा। नापि अधिक-ग्रहणं प्रतियोगि-स्मरणं वा स्वभावतः दुष्टम्। अनुत्पत्ति-दशायां अनुत्पत्तेः, उत्पत्ति-दशायां च स्वार्थ-प्रकाशन-स्वभावतायाः अ-परावृत्तेः। असंसृष्टयोः अधिकरण-प्रतियोगिनोः संसृष्टतया प्रतिभानं दुष्टम्। संसृष्टयोः च अ-संसृष्टतया इति चेत्? ननु अयं एव विपर्ययः। तथा च आत्माश्रयः दोषः। तस्मात् दुष्ट-इन्द्रियस्य तत्-विपर्यय-सामर्थ्ये अ-दुष्टस्य तत्-समीचीन-ज्ञान-सामर्थ्यं अपि। तथा च प्रयोगः 'इन्द्रियं अभाव-प्रमा-करणं, तत्-विपर्यय-करणत्वात्, यत् यद्विपर्यय-करणं तत् तत्-प्रमा-करणं, यथा रूप-प्रमा-करणं चक्षुः इति।

विकल्पनात् खलु अपि। अघटं भूतलं इति विशिष्ट धीः अवश्यं इन्द्रिय-करणिका स्वीकर्तव्या, प्रमाण-अंतरं वा सप्तमं आस्थेयम्। यथा हि विशेष्य-मात्र-उपक्षीणं इन्द्रियं अकरणं अत्र तथा विशेषण-मात्र-उपक्षीणा अनुपलब्धिः अपि न करणं स्यात्। स्व-स्वविषय-मात्र-प्रवृत्तयोः प्रमाणयोः समाहारः कारणं इति चेत्? न। विषय-भेदे फल-वैजात्ये च तदनुपपत्तेः। न हि मृत्सु तंतुषु च व्याप्रियमाणयोः कुलाल-कुविन्दयोः समाहारः स्यात्। नापि घट-पटादि-कारिणां चक्र-वेमा दीनां समाहारः क्वचित् उपयुज्यते। तत्र कर्बुर-कार्य-अभावात् न तथा। प्रकृते तु विशिष्ट-प्रत्ययस्य परोक्ष-अ-परोक्ष-रूपस्य दर्शनात्-तथा इति चेत्? न। विरुद्ध-जाति-समावेश-अभावात्। भावे वा करंबिते एव कार्ये द्वयोः अपि शक्तिः अवगंतव्या दर्शन-बलात्। न हि नियत-विषयेण सामर्थ्येन कर्बुर-कार्य-सिद्धिः। अन्यत्र अपि तथा प्रसङ्गात्। ननु उभयोः अपि उभयत्र सामर्थ्यं, कः अर्थः मिथः संनिधानेन इति चेत्? न। तत्-सहितस्य एव तस्य तत्र सामर्थ्यात् इति। एतेन 'सुरभि चदनं' इत्यादयः व्याख्याताः। तथा च अभाव-विषये अपि इन्द्रिय-सामर्थ्यस्य दुर्-अपन्हवत्वात् अलं असत्-ग्रहेण इति।

स्यात् एतत्। न अगृहीते विशेषणे विशिष्ट-बुद्धिः उदेति, तत्-कार्यत्वात्। न च विशिष्ट-सामर्थ्ये केवल-विशेषणे अपि सामर्थ्यम्। केवल-सौरभे

अपि चक्षुषः वृत्ति-प्रसङ्गात्। अतः अभाव-विशेषण-ग्रहणाय मान-अंतर-संभवः। अपि च कथं अन्-आलोचितः अर्थः इन्द्रियेण विकल्प्येत? न च मान-अन्तरस्य-अपि एषा रीतिः। अनुमानादिभिः अन्-आलोचितस्य अपि अर्थस्य विकल्पनात्। अ-प्राप्तेः च। न हि अभावेन इन्द्रियस्य संयोगादिः संभवति। न च विशेषणत्वं, संबंधान्तर-पूर्वकत्वात् तस्य। अवश्य-अभ्युपगंतव्यत्वात् च अनुपलब्धेः। न हि तदुपलब्धौ तत्-स्वभाव-उपलंभः इति चेत्? उच्यते-

अवच्छेद-ग्रह-ध्रौव्यात् अ-ध्रौव्ये। सिद्धसाधनात्।
प्राप्ति-अंतरे-अन्-अवस्थानात् न चेत् अन्यः अपि दुर्घटः॥

सः हि अर्थ विशेषणी भवन् केवलः अपि विस्फुरेत् यस्य अवच्छेदक-ज्ञानं न व्यंजकम्। सः च विकल्पयितव्यः आलोच्यते यः विशेषण-ज्ञान-निरपेक्षेण इन्द्रियेण विज्ञाप्यते। यः तु तत्-पुरस्सरः एव प्रकाशते तत्र तस्य विकल्प-सामग्री-समवधानवतः एव सामर्थ्यात् न अयं विधिः। स्वभाव-प्राप्तौ सत्यां अत्यधिका प्राप्तिः प्रतिपत्ति-बलेन रूपादौ अभ्युपगता। इह तु अनवस्था-दुःस्थतया न तदभ्युपगमः। न तु स्वभाव-प्रत्यासत्तिः एतावता एव विफलायते। न चेत् एवं प्रमाणान्तरे अपि सर्वं एतत् दुर्घटं स्यात्। तथा हि सर्वं एव मानं साक्षात् परंपरया वा निर्विकल्पक-विश्रांतम्। न हि अनुमानादिकं अपि अनालोचन-पूर्वकम्। ततः अनालोचितः अभावः कथं अनुपलब्ध्या अपि विकल्प्येत? न च तदा तदालोचनं एव जन्यते। प्रतियोगि-अन्-अवच्छिन्नस्य तस्य निरूपयितुं अशक्यत्वात्। शक्यत्वे वा किं अपराद्धं इन्द्रियेण? तस्य संबंध-अंतर-गर्भत्व-नियमेन विशेषणत्वस्य मानान्तरे अपि कः प्रतीकारः? तदभावस्य तदानीं अपि सत्वात्। परस्य तादात्म्यं अस्ति इति चेत्? ननु यदि असौ अस्ति, अस्ति एव। न चेत् न एव। न हि अभ्युपगमेन अर्थाः क्रियंते, अनभ्युपगमेन वा निवर्तंते इति। अवश्य-अभ्युपगंतव्यत्वे कारणत्वं सिद्धयेत्ः न तु मानान्तरत्वम्। अन्यथा भाव-उपलंभे अपि अभाव-अनुपलब्धिः एव प्रमाणं स्यात् न इन्द्रियम्।

अभाव-उपलंभे भाव-अनुपलंभवत् भाव-उपलंभे अभाव-अनुपलंभस्य
अपि वज्रलेपायमानत्वात् इति।

TRANS.: (In the verse-text the author gives further reasons for treating absence-cognition to be sense-generated and therefore perceptual. The reasons are):

The absence-cognition is perceptual or sense-generated because the counter-positive of the absence is perceptually apprehended by the sense-organ (there is the rule that whatever is sensorily perceived, its generic character and its absence are also sensorily perceived). Further the sensory cognition of the locus of absence (supposed to be needed for absence-cognition) is just the sensory process which does not stand in the way of the generation of absence-cognition by the sense-organ. Moreover the defects of the cognitions of the positive and the negative are mainly those which are due to the defects of the sense-organs and so the efficiency or validity of the cognitions is also due to the efficiency of the sense-organs. Lastly the determinate character of the absence-cognition must be due to sensory activity only (as mere non-cognition cannot account for the cognition of the absence as characterising a locus) as are for example the middle term in an inference or words in verbal cognition and such are the sense-organs apprehending objects like pot, cloth etc. If the rule did not hold then even words etc. would not yield the knowledge of absence because these cognitive means are known ordinarily to yield the knowledge of positive entities only. But isn't this alone rational? No! There does arise verbal knowledge of negation from a statement like, 'Devadutta is not at home' or inferential knowledge from the known non-cognition (as middle term) of the form, 'Although I searched there for Maitra I did not find him at the place'. It is true that sense-organs cognise the locus (a positive entity) but this cognition does not stand in the way of the absence-cognition because it is a process leading to the emergence of the latter. If this were not the case then the perceptual character of determinate cognitions would have to be sacrificed. But can't then the cognition of smoke (the middle term in the inference of fire) also be regarded as the process or function of the visual sense and so, inference being (subsumable under perception) discarded as an independent means of valid cognition? No! Only that activity can be treated as the process of an agent without which the causality of the agent cannot be effectuated. Certainly in the above instance the causality of eyes relating to the fire-cognition does not depend upon the smoke-cognition generated by it. But the above causality does depend upon the conjunction of the eye with fire (without which the fire-cognition does not arise) and so conjunction is the process or function of the eye. Moreover there do occur erroneous perceptions of the positive and the negative. The entity whose defects determine this erroneous character of perceptions of both kinds must itself be their legitimate cause. Non-cognition cannot be blamed for this because there is no intrinsic defect in it. Nor is the locus-perception or the recollection of the counter-positive of the absence intrinsically defective. When these have not taken place the absence-cognition does not arise at all and when these do take place they do not forfeit their intrinsic nature as cognitions to reveal their respective objects. (Thus there is no possibility of any defect being imported into the determinate positive or negative cognition by these conditions of it).

But aren't the cognition as connected, of the locus and the counter-positive of the absence (which is to be cognised in the locus) which are unconnected with each other, and when they are mutually connected their cognition as unconnected, defective or false (and thus this falsehood transmitted to the resulting cognition? Thus, the said cognitions are defective. Falsehood is nothing but this cognition of the locus as connected with the counter-positive when it is unconnected with it and likewise it is the cognition of the connected locus as unconnected. So, to say that the falsehood of the determinate cognition depends upon that of its conditions as stated above is to say that the falsehood depends upon itself which leads to the fallacy of self-dependence.

Thus if the defective sense-organ can produce false cognition then a normal healthy sense-organ can certainly produce a true cognition. This fact may be stated syllogistically thus: 'sense-organs produce true absence-cognition because they sometimes produce even false cognitions, whatever produces a false cognition regarding a certain thing is also productive of true cognition regarding that thing as is the visual organ which is productive of both true and false cognitions of colour'. Elucidating the last quarter of the verse-text the author says as follows. A determinate cognition like, 'The floor is devoid of a pot' has necessarily to be regarded as sense-generated or a seventh means of valid cognition (over and above the six admitted by Mīmāṃsā) capable of generating the determinate cognition of absence has to be postulated. If as Mīmāṃsā says, sensory activity is exhausted in yielding the locus-cognition then

the activity of non-cognition (as a means of cognition) is exhausted in yielding the cognition of the absence qualifying the locus. (There is left no means of cognition to apprehend the determinate content of the cognition. May it be urged that the synthesis of the two cognitions each of which apprehends its own object can apprehend the determinate content? No! According to Mīmāṃsā the objects of sense-organ and non-cognition are quite distinct one being positive and the other negative, also the natures of these cognitions are distinct, one is perception and the other is a special type of non-perceptual cognition. So there cannot be a synthesis of these cognitions. Certainly the potter and the weaver who deal respectively with clay and yarn do not collaborate to manufacture a joint product of clay and yarn. Nor is the collocation of wheel, shuttle etc., the causal conditions of pots and cloths, of use for producing anything. But isn't this impossibility of production due to the nonexistence of a complex product composed of different individual products while in the case of the absence-cognition we do have a determinate cognitive content composed of perceptual and non-perceptual elements? Well! The content is complex but the generic character of the cognition is not so. The cognition is of one identical character, viz. perception. If however the cognition is taken to be endowed with opposed characters then both the instruments of cognition are to be regarded as capable of producing the complex cognition, as such a cognition is actually produced. Certainly a capacity limited to a specific type of cognition cannot be producing a complex cognition because it could be so effective (even when it is not conjoined with a similar capacity of another cognition). But if each of the two capacities is effective in producing the complex cognition what purpose is served by their coming together? Well! The answer is that each capacity is effective only in association with the other.

The production of the transcendental sensation of smell by the eye associated with the revived memory of the previous olfactory sensation of smell may also be explained in the above manner. So even in the case of absence the causality of the sense-organ to apprehend it cannot be denied. Enough then of this bias for falsehood!

(Now the Mīmāṃsaka trots out another argument in support of his view). Let then there be this proof for non-cognition as an independent means of knowledge. Unless the epistemic qualifier in a determinate cognition is already known the latter cannot arise as it is produced by the cognition of the former. But it is not a fact that, that which is capable of producing the cognition of the determinate content is also capable of producing the cognition of the determinant which is the epistemic qualifier in the content. If this were the case then, because the eye can sense a fragrant flower it should be capable of sensing the fragrance also which is the quality of the flower. So to apprehend the special type of absence appearing in the determinate cognition of absence some instrument of cognition like non-cognition has got to be admitted. Moreover a determinate sensory perception does not arise without the prior occurrence of the indeterminate perception of its contents. But the sensory cognition of absence cannot be indeterminate as has been shown above. So the determinate cognition of absence must be a non-perceptual type of cognition not depending upon any indeterminate perception as such cognitions are not caused by indeterminate perceptions. Inference etc. produce determinate cognitions of things that are not indeterminately cognised. Nor is the sense-organ connected with absence to be able to produce its cognition. There is no conjunction between them. Qualifierness cannot be the relation of absence (as Nyāya says) because qualifierness is itself based on some other relation. Moreover non-cognition (of the absent) has necessarily to be admitted. If the cognition of the absent is there the cognition of absence at the place of the absent can never arise. So we cannot do without non-cognition in any case, why not then admit it as an independent means of cognition? In reply to these objections we say as below:

The cognition of absence necessarily depends upon the cognition of the absent or the counter-positive and so in the determinate cognition of absence as qualifying a locus the cognition of absence as qualifier is not needed because the absence is itself qualified or determined by its counter-positive. Unless the qualifier is undetermined by its own qualifier its cognition is not required for the determinate cognition in which it is the qualifier. So there is no need of non-cognition for the cognition of absence in the determinate cognition of absence. If however the cognition of the qualifier is not supposed to be essential for the cognition of the qualified in the determinate cognition then the foregoing arguments in support of non-cognition lose their force as they are afflicted by the fallacy of proving the already proved. (If the cognition of absence as qualifying a locus is possible without the separate cognition of the absence then the sense-organ being competent to produce it there will be no need of non-cognition to produce it). (As to the argument that there can be no relation between absence and the sense-organ) the reply is that apart from the qualifierhood of absence there is no relation between absence and its locus as the admission of any relation between the qualifierhood and the locus would lead to infinite regress. If the absence is not regarded as qualifier because there is no relation relating

the qualifierhood with the locus then even the Mīmāṃsaka cannot explain the determinate character of the absence-cognition.

Commenting on the above the author says as follows: If the cognition of a determinant is not needed in the cognition of an entity and if the entity itself happens to be a determinant in a determinate cognition then its cognition will be a prerequisite of the latter. So only that content of a determinate cognition needs first to be indeterminately cognised by the sense-organ whose cognition does not involve any qualifier. If the said content is itself qualified then the sense-organ itself can produce determinate cognition of it. This is the rule. (This rules out the earlier contention of the Mīmāṃsaka that all determinate cognitions require the indeterminate cognition of their contents as their causes).

(As to the earlier contention that sense-organs cannot be connected with absence the author says that) in the case of the connection of colour for example with the pot, the relation of inherence is admitted as connecting the colour with the pot although colour is intrinsically present in the pot. The relation of inherence is admitted here because there is evidence of common experience of the form, 'The pot has colour', to support the admission. In the case of absence however no such relation is admissible as the admission is sure to lead to infinite regress (one relation involving another relation). But the intrinsic qualifierhood of absence in relation to its locus is not rendered otiose by this denial. If all this is not admitted then the cognition of absence even by non-perceptual means including non-cognition will be very difficult to account for. To explain: All types of knowledge depend directly or indirectly upon indeterminate cognition. Even inference etc. cannot arise without the prior occurrence of indeterminate cognition. (But as shown above there cannot occur an indeterminate cognition of absence). How then can it be determinately cognised even by non-cognition? It cannot be contended that the indeterminate cognition of absence is produced by non-cognition itself as an absence which is not the absence of anything (and so determined by the thing as its counter-positive) is not identifiable as a particular absence. If the absence is identifiable then what is the fault of sense-organs that they are denied the privilege of apprehending the absence? Further, if the relation of qualifierhood is supposed necessarily to involve some other relation to relate it to its qualificand then how can non-perceptual determinate cognitions of absence be explained (without the admission of the series of relations connecting qualifierhood with the absence-locus? It is the same absence that appears in both perceptual and non-perceptual cognitions).

The Mīmāṃsaka may urge against this that absence has the relation of identity with its locus, so the determinate cognition of absence in its locus (by the identity-relation) can well be explained. But this contention cannot be sustained. If a thing is located in another it cannot be denied to be located. Someone's admission or denial of the occurrence of a thing does not bring it into being or take it out of being. Moreover if non-cognition is supposed to be necessarily present before absence-cognition then it can be treated as the cause of the latter but not as an independent means of cognition. If despite this, non-cognition is treated as an independent means of knowledge then instead of sense-organs non-cognition of absence itself can be regarded as the means of the knowledge of positive entities. Just as when absence is cognised the absent positive entity remains uncognised so when a positive entity is cognised its absence will remain uncognised. This is absolutely certain.

EXPL.: Continuing the criticism of the Mīmāṃsā defence of non-cognition as a method of knowledge the author formulates the rule that if a means of knowledge apprehends an object then it apprehends its absence too. If non-cognition alone apprehended absences of things then negative statements and negative inference would yield no knowledge. Non-cognition is certainly needed for absence-cognition but only as a function or a process of the sense-organ which is the real instrument of knowing absence. One may object to this on the ground that like non-cognition of absence the cognition of the middle term in an inference could well be regarded as the function or process of sense-organ in the production of the inference of the major, and thus inference could be subsumed under perception. The reply to the objection is that the cognition of the middle cannot be the function of the eye in ascertaining the presence of the major as the major is not perceptible in inference. The determination of the defects of positive and negative cognition by the defects of the sense-organs is also a proof that the latter are the main cause of negative or absence-cognitions. If defective sense-organs can produce defective or erroneous absence-cognition then normal sense-organs are sure to produce true absence-cognitions.

Another and a more important proof for the sense-causality of absence-cognitions is that in the determinate cognition like, 'There is absence of pot on the floor' non-cognition is concerned with the pure absence-cognition while the sense-organ is concerned only with the locus of the absence. What is then the cause of the determinate cognition? It cannot be the sense-organ alone or non-cognition alone. Each with the other, that is to say, both of these have to be regarded as the

cause of the determinate cognition. This seems to be the author's considered view. On this view non-cognition would have to be treated as an independent means of cognition. As a matter of fact, although the sense-organ provides the cognition of the locus it is the non-cognition of the absent entity sought for that leads to the determinate cognition of the locus as devoid of the entity. So the case for non-cognition does not seem to be rejectable on the above ground.

An important point is raised here by the Mīmāṃsaka. The determinate cognition of absence needs the indeterminate cognition of absence of which non-cognition alone can be the means. The author's reply to this is that absence being a determined entity there cannot be any indeterminate cognition of it. So the determinate cognition of absence does not depend upon any indeterminate cognition of it. Alright! But what of the determinate cognition of absence as the absence of this or that entity? Certainly the need of such a cognition for the determinate cognition cannot be denied. The specific absence is a qualifier of a locus, so its prior cognition is essential for the cognition of the locus as qualified by it. If therefore the Mīmāṃsaka contends that this cognition of the qualifier can be had only through non-cognition how is he to be rebutted?

Prayer to god by way of listing the topics discussed in the section

TEXT: प्रत्यक्षादिभिः एभिः एवं अधरः दूरे विरोध-उदयः।
प्रायः यत्-मुख-वीक्षण-एक-विधुरैः आत्मा अपि न आसाद्यते॥
तं सर्व-अनुविधेयं एकं असम-स्वच्छंद-लीला-उत्सवं।
देवानां अपि देवं उद्धवत्-अति-श्रद्धाः प्रपद्यामहे॥

TRANS.: To that lord of lords who is worshipped by all beings, whose free joyous celebration of joy is simply unique, whose reality the various means of knowledge like perception, inference etc. simply fail to contradict and from whom alone they derive their own validity, we offer our obeisance with great devotional fervour.

EXPL.: The author offers obeisance to Lord Śiva at the end of this third section and by way of it hints at the main topics discussed in the section. These are the different means of valid cognition acceptable to Nyāya and the rebuttal of those that are rejected by the school.

FOURTH BUNCH OF FLOWERS (of arguments)

(Now the author takes up the question of the validity of God's knowledge which is stated at the beginning of the treatise as the fourth of the four main questions to be discussed. As a matter of fact this question concerns the nature of the validity of knowledge regarding which Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā hold opposite views)

Discussion of the nature of knowledge and criticism of the Mīmāṃsā view

TEXT: न नु सदपि ईश्वर-ज्ञानं न प्रमाणं, तत्-लक्षण-अयोगात्। अन्-अधिगत-अर्थ-गंतुः तथाभावात्। अन्यथा स्मृतेः अपि प्रामाण्य-प्रसङ्गात्। न च नित्यस्य सर्व-विषयस्य च अन्-अधिगत-अर्थता। अत्र उच्यते-

अ-व्याप्तेः-अधिक-व्याप्तेः अलक्षणं अपूर्व-दृक्।
यथार्थ-अनुभवः मानं अनपेक्षतया इष्यते॥

न हि अधिगते अर्थे अधिगतिः एव न उत्पद्यते। कारणानां अ-प्रतिबंधात्। न च उत्पद्यमाना अपि प्रमातुः अनपेक्षिता इति न प्रमा। प्रामाण्यस्य अ-तदधीनत्वात्। नापि पूर्व-अविशिष्टता-मात्रेण अप्रामाण्यम्। उत्तर-अविशिष्टतया पूर्वस्य अपि अप्रामाण्य-प्रसङ्गात्। तदनपेक्षत्वेन तु तस्य प्रामाण्ये तत्-उत्तरस्य अपि तथा एव स्यात् अ-विशेषात्। छिन्ने कुठारादीनां इव परिच्छिन्ने नयनादीनां साधकतमत्वं एव नास्ति इत्यपि नास्ति। फल-उत्पाद-अनुत्पादाभ्यां विशेषात्। तत्-फलं प्रमा एव न भवति, गृहीत-मात्र-गोचरत्वात् स्मृतिवत् इति चेत्? न। यथार्थ-अनुभवत्व-निषेधे साध्ये बाधितत्वात्। अन्-अधिगत-अर्थत्वे सिद्धसाधनात्। साध्य-समत्वात् च। व्यवहार-निषेधे तत्-निमित्त-विरह-औपाधिकत्वात्। बाधितत्वात् च। न च अन्-अधिगतार्थत्वं एव तत्-निमित्तं, विपर्यये अपि प्रमा-व्यवहार-प्रसङ्गात्। नापि यथार्थत्व-

विशिष्टं एतदेव, धारा-वहन-बुद्धि-अव्याप्तेः। न च तत्तत्-काल-कला-विशिष्टतया तत्र अपि अन्-अधिगतार्थत्वं उपपादनीयम्। क्षण-उपाधीनां अन्-आकलनात्। न च अ-ज्ञातेषु अपि विशेषणेषु तत्-जनित-विशिष्टता प्रकाशते इति कल्पनीयम्। स्वरूपेण तत्-जनने अनागतादि-विशिष्टता-अनुभव-विरोधात्। तत्-ज्ञानेन तु तत्-जनने सूर्य-गत्यादीनां अज्ञाने तद्-विशिष्टता-अनुत्पादात्। न च एतस्यां प्रमाणं अस्ति। न च अन्-उपकार्य-अन्-उपकारकयोः विशेषण-विशेष्यभावे कथं अतिप्रसङ्गः वारणीयः? व्यवच्छित्ति-प्रत्ययेन व्यवच्छित्तौ स्व-भावेन, अन्यथा तवापि अनवस्थानात् इति। ज्ञातता एव उपाधिः इति चेत्? न। निराकरिष्यमाणत्वात्। तत्-सद्भावे अपि वा स्मृतेः अपि तथा एव प्रामाण्य-प्रसङ्गात्। जनक-अ-गोचरत्वे अपि उत्तरोत्तर-स्मृतौ पूर्व-पूर्व-स्मरण-जनित-ज्ञातता-अवभासनात्। अस्तु वा प्रत्यक्षे यथा तथा। गृहीत-विस्मृत-अर्थश्रुतौ का वार्ता? अप्रमा एव असौ इति चेत्? गतं इदानीं वेद-प्रामाण्य-प्रत्याशया। नहि अनादौ संसारे स्वर्गकामः यजेत इति वाक्यार्थः केनचित् न अवगतः, संदेहे अपि प्रामाण्य-संदेहात्। न च तत्र अपि काल-कला-विशेषाः परिस्फुरंति। न च एक-जन्म-अवच्छेद-परिभाषया इदं लक्षणम्? तत्र अपि अनुभूत-विस्मृत-वेदार्थं प्रति अप्रामाण्य-प्रसङ्गात्। कथं तर्हि स्मृतेः व्यवच्छेदः? अन्-अनुभवत्वेन एव। यथार्थः हि अनुभवः प्रमा इति प्रामाणिकाः पश्यंति। 'तत्वज्ञानात्' इति सूत्रात्। 'अव्यभिचारि ज्ञानं' इति च। ननु स्मृतिः प्रमा एव किं न स्यात्, यथार्थ-ज्ञानत्वात्, प्रत्यक्षादि-अनुभूतिवत् इति चेत्? न। सिद्धे व्यवहारे निमित्त-अनुसरणात्। न च स्वेच्छा-कल्पितेन निमित्तेन लोक-व्यवहार नियमनम्। अव्यवस्थया लोक-व्यवहार-विप्लव-प्रसङ्गात्। न च स्मृति-हेतौ प्रमाण-अभियुक्तानां महर्षीणां प्रमाण-व्यवहारः अस्ति। पृथक् अनुपदेशात्। उक्तेषु अन्-अंतर्भावात् अनुपदेशः इति चेत्? न। प्रत्यक्षस्य अ-साक्षात्कारि-फलत्व अनुपपत्तेः। लिंग-शब्दादेः च सत्ता-मात्रेण प्रतीत्य साधनत्वात् इति। एवं व्यवस्थिते तर्क्यते अपिः-यत् इयं अनुभव-एक-विषया सति तत्-मुख-निरीक्षणेन

तद्-यथार्थत्व-अ-यथार्थत्वे अनुविधीयमाना तत्-प्रामाण्यं अव्यवस्थाप्य न यथार्थतया व्यवहर्तुं शक्यते इति। व्यवहारे अपि पूर्व-अनुभवः एव प्रमितिः अनपेक्षत्वात्। न तु स्मृतिः। नित्यं तदपेक्षणात्। अ-समीचीने हि अनुभवे स्मृत्तिः अपि तथा एव।

ननु एवं अनुमानं अपि अप्रमाणं आपद्येत? न। विषय-भेदात्। आगमः तर्हि न प्रमाणं, तद्विषय-मानान्तर-अनुविधानात्। न। प्रमातृ-भेदात्। धारावाहिक-बुद्धिः तर्हि न प्रमाणं आद्यप्रमाण-अनु-विधानात्। न। कारण-विशुद्धि-मात्र-अपेक्षया प्रथमवत् उत्तरासां अपि पूर्व-मुख-निरीक्षण भावात्। कारण-बलायातं काकतालीयं पौर्वापर्यं इति।

यदि हि स्मृतिः न प्रमितिः पूर्वानुभवे किं प्रमाणम्? स्मृति-अन्यथानुपपत्तिः इति चेत्? न। कारण-मात्र-सिद्धेः न तु तेन अनुभवेन एव भवितव्यं इति नियामकं अस्ति अन्-अनुभूते अपि तर्हि स्मरणं स्यात् इति चेत्। किं न स्यात्? न हि अत्र प्रमाणं अस्ति। पूर्व-अनुभव-आकार-उल्लेखः स्मृतेः दृश्यते। सः अन्यथा न स्यात् इति चेत्? तत् किं बौद्धवत् विषय-आकार-अन्यथा-नुपपत्त्या विषय-सिद्धिः त्वयापि इष्यते, तथाभूतं ज्ञानं एव वा तत्-सिद्धिः? आद्ये तद्वत् एव अनैकांतिकत्वम्। न हि यदाकारं ज्ञानं तत्-पूर्वकत्वं तस्य इति नियमः। अनागत-ज्ञाने विभ्रमे च व्यभिचारात्। द्वितीये तु स्मृति-प्रामाण्यं अवर्जनीयम्। मा भूत पूर्व-अनुभव-सिद्धिः, किं नः छिन्नं इति चेत्? न तर्हि स्मृति-अनुभवयोः कार्यकारणभाव-सिद्धिः इति। न। तत्-अप्रामाण्ये अपि पूर्व-अपर-अवस्थावत् आत्म-प्रत्यभिज्ञान-प्रामाण्यात् एव तदुपपत्तेः। यः अहं अन्वभवं अमुं अर्थं सः अहं स्मरामि इति मानस-प्रत्यक्षं अस्ति इति।

न च गृहीत-ग्राहित्वं ईश्वर-ज्ञानस्य। तदीय-ज्ञानांतर-अगोचरत्वात् विश्वस्य। न च तदेव ज्ञानं काल-भेदेन अप्रमाणम्। अनपेक्षत्वस्य अ-परावृत्तेः। तथापि वा अप्रामाण्ये अतिप्रङ्गात् इति।

TRANS.: Isn't it a fact that although God is all-knowing his knowledge is not valid as it does not fulfil the definition of validity? Only that cogni-

tion whose object is not cognised by any other cognition is valid. If it were not so even recollection can be valid. But as divine knowledge is all-encompassing it does not have anything unknown as its object. The properties of omniscience and knowing an object not already known cannot go together. (So God is not a dependable Being who can be credited with the authorship of the Vedas).

In reply to the above we say as below: 'Cognising the uncognised cannot be the definition of valid cognition as the definition suffers from the fallacies of both narrowness and over-extensiveness. (Recollection is not a cognitive experience although it is a variety of true cognition. Serial cognition of an identical object is valid but its object is not an uncognised one. A false cognition cognises what is uncognised by the corresponding true cognition yet it is not valid). A true cognitive experience is valid as, like recollection it does not depend upon a prior cognition for its genesis.

To explain: Certainly it is not the case that no cognition of the already-cognised does not ever arise. And even if such a cognition arose it is not invalid because it (the repeated cognition) is not required by the cogniser. The validity of a cognition does not depend upon the need of the cogniser. Nor does the latter cognition become invalid because it has the same object as its preceding cognition. If it were so then the earlier cognition would be rendered invalid because its successor has the same object as it does. If the earlier cognition is supposed to be valid because it does not depend upon the latter then the latter too can be treated as valid because it does not depend upon the cognition that succeeds it. It cannot be urged against this that as the axe etc. do not cut etc. the piece of wood which has already been cut by them so the sense-organs etc. cannot effectively cognise whatever has already been cognised by them. The two cases are quite different from each other. The axe cannot cut the same wood twice but the eyes etc. can go on cognising the same entity for any duration. But can't it be urged against this that the result of such continued cognition is not true like recollection which apprehends an object that is already apprehended by it? No! If truth of a cognition is understood as its having a qualificand whose (epistemic) qualifier is actually located in it then cognising the cognised object cannot be opposed to it and so the inference of falsehood by means of the latter property would lead to the fallacy of absent major. If however truth is understood as 'cognising the uncognised' then its absence is the same as not cognising the uncognised and this is the same as the above middle term. (Despite a slight difference between 'not cognising the uncognised' and 'cognising the cognised' the two properties

are equivalent and so) the inference gets afflicted by the fallacy of 'proving the already proved' or 'middle equivalent to major'. A third meaning of 'truth' is 'being the object of the usage of the word true'. If the absence of this usage is sought to be inferred then the fallacy of conditionality would afflict the inference, the condition being the absence of the property connoted by the word 'true'. The property connoted by the word 'true' does not coexist with absence of truth so its absence is concomitant with the major term in the inference. But since even cognitions cognising the already cognised are endowed with the property connoted by the word 'true' the absence of this property is not concomitant with the middle. Thus the inference becomes conditional. The fallacy of absent major also afflicts the inference as the usage of the word 'true' in relation to cognitions cognising the cognised is common. Can one say that 'cognising the uncognised' alone is the connotation of the word 'true'? No! If it were so then even false cognition could be called true as its object is uncognised by any true cognitions. If truth as commonly understood coupled with the above property is taken to be the said connotation then serial cognitions of the same thing would not be covered by the definition. Can each of the objects of the serial cognitions enter into the cognitions as endowed with the property of occurrence at a particular moment so that these objects may be distinguished from one another? No! Moments as characteristics of things are insensible as they are too minute to be sensed. May it be presumed that even if the qualifier of a qualified entity is not known the qualifiedness or determinateness produced by the former on the latter does manifest itself? No! If a qualifier by itself led to the manifestation of determinateness in the qualified entity then no entity going to come into being can be apprehended as future as the entity which is the qualificand of futurity is nonexistent. This difficulty may be overcome if the qualifier as cognised is supposed to lead to the apprehension of determinateness. But the temporal character accrues to things through solar movements impinging upon them but these are too subtle to be noticed. (So the distinction between the different similar objects of serial cognitions cannot be apprehended). There is also no proof for the above presumption. But if this is so how can the unfavourable contingency of any two entities which are not related as the affecter and the affected could yet be treated as the qualifier and the qualified? The answer to the question is this. The qualifier-qualified relation leads to the distinction of the qualified entity from those that are not qualified. This is the very nature of qualification. If this is not admitted then even the determinateness produced by the qualifier in the qualified entity

would be of no use unless it helped distinguish the latter from other entities. If determinateness itself produced another property in the qualified entity to distinguish it then there cannot be an end to such hypothetical entities. So it is best to admit that the qualifier itself helps distinguish the entity qualified by it. Alright! Let then knownness itself be the property distinguishing one object from another in a serial cognition. As this property differs from moment to moment the objects characterised by them would also differ from each other. No! This explanation of the distinction is not acceptable. It is going to be refuted later. Even if knownness as a property of known objects is admitted the admission would entail the epistemic validity of memory. Although the knownness of a previously-known object is not apprehended in recollecting it yet in a succession of recollections of the known object the different recollectednesses pertaining to the different recollections can certainly provide them with previously-unknown objects to apprehend. Besides, let perception be or not be the cogniser of the uncognised but what of the cognition of that which was first cognised, then forgotten and subsequently revived by memory? Such a cognition cannot be the cogniser of the uncognised. But isn't it invalid? Well! If so then you have to give up the doctrine of the self-validity of the scriptures as one may read and apprehend Vedic sentences again and again without acquiring any new knowledge from them. In this beginningless universe it cannot be the case that the meanings of Vedic injunctions would not have been grasped by anybody heretofore. Since the universe is beginningless and selves also are beginningless one can never be sure that one has not read and understood earlier the Vedic injunctions. Even if there is doubt about this the validity of the knowledge arising from Vedic sentences becomes suspect. Certainly the cognitions of Vedic injunctions etc. cannot be endowed with the temporal qualities pertaining to the moments at which they occur. Can't one urge against this that the definition formulated above involves the respective cognitions of different individuals born at different times and apprehending their respective objects?

Well! Even so the definition cannot validate one's knowledge of a Vedic injunction which has been somehow revived after a spell of forgetfulness. Alright! If cognitive validity is not to be defined as we say, then how is memory to be excluded as a valid mode of cognition? The answer is that memory stands excluded simply because it is not a cognitive experience. All reliable people say that a cognition that corresponds to a fact is a valid cognition. The aphorism of Gotama also says this very thing. It is said further in the aphorism that a valid cognition does not misrepresent its object. It may be asked, 'why not treat recollection as a

valid mode of cognition itself?' One may even infer that recollection is a valid cognition like perceptual and other cognitions. The reply to this is that there is no usage regarding recollection that it is a kind of valid cognition. Only if such a usage obtained the determinant of the usage namely a modified definition of validity encompassing recollection with other cognitions could be laid down. (But there is no such usage at all). Certainly one cannot control popular usage of a word by means of an arbitrarily-fixed connotation of it as this would create total confusion in usage through irregularity. Besides the great sages who are regarded as experts in the theory of knowledge have not used the term 'means of knowledge' to refer to the means of recollection. They have not mentioned it separately as a means of knowledge. Could this be due to the inclusion of the means of recollection within the class of means of knowledge already mentioned? No! Since the means of perception produce knowledge which is immediate the means of recollection cannot be identified with it. As to the middle term and words etc. which respectively produce inferential and verbal knowledge, they are not productive of these effects by themselves (as it is as known that they are productive) but such is not the case with the means of recollection.

(Now the author turns to the fourth quarter of the verse-text for its elucidation). Having thus established the non-validity of recollection we may go on to formulate a conditional argument also to prove the non-validity. The argument is like this: 'Since recollection is co-objective with the cognition that produces it and is dependent for its truth or falsehood upon the truth or falsehood of the latter, it cannot be treated as true or false unless the cognition producing it is established as true or false. The usage regarding truth and falsehood of recollection is based mainly on the cognition producing it. The cognition is true or false by itself while the truth or falsehood of recollection is dependent always upon the truth or falsehood of the cognition producing it. If a cognition is false then the recollection of its object will also be false. Will then inference too—which depends upon a perceptual basis be rendered invalid (like recollection)? No! The objects of inference and its perceptual basis are different (such is not the case with a cognition and the recollection following it). But then how can the scripture be valid as the truth or falsehood of the verbal knowledge of the listener of words depends upon the truth or falsehood of the corresponding knowledge of the speaker? The answer is that the knowers of verbal cognition are different persons but the person who recollects is the same who has the cognition generating the recollection. (So recollection depends upon cognition directly, both belonging to the same person but the depend-

ence of the listener's verbal cognition on the speaker's verbal cognition is indirect the cognisers being different). But then serial cognitions cannot be valid as all the cognition-episodes following the first are co-objective with it and depend upon it. Nyāya's reply to this is that none of the serial cognitions depends upon the first cognition for its validity which is determined by the efficiency of the causes of the cognitions. So far as the particular sequence of the serial cognitions is concerned it is just coincidental and is due to the sequential character of the causal collocation (which lasts till the emergence of the last cognition). It may be asked, 'If recollection is not valid what can be the proof for the prior occurrence of the cognition causing it?' If the answer is that the very non-explicability of the occurrence of recollection is the required proof then it can be contended that recollection as an effect would call for only some cause but that the cause is the prior cognition only cannot be determined. But if this is so can't even the unknown be recollected? Yes, it can be. There is no reason why this cannot be. But isn't recollection endowed with the form of the cognition generating it (so that there has to be the generating cognition prior to recollection)? Well! such a proof for the prior occurrence of cognition would be like the proof that the Buddhist adduces for the existence of objects of cognition. Only because the diverse objective forms of the cognitions cannot be explained without admitting the reality of the objects corresponding to the forms, the Buddhist maintains the reality of the objects. The Buddhist may even regard the cognition itself as the affirmation of its object. The former view involves the fallacy of deviation as it is not necessary that a cognition should be preceded by the object whose form it bears. Illusions and cognitions of future object are not preceded by the objects whose form they bear. Likewise memory, despite having the form of the cognition generating it, need not be preceded by it. If however the abovementioned second view is entertained then the validity of memory is unavoidable (as memory itself is the cognition which affirms the past existence of its object). Thus the admission of the validity of memory is essential as a proof for the prior occurrence of the cognition generating the memory. One may here retort, 'Let there not be the prior cognition generating memory, what is lost by this non-admission?' The reply is that if cognition did not precede memory then the causal relation between the two will not be established. However all this argumentation is pointless. Even if memory is invalid validity of the recognition by the self that it is the entity that underlies the earlier and latter experiential states of cognition and memory is adequate to establish the causal relationship. There does occur the introspective cognition of the form, 'I who cognised earlier this object am now recollecting it'.

Nor does God's knowledge apprehend what is already apprehended. There are not more than one knowledge of God apprehending the whole universe. And the same self-identical knowledge cannot be valid at one time and invalid at another. Non-dependence upon any other cognition (which is the characteristic of a valid cognition) is not excluded from divine knowledge. If notwithstanding this, divine knowledge is treated as invalid then all knowledge will be invalidated as in the second moment of its occurrence it apprehends that which is already apprehended.

EXPL.: Taking up the Mīmāṃsā view that a valid cognition has only an uncognised (by the cogniser) entity as its object for critical consideration the author argues that it is a fact that an object is often cognised again and again and that such cognitions do not forfeit their validity because their recurrence does not serve any purpose. Co-objectivity of the succeeding cognition with the preceding one cannot be supposed to render the former invalid as even the preceding cognition can be rendered invalid for the same reason. It may be contended that the first cognition in a series of coobjective cognitions is independent of all the cognitions other than itself while the second, third etc. cognitions depend upon the preceding ones. On this account the first alone may be treated as valid. But the fact is that just as the first cognition is independent of subsequent cognitions in its objectivity, the latter also are independent of the first in their objectivity. It can't be urged against this that just as an Axe does not cut twice the same piece of wood, the sense-organs also do not produce the same (type of) cognition again and again or that the reproduction of cognitions does not yield truth as is the case with recollection. The truth of cognitions consists in their correspondence with their objects which cannot be denied of cognitions of the same object. If truth is equated with the property of 'cognising the uncognised' then even illusion can be regarded as true. These difficulties may be met by the assumption that the moment at which a cognition occurs qualifies its object so that even the same type of cognitions are distinguished from each other. But moments being too subtle for perception they cannot be supposed to qualify a perceptual object'. It cannot be argued against this that even if the moment as the qualifier is unperceived the momentariness of the object can be perceived (and thus the distinction of cognitions maintained). If a qualifier by itself produced qualifiedness in an object then a future object cannot be cog-

nised as future as its futurity is nonexistent. If however the qualifier as known is supposed to produce qualifiedness in the object qualified then since the solar movement etc. are the determinants of time, and they are not perceptible, the moments also will be imperceptible. (So the objects qualified by the moments cannot be perceptible). Moreover there is no proof that objects are perceived as occurring at certain moments. It may be asked, 'how can there obtain the qualifier-qualified relation between two entities if they are not respectively the benefactor and the benefited in some manner. (Here moments are the benefactors, and things are benefited by them as they acquire the character of momentariness from the moments)? And if such a relation is admitted without any basis between two things any two things could be supposed to be so related? The simple answer to the question is that the relation leads to the cognition of the distinction of the qualified thing from other things. The qualifier does this by itself; it does not produce a property like 'qualifiedness' in the qualificand in order to distinguish it from other things as the Mīmāṃsaka says; if being characterised by moments is taken as the distinguishing feature of precepts then this will require another feature through which it can produce the distinction and thus there is sure to arise the fallacy of regress. The Mīmāṃsaka may contend that cognitive objects are characterised by the property of cognisedness which differs from cognition to cognition and is apprehended by it. But if this were the case then even memory can be reckoned as a valid means of cognition as each episode of memory pertaining to the same object can have as its object the entity characterised by the property of cognisedness relating to the previous memory (and thus its object will be a novel one not apprehended by any other cognition, even including the cognition giving rise to the memory). Besides the recognition first cognised and then forgotten cannot have novelty in its object and so fail to fulfil the foregoing definition of cognition.

According to Mīmāṃsā memory is a valid means of cognition which is denied by Nyāya. Memory is wholly dependent upon the cognition giving rise to it while the latter does not depend upon memory. So according to Nyāya memory is not a valid means of cognition. It may be argued by Mīmāṃsā that although memory depends upon coobjective cognition for its genesis it is the only proof for the prior occurrence of the latter and so it has to be treated as valid. Nyāya's rejoinder to this is that even if memory is not reckoned as a valid means of cognition the introspective recognition by the recollector that he or she is the same person who was the cogniser (of the same object) is adequate as a proof for the occurrence of the earlier cognition.

Proof for the property of 'cognisedness' and its rebuttal

TEXT: स्यात् एतत्। अनुपकारकं विषयस्य तदीयं एतदीयं वा न भवितुं अर्हति अविशेषात्। न च तस्य इति अनियतं तत्र प्रमाणं अति-प्रसङ्गात्। न च तत्-अभिज्ञं अंतरेण तदुपकारस्य उत्पत्तिः तथा अनभ्युपगमात्। अभ्युपगमे वा कार्यत्वस्य अनैकांतिकत्वात। अत्र उच्यते-

स्वभाव-नियम-अभावात् उपकारः अपि दुर्घटः।
सुघटत्वे अपि सति अर्थे असति का गतिः अन्यथा॥

विशेष-अभावात् तत्र एव फलं न अन्यत्र इत्यस्य अपि नियमस्य अनुपपत्तेः। स्वभाव-नियमेन च उपपत्तौ तथा एव विषय-व्यवस्था-उपपत्तेः। अवश्यं च एतत् अनुमंतव्यम्। अतीतादि-विषयत्व-अनुरोधात्। नहि तत्र ज्ञानेन किंचित् क्रियते इति शक्यं अवगंतुम्। असत्वात्। न च तद्धर्म-सामान्य-आधारं किंचित् क्रियते इति युक्तम्। तेन तस्य एव विषयत्व-प्राप्तेः। तादात्म्यात् विशेषस्य अपि सा एव ज्ञातता इति चेत्? तत् किं चक्षुषा घटे ज्ञायमाने रसः अपि ज्ञायते, तादात्म्यात्? घटाकारेण ज्ञायते एव असौ रसः इति चेत्? अथ रसाकारेण किं न ज्ञायते? तेन रूपेण ज्ञातता-अनाधारत्वात् इति चेत्? न तर्हि वर्तमान-सामान्य-ज्ञाने-अपि अतीत-अनागतादि-ज्ञानम्। तेन आकारेण प्राकट्य-अनाधारत्वात् इति।

TRANS.: Let there be then this argument (for the property of cognisedness in cognitive objects). What does not leave any benefit in an object cannot be regarded as pertaining to this or that object. A valid means of cognition relating to an object cannot accidentally pertain to it. Nor can there be any benefit to an object from a valid cognition except its cognisedness by its cogniser. If this is not admitted then the middle term 'producedness' cited by the Naiyāyika in the inferential proof of God's existence would be afflicted by the fallacy of deviation. God is inferred as the omniscient creator of the universe by Nyāya. If a creator is not required to know the causal conditions of the object he creates then God cannot be an omniscient being). Regarding the above argument we say as below:

That an object like the pot is cognised by the pot-cognition and not by any other cognition (and therefore as per the Mīmāṃsā view the pot is endowed with the property of 'cognisedness' relating to the pot-cognition only) is determined only by the nature of the pot-cognition. There is no other determinant of the cognitivity of an object except the nature of its cognition. So no benefit can be supposed to accrue to an object from its cognition. Even the so-called benefit of endowment with the property of cognisedness can accrue only to a present object, not to a nonexistent past or future object.

To explain: If in relation to a certain cognition there is nothing to distinguish its own object from any other then how can it be determined (according to Mīmāṃsā) that the cognition will produce its benefit in its own object and not in any other? If the very nature of the cognition is the determinant then the cognitivity of its object also may be supposed to be determined by this determinant. And this fact has necessarily to be conceded as otherwise no cognition can have a past or future thing as its object. No cognition can produce any benefit in a nonexistent object. Nor can a cognition produce the benefit of 'cognisedness' in something (related to its object) like its generic property (If a pot is cognised its potness is also cognised). If the benefit goes to the generic property then the thing (characterised by the property) cannot be the object of the cognition. But can't it be urged that the thing being non-different from its genus it too acquires the benefit from its cognition? Well! If this were so then if a pot is seen its taste also should be sensed as both colour and taste are identical or non-different from the pot (according to Mīmāṃsā). Can one say in retort to this that when the pot is seen its taste is also sensed as (a quality of) the pot? Well! If this were so, it needs to be explained why the taste is not sensed as taste. If the explanation is that the taste as taste is not sensed when the colour is seen then the past and future things also cannot be supposed to be cognised when only the generic property characterising the present thing is cognised. The past and future things are not cognised generically. They are cognised as past or future things.

EXPL.: According to Mīmāṃsā cognition is a kind of mental activity which must produce some result in its object as every other activity does. This result is 'cognisedness' or 'manifestness' which accrues to a thing when it is apprehended. Countering this view the author argues that a nonexistent thing is cognised although it cannot be the repository of any benefit. If the generic property characterising a thing is supposed to be the main beneficiary and the thing which is non-different from the property the indirect beneficiary then, if a pot is seen its taste also should be sensed as things and their qualities are non-different from each other (as per Mīmāṃsā).

Another proof for 'cognisedness' and its rebuttal

TEXT: ननु क्रियया कर्मणि किंचित् कर्तव्यं इति व्यासेः अस्तु अनुमानम्? न।
अनैकान्त्यात् असिद्धेः वा न च लिंगं इह क्रिया।
तत्–वैशिष्ट्य–प्रकाशत्वात् न अध्यक्ष–अनुभवः अधिके॥
धातु–अर्थ–मात्र–अभिप्रायेण प्रयोगे संयोगादिभिः अनेकांतात्। न हि शर–संयोगेन गगने किंचित् क्रियते, अंत्य–शब्द–अभिव्यक्त्या वा। स्पंद–अभिप्रायेण असिद्धेः। व्यापार–अभिप्रायेण शब्द–लिंग–इन्द्रिय–व्यापारैः व्यभिचारात्। न हि तैः प्रमेये किंचित् क्रियते, अपि तु प्रमातरि एव। फल–अभिप्रायेण अपि तथा। अंततः तेन एव अनेकांतात्। अनवस्थानात् च। आशु–विनाशि–धर्म–अभिप्रायेण द्वित्वादिभिः अनियमात्। आशु–कारक–अभिप्रायेण कर्मणि असिद्धेः। कर्मणि आशु–कारकं ज्ञानं इत्येव हि साध्यम्। कर्तरि आशु–कारकत्वस्य कर्म–उपकारकत्वेन अव्यासेः। शब्दादि–व्यापारैः एव अनेकांतात्।

TRANS.: But isn't there the invariable concomitance between an action and its result and so can't 'cognisedness' be inferred on the basis of the cognitive activity? No! If in the said inference the word 'action' is used in the sense of 'what a verbal root means' then the middle term deviates from the major term in the inference. For example in the sentence, 'The man shoots an arrow in the sky', the verb 'shoots' means 'aiming an 'arrow at a target', which does not produce any result in the sky. If on the other hand the word 'action' is taken in the sense of 'motion' then cognition not being motion the middle term viz., the property of being action will be absent in the minor viz., cognition. Thus either way the inference will be fallacious. It cannot here be contended that the said reality of the property of cognisedness is vouchsafed by introspection (following perception) of the form say, 'The pot is known'. This intro-

spection is evidence for (or manifests) the fact that the pot-cognition is related to the pot which is its object.

To explain: If the word 'action' is used above in the sense of the verbal root then since conjunction etc. (of the arrow with the bow, as stated above), which are meant by certain verbal roots, do not produce any result in things like the sky the concomitance of action and some result produced by it would be jeopardised. Likewise the last sound-vibration in a series of sound-vibrations, being a momentary entity even cognition cannot produce any result in it (so a sentence like 'x hears the last sound-vibration' would be falsified simply because nothing can produce any result in the last sound-vibration). Can then the word 'action' be taken in the sense of 'motion'? No! Cognition is not motion (even if in metaphorical sense cognition is referred to as mental activity). Perhaps then the word 'action' can be used to mean 'a process' but this (meaning of the word) fails to be concomitant with its result in the cases of words, middle terms in inferences and sense-organs. The processes initiated by these do not produce any result in their respective objects. It is only the agent or knower who really benefits from the verbal and other cognitive processes. If 'action' means some result (or benefit) even then the foregoing fallacy remains. If a result produces a certain other result then the latter also will produce a result and this process can go on forever. But if it stops with some result then that result being unproductive the above concomitance will fail and the inference based upon the concomitance will be rendered fallacious. Another meaning of 'action' is 'an entity' or property which does not last for more than three moments. (In Nyāya view all mental states are supposed to exist for two moments only but numbers starting from twoness exist for three moments. Cognition being a mental state it exists for two moments and according to Mīmāṃsā it produces 'cognisedness' in its object). This meaning too leads to the fallacy of deviation as 'twoness' etc. are entities of short duration but they do not produce any result in any thing connected with them. A slightly different meaning of the word is 'an entity producing quick result in the entity denoted by the word in the objective case'. This meaning if adopted conflates the major and minor terms in the foregoing inference. The major term in the inference is 'production of quick result in the object' which is sought to be inferred by means of this very term (which is taken to be the nature of action). If however 'production of quick result in the agent' is lastly taken to be meant by action then since this is not concomitant with production of result in the object there arises the fallacy of deviation in the inference. The processes initiated by words (in verbal cognition) the middle term in inferential cognition and so on in the form of certain cognitions in the agent of these cognitions last only two moments. So these cannot last long enough to be of help to the object.

EXPL.: The author here criticises the suggestions of Mīmāṃsā that every action is productive of some effect in its object and so cognition being a kind of mental activity cannot but produce some effect like the property of cognisedness in its object. The various possible meanings of the word 'action' namely, 'that which is meant by a root term in a verb', 'movement or vibration', 'process', 'the result of a process', 'the property which produces quick result' 'the entity which produces quick result in its object' and finally 'that which is productive of quick result in the agent' are critically considered and rejected by the author. Thus the said concomitance between so-called action and its result propounded by Mīmāṃsā is found to fail totally.

It may here be noted that knowing or cognising is itself the result of the activity or process like the sense-object-contact and the sense-mind-contact. When cognition or knowledge arises the object is supposed to be cognised or known and thus get cognitively or epistemically related to the cognition. This cognition or knowledge itself is the result of the processes preceding it. There is no other result, issuing from this result which can be identified as the cognisedness of the object cognised. If Cognisedness is supposed to be cognised how can cognition which is involved in the property of cognisedness remain uncognised? (Cognisedness is the property of being the object of cognition).

Another series of arguments for the property of 'cognisedness' and its rebuttal

TEXT: स्यात् एतत्। अनुभवसिद्धं एव हि प्राकट्यम्। तथाहि, ज्ञातः अयं अर्थः इति सामान्यतः, साक्षात्कृतः अयं अर्थः इति विशेषतः विषय-विशेषणं एव किंचित् परिस्फुरति इति। चेत्? तदसत्। यथा हि-

अर्थे न एव विशेषः हि निराकारतया धियाम्। तथा-
क्रियया एव हि विशेषः हि व्यवहारेषु कर्मणाम्॥

किं न पश्यसि, घट-क्रिया, पट-क्रिया इतिवत् कृतः घटः, करिष्यते घटः इत्यादि, तथा एव गृहाण, घट-ज्ञानं, पट-ज्ञानं इतिवत् ज्ञातः घटः,

ज्ञायते इति? कथं अ-संबद्धयोः धर्म-धर्मिभावः इति चेत्? ध्वस्तः घटः इति यथा। एतदपि कथं इति चेत्? नूनं ध्वंसेन अपि घटे किंचित् क्रियते इति वक्तुं अध्यवसितः असि? तत्-निरूपण अधीन-निरूपणः ध्वंसः स्वभावात् एव तदीयः इति किं अत्र संबधांतरेण इति चेत्? प्रकृते अपि एवं एव।

एतेन फल-अनाधारत्वात् अर्थः कथं कर्म इति निरस्तम्। विनाश्यवत् करण-व्यापार-विषयत्वेन तदुपपत्तेः। स्वाभाविक-फल-निरूपकत्वं च तुल्यम्।

ननु ज्ञानं अतीन्द्रियत्वात् असाधारण-कार्य-अनुमेयं, तदभावे कथं अनुमीयेत? अ-प्रतीतं च कथं व्यवहार-पथे अवतरेत् इति ज्ञान-व्यवहार-अन्यथानुपपत्त्या ज्ञातता-कल्पनम्। तदपि असत्। परस्पराश्रय-प्रसङ्गात्। ज्ञाततया हि ज्ञानं अनुमीयेत। ज्ञाते तद्-व्यवहार-अनुपपत्तिः तां ज्ञापयेत्। कुतः च ज्ञानं अतीन्द्रियम्? इन्द्रियेण अनुपलभ्यमानत्वात् इति चेत्? न। अनुमान-उपन्यासे साध्य-अविशिष्टत्वात्। अनुपलब्धिमात्र-उपन्यासे तु योग्यता-अविशेषिता असौ कथं ऐन्द्रियक-उपलंभ-अभावं गमयेत्? तद्विशेषणे तु कथं अतीन्द्रियं ज्ञानं इति? तथाविध-ज्ञातता-अनाश्रयत्वात् इति चेत्? न। आश्रयासिद्धेः। व्यवहार-अन्यथानुपपत्त्या एव सिद्धः आश्रयः इति चेत्? न। ज्ञान-हेतुना एव तदुपपत्तेः। तस्य आत्म-मनः संयोगादि-रूपस्य सत्वे अपि सुषुप्ति-दशायां अर्थ-व्यवहार-अभावात् न एवं इति चेत्? न। तावत्-मात्रस्य व्यवहार-अहेतुत्वात्। अन्यथा ज्ञान-स्वीकारे अपि तुल्यत्वात्। स्मरण-अन्यथानुपपत्त्या इति चेत्? न। तस्य अपि असिद्धेः। अस्ति तावत् व्यवहार-निमित्तं किंचित् इति चेत्? किं अतः? न हि एतावता ज्ञानं तदिति सिद्ध्यति। तस्य एव असिद्धेः। तथापि नियतस्य कर्तुः प्रवृत्तेः कर्तृ-धर्मेण एवं केनचित् प्रवृत्ति-हेतुना भवितव्यं इति चेत्? अस्तु इच्छा प्रत्यक्ष-सिद्धा न तु ज्ञानम्। सा एव कथं नियत-अधिकरणे उत्पद्यतां इति चेत्? न। ज्ञान-अभ्युपगमे अपि तुल्यत्वात्। स्व-हेतोः कुतश्चित् इति चेत्? ततः एव इच्छा अस्तु किं ज्ञान-कल्पनया इति?

स्यात् एतत्। प्रकाशमाने खलु अर्थे तत्-उपादित्सादिः उपजायते, न तु सुषुप्ति-अवस्थायां अ-प्रकाशमाने अपि अर्थे इति अनुभव-सिद्धम्। ततः इच्छायाः कारणं विलक्षणं एव किंचित् परिकल्पनीयं यस्मिन् सति सुष्वाप-लक्षण-औदासीन्यं अर्थ-विषयं आत्मनः निवर्तते इति चेत्? हन्त एवं सुष्वाप-निवृत्तिं अनुभव-सिद्धां प्रतिजानानेन ज्ञानं एव अपरोक्षं इष्यते। अचेतयन् एव हि सुषुप्तः इत्युच्यते। अचैतन्य-निवृत्तिः एव हि चैतन्यं ज्ञानं इति। तथा च कालात्ययापदिष्टः हेतुः।

एतेन क्षणिकत्वात् इति निरस्तम्। अपि च किं इदं क्षणिकत्वं नाम? यदि आशुतर-विनाशित्वं तदा अनैकांतिकम्। अथ एक-क्षण-अवस्थायित्वं, तदसिद्धं प्रमाणाभावात्। ननु स्थायि-विज्ञानं यादृशं अर्थ-क्षणं गृह्णत् उपपद्यते, द्वितीये अपि क्षणे किं तादृशं एव गृह्णाति, अन्यादृशं वा न कं अपीति? न प्रथमः। तस्य क्षणस्य अतीतत्वात्। प्रत्यक्ष-ज्ञानस्य च वर्तमानत्वात्। न च अतीतं एव वर्तमान-आभतया उल्लिखति? भ्रान्तत्व-प्रसङ्गात्। न द्वितीयः। विरम्य-व्यापार-अयोगात्। प्रथमतः अपि तथा अभ्युपगमे अनागत-अवेक्षण-प्रसङ्गात्। न तृतीयः। ज्ञानत्व-हानेः इति महाव्रतीयाः। तदसत्। ज्ञानं गृह्णाति इत्यस्य एव अर्थस्य अनभ्युपगमात्। अपि तु तदेव ग्रहणं इति अभ्युपगमः। तथा च ज्ञानं प्रथमे क्षणे यं अर्थं-आलंब्य जातं, द्वितीये अपि क्षणे तदालंबनं एव तत् न वा इति प्रश्न-अर्थः। तत्र तदालंबनं एव तदिति परमार्थः। न च एव भ्रान्तत्वम्? विपरीत-अनवगाहनात्। तथापि ज्ञेय-निवृत्तौ कथं ज्ञान-अनुवृत्तिः? तदनुवृत्तौ वा कथं ज्ञेय-निवृत्तिः इति चेत्? किं अस्मिन् अनुपपन्नम्? न हि ज्ञानं अर्थः च इत्येकं तत्वम् एक-आयुष्कं च इति। सत्यपि वा क्षणिकत्वे कथं अप्रत्यक्षम्? इत्थं यथ। उच्यते-न स्वप्रकाशं वस्तुत्वात् इतर वस्तुवत्। न च ज्ञानांतर ग्राह्यं, ज्ञान-यौगपद्य-निषेधेन समानकालस्य तस्य अभावात्। ग्राहक-काले ग्राह्यस्य अतीतत्वेन वर्तमान-अभावत्व-अनुपपत्तेः। ग्राह्यकाले च ग्राहकस्य अनागतत्वात् इति चेत्? ननु एवं ज्ञातता अपि न प्रत्यक्षा स्यात् क्षणिकत्वात्। कथम् इत्थम्। न स्वप्रकाशा वस्तुत्वात्। न जनक-ग्राह्या। अनागतत्वात्। विरम्य

व्यापाराभावात्। न सम-समय-ज्ञान-ग्राह्या। ज्ञान-जनक-इन्द्रिय-संबध-अननुभवात्। न च तदुत्तर-काल-ज्ञान-ग्राह्या। तदानीं अतीतत्वात् इति। क्षणिकत्वं एव तस्याः कुतः इति चेत्? त्वदुक्त-युक्तेः एव।
तथाहि, यं क्षणं आश्रित्य जाता ततः परं अपि तं एव आश्रयते अन्यं वा, न वा कं अपीति? तत्र न प्रथमः। तस्य तदानीं असत्वात्। न द्वितीयः। अ-प्रतिसंक्रमात्। एक-क्षण-अवगाहिनि च ज्ञाने तदन्य-क्षण आश्रय-ज्ञातता-फलत्वेन भ्रान्तत्व-प्रसङ्गात्। रजतावगाहिनि पुरोवर्ति-वृत्ति ज्ञातता-फले इव। न च अन्यं अपि क्षणं ज्ञानं अवगाहते, तदानीं तस्य असत्वात्। न तृतीयः। निः स्वभावता-प्रसङ्गात्। न हि असौ तदानीं तदीया अन्यदीया वा इति। अतीतेन अपि तेन एव क्षणेन उपलक्षिता अनुवर्तते इति चेत्? एवं तर्हि वर्तमान-अर्थता प्रकाशस्य न स्यात्। अन्यथा ज्ञानस्य अपि तथा अनुवृत्तेः क दोषः? न हि वर्तमानार्थ-प्रकाश-संबधं अंतरेण ज्ञानस्य अन्या वर्तमान-अवभासता नाम। अर्थ-निरपेक्ष-प्रकाश-अनुवृत्ति-मात्रेण तथात्वे भूत-भावि-विषयस्य अपि ज्ञानस्य तथाभाव-प्रसङ्गात्। अथ मा भूत् अयं दोषः इति स्थूलः एव वर्तमानः प्रकाशेन आश्रीयते इत्यभ्युपगमः तदा तत्-ज्ञानस्य अपि सः एव विषयः इति तस्य अपि न क्षणिकत्वं इति।
ननु ज्ञानं ऐन्द्रियकं चेत् विषय-संचारः न स्यात् संजात-संबंधत्वात्। न च जिज्ञासा-नियमात् नियमः? तस्याः संशय-पूर्वकत्वात्। तस्य च धर्मि-ज्ञान-पूर्वकत्वात्। धर्मिणः च संनिधिमात्रेण ज्ञाने जिज्ञासा-अपेक्षणे वा उभयथा अपि अनवस्थानात् इति। तत् न। ज्ञातता-पक्षे अपि तुल्यत्वात्। तस्याः अपि हि ज्ञेयत्वे तत्-परंपरा-ज्ञान-आपातात्। जिज्ञासा-नियमस्य च तद्वत् अनुपपत्तेः। न च इन्द्रिय-संबंध-विच्छेदात् विरामः इति युक्तम्। स्वभावतः एव काचित् असौ अजिज्ञासिता अपि ज्ञायते न तु सर्वा इति चेत्? तुल्यम्। प्रागुत्पन्न-ज्ञातता-स्मरण-जनित-जिज्ञासः समुन्मीलित-नयनः संजात-ज्ञान-समुत्पादित-प्राकट्यं जिज्ञासुः एव प्रतिपद्यते इत्यतः न अनवस्था इति चेत्? तुल्यं एतत्।
ननु ज्ञानं न सविकल्पक-ग्राह्यं, तस्य निर्विकल्पक-पूर्वकत्वात्।

निर्विकल्पक-गृहीतस्य तावत्-काल-अनवस्थानात् तस्य तेन एव विनाशात्। नापि केवल-निर्विकल्पक-वेद्यम्। तस्य सविकल्पक-उन्नेयत्वेन तदभावे प्रमाणाभावात्। न च समवाय-अभाववत् निर्विकल्पक-निरपेक्ष-सविकल्पक-गोचरत्वं ज्ञानस्य इति सांप्रतम्। तयोः विशेषण-अंशस्य प्राक् ग्रहणात् अनुमानादिवत् तदुपपत्तेः। प्रकृते तु ज्ञानत्वादेः अनुपलब्धेः। अगृहीत-विशेषणायाः च बुद्धेः विशेष्य-अन्-उपसंक्रमात् कथं एवं स्यात्? न। उत्पन्न-मात्रस्य एव बाह्य-विषय-ज्ञानस्य आलोचनात्। ततः तत्-पुरः सरं प्रथमतः एव तत्-जातीयस्य ज्ञानांतरस्य विकल्पनात्। इन्द्रिय-संनिकर्षस्य तदा एव विशेषण-ग्रहण-लक्षण-सहकारि-संपत्तेः। व्यक्ति-अंतर-समवेतं अपि हि सामान्यं गृहीतं तदेव इति उपयुज्यते। अन्यथा अनुमानादि-विकल्पानां अनुत्पाद-प्रसङ्गः। तत्-गतस्य विशेषस्य अग्रहणात्। अन्यगतस्य च अनुपयोगात् किं लिंग-ग्रहण-सहकारि स्यात् इति? एतेन शब्दादि-प्रत्यक्षं व्याख्यातं इति।
स्यात् एतत्। विषय-निरूप्यं हि ज्ञानं इष्यते। न च अतीन्द्रियस्य परमाण्वादेः मनसा वेदनं अस्ति। न च अगृहीतस्य विशेषणत्वम्। न च नित्य-परोक्षस्य अपरोक्ष-विशिष्ट-बुद्धि-विषयत्वं व्याघातात् इति। न। बाह्येन्द्रिय-ग्राह्यस्य अग्राह्यस्य वा पूर्व-ज्ञान उपनीतस्य एव मनसा वेदनात्। अन्यथा अतीन्द्रिय-स्मरणस्य अपि अनुत्पत्ति-प्रसङ्गात्। इयान् तु विशेषः-तस्मिन् सति तत्-बलात् एव, असति तु तत्-जनित्-वासना-बलात्। न च एवं सति स्मरणं एतत्? अगृहीत-ज्ञान-गोचरत्वात्। न च विषयांशे तत्तथा स्यात् इति युक्तम्। अवच्छेदकतया प्रागवस्थावत् अवभासनात्। न च प्रत्यभिज्ञानं अपि ग्रहण-स्मरणाकारम्। विरोधात्। अथ ग्रहण-स्मरणयोः कियती सामग्री? अधिकः अर्थ-संनिकर्षः ग्रहणस्य, संस्कारमात्रं सनिकर्षः स्मरणस्य।
अथ ग्रहणत्वे अपि कुतः एतत् अपरोक्षाकारम्? कारणांतर-निरपेक्षेण संस्कार-अधिक-संनिकर्षवता इन्द्रियेण जनितत्वात्। अथ कः संनिकर्षः? ज्ञानेन संयुक्तसमवायः, तदर्थेन संयुक्त समवेत-विशेषणत्वं इति। मनसः

निरपेक्षस्य बहिः व्यापारे अंध-बधिरादि-अभाव-प्रसङ्गः इति चेत्? ज्ञान-अवच्छेदकं प्रति नायं दोषः। न च ज्ञान-अपेक्षया बहिः इत्यस्ति। नापि तद्विषय-अपेक्षया निरपेक्षत्वम्। तस्य एव ज्ञानस्य अपेक्षणात्। अथापि ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षं इत्यत्र किं प्रमाणम्? प्रत्यक्षं एव। यत् असूत्रयत्- 'ज्ञान-विकल्पानां भाव-अभाव-संवेदनात् अध्यात्मम्।'

ननु न ईश्वरज्ञानं प्रमा, नित्यत्वेन अ-फलत्वात्। नापि प्रमाणम्। अकारकत्वात्। अत एव च न तदाश्रयः प्रमाता। इति? उच्यते-

मितिः सम्यक् परिच्छित्तिः तद्वत्ता च प्रमातृता।
तदयोग-व्यवच्छेदः प्रामाण्यं गौतमे मते॥

समीचीनः हि अनुभवः प्रमा इति व्यवस्थितम्। तथा च अनित्यत्वेन विशेषणं अनर्थकम्। नित्य-अनुभव सिद्धौ तत्-व्यवच्छेदस्य अनिष्टत्वात् असिद्धौ च व्यवच्छेद्य-अभावात्। न च इदं अनुमानम्? आश्रयासिद्धि-बाधयोः अन्यतर-आक्रांतत्वात्। न तत्-प्रमा-करणं इति तु इष्यते एव। प्रमया संबधाभावात्। तदाश्रयस्य तु प्रमातृत्वं एतदेव यत् तत्समवायः। कारकत्वे सति इति तु विशेषणं पूर्ववत् निरर्थकं अनुसंधेयम्। यद्येवं 'आप्त-प्रामाण्यात्' इति सूत्र-विरोधः? तेन हि ईश्वरस्य प्रामाण्यं प्रतिपाद्यते न तु प्रमातृत्वं इति चेत्? न। निमित्त-समावेशेन व्यवहार-समावेश-अविरोधात्। प्रमा-समवायः हि प्रमातृ-व्यवहार-निमित्तम्। प्रमया तु अयोग-व्यवच्छेदेन संबंधः प्रमाण-व्यवहार-निमित्तम्। तदुभयं च ईश्वरे। अत्रापि कार्यया इति विशेषणं पूर्ववत् अनर्थकं ऊहनीयम्।

स्यात् एतत्। प्रमीयते अनेन इति प्रमाणम्। प्रमिणोति इति प्रमाता इति कारक-शब्दत्वं अनयोः, तथा च कथं अकारकं अर्थः इति चेत्? न। एतस्य व्युत्पत्ति-मात्र-निमित्तत्वात्। प्रवृति-निमित्तं तु यथा-उपदर्शितं एव। व्यवस्थापनात्। अन्यथा अस्मदादिषु न प्रमातृ-व्यवहारः स्यात्। सर्वत्र स्वातंत्र्य-अभावात्। करण-व्यवहारः तु अन्यत्र यद्यपि अनिमित्त कः अपि तथापि इह उक्त-निमित्त-विवक्षया एव इति। एवं तर्हि पंचम-प्रमाण-अभ्युपगमे अपसिद्धांतः। न हि तत् प्रत्यक्षं, अनुमानं आगमः वा। अनिन्द्रिय-लिंग-शब्द-करणत्वात्। न। साक्षात्कारि प्रमावत्तया,

प्रत्यक्ष-अंतर्भावात्। इन्द्रिय-अर्थ-संनिकर्ष-उत्पन्नत्वस्य च लौकिक-मात्र-विषयत्वात्।

स्यात् एतत्। तथपि ईश्वरज्ञानं न प्रमा, विपर्ययत्वात्। यदा खलु एतत् अस्मदादि-विभ्रमान् आलंबते तदा एतस्य विषयं अस्पृशतः न ज्ञान-अवगाहन-संभवः इति तदर्थः अपि आलंबनं अभ्युपेयम्। तथा च तदपि विपर्ययः विपरीतार्थ-आलबंनत्वात्। तत्-अनवगाहने वा अस्मादादेः विभ्रमान् अविदुषः तदुपशमाय उपदेशानां असर्वज्ञ-पूर्वकत्वं इति। न। विभ्रमस्य अप्रामाण्ये अपि तद्विषयस्य तत्वं उल्लिखतः अभ्रान्तत्वात्। अन्यथा भ्रान्ति-समुच्छेद-प्रसङ्गः। प्रमाणाभावात्। तथापि आरोपित-अर्थ-अवच्छिन्न-ज्ञान-आलंबनत्वेन कथं न भ्रान्तत्वं इति चेत्? न यत् यत्र नास्ति तत्र तस्य अवगतिः इति भ्रान्ति-अर्थत्वात्। एतदालंबनस्य च एवं उल्लिखतः सर्वत्र यथार्थत्वात्। न हि न तत् रजतं, नापि तत्र असत्। नापि तत्र अवगतं इति।

साक्षात्कारिणि नित्य योगिनि पर द्वार-अनपेक्षस्थितौ।
भूतार्थ-अनुभवे विशिष्ट-निखिल-प्रस्तावि-वस्तु-क्रमः॥
लेशादृष्टि-निमित्त-दुष्टि-विगम-प्रभ्रष्ट-शंका-तुषः।
शंका उन्मेष-कलंकिभिः किं अपरैः तत् मे प्रमाण शिवः॥

TRANS.: Alright! Let then there be this proof for the thesis of 'cognisedness'. Manifestness of objects is an experientially-certified fact. When we say generally that 'a certain object is known' or 'that this object is directly perceived', there does appear something as adjectival—generally or specifically to the object cognised. (This something must be the property of cognisedness characterising the object of cognition). No! This proof cannot be upheld because there cannot be any specific property in the object generated by cognition as all cognitions are formless and are distinguished from each other by their respective objects-only. Similarly it is because of the distinction of different efforts generating them that different actions stand distinguished from each other (Like cognition effort also does not produce any result in the action or thing caused by it).

To explain: Don't you see that like the usages 'this is the action of the pot, this is the action of the cloth', usages like 'the pot has already been

produced', 'the pot will be produced' etc. are quite common (when their objects are nonexistent). Similarly just like the epistemic usage. 'This is pot-cognition', 'This is cloth-cognition', there are usages like 'This pot has already been cognised, The pot will be cognised' etc. (which reveal the qualifier-qualificand-relation even of the existent cognition and the nonexistent object). But how can there be this relation between unrelated things? The answer is clear. In the expression 'The pot is destroyed', the pot is nonexistent when its destruction takes place (even when we say that the pot is the object of destruction). But how is this too possible (if the pot is unrelated to destruction)? Well! Does this query mean that even destruction (is related to) and does something really to the destroyed pot? No! What is meant is that destruction of the pot is definable only by means of the definition of the pot and only because of this the destruction pertains by its very nature to the pot. Well! If this is so in the present case then the same is the case with cognition, conation etc. This rejoinder takes care of the possible objection as to how what is not the bearer of the result of action can be treated as its object. (The object in the objective case is grammatically defined as the bearer of the fruit of the action inhering in or initiated by some other object). Just as the destroyed entity is treated as the object of destruction on account of its being the object of the process instrumental to destruction so the cognitive object too may be treated as the object of its cognition (due to its being the object of the process instrumental to cognition). In both cases the result of the process-destruction in one case and cognition in another—are respectively defined (or determined) by their respective objects.

It may now be asked, 'Cognition being an extrasensory object its existence is inferrible only by means of some special effect of it but if no effect of cognition is derived from it how can it be inferred to exist? And if cognition is not known to exist how can there be any usage pertaining to it? So, to account for the usage itself there is the need to postulate cognisedness as a property.' No! The question and the argument supporting it are incorrect as the argument involves the fallacy of mutual dependence. It is on the basis of the supposed reality of cognisedness that the reality of cognition may be inferred and only if an object is cognised the usage regarding its cognisedness leads by way of implication to the postulation of cognisedness. But (leaving this aside), why should cognition be treated as extrasensory? Is it because cognition is not sensed? There cannot be an inference like, 'cognition is extrasensory because it is not sensed', as the major and minor terms in the inference are identical. If non-cognition is put up as the proof for the extrasensory character of cognition then competence to be cognised needs to be introduced as the qualification of the middle term as mere non-cognition of a thing cannot prove its nonexistence. But if this qualification is introduced then it follows that cognition is something which is capable of being sensed although it is not sensed. Can one say against this that cognition is unsensed because it is not endowed by the cognisedness characteristic of perceptual objects? No! then cognition itself being imperceptible it cannot be the minor term in the inference of its imperceptibility. But isn't the inexplicability of usage pertaining to cognition sufficient proof for its reality? Well! The causes of cognition are themselves adequate to explain the usage. There is no need to treat cognition itself as one of the causes of the usage. But aren't the causes of cognition like the contact of self, mind etc. present during sound sleep without producing any usage regarding the cognition of any object? No. These causes alone are not adequate to engender the usage, for even the inclusion of cognition among the causes of the usage cannot help explain why during sound sleep there does not obtain any usage pertaining to cognition. For this purpose some special conditions for the usage needs to be postulated. But doesn't the occurrence of memory or recollection prove by implication the prior occurrence of cognition? No! Even memory is a kind of cognition so its existence needs to be proved. But then isn't there something which engenders usages about cognition? May be, but simply by means of this it cannot be established that the basis of the usage is cognition and nothing else. However can't it be urged that the regular disposition to act on the part of an agent calls for a causal condition inhering in the agent himself? Alright! Let this condition be the familiar desire itself of the agent (there is no need to admit cognition as the condition). But how can it be ensured that the desire coexists with the disposition in the agent? This question can be asked about cognition also. But can't it be contended that the desire arises from its own causes and coexists with the disposition? Well, then let there be only the desire, do away with the very idea of cognition (as the cause of disposition).

Well! Let then there be this argument (for cognition): Only if an object is manifest the desire etc. for the object arise. These do not arise in the state of sleep when the object is unmanifest. This is proved by experience. So we have to admit some peculiar cause of desire which being there the indifference or ignorance pertaining to an object which is characteristic of sleep disappears (and this cause is cognition). Oh! One who swears by the familiar state disruptive of sleep does indirectly admit the immediate perceptual cognition itself. Only in the absence of

consciousness a man is said to be asleep and it is only the dissipation of unconsciousness which is called cognition. Thus cognition being cognisable the foregoing inference that cognition is extrasensory is riddled by the fallacy of the absence of major in the minor. Since thus, cognition is proved to be sensible it cannot be inferred to be extrasensory on the basis of its supposed momentariness. (If it were momentary it cannot be the objective cause of its sensation and also apprehended by it). Moreover what is this alleged momentariness of cognition? If momentariness consists in destruction in the third moment from origination then desire too is such an entity but it is not perceptible. If however momentariness is existence in the moment of origination only then this is inadmissible in the absence of proof.

Alright! We ask now a different question: 'Does the durable (as per Nyāya) cognition apprehend in the second moment of its occurrence an object just similar to the first or one dissimilar to it or none at all?' The first alternative is inadmissible as the object apprehended in its second moment by a cognition cannot be characterised by the first moment (which is past and by which the object was characterised in the first moment). The cognition however remains the same during both the moments. Nor does the cognition refer to the object of the previous moment as present as then it would become illusory. The second of the above alternatives too is not admissible. If it is the same cognition there is no reason why it should wait till the second moment to apprehend the object characterised by the second moment. The cognitive process cannot proceed haltingly. If however the object of the second moment is apprehended in the first moment itself then the apprehending cognition would amount to precognition. As to the third alternative, if it is accepted it would jeopardise the cognitionness itself of the cognition. This is the view of certain thinkers known as the adherents of *Mahāvrata*.

But all this is wrong, we do not strictly admit the very usage that cognition apprehends the object. Instead our view is that cognition itself is apprehension. So the aforementioned question amounts to the query whether a cognition depends upon the same object—depending upon which (as its objective condition) it comes into being in the moment of its origination. The answer to the question is a definite 'yes' (as in both moments the cognition has the same object as its objective condition). This does not render cognition illusory as it does not apprehend a distorted object. But then if the object changes from moment to moment how can the cognition remain the same self-identical entity or if the latter is true how can the object differ from one moment to another? Well! What is inexplicable in this? Certainly cognition and its object are

not essentially one or have the same duration of existence. Even if cognition is treated as momentary how can it be imperceptible? One can say that the imperceptibility may be maintained for the following reason; Cognition is not self-cognised as it is a thing like other things; cognition is not also cognised by another cognition as two cognitions cannot be simultaneous and so there cannot occur a cognising cognition contemporaneous with the cognised cognition. When the former cognition is present the latter will be absent and so the present appearance of the (content of the) cognising cognition cannot be explained. And when the cognition to be cognised is present the cognising cognition has to come into being (so that it cannot cognise the former). Now these reasons can be adduced against the cognisability of 'cognisedness' also. For example, cognisedness is not perceptible as it is momentary. The reasons for the momentariness may be explained thus. Cognisedness is not self-cognised as it is an entity. It is uncognised by the cognition producing it because it is subsequent in its origination to the latter. And the causal cognition cannot wait for a moment to produce cognisedness. Nor is cognisedness cognised by a cognition contemporary with it as no sense-contact productive of this cognition is known to occur. Nor also cognisedness is cognised by a cognition subsequent to it as it goes out of existence when the latter arises. 'But if all this goes to show that cognisedness is uncognised how can this prove the momentariness of the former?' It may be asked. The answer is, 'For the same reasons as mentioned above against the cognisability of cognitions?'

To explain: It may be asked (as above), 'Does cognisedness originating at a certain moment in a certain object continue to reside in the same object (subsequently) or pass on to another object (after the first moment) or reside nowhere? The first alternative is ruled out as the cognisedness is nonexistent after the first moment. The second too is ruled out as cognisedness is not transferable from one object to another. Besides the cognition which apprehends the object of an earlier moment cannot be regarded as productive of the cognisedness pertaining to the object of the subsequent moment as then the cognition would be rendered illusory. It is just like the cognition of the nonexistent silver producing cognisedness in the apparently-present silver where the shell is really present. Nor does a cognition of the first moment apprehend the next moment too as it does not survive the first moment. The third of the above alternatives too is unacceptable as then cognisedness will lose its very nature. Certainly a cognisedness cannot belong to one thing or another thing when it does not reside anywhere. But can't the cognisedness as indirectly connected with the earlier moment of its oc-

currence continue to exist in the next moment? Well! If it did so then perceptual cognition cannot have a present entity as its object. Otherwise like cognisedness cognition also may persist in the second moment after the moment of its origination and appear as present. In fact the appearance of presentness in cognition is nothing other than its relation with the manifestation of a present object. If however a cognition is treated as present simply by the presentness of the manifestation occurring in it irrespective of the temporal quality of the object manifested then the cognition even of the past or future would have the appearance of the cognition of the present. This difficulty may be avoided by regarding the gross (durable) entity as manifested in cognition. If it is, then only such an entity will be the object of cognition and so it cannot be regarded as momentary.

(Now another question is raised by the Mīmāṃsaka): If cognition pertains to the mind it remains always connected with the self by the relation 'Inherence in the self which is conjoined with the mind'. How then can it be connected with its object? (Only a cognition can be cognised by another cognition). The self and the mind being eternal the relation of cognition with these entities will last as long as cognition lasts. But the relation of cognition, mind, sense and object being occasional objective cognition cannot always be ensured. The desire to know may however be supposed to determine the occasional occurrence of cognition. But this desire arises only if there is doubt about the object of cognition and the doubt arises only if there is prior knowledge of the qualificand, in the doubt. Thus for the desire to cognise, the cognition of the qualificand of cognition is indirectly needed. Now this cognition may arise of itself as the self, the mind etc. are eternal and therefore the relation of the various entities producing cognition is eternal. Alternatively this cognition also may need desire to have it to produce it and then there will arise the same regress as in the previous case. So whether the qualificand is cognised of itself or depends upon desire to produce it in either case there results infinite regress. Well! This dilemma besets the thesis of 'cognisedness' also (as it does the above view). If cognisedness is cognised there is bound to result an infinite series of cognisednesses one characterising another. And as in the above case the desire to cognise cannot be supposed to determine the occurrences of different cognisednesses. Can the cessation of sense-object-contact be taken to terminate the series of cognisednesses that may otherwise go on unendingly? No! Self-cognisedness and the cognisedness of this cognisedness and so on can never come to end as the eternal self is eternally connected with the eternal mind. If certain cognisednesses

are cognisable by their very nature while others are not so, then the same can be true of cognition too. It may be urged that if recollecting the cognisedness of an earlier cognition, a person, eager to acquaint himself with the cognisedness of a recent cognition turns his attention towards it, then alone he cognises it (not otherwise) and so the said regress cannot arise. But this may be urged as before about cognition too.

Now there arises another difficulty in the view of the perceptibility of cognition. The difficulty is that cognition cannot be cognised by any determinate cognition as every such cognition is preceded by the indeterminate cognition of cognition which cannot last till the emergence of its determinate cognition. The cognition apprehending the original cognition and succeeding it will itself destroy the latter. Nor is cognition cognisable by an indeterminate cognition. The occurrence of an indeterminate cognition is inferrible only on the basis of the occurrence of a coobjective determinate cognition which being absent here the possibility of the indeterminate cognition cannot be validly entertained. Can't it be contended here that just as the relation of inherence and absence are determinately cognised even though there is no prior indeterminate cognition of them so also cognition is determinately cognised without first being indeterminately cognised? No! In the cases of the cognitions of inherence and absence the qualifying relation of the one and the counter-positive of the other being already involved in the respective cognitions, these entities are directly determinately cognised without first being indeterminately cognised. It is just like the emergence of the determinate inferential cognition which is always preceded by the determinate cognition of the minor term and presence of the middle term in the minor. But in the case of cognition itself the characteristic property of cognition viz., cognitionness, remains unknown (before the cognition is even indeterminately known). So without the cognition of the qualifying property the qualified entity viz., cognition cannot be expected to be known. All this argumentation is however baseless. As soon as the indeterminate cognition of some external entity takes place, cognitionness also is indeterminately cognised. As the sense-organ comes in contact with cognitionness, in the next moment when a new cognition of the external entity succeeds the previous one then the determinate cognition of the cognition comes into being. As a result not only the succeeding cognition but all other cognitions including the previous one are determinately cognised. (Since sense-contact is available only at a later moment the causal collocation of the determinate cognition cannot be had earlier, Yet if one instance of cognition is

identified as endowed with cognitionness all other instances are also so identified). If such were not the case with all determinate cognitions then there cannot arise any determinate inferential cognition. In the stock example of the inference of fire on the hill the fire as present in the kitchen is alone cognised as concomitant with smoke. This cognition is of no use in cognising the presence of a different specimen of fire on the hill. [Only if fireness perceived in the kitchen-fire is taken to have been cognised as characterising all instances of fire (perceived and unperceived) the general inference of fire on the hill becomes possible]. Otherwise there can be no cognition of the major term associated with the cognition of the middle which may lead to the inference of the major term in the minor. This explanation applies to verbal cognition also. Likewise when a certain specimen of a letter say 'a' is cognised as 'a' or endowed with a-ness all other specimens of 'a' are also so known even if they are not individually known.

Alright! Here is another argument against the perceptuality of cognition. All cognition is admitted to be identifiable by means of its object. But the extrasensory entities like atoms, dyads etc. are not cognised even by the mind—the internal sense-organ. Nor is any uncognised entity the qualifier of any qualificand. Nor also an eternally-invisible entity the object of a determinate perceptual cognition. It is self-contradictory to hold the ever-invisible entity as objectified by an internal (mental) determinate perception. (Since the cognition of the invisible entity cannot thus be introspected—as the invisible entity which is the objective qualifier of the cognition is imperceptible the qualified cognition also would be imperceptible). (The reply to this argument is simple). It is not at all necessary that the cognition introspected upon by mind should have only a perceptible object. (Even non-perceptual cognitions are cognised by mind) whether a thing is sensed or not sensed by an external sense-organ, if its cognition is presented to the mind then it is introspected by it. If this were not the case then there cannot arise even the memory of extrasensory entities (as these are not perceptible) and memory arises only when the mind evokes the residual impressions of experiences reposing in the self). But there is this peculiarity to be noted about the mental cognition of cognition. If a cognition of a sensory or extrasensory entity is present in the mind then, the mind being in contact with it its mental cognition will be perceptual in nature. But if instead of the cognition, only its residual impression is carried by the mind then the mental cognition of the cognition would be of the nature of memory only. 'But if this is so won't then all mental cognitions of cognition be of the nature of memory or recollection only as it is only what is

cognised by the objective cognition is cognised by the mind? (In the introspective cognition of the form 'I know the pot' it is the pot that appears in its cognition as well as the mental cognition of the cognition). No! The cognition which is the introspective object is not already cognised and so the introspection cannot be recollective in nature. Certainly the introspection is not coobjective with its object viz. the cognition of a certain object as this appears in the latter as its qualifier and not as its qualificand. (Even if it were the qualificand of the object-cognition it cannot be the qualificand of the introspective cognition). Thus although in the introspective cognition the previously perceived object figures as the objective determinant of its cognition yet the former cannot be treated as recollective because it is perceptual in relation to the cognition which it directly apprehends. This should not make one think that recognition will now be both recollective and objective as it involves both kinds of content. Recollective and non-recollective cognitions are mutually opposed in nature. (The involvement of the different elements in the cognition can be explained as above).

Here an important question may be raised. If despite the prior evocation of residual impression the cognition following it (like the introspective one) could be non-recollective (and vice versa), then what could be the extra causal conditions which respectively determine the recollective and non-recollective nature of the resulting cognitions? The answer to the question is this. Over and above the general conditions of cognitions, if there is present sense-object-contact the resulting cognition is non-recollective while the presence of residual impression alone (in place of the contact) renders the resulting cognition recollective.

'But why should recognition, despite being a kind of cognition, be regarded as of the nature of immediate cognition or perception?' One may ask. The answer is that the cognition is generated by sense-contact which does not depend upon any other condition (like the cognition of the middle term etc.). This contact is over and above the residual impression which too is needed for recognition. But what is this sense-contact? It is conjunction with the inheree in the case of cognition (as mind is conjoined with the self in which cognition inheres); with the object appearing in the cognition however the contact is 'conjunction with the inheree which is qualified by'. The object qualifies the cognition inhering in the self conjoined with the mind. Again one may ask. 'If as mentioned the mind can have by its own contact immediate cognition of the external object there will not be any blind or deaf person (as they can see and hear by means of their mind itself)?' (It has therefore to be admitted that cognition is not perceptible by mind as explained).

The reply to this question is that the mind depends upon sensory cognitions to apprehend external objects. It does not depend upon the cognitions for cognising the cognitions themselves even if their objects are externally sensed. When a cognition is mentally cognised its object is internal to it (and so it does not need to be separately cognised). Nor is mind independent of the cognition of external objects in its cognition of them. As the objective condition of the cognition cognised the object is needed for the mental cognition of cognition. 'But still what is the proof that introspection is perceptual?' One may ask. The answer is, 'the testimony of reflective cognition itself'. This fact is expressed in his aphorism by Gotama thus: ज्ञान विकल्पानां भावाभाव-संवेदनादध्यात्मम्. This says that, 'That different types of cognition occur or do not occur is experienced by the self itself'.

How can divine cognition be true if being eternal it does not result from any instrument of cognition? And how is it an instrument of valid cognition when it does not initiate any process for any production? To these questions we give the following reply:

> Knowledge is correct apprehension and knowership is, 'being endowed with knowledge. Exclusion of the absence of truth is validity. These are the views of Gotama the founder of the Nyāya school.

To explain: It is established that a true experience is knowledge. So there is no need to qualify the experience as eternal. If eternal cognition is established then its exclusion by the qualification 'non-eternal' would be wrong but if no such cognition is known then there is nothing to be excluded by it. As to the non-instrumentality of divine cognition we certainly admit it as the latter is not connected with any knowledge. (It is itself knowledge). The knowership of God consists only in His being the inheree of knowledge.

The qualification of agency or doership denied of God is of course as meaningless as the qualification of eternity. (If without being a doer one can be an agent the qualification will be too narrow and if every knower is a doer then the qualification is redundant). But doesn't this explanation conflict with the statement in Nyāya aphorism which says that God has knowledge but is not an agent (or the active possessor of knowledge)? No! The conflict is apparent and is resolved by the coexistence of the connotations of the two words which leads to their coordinate use for the same meaning. The basis of the usage of the word 'knower' is the meaning 'being the inheree of knowledge' and the basis of the usage of the word 'being true' is the meaning 'exclusion of the absence of knowledge'. Both these meanings apply to God. Here too it

may be noted that the qualification of knowledge as non-eternal as in the case of other qualifications mentioned above leads to the fallacy of narrowness or redundancy.

Alright! Let then there be this argument against the above. The word *'Pramāṇa'* in Sanskrit means 'that by means of which things are known' and the word *'Pramātā'* in Sanskrit means 'one who ascertains truth'; so both these words signify agency. If this is so how can they mean something other than an agent? Well! These are the bases of the semantic meanings of the words. The basis of the usage of the word however is the same as explained and established above. If it were not so then the words could not be applicable to us—the common human beings—as none of us is free to have all kinds of knowledge. As to the usage of the word 'instrumental (to cognition)' in the case of sense-organs etc., it is certainly due to the causal relation holding between the instrument and its product but in the case of God it is only the relation of inherence obtaining between knowledge and God that is the basis of the said usage. But then doesn't this amount to the admission of a fifth source of knowledge? Certainly divine knowledge cannot be classed as perceptual, inferential or verbal as it is not mediated by sense-contact, the middle term or even words? No! Divine knowledge is included in perception itself as it is directly cognitive of all objects. The usual definition of perception in terms of its genesis by contact has application to common perceptions only.

Well! There is now another argument against the above. It is this, Divine cognition is false because it is illusory. Since God's knowledge apprehends everything even our illusions are apprehended by it and so the erroneous contents of the latter must also enter divine knowledge rendering it false. If our illusions and their contents are inaccessible to divine knowledge then all God's teachings for the removal of our falsehoods would be useless as they issued from a non-omniscient being. No! The argument is misconceived. Illusion is certainly false but the realisation that it is so is not false. If it were not so then the distinction between illusion and truth would simply disappear (as it is truth of the realization of the falsehood of a false cognition that helps distinguish falsehood from truth). But still isn't divine knowledge falsified because it objectifies our false cognition in which a property is imposed upon a locus in which it does not exist? No! Illusoriness of a cognition consists in apprehending the presence of that in a locus where it is absent. If a cognition apprehends a false cognition as it actually is (as described) it must be true.

For example the reflective cognition of the falsehood of a cognition is of the form, 'I cognised the shell as silver'; here there is absolutely no element of falsehood. The cognition is located in the self where it appears as based. The silverness appearing to characterise the shell in the illusion appears in the capacity of the epistemic qualifier in the reflective cognition (Which is not a falsehood). Nor is silverness nonexistent. Thus the divine knowledge of any falsehood (as an instance of falsehood) is not itself false.

Now the author offers prayer to Lord Śiva indirectly referring to important topics discussed in the section. The Lord Śiva is alone my refuge and authority. Why should I turn to the alien thinkers (the Buddhists) whose teachings are besmirched by the provocations of all kinds of doubts? The scriptural teachings of the Lord are such that all kinds of stray doubts resulting from the confusion caused by partial knowledge are simply dissipated by it.

Also the Lord's direct and true knowledge is such that every thing in the universe is present to it in its real and organised form.

(In the foregoing passage the author considers two important questions about God. One, can God be omniscient if He is not the origin of His knowledge which is eternal? Two, can God be the knower if He has no agency of any kind? There is an important third question too discussed towards the end of the passage. This is the question if God is not chargeable of falsehood and illusion when his knowledge comprehends everything including the falsehoods of us all. To the first question the simple answer is that the Sanskrit term *'Pramāṇa'* need not always be taken in the sense in which it is usually taken. Even the mere inherence of knowledge can be called *'Pramāṇa'*. The second question is also answered by slightly altering the meaning of the Sanskrit word *'Kāraka.'* 'Independent agency' or 'doership' is the common meaning of the word. None of us however is such an absolutely independent agent of any of our activities. God too is not such an agent as He is devoid of all activity. The third question is answered by carefully distinguishing between a false cognition and the reflection that the false cognition is false. No false element is involved in the reflection on falsehood).

EXPL.: Various arguments advanced by Mīmāṃsā for proving the generation of the property of cognisedness in its object by cognition are considered and rejected above. The most obvious of these arguments is that the object acquires manifestness on being cognised. And every cognised object differs from every other on account of the different 'cognisednesses' produced in their respective objects by different

cognitions. This argument is one-sided. Even cognitions differ because of the difference of their objects. In fact it is the difference of cognitions caused by the objective difference which appears to be more obvious than the other difference. Besides it cannot always be the same effect produced by cognition in its object causing the difference. The past and future objects can never then be cognised. Again if cognition as some kind of activity produces its effect in its object does destruction also as a different kind of activity produce its effect in the destroyed entity? Another argument of Mīmāṃsā to support the above thesis is that cognition is an extrasensory entity and so it needs to be inferred from the effect it produces. But no cogent proof for this is adduced except that the external senses have no contact with cognition to sense it. But there is the internal sense-mind—whose contact with the sense-organ in a particular region of the body does produce cognition which is directly experienced by the knower. The testimony of common experience in the form 'I know this or that' attesting the internal perceptibility of cognition cannot be flouted by Mīmāṃsā. And if cognition is treated as extrasensory how can desire and other qualities of the self be treated as not extrasensory?

The third argument for the above thesis has some force. Cognition being momentary it cannot apprehend its object which being its objective cause must preexist it. So when the object exists its cognition does not exist and when the cognition exists its object does not exist. Moreover if cognition is not momentary it may be asked if cognition cognises the same entity in the second and subsequent moments of its existence as it does in the first moment. In raising these questions on behalf of Mīmāṃsā the author seems to have confused the Buddhist view of cognition with that of Mīmāṃsā. Only the Buddhists hold that everything including cognition is momentary. By 'momentary' the Buddhists mean 'that which exists just in the moment of its origination'. This however cannot be the meaning of momentary in the Mīmāṃsā or Nyāya view. Cognition, desire etc. are supposed to be momentary by these schools but the momentariness of these states consists in their existence for two moments and disappearance in the third moment. So even on the momentarist view the apprehension of objects by cognition is quite easy to explain.

It needs here to be pointed out that the postulation of cognisedness as the effect of cognition is exactly similar to the postulation of the object-form (in cognition) which the Buddhists have made. Mīmāṃsaka takes to task the Buddhist for the postulation of the object-form. But the Buddhists can repay the Buddhists in their own coin. If cognition is

formless then its object also is devoid of cognisedness (as a property). Of course a previously-perceived object has a familiar look but this is just the projection of one's recollection of the earlier perception of the object. There remains however the question of how a past or future entity becomes the object of cognition. Mīmāṃsā cannot answer this question satisfactorily as cognisedness as a property cannot be supposed to reside in nonexistent entities. Nyāya answers this question by treating the cognitive relation as one which both the cognition and the object help to define. Actual contact between the two is not required for them to pertain to each other. Mīmāṃsā too does not admit any actual (physical or concrete) relation between cognition and its object. It is only (an unanalysable) epistemic relation of 'presentness' to cognition that is admitted to connect the object with its cognition by Mīmāṃsā. So there is not much difference between the views of Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā on this point.

The fourth argument of Mīmāṃsā to prove the extrasensory nature of cognition is a kind of sophistry. It is to the effect that no cognition can ever cognise an object as the self-mind-contact generating cognition is always there so that there will go on an unending series of cognitions. The author meets this argument by showing how the admission of 'cognisedness' by Mīmāṃsā also suffers from the fallacy of infinite regression. But there is one serious shortcoming in the Mīmāṃsā objection which the author seems to have failed to point out. Despite the eternal character of self-mind-contact the contact of certain sensitive regions of the organism with the mind is essential for cognition or any other quality to emerge in the self. This contact does not take place at all times. So the contingency of the occurrence of an unending series of cognitions cannot be pressed by Mīmāṃsā.

The fifth argument of Mīmāṃsā disputes the very possibility of the cognisability (by perception) of cognition. There cannot be a determinate cognition of cognition as every determinate cognition is preceded by indeterminate cognition but since cognitions lasts only two moments the cognition to be cognised cannot last till its determinate cognition may arise. This is a flimsy argument. Whether a cognition is known or not known by an indeterminate or determinate cognition is ascertainable only if the knownness of cognition is admitted for, the ascertainment itself is a kind of cognition.

The sixth argument is to the effect that things like atoms being invisible their cognition cannot be cognised by mind. Even the inferential cognition of invisible entities cannot be determinately cognised by mind as the invisible entity enters into its cognition as its objective determinant. The argument is met by the reply that for the cognition of an invisible entity to be mentally cognised it is not necessary that the entity itself need be cognised by the mind. All the foregoing arguments and counter-arguments do not seem to be concerned with the core issue which is common to all Indian philosophical schools. The issue is the self-cognisedness of cognition. In different ways all different Indian philosophies excepting Buddhism and Advaita have tackled the issue without jeopardising the objectivity of cognition. Nyāya like Mīmāṃsā does not admit self-cognition of cognition but on this account it does not regard cognition as extrasensory and only inferrible. If cognition is to be treated as inferrible even desire, pleasure, pain etc. should be treated as inferrible. Why Mīmāṃsā makes an exception in the case of cognition is not clear. Moreover in postulating the property of cognisedness Mīmāṃsā seems to have ignored the fact that cognisedness as a property involves cognition. So without cognising cognition it is not possible to cognise cognisedness. The major positive argument of Mīmāṃsā in defence of cognisedness is however rather trivial. It is the argument that cognition is an activity and so it must produce some result in its object. Except Mīmāṃsā no Indian philosophical school regards cognition as an activity even of mind. The verb 'cognise' formed from the noun 'cognition' creates the wrong impression that cognition is an activity. Even if cognition is treated as an activity it could be the activity of just grasping its object. It need not produce any result in the object. And what is this result—'Cognisedness'—except being the object of cognition? So, to say that cognition produces cognisedness in its object is just to say in a roundabout way that cognition cognises its object or that there occurs the cognition of an object. Unless 'Cognisedness' is regarded as a unique unanalysable property characterising the cognised object Mīmāṃsā cannot put up even a lame defence of its view.

Having considered in detail the various arguments for the Mīmāṃsā view of the imperceptibility of cognition and criticized them thoroughly the author turns to the assertion made at the beginning of the section that divine knowledge is not valid. The reasons for invalidity as adduced by atheists including the Mīmāṃsakas are not very convincing. For example divine knowledge is supposed to be eternal. So it cannot have a cause as other knowledges have. This objection is met by the reply that knowledge need not be non-eternal in order to belong to God who does not produce it. This knowledge is also not instrumental in producing anything as other instruments are. God is also a knower—in the sense of an agent of knowledge—as human knowers are. Again God's knowledge is not falsified on account of cognising cognitions, true and false.

To cognise a thing otherwise than as it is, is falsehood. But to know a falsehood as falsehood is not to incur falsehood. For example the knowledge that 'the cognition that a piece of shell is silver' had by a deluded person is false is not a case of false knowledge. Thus the validity of divine knowledge as well as the omniscience of the divine being can easily be established against the criticisms of atheists.

At the end of the section the author, by way of offering fervent prayer to Lord Śiva, lists the different important issues discussed in the section. The author has also shown how the fourth objection against the existence of God (or any transcendental creative agency) mentioned at the beginning of the treatise can be met. In the last and the fifth section of the treatise the last of the earlier-mentioned objections will be taken up for detailed co ısideration.

FIFTH BUNCH OF FLOWERS
(of arguments)

Proofs for the existence of God stated and defended

TEXT: तत्-साधक-प्रमाण-अभावात् इति पंचमीं विप्रतिपत्तिं निराकर्तुं उपन्यस्यति-

ननु ईश्वरे प्रमाण-उपपत्तौ सत्यां सर्वं एतत् एवं स्यात्, तदेव तु न पश्यामः इति चेत्? नहि एष स्थाणोः अपराधः यत् एनं अंधः न पश्यति। तथाहि-

कार्य-आयोजन-धृत्यादेः पदात् प्रत्ययतः श्रुतेः।
वाक्यात् संख्या-विशेषात् च साध्यः विश्वजित्-अव्ययः॥

क्षित्यादि, कर्तृ-पूर्वकं कार्यत्वात् इति।

न बाधः अस्य उपजीव्यत्वात् प्रतिबंधः न दुर्बलैः।
सिद्धि-असिद्ध्योः विरोधः न, न असिद्धिः अ-निबंधना॥

तथाहि अत्र ये शरीर-प्रसङ्गं उद्घाटयंति कः तेषां आशयः? किं ईश्वरं पक्षयित्वा कर्तृत्वात् शरीरित्वं, ततः शरीर-व्यावृत्तेः अकर्तृत्वम्? अथ क्षित्यादिकं एव पक्षयित्वा कार्यत्वात् शरीरि-कर्तृत्वम्? यद्वा शरीर-अजन्यत्वात् अकार्यत्वम्? पर-व्याप्ति-स्तंभनार्थ विपरीत-व्याप्ति-उपदर्शन-मात्रं वा? इति? तथ प्रथम-द्वितीययोः आश्रया-सिद्धि-बाध-अपसिद्धांत-प्रतिज्ञा-विरोधाः। तृतीये तु व्याप्तौ सत्यां न इदं अनिष्टम्। असत्यां तु न प्रसङ्गः। चतुर्थे बाध-अनेकांतिकौ। पंचमे तु असमर्थ-विशेषणत्वम्। षष्ठे अपि न अ-गृह्यमाण-विशेषया व्याप्त्या बाधः। न च अगृह्यमाण-विशेष-व्याप्त्या गृह्यमाण-विशेषायाः सत्प्रतिपक्षत्वम्। अस्ति च कार्यत्व-व्याप्तेः पक्षधर्मता-परिग्रहः विशेषः। कर्ता शरीरी, विपरीतः न कर्ता इति च अनयोः तद्विरहः।

ननु यद्-बुद्धिमत्-हेतुकं तत्-शरीर-हेतुकं इति नियमे यत्-शरीर-हेतुकं न भवति तद् बुद्धिमत्-हेतुकं अपि न भवति इति विपर्यय-नियमः अपि स्यात्? तथा च पक्षधर्मता अपि लभ्यते इति चेत्? न। गगनादेः सपक्ष-भागस्य अपि संभवात् केवल व्यतिरेकित्व-अनुपपत्तेः। अन्वये तु विशेषण-असामर्थ्यात्। हेतु-व्यावृत्ति मात्रं एव तत्र कर्तृ-व्यावृत्ति-व्याप्तं न तु शरीर-रूप-हेतु-व्यावृत्तिः इत्युक्तम्। व्याप्तः च पक्षधर्मः इत्युच्यते न तु अन्यः अतिप्रसङ्गात्। एतेन तद्-व्यापक-रहितत्वात् इति सामान्य-उपसंहारस्य अ-सिद्धत्वं वेदितव्यम्। न हि यत्-व्यावृत्तिः यदभावे अन्वय-व्यतिरेकाभ्यां उपसंहर्तुं अशक्या तत्तस्य व्यापकं नाम इति। विशेष-विरोधः तु विशेष-सिद्धौ सह-उपलंभेन तदसिद्धौ मिथः धर्मि-परिहार-अनुपलंभेन निरस्तः न आशंकां अपि अधिरोहति इति।

स्यात् एतत्। अस्ति तावत् कार्यस्य-अवांतर-विशेषः यतः शरीरि-कर्तृत्वं अनुमीयते। तथा च तत्-प्रयुक्तां एव व्याप्तिं उपजीवेत् कार्यत्व-सामान्यं इति चेत्? न स्यात्। न हि विशेषः अस्ति इति सामान्यं अप्रयोजकम्। तथा सति सौरभ-कटुत्व-नीलिमादि-विशेषे सति न धूम-सामान्यं अग्निं गमयेत्? किं नाम साधक-सामान्ये साध्य-सामान्यं आश्रित्य प्रवर्तमाने तद्विशेषः साध्य-विशेष-व्याप्तिं आश्रयेत्। न तु विशेषे सति सामान्यं अकिंचित्करम्। तस्य अपि विशषांतर-अपेक्षया अकिंचित्करत्व-प्रसङ्गात्। सौरभादि-विशेषं विहाय अपि धूमे वन्हिः दृष्टः, न तु विशेषं विहाय कार्यं कर्ता इति चेत्? न। कार्य-विशेषः कारण-विशेषे व्यवतिष्ठते, न तु कार्य-कारण-सामान्ययोः प्रतिबधं अन्यथा कुर्यात् इति। किं न दृष्टं कार्यं कारणमात्रे, अंकुरः बीजे, तद्विशेषः धान्ये, तद्विशेषः शालौ, तद्विशेषः कलमे इत्यादि बहुलं लोके? क्वच दृष्टं अणु-द्रव्य-आरभ्यं द्रव्यं, नित्य-रूपादि-आरब्धं रूपादि? तथापि सामान्ययोः अविरोधात् सिद्धयति एव। अवश्यं च एतत् अंगीकर्तव्यम्। अन्यथा कार्यस्य आकस्मिकत्व प्रसङ्गात्।

स्यात् एतत्। अन्वय-व्यतिरेकि तावत् इदं कार्यत्वं इति परमार्थः। तत्र

आकाशादि-विपक्षात् किं कर्तृ-व्यावृत्तेः कार्यत्व-व्यावृत्तिः आहोस्वित् कारणमात्र-व्यावृत्तेः इति संदिह्यते। तदसत्। कर्तुः अपि कारणत्वात्। कारणेषु च अन्यतम-व्यतिरेकस्य अपि कार्य-अनुत्पत्तिं प्रति प्रयोजकत्वात्। अन्यथा कारणत्व-व्याघातात्। कारणादि-विशेष-व्यतिरेक-संदेह-प्रसंगात् च।

कथं हि निश्चीयते किं आकाशात् कारण-व्यावृत्त्या कार्यत्व-व्यावृत्तिः उत करण-व्यावृत्त्या? एवं किं उपादान-व्यावृत्त्या, किं असमवायि-व्यावृत्त्या, किं निमित्त व्यावृत्त्या इति? कार्यत्वात् कारणं उपादानं, अ-समवायि, निमित्तं वा बुद्धयादिषु न सिद्धयेत्। कर्तुः कारणत्वे सिद्धे सर्वं एतत् उचितं, तदेव तु असिद्धं इति चेत्? किं पटादौ कुविन्दादिः अकारणं एव कर्ता? प्रस्तुते वा उदासीनः एव साधयितुं उपक्रांतः। तस्मात् यत्किंचित् एतदपि इति।

ननु कर्ता कारणानां अधिष्ठाता साक्षात् वा शरीरवत्, साध्य-परंपरया वा दंडादिवत्। तत्र न पूर्वः, परमाण्वादीनां शरीरत्व-प्रसङ्गात्। न द्वितीयः। द्वार-अभावात्। न हि कस्यचित् साक्षात् अधिष्ठेयस्य अभावे परंपरया अधिष्ठानं संभवति।

तदयं प्रमाणार्थः-परमाण्वादयः न चेतन-अधिष्ठेयाः शरीरेतरत्वात्। यत् पुनः साक्षात् अधिष्ठेयं न तदेवं, यथा अस्मत्-शरीरं इति। नापि परंपरया अधिष्ठेयाः। स्वव्यापारे शरीर-अनपेक्षत्वात् स्वचेष्टायां अस्मत्-शरीरवत्। व्यतिरेकेण च दंडादि उदाहरणम्। एवं क्षित्यादि न चेतन-अधिष्ठित-हेतुकं, शरीरेतर-हेतुकत्वात् इति अति पीडया सत्प्रतिपक्षत्वम्। अपि च पटादौ कुविन्दादेः किं कारण-अधिष्ठानार्थं अपेक्षा, तेषां अचेतनानां स्वतः अप्रवृत्तेः। आहो कारकत्वेन? न पूर्वः। तेषां परमेश्वरेण एव-अधिष्ठानात्। न हि अस्य ज्ञानं, इच्छा, प्रयत्नः वा वेमादीन् न व्याप्नोति इति संभवति। न च अधिष्ठितानां अधिष्ठानांतर-अपेक्षा तदर्थं एव। तथा सति अनवस्थानात् एव अविशेषात्। न द्वितीयः। अधिष्ठातृत्वस्य अनंगत्व-प्रसङ्गेः दृष्टांतस्य साध्य-विकलत्व-आपत्तेः। न च हेतुत्वेन एव तस्य अपेक्षा अस्तु इति वाच्यम्। एवं तर्हि यत् कार्यं तत् सहेतुकं

इति व्याप्तिः न तु सकर्तृकं इति। तथा च तथा एव प्रयोगे सिद्धसाधनात्। किं च अनित्य-प्रयत्न-पूर्वकत्व-प्रयुक्तां व्याप्तिं उपजीवत् कार्यत्वं न बुद्धिमत्-पूर्वकत्वेन स्वभाव-प्रतिबद्धम्। न हि अनित्य-प्रयत्नः अपि बुद्ध्या शरीरवत् कारणत्वेन अपेक्ष्यते येन तन्निवृत्तौ अपि अकार्य-बुद्धिः न निवर्तेत इति।

तदेतत् प्रागेव निरस्त-प्रायं न उत्तरांतरं अपेक्षते। तथाहि साक्षात् अधिष्ठातरि साध्ये परमाण्वादीनां शरीरत्व-प्रसङ्गः इति किं इदं शरीरत्वं यत् प्रसज्यते? यदि साक्षात्-प्रयत्नवत्-अधिष्ठेयत्वं, तत् इष्यते एव। न च ततः अन्यत् प्रसंजकं अपि। अथ इन्द्रियाश्रयत्वम्? तत् न। तत्-अवच्छिन्न-प्रयत्न उत्पत्तौ तत्-अवच्छिन्न-ज्ञान-जनन-द्वारा इन्द्रियाणां उपयोगात्। अनवच्छिन्न-प्रयत्ने न अयं विधिः नित्यत्वात्। अतः एव न अर्थाश्रयत्वम्। न हि नित्य-ज्ञानं भोग-रूपं अभोग-रूपं वा यत्नं अपेक्षते। तस्य कारण-विशेषत्वात्। न च नित्य-सर्वज्ञस्य भोग-संभावना अपि। विशेषादर्शन-अभावे मिथ्याज्ञान-अनवकाशे दोष-अनुत्पत्तौ धर्माधर्मयोः असत्वात्। तस्मात् साक्षात् प्रयत्न-अनधिष्ठेयत्वात् स्व-व्यापारे तदनपेक्षत्वात् च इति द्वयं साध्याविशिष्टम्। अनिन्द्रियाश्रयत्वात्, अभोगायतनत्वात् स्वव्यापारे तत्-अनपेक्षत्वात् च इति त्रयं अपि अन्यथा-सिद्धम्। अ भोगायतनत्वात् अन्-इन्द्रियाश्रयः अपि। भोक्तृ-कर्म-अनुपग्रहात् अभोगायतनं अपि। स्पर्शवत्-वेगवत्-द्रव्य-अनुद्यत्वात् तदनपेक्षं अपि स्यात्। अचेतनत्वात् चेतनाधिष्ठितं अपि स्यात् इति कः विरोधः? तथा च साक्षात्-प्रयत्न-अधिष्ठितेतर-जन्यत्वात् इति साध्यसमः। इन्द्रियाश्रयेतर-जन्यत्वात् भोगायतनेतर-जन्यत्वात् इति द्वयं अपि अन्यथासिद्धम्। कार्य-ज्ञानादि-अनपेक्षत्वात् शरीरेतर-जन्यं अपि स्यात्। अचेतन-हेतुकत्वात् चेतनाधिष्ठितं अपि इति कः विरोधः?

अप्रसिद्ध-विशेषणः च पक्षः। न हि चेतनाधिष्ठित-हेतुकत्वं क्वचित् प्रमाण-सिद्धम्। न च चेतनाधिष्ठित-हेतुकत्व-निषेधः साध्यः? हेतोः असाधारण्य-प्रसङ्गात्। गगनादेः अपि सपक्षात् व्यावृत्तेः। यत् पुनरुक्तं, कुविन्दादेः पटादौ कथं अपेक्षा इति? तत्र कारकतया इति कः संदेहः?

किंतु कारकत्वं एव तस्य ज्ञान-चिकीर्षा-प्रयत्नवतः न स्वरूपतः। तदेव च अधिष्ठातृत्वम्। यत्तु अधिष्ठिते किं अधिष्ठानेन इति? तत् किं कुविन्दः उद्धार्यते, ईश्वरः वा, अनवस्था वा आपाद्यते? न प्रथमः। अन्वय-व्यतिरेक-सिद्धत्वात्। न द्वितीयः। परमाण्वाद्यधिष्ठातृत्व-सिद्धौ ज्ञानादीनां सर्व-विषयत्वे वेमादि-अधिष्ठानस्य अपि न्यायप्राप्तत्वात्। न तु तदधिष्ठानार्थं एव ईश्वरसिद्धिः।

न तृतीयः। तस्मिन् प्रमाणाभावात्। तथापि एक-अधिष्ठितं अपरः किं अधितिष्ठति इति प्रश्ने किं उत्तरं इति चेत्? हेतु-प्रश्नः अयं प्रयोजन-प्रश्नः वा? न आद्यः। ईश्वर-अधिष्ठानस्य नित्यत्वात्। कुविन्दादि-अधिष्ठानस्य स्व-हेतु-अधीनत्वात्। न द्वितीयः। कार्य-निष्पादनेन भोग-सिद्धेः स्पष्टत्वात्। एक-अधिष्ठानेन एव कार्यं स्यात् इति चेत्? स्यात् एव। तथापि न संभेदे अन्य तर-वैयर्थ्यम्। परिमाणं प्रति संख्या-परिमाण-प्रचयवत् प्रत्येकं सामर्थ्य-उपलब्धौ संभूयकारित्व-उपपत्तेः। अस्ति तत्र वैजात्यं इति चेत्? इह अपि किंचित् भविष्यति इति। न च अकुर्वतः कुलालादेः काय-संक्षोभादि-साध्यः भोगः सिद्ध्येत् इति तदर्थं अस्य कर्तृत्वं इश्वरः अनुमन्यते, तदर्थमात्रत्वात् ऐश्वर्यस्य इति।

यत्तु 'अनित्य-प्रयत्न' इत्यादि। भवेत् अपि एवं यदि अनित्य-प्रयत्न-निवृत्तौ एव बुद्धिरपि निवर्तेत, न तु एतदस्ति। उदासीनस्य प्रयत्नाभावे अपि बुद्धि-सद्भावात्। हेतुभूता बुद्धिः निवर्तते इति चेत्? न। उदासीनबुद्धेः अपि संस्कारं प्रति हेतुत्वात्। कारक-विषया बुद्धिः निवर्तते इति चेत्? न। उदासीनस्य अपि कारक-बोद्धृत्वात्। न हि घटादिकं अकुर्वतः चक्रादिकं न इक्षामहे। हेतुभूता कारकबुद्धिः निवर्तते इति चेत्? न। अ-यतमानस्य अपि दुःख-हेतु-भूतायाः अपि तत्-हेतु-कंटक-स्पर्श-बुद्धेः अभावात्। चिकीर्षा-हेतुभूतः अनुभवः निवर्तते इति चेत्? न। केनचित् निमित्तेन अकुर्वतः अपि चिकीर्षा हेतुभूत-बुद्धि-संभवात्। अनपेक्ष-कृत्ति-हेतु-चिकीर्षा-कारणं बुद्धिः निवर्तते इति चेत्। न तर्हि बुद्धिमात्रम्। तथा च अनित्य-प्रयत्न-हेतुकत्व-प्रयुक्तं विशिष्ट-प्रयत्न-चिकीर्षा-हेतु-बुद्धिमत्-पूर्वकत्वं इति तन्निवृत्तौ तदेव निवर्ततां न तु बुद्धिमत्पूर्वकत्वमात्रं, तत्र तस्य अप्रयोजकत्वात्

इति बुद्धिमत्पूर्वकत्व-साध्यपक्षे परिहारः। स कर्तृकं इति प्रयत्न-प्रधान पक्षे-शंका एव नास्ति। तस्य एव तत्र अनुपाधित्वात्।
एतेन शरीर-संबंधे बुद्धि-गत-कार्यत्ववत् बुद्धि-संबंधे प्रयत्न-गत-कार्यत्वं उपाधिः इति निरस्तम्। यः हि बुद्ध्या शरीरवत् शरीर-निवृत्त्या बुद्धि-निवृत्तिवत् वा प्रयत्नेन बुद्धिं, बुद्धिनिवृत्त्या प्रयत्न-निवृत्तिं साधयेत्, सः एवं कदाचित् उपालभ्यः। वयं तु अवगत-हेतु भावं कलित-सकल-शक्ति-कारक-प्रयोक्तारं कार्यात् एव अनुमिमानाः न एवं आस्कंदनीयाः। तत्र तस्य अनुपाधित्वात्। न च प्रयत्नः आत्मलाभार्थं एव मतिं अपेक्षते। विषय-लाभार्थं अपि अपेक्षणात्। ततः प्रयत्नात् बुद्धिः तन्निवृत्तेः च प्रयत्न-निवृत्तिः सिद्ध्यति एव इति विस्तृतं अन्यत्र। कार्य-बुद्धि-निवृत्त्या तु कार्यः एव प्रयत्नः निवर्तते न नित्यः। नित्ये च प्रयत्ने नित्या एव बुद्धि प्रवर्तते न अनित्या। न हि तथा तस्य विषय-लाभ-संभवः। शरीरादेः प्राक् तदसंभवे देह-अनुपपत्तौ सर्व-अनुपपत्तेः। शरीराजन्यत्ववत् च अनित्य-प्रयत्न-अजन्यत्वं इति संक्षेपः।

TRANS.: Now the author goes on to expatiate (his views) in order to remove the fifth of the aforementioned doubts (about the existence of God). 'Isn't all that has been said true only if there is a valid proof for the existence of God but no such proof is at all available to us? Well! It is certainly not the fault of a stick that a blind person does not see it! (This is a sarcastic remark against the obtuseness of the atheists' intellect. The proofs for God's existence are many and obvious). These are as below:

The existence of the eternal divine being is to be inferred on the basis of reasons (or middle terms) like the producedness (of the world), the creative movement of atoms, the sustenance (as also destruction) of the universe, usages pertaining to things in the world, validity of knowledge, the authorship of scriptures or scriptural statements (injunctive, prohibitive etc.) and the particular number like duality, trebleness etc. of the atoms.

There are inferences of the form, 'The earth and other things in the universe are created entities because they are products'.

Alternative meanings of the above words are as follows: The Sanskrit word *'Kārya'* means the import of scriptural statements. The next word *'Āyojana'* means explanation of scriptural statements. The word *'Dhṛti'* means knowledge of the scriptures, *'Pada'* means the symbol *'Om'* which is supposed to stand for God. *'Pratyaya'* means the suffix in injunctive verbs which refers to the most reliable being who lays down injunctions; *'Śruti'* means scriptures which too refer to God as their author, *'Vākya'* means the syntactical relations of words in sentences. God is the repository of all knowledge relating to syntactical relations. The word *'Sāṃkhya'* stands for certain recensions of scriptures which are authored by God.

EXPL.: In the very first verse of the section the author lays down certain proofs to establish the existence of God. The first proof is the inference that the earth etc. have a creator because they are products like the clay-pot etc. The second proof is the inference that the movements in atoms in the precreative condition must have a cause which cannot be other than the divine being as all other non-eternal entities and beings are nonexistent before creation. The third proof is the inference that the existence (and even destruction) of the whole universe is sustained by God. The gravitational and other forces which according to modern science keep the universe going do themselves require some cause to support them.

The fourth proof requires a supreme being like God to lay down conventions for word-meanings. The fifth proof calls for an ultimate and unimpeachable source of all truth which cannot be other than God. The sixth proof requires God as the author of the scriptures. The sixth proof how ever appears to be some kind of repetition of the fifth proof as the author of the scriptures is the author of scriptural statements also. The explanation of the proof given by commentators is not quite satisfactory as no separate convention for the meaning of sentences needs to be laid down if conventions for word-meanings have already been laid down. The last proof is a peculiar one according to which the ultimate cause of the material structure of the universe viz., the number of the atoms cannot come into being unless there is a being to take cognizance of the number.

Criticisms of the foregoing proofs and their rebuttals

TRANS.: The inferences for God's existence mentioned above are not contradictable as all possible contradictions of the inferences depend upon the assumption of the existence of God. (All the contradictory

inferences are sure to have God as their minor term or even the denials of God's existence are significant only on the assumption of God's existence). As to the rebuttal of the inference of existence by means of the inference of nonexistence, it is not possible because such inference is rather weak in comparison to the former. If the world is proved to have an embodied creator by an inference then the inference of God's creatorship is not going to be refuted. (Both inferences may be true on the assumption that God is embodied). But if bodily creativity remains unproved then there is no problem at all. And since the middle is present in the minor and it is unconditionally associated with the major there is also no fallacy of absent or conditional middle in the inference.

To explain: Those thinkers who trot out bodily creativity as a counter to above inferences should make clear what exactly they purport to prove. Do they seek to infer embodiedness of God if He is supposed to be the creator but since God cannot be supposed to be embodied He is not the creator? Alternatively is it their purport to infer God's embodiedness because the world is a product created by God? Or do these disputants want to prove unproducedness or eternity of the world because it is uncreated by an embodied being or that because of the latter it is not created at all? Perhaps they may intend just to put up a counter-argument against the argument for existence by setting forth a concomitance between 'createdness' and 'producedness by an embodied being' which is opposed to the concomitance on which the existential inference is based. Of these six alternative retorts the first two are riddled by the fallacies of unestablished minor, absent major, denial of an established thesis and contradiction of one's own thesis. First, if God does not exist how can it be inferred that God is embodied? Secondly God's existence is sought to be inferred by means of His creativity, so even to deny God His existence as the creator of the world has to be denied. This is possible only if God's creativity is (somehow) admitted! Thirdly the atheists are obliged to concede somehow the existence of God even to deny God. Fourthly, the atheists contradict themselves by conceding the existence of God (as shown above) but denying his creativity and embodiedness.

In the third of the above alternatives if creativity and bodily creativity are found to be concomitant the existential proof will not be affected. (If the world is not known to be created by an embodied being then it can be inferred to have been created by a disembodied being). But if no such concomitance is found the inference remains intact. The fourth of the above alternatives is afflicted by the fallacies of absent major and deviation. If the world including the self-germinating sprout is the minor term in the inference then there arises the fallacy of absent major as the former cannot be denied to be produced. If only a part of the world is the minor term then the fallacy of deviation arises as the sprout which is a product is not known to be created. In the fifth alternative the qualification 'bodily' characterising the middle term is redundant as 'uncreatedness' can be proved by unproducedness alone. The sixth and the last alternative in which the concomitance opposed to the concomitance basic to the existential inference is set forth is not stronger than the former to oppose it. Nor is the inference based on such a concomitance capable of countering the existential inference which is based on a concomitant middle term whose presence in the minor is assured. (Producedness and createdness are known to go together). This is not the case with disembodied creativity. (That a disembodied being is not a creator is not known). It may be contended here that like the positive concomitance that 'whatever is caused by an intelligent agent is caused by a bodily agent too' there is also the corresponding negative concomitance that 'whatever is not caused by a bodily agent is not caused by an intelligent agent'. Thus presence of the middle in the minor is also available for the above inference (opposed to existence). This is however not correct as the inference is not a negative one (which it is claimed to be). The sky which is uncreated and eternal is a cominor in the inference which a negative inference does not have. The inference ('whatever is not produced by an embodied being is not produced by an intelligent being') cannot be a positive inference too. The qualification 'bodily' occurring in the middle term is here inconsequential. The absence of causedness is by itself concomitant with absence of createdness. Only that which is concomitant (not that which is qualified by a redundant property) is of use as a middle term present in the minor. A middle which is not strictly concomitant with its major is sure to lead to the fallacy of deviation.

This rejoinder meets a possible contradicting inference that 'the world is not created because it is devoid of the property which pervades creativity'. Such a generalised inference is not possible here. Certainly if the absence of a thing is not known to be concomitant positively or negatively with the absence of another thing then this thing cannot be treated as the pervader of the former, (absence of bodily creation does not pervade absence of creation by an agent).

Commenting on the third quarter of the verse-text the author says that if both bodily creation and disembodied creation of the world are established then these properties being coexistent there cannot be any opposition between them. But if the coexistence is not established then

neither of them excludes the other in the same locus and thus the possibility of their mutual opposition is simply beyond doubt.

Alright! Let then there be this proof for the above thesis: Certainly there is the special type of producedness from which bodily-producedness of the produced entity is inferred (every product is not a bodily product like the sprout). So in the inference of createdness of the world producedness which is the middle term will have to be qualified as 'pertaining to the body' and thus the inference of the createdness of the world will not be afflicted by the fallacy of conditionality. This however is not correct. Certainly it is not true that because there is concomitance between a certain property and a species of another property therefore the former is not concomitant with the general property or it is not determined by it. For example, if special properties like fragrance or pungency or blueness are the characteristics of smoke it is not the case that the smoke as such does not lead to the inference of fire. The truth of the matter is that if there is general concomitance or causal relation between two things then there obtains such a relationship also between the corresponding species of the two things. It is however not the case that if there is concomitance between two specific entities then there is no concomitance between the entities generally. If in view of the concomitance of specific entities general concomitance is denied then as the specific entities have their own specifications even their concomitance would have to be denied. But isn't it a fact that even in the absence of fragrance in smoke fire is seen to be concomitant with smoke but in the aforementioned inference no creator is known who is not associated with a special kind of producedness viz. that pertaining to the body? Well! It is true that a certain kind of cause is associated with a certain kind of effect but this does not stand in the way of the general concomitance of cause and effect. Is it not found that the seed as seed is the (general) cause of the sprout but a specific kind of seed is the cause of a special kind of sprout namely, that of paddy, a special kind of paddy is the cause of a special kind of sprout and again a special kind of paddy-sprout is the cause of its own special kind of effect? And has it been ever seen that entities of the smallest size produce entities of the size of dyads etc. or the eternal colour etc. of water-atoms produce the colour etc. of larger water-molecules? Despite this the causal relations of specific entities is admitted by all and it is not taken to be opposed to the general causal relation of different types of entities. And this has to be necessarily admitted, otherwise causation will become a chance affair.

Alright! Consider then this argument: (As you say) the middle term 'producedness' in the inference is positively and negatively concomitant with the major. Now we raise the doubt whether the exclusion of this middle from eternal entities like the sky which are contra-minors is due to their being uncaused or the absence of any creator of them. The answer is that the doubt has no basis because even the creator is the cause. The absence even of one of the causes may prevent the origination of the effect. If it were otherwise then the causality of the cause would be jeopardised and it may give rise to the doubt if the non-producedness of the sky is due to the absence of a special kind of its cause. How is it to be determined that the sky is not produced because it has no cause or if it has one it is not a material cause or an efficient cause? If general causality (above-mentioned) is alone admitted then no material, non-material or efficient cause of cognition can be established.

Well! All this may be conceded only if the creator is a cause but this has not been proved at all. But does this mean that the weaver etc. are creators of cloth etc. without being the respective causes of the latter? Or is it meant that the weavers etc. are uninterested in or indifferent to the objects they create? So all this argumentation is simply trivial.

But isn't it a fact that a creator is the sustainer or supporter of all causal conditions like the living organism (of what is created) either directly or indirectly through a series of intermediate effects like the stick? The first is not possible in the case of God as then being the cause of atomic movements God will have atoms as his body. The second too is not possible because there is no instrument for God's creative activity. If there is not available a direct instrument or support to work through (for God) then even indirect instrument or support for his activity cannot be available. The upshot of the objections is this. Atoms, dyads etc. are not the entities inhabited by any sentient being as they are not organisms. Whatever is so inhabited is not atomic as is our body. Even indirectly, atoms etc. are not inhabited by sentient beings as they do not depend upon any organism for their movements as is the case with our body which does not depend upon another body for its movements. Negative examples of this are sticks etc. which depend upon the body for moving them. Likewise the world etc. is not caused by any cause inhabited by a sentient being because it is (supposed to be) caused by something other than the body. Thus with great difficulty the existential proof can be countered by this proof (or a chain of proofs).

Moreover it may be asked if the cloth etc. need the weaver for providing support to their agent or causes as, being insentient they cannot

themselves come into being. Alternatively do these need the weaver etc. as their causal agent? The first is not true as the cloth or yarn etc. are inhabited by God himself. Certainly it cannot be the case that God's knowledge, desire or effort do not inhabit or encompass the shuttle etc. (with which the cloth is woven). Nor is that which is inhabited and supported by one being dependent upon another being to support it. If this were the case then there would result infinite regress as every support will need another support to sustain it. The second alternative too is not true. According to this alternative being the inhabitant or support is not part of being the cause of a thing. So in the existential inference examples like clay-pot would be devoid of the major term 'createdness' involving supportiveness. But can't the cloth, pot etc. need the weaver etc. only as their causes and not as their sustaining or supportive entities? If this is the fact then producedness can be concomitant with causedness only and not with createdness. If the existential inference is based on this concomitance only (and has the form, 'the world is caused because it is produced') then it would involve the fallacy of proving the already proved.

Besides, producedness of things is concomitant only with the non-eternal or ephemeral efforts of their creators (as for example the efforts of the potter, the weaver etc. are mainly needed for the production of the cloth, pot etc., mere knowledge of the means of the production of these entities is not of use for the production). So 'producedness' the middle term is not naturally concomitant with intelligent creativity (which is associated with God's being).

Moreover 'producedness', the middle term in the inference is determined by its concomitance with the ephemeral type of creativity only (that is, whatever is produced is the result only of ephemeral creation, not of an eternal one) not with intelligent creation (so that the creator of the world could be proved to be an eternally-intelligent being). There is no natural concomitance between producedness and intelligent creativity. Certainly intelligence does not depend upon ephemeral creativity as it does upon the body so that in the absence of the former, intelligence—specially the eternal one would not cease to be present. (As a matter of fact it is intelligence upon which creative effort or activity depends. It is not the other way about. As to eternal intelligence it does not depend upon anything at all. In the familiar instances of food, cloth etc. only ephemeral creativity and producedness are generally found to be concomitant. Intelligence and ephemeral creativity are not found to be invariably concomitant. Thus creativity other than the ephemeral one can be treated as the major term in the existence-inference and this

is far from the intelligent creativity attributed to God. This entails the fallacy of the conditionality of the inference as everything that is created is ephemerally created and all that is produced like the world itself is not ephemerally created by beings like us). All such objections have already been met earlier and so no other answers to them are called for. (For example, the objection based on contradictory inference is met by the answers that just as the clay-pot, cloth etc. need one kind of causal collocation, the atomic conjunction etc. required for the creation of the world need quite a different kind of causal collocation comprising divine intelligence, effort etc. Similarly the objection based on the fallacy of proving the already proved is met by the reply that some effects need many causal conditions while the world as a whole needs only a single author. The objection due to the conditionality of the middle cited above may also be easily met as the world as a whole is not an individual entity like the pot producible by the ephemeral effort of a creator). However the above objections could be countered in the following manner also: To explain: If in the inference of a direct supportive (divine) cause of the world the contingency of this cause becoming endowed with atomic or dyadic body is precipitated by the opponent (because otherwise the divine being cannot bring together atoms) then he may be asked to define what he means by embodiedness. If embodiedness is the same as being utilised directly by a being endowed with effort then this we certainly admit. And moreover these two properties (which are taken respectively to be the precipitator and precipitated) do not differ from each other (how then can one of them precipitate the other)? But embodiedness cannot mean, 'to be the repository of sense-organs'. If bodily effort is to be generated, only then sense-organs would be needed to generate cognitions through the bodily medium. This rule does not apply to divine effort which has no bodily limitation as it is eternal. For this very reason the divine effort is not limited by its objects too. Certainly the eternal knowledge of God does not depend upon the experiences of pleasure, pain etc. which require the human organism to support them. These experiences are the special causes which God is not endowed with. A being who is eternally omniscient cannot ever have any pleasure-pain-experience caused by virtue and vice which result from defects issuing from false cognition. From this explanation it follows that in the counter-inference of the opponent the middle term gets conflated with the major, (and so the inference collapses). The counter-inferences are: 'Atoms etc. are not supportive of divine effort or they do not need divine effort for their motion;' the middle term in both these inferences is the property of 'being

other then a body' but as explained above this property is the same as the major term (as per the above explanation) in both the counter-inferences. The other middle terms (in the counter-inferences) namely, 'being unendowed by sense organs,' 'being the repository of pleasure-pain-experiences and not requiring bodily aid for its activities (or effort)' are all irrelevant to their (corresponding) major terms. Since God has no destiny He has no pleasure-pain-experiences (which are caused by destiny) and so He is also devoid of sense-organs needed for the experiences). Further God's activity (or effort) is not prompted by any tactual forceful object. It may also be independent of any physical organism or body (which alone can move a concrete material object). Moreover atoms before creation require the supportive agency of God to induce creative movement in them as they are inert by nature (and so cannot by themselves act creatively). Thus there is no incompatibility between the major term in the existential inference and the middle terms of the counter-inferences (cited above).

(Elucidating further the above rebuttal of the counter-inference the author shows how the different middle terms resulting from the different meanings attached to the word 'body' occurring in the middle term of the counter-inferences entail different fallacies in the latter). For example if 'body' means the entity that is directly endowed by effort' then the counter-inference will have the form, 'The atomic constituents of the world etc. are directly supportive of any effort creating the latter because they are (supposed) to be created by an unbodied being'. In this inference if 'body' has the first meaning mentioned above then since it is doubtful that only a body can be endowed with effort, the middle term is as unestablished as the major term. This amounts to the fallacy of the middle being like the major in regard to its certainty. On the second meaning given above, the counter-inference takes the form, 'the world etc. are not directly endowed with effort because they are produced by a being who is not endowed with sense-organs'. The middle term in this inference is irrelevant to the major as only ephemeral cognitions, conations etc. require the sensory activity as their cause. If the world is (supposed to be) created by eternal cognition, conation etc. then the creator would not be required to be a sensory being. This very defect or fallacy affects the middle term if it is taken in the third sense given above. The insentient atoms give rise to the world-structure through constructive movements. But these movements cannot be produced by an insentient but embodied being as such a being cannot exist before the creation of the world. So only a being who does not inhabit any body which is the locus of all experiences can create the world.

Thus in all its three senses the use of the word 'body' in the middle term does not lead to any incompatibility between the major term of the existential inference and the middle term of the counter-inference. The minor term in the counter-inference also suffers from the fallacy of unestablished major. That there is anything which is brought into being by a cause unendowed with sentience (which in fact the Mīmāṃsaka seeks to prove) is not validly established. Every known thing is found to be produced by a cause endowed with sentience). This difficulty may be avoided by slightly changing the form of the major term. Instead of the above term we can have 'the absence of the property of being caused by a sentient entity' as the major term. For this to be an established major term it is enough if its counter-positive is established (as an absence is taken to be known if its counter-positive is known). But this alteration also leads to a fallacy namely (a too narrow middle term, a middle which is confined to the minor term suffers from this fallacy). Even an eternal entity like the sky which is not caused by any sentient or insentient entity is bereft of the middle term viz., being produced by that which is not embodied. There is thus no cominor (other than the minor in the inference in which the middle may be expected to be present). As to the objection raised earlier regarding the nature of the supportive (causal) character of the weaver etc. in relation to the cloth etc. that they produce, the answer is that certainly the weaver etc., are endowed with the supportive character only because they are the causes of cloth etc. But these are causes not by their very nature or intrinsically but because they are endowed with knowledge and the desire to produce the cloth etc. The supportive character of a cause consists only in its being endowed with knowledge of and desire and effort for the production of its effect.

As to the (earlier) objection regarding products like cloth etc., that, if they already have the shuttle etc., as their supportive causes there is no need for them of the additional supportive causality of God (and if this is sought to be established by the existential inference this would entail the fallacy of proving the already proved) it may be asked; 'Does the objection seek to deny the known causality of the weaver etc. for the production of cloth etc., or discard the supportive causality of God for such things because they can and are produced by insentient causes like shuttle etc. or finally does the objection purport to precipitate the contingency of an infinite series of causes for all products? The first alternative cannot be upheld as the causality of the weaver etc. for the cloth etc. is established by their positive and negative association with the latter. The second alternative too cannot be upheld. If God's supportive cau-

sality relating to the creative movements of invisible entities like atoms, destiny etc. is already proved, then his knowledge of everything in the universe is also proved because only an omniscient being can activate invisible entities in the right direction and from this God's supportive causality relating to the shuttle etc. (themselves the supportive causes of cloth etc.) follows rationally. But God's existence is not sought to be proved mainly on the basis of its supportive causality relating to products like cloth. The third of the above alternatives too is not sustainable. There is no valid ground for the infinite regression. But why is it that what is supported by one kind of cause requires another kind of cause (like God) also?

Is there a satisfactory answer to this question? Well! Is it a question about the cause or the purpose (of production of a thing)? It cannot be the first as divine causality of everything is eternal while the causality of the weaver etc. (the ephemeral entities) is dependent upon their respective causes. The second too cannot be the nature of the query. Even while being supported by divine causality, cloths etc. need the additional causality of weaver etc. 'But can't a product be brought into being by a single supportive cause only and so the cloth etc. could be produced by God alone without needing the weaver etc.?' It may be queried. The answer is 'yes' If more than one cause is needed for producing a certain effect then either of them cannot be (treated as) redundant. For example the number of components, their dimension and their volume are required singly, dually or trebly for the production of dimensions of different types of composite entities. It isn't contended here that because certain dimensions are produced by one or two of these causes the causality of all the three put together for producing certain special dimensions is redundant. 'But isn't here some diversity amongst the dimensions produced by the single, double or triple causes?' One may ask. Well! Then even in the case under consideration there can be some diversity requiring the dual causality of the weaver and God. If the weaver remained inactive (leaving all productive activity to God) then he cannot have the pleasure-pain-experiences that result from bodily perturbations. Divine casualty is required to sustain this pleasure-pain-causality. God's divinity consists only in this sustenance or (omni) providence.

There remains now the problem relating to the concomitance of ephemeral effort and knowledge. The concomitance can be upheld if at all if in the very absence of the ephemeral effort the corresponding knowledge also remained absent. But this is not a fact. Even a person, who being uninterested in a thing is inactive towards it, is not (always) devoid of knowledge about it. But isn't the knowledge of the disinterested person unproductive (of anything)? No! Even such knowledge is productive of its impression in the mind of the knower. 'But isn't it a fact that the knowledge (of the inactive person) is not concerned with the causes of production (and so has nothing to do with productivity)?' No! The inactive person may have full knowledge of the causes of the production of a thing (despite his lack of interest in production). Certainly a person not taking part in the production of a pot does perceive the wheel, the clay etc. which are the causes of the pot-production. But isn't this knowledge also productive of the effort resulting in production (and so the above concomitance can be upheld)? No! This is not true. If a person walking on a road inadvertently treads on a thorn, the resulting consciousness of the pain to the person is not caused by any effort and so the concomitance cannot be maintained. May one contend against this that even such a person does not have the consciousness which generates the desire for the production of a thing (the person pricked by the thorn did not at all have the desire to be pricked)? No! Even a person having the desire to do a thing and the cognition causing the desire may remain inactive for some reason. This objection may be met by stipulating that only that knowledge which is the cause of the desire for the effort not dependent upon any other effort (or cause) is concomitant with ephemeral creativity. The effort arising only from the knowledge of the material cause of a thing is one which satisfies the above condition. In the absence of such an effort the knowledge causing it will also be absent. In the above instance the knowledge generating the pain of pricking is not the cause of any desire for effort on the part of the person treading the thorn. From this stipulation however it follows that knowledge alone (or being produced by knowledge alone) is not concomitant with effort (or being produced by ephemeral effort). Ephemeral productivity determines only the special kind of knowledge-productivity which is mentioned above, so that not everything produced by knowledge can be supposed to be produced by ephemeral effort as it is irrelevant to production by knowledge as such. Thus the inference that the world etc. are produced by a being who is fully knowledgeable about it (or is omniscient) does not suffer from the fallacy of conditionality (the condition being ephemeral productivity. This condition pervades only those things that are produced by the special kind of knowledge mentioned above). If however the major term in the above inference is interpreted as 'being produced by a being who has the effort (for producing the world)', then the above-mentioned condition becomes identical with the major term. So the fallacy of conditionality

cannot be imposed on the inference. A major term cannot be its own condition.

The foregoing criticisms takes care of a possible argument of the atheist. The argument is to the effect that if the theist charges the atheist's counter-argument of conditionality the atheist also can do the same to the theist's argument. The atheist's counter-argument that, God is embodied because he has knowledge like us is afflicted by the condition 'ephemerality of knowledge'. This is the theist's charge. The atheist also charges the theist's argument that 'God is the knowledgeable creator of the world because the world is a created entity', of the fallacy of conditionality, the condition being 'ephemerality of the creative effort'. This counter-change of the atheist against the theist's charge is met by the above criticisms thus: The atheist's charge can target the theistic inference only if it sought to prove the existence of knowledge on the basis of the existence of effort corresponding to the latter or absence of effort on the basis of the absence of corresponding knowledge. This inference is just like the inference of embodiedness by means of the existence of knowledge or the absence of knowledge by means of the absence of embodiedness. Both kinds of inferences may be susceptible to the atheist's charge of conditionality. But the theist—who seeks to infer God as the prompter of causal agents endowed with all the different productive capacities on the basis of the producedness of the world cannot be blamed of the above charge. The conditions alleged above do not afflict the inference of God as the prompter of all the activities of all causal agents. Nor does effort need knowledge only to produce it (so that God's effort would be excluded from the purview of the inference). Even for being co-objective with knowledge effort needs it (thus by means of the existence of knowledge the existence of the corresponding effort, and similarly by means of the absence of the latter the absence of the former (in the case of human beings) can certainly be inferred. This has been explained elsewhere. The absence of ephemeral knowledge leads to the absence of ephemeral—and not eternal—knowledge only. If the effort or will is eternal the corresponding knowledge also has to be eternal. It cannot be ephemeral. If the knowledge were ephemeral the corresponding eternal effort cannot be co-objective with it. Without a body ephemeral knowledge cannot arise and there being no body before creation there cannot exist any effort to create the world. Thus like the condition 'not produced by a body' rejected earlier, the alleged condition 'not produced by any ephemeral effort' needs also to be rejected. This is the sum and substance of all the above argumentation.

EXPL.: In this last and most important section of the treatise the author seeks to establish the reality of God by means of certain middle terms listed in the very first verse of the section. The first middle term is 'producedness' (or 'non-eternity'). The earth, sprout etc. are created by some being because they are products (or produced entities). The second middle term resulting from a different interpretation of the word 'producedness' (for which the Sanskrit word is '*Kāryatva*') as 'having significant import' is valid statements. The second listed middle term stands for the activity that brings together the atoms to produce dyads etc. before the creation of the world. Only because of God's effort or will the atoms join with each other to give rise to the structure of the world. Another middle term resulting from a different interpretation of the term is 'elucidation'. God elucidates the scriptures to certain sages at the start of each creation-cycle. The third listed middle term means the support which God alone can provide to the universe. A different interpretation of this term yields another middle term, namely 'understanding' or retention of the knowledge of the scriptures. God alone is the first knower of the scriptures who imparts this knowledge to certain sages at the start of creation. The destruction of the world taking place during annihilation is also a middle term in the inference of God's existence. The next listed middle term '*pada*' also refers to words like 'God' etc. which have a definite meaning which is nothing other than God. Thus the term yields one more middle term. The term next to '*pada*' is '*pratyaya*' which also means the suffixes occurring in the injunctive and prohibitive verbs of imperative sentences of scriptures. The being whose commands are conveyed by these suffixes is God himself. Next is the term '*śruti*' which has the additional meaning viz. the scriptural statements in which God is praised. Thus statements too can act as middle term in the inference. The term *vākya* following '*śruti*' also has more or less the same meaning as the latter (besides its original meaning given in the translation). So this provides one more middle term. The last term *Saṃkhyā* may be taken in the sense of the number 'one'. God is described in certain scriptural statements as a unique being.

A careful study of the above-mentioned additional middle terms derived from the original ones by the commentator shows that they are all concerned with scriptures or scriptural words or statements. Since according to Nyāya God is the author of the scriptures it is rather queer that God's existence should be sought to be based on the evidence of the scriptural words or statements. Of the original middle terms the fourth one that is based on the validity of the scriptural statements is rather weak as without establishing the divine authorship of the scrip-

tures their validity cannot be treated as a premise in the existential inference. Now there arises the question regarding the precise nature of the minor term in the inference. Each of the things in the world cannot be the minor term for then there cannot be one inference for God's existence. There is also no common character of all the things in the world under which they could be treated as one minor term. Everything that is a product but not produced by an embodied being cannot also be the common form of the minor term. Even an embodied being can produce things in the world or the world itself, through the influence of destiny (without depending upon divine help). If, slightly modifying the above (adjective or) qualification the minor is described as all the products that are not produced by any effort which is not the cause of destiny, then even divine effort would be excluded by this qualification as God is supposed to be one of the causes of the destinies of selves. Can then the common form of the minor term be 'all the products that are not produced by any ephemeral effort (as that of embodied beings)? No! Even an object like pot fulfils this qualification as no effort directly produces the pot. So instead of God's existence it is the potter's existence that would be proved by the inference.

The question of the precise nature of the major term in the inference also needs to be answered. 'Being created by one who possesses the knowledge (which is immediate) as well as the desire to create and the creative effort relating to the material cause of the world is the form of 'producedness' mentioned above as the major term'. Now since even the destinies of human beings are required for the production of the world (as it is in the world that the destinies find their fulfilment), the knowledges of different human beings (as also their efforts etc.) generating their respective destinies can be taken as the indirect creators of the world. Thus instead of God, human beings themselves can be inferred as world-creators. If direct (unmediated by destiny) creation is treated as the qualification of the major term then no instance of the term will be available. Pot, cloth etc. are brought into being partly by the destinies of the beings whose purposes and objects they subserve. Moreover the world consists of innumerable different objects having different material causes, how can there be one material cause of the whole world whose knowledge the world-creator may be expected to possess? Besides ordinary objects are the result of the inferential knowledge of their being useful or useless which their human producers have. Since the world-production is considered on the analogy of the production of ordinary objects, the producer of the world would have to be regarded as endowed with the knowledge of the usefulness of the world

for himself. All the good and bad attributes of human agents would have to be ascribed to God if his world-creatorship is likened to human-creatorship.

Moreover producedness or ephemeralness which is the middle term in the inference is also not easy to define. To be destructible is not the nature ephemeralness as destruction which is ephemeral is not subject to destruction. To be the counter-positive of anterior nonexistence is also not so. Thus the inference will be afflicted by deviation if either anterior or posterior negation or destruction fulfils the definition of ephemeralness but is not a created entity. But all the above difficulties can be overcome if the inference is formulated thus: The minor term in the inference is 'All the ephemeral entities inherent in something or other (which negations are not) which are not produced by any ephemeral effort (of any being) through the mediation of destiny'. (Only God can create things without the mediation of destiny). The major term corresponding to the minor term is, 'Being produced or created by the knowledge, the desire to create and the effort relating to the material cause of the above-mentioned ephemeral things'. The middle term to prove the occurrence of major in the minor is, 'Being inherent in something and also being the counter-positive of its anterior negation'. In simple terms what this complexly-worded inference states is that all positively-existent ephemeral things are the direct creations of the divine being who has eternal knowledge of the causal conditions of the former and also the will etc. to create them.

Having laid down the various inferential proofs for God's existence the author turns to the objections preferred against the inferences by the atheist. All these objections are based on the bodiless nature of God maintained by the theists. The objections may take the form of counter-inferences seeking to prove that God must be an embodied being as he is a creator or that God cannot be a creator if he is not embodied or that if the world is not created by an embodied being then it is not created at all and therefore there is no creator of it or finally the objection may just set forth the concomitance between embodiedness and creatorship with a view to oppose the concomitance on which the theistic inference is based. Various fallacies have been pointed out in the above counter-inferences by the author but the suggestion of the fallacy of non-concomitant middle term in the fifth counter-inference by the author seems rather queer. That the world is ephemeral in nature and therefore it must have been created is an obvious fact. No inference contradicting this fact can be accepted as valid. There is therefore no need to point out the fallacy of non-concomitant middle in the inference when it di-

rectly contradicts perceptual testimony. So far as the sixth counter-inference is concerned it cannot contradict the theistic inference as it is not equipollent with it, the middle term-producedness—in the theistic inference is known to be present in the minor (as the world is known to be a product) but whether the world is produced by an embodied being or a disembodied being is not definitely known. So the presence of the middle in the minor in the counter-inference is doubtful; consequently the inference cannot be strong enough to contradict the theistic inference. Of the two conditions of a valid middle term only one viz., concomitance is present in the middle of the atheistic inference while both concomitance and presence in the minor are present in the middle of the theistic inference and so it cannot be opposed by the atheistic inference. It may be argued against this that there is concomitance between the absence of body-createdness and the absence of intelligence-createdness ('whatever is not produced by an embodied being is not produced by an intelligent being'). The basis of this negative concomitance is the positive concomitance holding between intelligent creation and bodily-creation. Thus the middle term-absence of bodily creation—in the atheistic inference is endowed with both the above conditions of a valid middle term and as such it may be regarded as strong enough to counter the theistic inference. This argument however is unacceptable as the inference based upon it cannot be either purely negative or positive. The eternal sky is a cominor which is neither body-created nor intelligence-created. A purely negative inference however does not have a cominor term. The inference cannot also be a positive one as it has already been pointed out above that only unproducedness (by itself) has concomitance with uncreatedness. (The qualification 'bodily' is redundant in the middle term and as such the qualified middle term cannot be treated as concomitant with the major term). It may however be argued that since everything that is produced by an intelligent being is the same as is produced by an embodied being there (necessarily) obtains the concomitance between the absence of being produced by an intelligent being and the absence of being produced by an embodied being. This is just the negative concomitance corresponding to the positive concomitance (holding between the two kinds of producedness). On the basis of this negative concomitance the negative middle term 'not being produced by an embodied being' can well be supposed to be present in the minor. Thus the counter-inference can be treated as strong enough to contradict the theistic inference. But this argument is flawed as the inference based upon it cannot be regarded as either negative or positive. Since sky and other eternal entities are both unproduced by intelligent and embodied beings, positive instantiation of the concomitance is available which is never the case with negative inferences. The inference cannot be regarded as positive either because as explained above the qualification 'embodied' introduced into the middle term is redundant and so the middle as characterised by the qualification cannot be treated as concomitant. (The qualifying property cannot determine the middleness of the middle term. Bare unproducedness it is that determines the middleness as all unproduced things are unproduced by intelligent beings). Since the foregoing inference is found to be fallacious another inference couched in general terms like, 'The world etc. are not produced by any intelligent being as they are devoid of any property that pervades intelligent creativity' may also be treated as fallacious. Bodily creativity cannot be regarded as pervasive of intelligent creativity; how can then the absence of the former property entail the absence of the latter one? Unless the positive and negative association of the absence of bodily creativity with the absence of intelligent creativity is established the concomitance of intelligent creativity and bodily creativity cannot be assumed. It may be contended against this rejoinder that while bodily creation of the world is sought to be established inferentially it is perceptually found that there is no embodied creator of the world. Thus the world is found to be characterised by two mutually-contradictory properties vitiating the theistic inference. The reply to this contention is simple. If the two properties are known to coexist then like the colour and smell of a material object they cannot exclude each other. But if such coexistence of the two is not found then the possibility of either of them excluding the other from its locus does not arise at all.

It may yet be contended that the theistic inference is vitiated by the fallacy of conditionality the condition being the property of 'being produced by an embodied being'. There are these two kinds of products viz. those that are produced by embodied beings, like the pot, the cloth etc. and the world, the sprout etc. which are not produced by any embodied being. Now the middle term 'producedness', being common to both kinds of products it cannot be concomitant with the major term which is the property of 'being produced' by the effort of a being. Since everything produced by effort is produced by an embodied being but every product is not such therefore the aforementioned condition fulfils the definition of a condition (namely, being pervasive of the major and non-pervasive of the middle). The contention is however baseless. It is not logical to maintain that two general properties like 'producedness' and 'being created by effort' are not concomitant with each other because the specific prop-

erties subsumed under them are concomitant. If such were the case then fragrance, blueness, bitterness etc. characterising different kinds of smoke being associated with different kinds of fires characterised by properties corresponding to the above properties the general concomitance of smoke and fire would cease to exist. The fact is that if the middle term is concomitant with the major then the specific instances of the former would be concomitant with the corresponding specific instances of the latter. The concomitance of specific properties certainly does not stand in the way of the concomitance of their genera. If this always happened then the specific properties too will cease to be concomitant as these too may have more specific properties subsumable under them whose concomitance can go against their own concomitance. May it be urged against this that in the above-mentioned case of smoke and fire, their general concomitance needs to be admitted because even in the absence of fragrance etc. smoke is seen to be associated with fire but the concomitance of producedness and createdness is not such as, only certain kinds of produced entities are created by embodied beings (there is no creator who is devoid of a specific character like embodiedness)? No! This contention too cannot be entertained. The concomitance of specific properties cannot obstruct the corresponding concomitance of the general properties (under which the latter are subsumed). Just as there is general concomitance between cause and effect, there is also the specific concomitance between a particular cause like the seed and a particular effect like the sprout. Further there is the more specific concomitance between a specific kind of seed and a specific kind of grain and so on. There are of course counter-instances to the causal principle (or the principle of concomitance between cause and effect). The atomic dimension does not produce any dimension or the atomic colour does not produce any colour yet the general causal principle that the dimension or colour of the component is productive of the dimension or colour of the composite is not regarded as false. If this is not admitted then production will be an accidental phenomenon.

From the above it is evident that although there are different types of products and different types of causes of them yet the general causal principle applying to all kinds of products and their respective causes is not affected by this difference. So the theistic inference with its aforementioned major and middle terms cannot suffer from the fallacy of conditionality.

Now an important objection is raised against the theistic inference. The inference is based on both positive and negative concomitances. The sky, and other eternal entities are the instances of the negative concomitance of the absence of the major with the absence of the middle. The eternal entities are certainly devoid of producedness which is the middle term. But can't this absence be due to the uncausedness of eternal entities instead of there being no creator of them? No! Even the creator or the creative agent is a cause. The absence of even a single cause in the causal collocation determines the non-production of the effect. If this were not so then the creative agent not being a cause, other causes cannot be effective and so the effect would become uncaused or accidental. There may also arise the doubt whether the eternal entities are not producible because a particular cause is not available for their production or the whole causal collocation needed for their production is unavailable. For example one may wonder whether the eternal entities are such because they do not have the material, the non-material or the efficient cause. Unless every causal condition is recognised as one of the causes it is not possible to know that imperceptible internal states like intellect etc. have all the three kinds of causes. The general principle can lead only to the general conclusions that intellect being an effect it must be caused.

Having answered the above objection the author now takes up other possible objections of the atheist. One objection is this: The creator is the ultimate support of all causal conditions directly or indirectly. The movements of the body that a self inhabits are caused by its effort and so the self is the direct support of its body. In the case of the stick by means of which the embodied self produces movements in the stick and through it in the wheel, the self is the indirect support (as the body-movement is productive of the stick movement). Now God cannot be the direct support of the causes of the world as the atoms through whose conjunction alone the world is supposed to be created by God cannot constitute his body but there is no other body through which God can bring about movement in atoms. The atoms cannot even indirectly constitute the body of God as the movements in atoms are not produced by any embodied being (God by himself is supposed to activate the atoms). Our body moves of itself without needing another body to move it. Atoms also are moved directly by God or God's will without the help of any bodily movement. Such is not the case with sticks etc. for whose movement the bodily activity of an embodied being is required. Thus it can be counter-argued that the worlds etc. are not produced by any cause of which an intelligent being is the sustainer, on the ground that something other than the body brings the worlds into being. This counter-argument does not however directly oppose the theistic argument whose major term is createdness.

Another objection to the theistic argument may be presented thus: 'Are the weaver, potter etc. needed for the production of the cloth, pot etc., as the supports of the causal conditions of the latter (as, being insentient these cannot by themselves be causally operative) or as the causal conditions themselves?' The first cannot be the case as God is (supposed to be) the support of everything in the universe as there is nothing which God's knowledge, will and effort do not have within their ken. And God's support being available to everything it will not need any other support. If some other support over and above the divine support is called for, for any production then this second support is sure to need a third support, the third the fourth and thus there will be needed an unending series of supports. The second of the above two alternatives also cannot hold as then, the sentient support not being needed for the production of anything, there cannot be a thing which instantiated the concomitance of the middle and major terms (viz. producedness and having a cause which is supported by a sentient being) in the inference. If however the weaver etc. are supposed to be needed only as causes for the things they produce then the concomitance available for the inference is that between a cause and its effect only. This will yield only a known universal truth that every effect has a cause.

In reply to the above and related objections the author says that the embodiedness of God sought to be precipitated by the objections cannot be defined either as the possession of sense-organs or as being the locus of the experiences of pain, pleasure etc. If God's body is supposed to be atomic in size then the possibility of its having sense-organs or being the locus of any kind of experience is simply ruled out. It is only the gross composite body that can have sense-organs and sense-generated experiences. If atoms are regarded as the body of God then there is no need to admit the possession of sense-organs or the occurrence of any sensory and transitory experience in God.

From the foregoing discussion it is obvious that the criticism of the theistic arguments is mainly based on the assumption that without a bodily support even God cannot engage in the creative activity which is supposed to produce the world. This assumption is called in question by the theist on two counts. First, it is only the ephemeral activity of ephemeral beings like the potter, weaver etc. that requires a bodily support because the body delimits the scope of the action that takes place through its medium. God's creative activity as also His cognition and will are eternal and so they do not need any non-eternal locus or medium to support them. Secondly if embodiedness is considered essential for the creative activity then even the eternal atoms can be treated as

the body of God. There are however two points about God's creativity which need to be noted. First, since the whole universe is God's creation everything in the universe must be regarded as encompassed by God's creativity. So even things produced by man, like the pot, the cloth etc. must have God as their creator. How is this dual creativity to be explained? The production of sprout by seeds and other natural productions of course cannot be attributed to man. If these are attributed to God then one may argue that the theist is equating natural processes with divine creativity. The theist's reply to these questions is that in respect of natural productions divine creativity is absolute while human products depend only partially upon divine creativity. Natural productions certainly take place according to natural laws which are ascertained by means of scientific investigation. The hand of God does not appear to be involved in the natural processes resulting in natural productions. Yet the constructive direction which the natural processes take because of which the world goes on evolving despite the prevalence of the destructive activity of human and non-human agents cannot be accounted for without the assumption of God's overall supervision of it.

Secondly as creativity consists in the direct knowledge and the desire and effort to create an object and as there obtains the causal relation between knowledge, desire and effort pertaining to the same thing it may be thought that such a casual relation obtains between God's knowledge, desire and effort too. But this cannot be the case as God's knowledge, desire and effort are all eternal. However these pertain to the same object viz., the whole universe. As a matter of fact there being only a single eternal will and a single eternal effort encompassing everything in the universe, every object of one of these is the object of the other. God's knowledge determines God's will and this determines God's effort only in the sense that whatever is the object of God's knowledge is also the object of God's will and efforts so there is determination without causation among these attributes of God.

All atheistic conditional arguments are counterfactual

TEXT: तर्काभासतया अन्येषां तर्काशुद्धिः अदूषणम्।
अनुकूलः तु तर्कः अत्र कार्य-लोपः विभूषणम्॥
कारक-व्यापार-विगमे हि कार्य-अनुत्पत्ति-प्रसङ्गः। चेतन-अचेतनयोः

व्यापारयोः हेतु-फलभाव-अवधारणात् कारण-अंतराभावे इव कर्तृ-अभावे कार्य-अनुत्पत्ति-प्रसङ्गः। कर्तुः अपि कारणत्वात्।

यः तु आह-प्रत्यक्ष-अनुपलंभाभ्यां तदुत्पत्ति-निश्चयः दृश्ययोः एव, न तु अदृश्ययोः। प्रत्यक्षस्य अनुपलंभस्य च तावत्-मात्र-विधि-निषेध-समर्थत्वात् धूम-अग्निवत् कंप-मारुतवत् च। न हि धूमः कार्यः अनलस्य इति उदर्यस्य अपि। न हि शाखा-कंपः मातरिश्वनः इति स्तिमितस्य अपि स्यात्। किंतु भौम-स्पृश्ययोः एव। तथा इहापि शरीरवतः एव कारणत्वं अवगंतुं उचितं, न अन्यस्य इति। तदसत्। प्रत्यक्ष-अनुपलंभौ हि दृश्य-विषयौ उपायः तदुत्पत्ति-निश्चये, न तु दृश्यता एव तत्र उपेया। किं नाम? दृश्याश्रितं सामान्य-द्वयम्। तत्-आलीढस्य हि तदुत्पत्ति-निश्चये दृश्यं अदृश्यं वा सर्वं एव तत्-जातीयं तदुत्पत्तिमत्तया निश्चितं भवति। यथा स्पर्श, रूप, रस, गंधानां उत्तर-उत्तर-निमित्ततायां एव। अस्माकं च अतीन्द्रिय-समवायादि-सिद्धौ। न चेत् एवं उदाहृतयोः एव दहन-पवनयोः आलोक-रूपवतोः तदुत्पत्ति-निश्चये कथं अनालोक-निरस्त-रूपयोः सिद्धिः यत् उदर्य-स्तिमित-साधारणी सिद्धिः स्यात् इति? तत् भवेत् अपि एवं यदि शरीरादिकं विना कार्यं इव, भौमं स्पर्शवद्-वेगवंतं च विना अग्निमात्रात् पवनमात्रात् वा धूम-कंपौ स्याताम्। न तु एवम्। न च एवं चेतन-व्यभिचारः अपि शक्य-अभिधानः इत्यलं बाल-प्रलापानां समाधानैः।

तदुत्पत्तेः असिद्धौ अपि तत्तत्-उपाधि-विधूननेन स्वाभाविकत्व-स्थितौ यदि कर्तारं अतिपत्य कार्यं स्यात् स्वभावं एव अतिपतेत् इति कार्य-विलोप-प्रसङ्गः इति। एतत् च सर्वं आत्मतत्वविवेके निपुणतरं उपपादितं इति न इह प्रतन्यते। एवं च सिद्धे प्रतिबंधे न प्रतिबंधादेः क्षुद्र-उपद्रवस्य अवकाशः। प्रतिबंध-सिद्धौ इष्ट-आपादनाम्। तदसिद्धौ ततः एव तत् सिद्धेः अप्रसङ्गात् इति।

ननु तस्य सर्वदा सर्वत्र अविशेषे कार्यस्य सर्वदा उत्पत्ति-प्रसङ्गः इति निरपेक्ष-ईश्वर-पक्षे दोषः? सापेक्षे उपेक्षणीयः एव अस्तु इति बालस्य प्रदीप-कलिका-क्रीडया एव नगर-दाहः? तत् न। स्थेममाजः जगतः

एव अकारणत्व-प्रसङ्गात्। ओमिति ब्रुवतः सौगतस्य दत्तं उतरं प्राक्।

आर्षं धर्म-उपदेशं च वेद-शास्त्र-अविरोधिना।
यः तर्केण अनुसंधत्ते सः धर्मं वेद न इतरः॥

तं इमं अर्थः आगमः संवदति। विसंवदति तु परेषां विचारम्।

विश्वतः चक्षु-उत विश्वतो-मुखः।
विश्वतो-बाहुः उत विश्वतः पात्॥
सं बाहुभ्यां-धमति सं पतत्रैः।
द्यावाभूमी जनयन् देवः एकः॥

अत्र प्रथमेन सर्वज्ञत्वं, चक्षुणा दृष्टेः उपलक्षणात्। द्वितीयेन सर्व-वक्तृत्वं, मुखेन वाक्-उपलक्षणात्। तृतीयेन सर्व-सहकारित्वं, बाहुना सहकारित्व-उपलक्षणात्। चतुर्थेन व्यापकत्वं, पदा व्याप्तेः उपलक्षणात्। पंचमेन धर्माधर्म-लक्षण-प्रधान-कारणत्वं, तौ हि लोक-यात्रा वहनात् बाहू। षष्ठेन परमाणु-रूप-प्रधान-अधिष्ठेयत्वं, ते हि गति-शीलत्वात् पतत्र-व्यपदेशाः, पतंति इति। संधमति, संजनयति इति च व्यवहित-उपसर्ग-संबंधः। तेन संयोजयति समुत्पादयन् इत्यर्थः। द्यावाः इति ऊर्ध्व-सप्त-लोक-उपलक्षणम्। भूमी इति अधस्तात्। एकः इति अनादिता इति। स्मृतिः अपि-'अहं सर्वस्य प्रभवः मत्तः-सर्वं प्रवर्तते' इत्यादि। एतेन ब्रम्हादि-प्रतिपादका, आगमाः बोद्धव्याः।

TRANS.: All the conditional arguments advanced against the theistic inference are fallacious as 'God' whose being is sought to be repudiated by the arguments is their common qualificand (as in the argument, 'If God is the creator of the universe then, He must be embodied'). So the arguments turn out to be self-contradictory. Thus the charge of fallaciousness urged against the theistic inference is rendered infructuous. As against this the theistic inference is supported by the conditional argument based on causality. The denial of causality would entail the denial of the origination of any effect. This is the favourable feature of the theistic inference.

To explain: If there is no causal operation then no effect can come into being. It is well-known that the actions (or processes) of the sentient and the insentient are related one with another as cause and effect. So, as in the absence of other kinds of causal conditions, even in

the absence of the causal agent the effect cannot come into being. Even the agent is one of the causes of the effect. Some one (the Buddhist for example) may contend against this thus: Positive and negative associations confirm the causal relationship of those things alone which are visible, not invisible. The two kinds of association are capable of confirming the origination and non-origination respectively of the visible effect only as we find in the case of the association of smoke and fire or fluttering and breeze. If association of a visible cause and its effect led to the knowledge of the invisible effect too then the knowledge that smoke is caused by fire could yield the knowledge of the presence of bodily heat too if smoke is perceived to be present at a place. Similarly the fluttering of the branch of a tree while leading to the knowledge of the presence of air may also lead to the inference of invisible still air. But such is not the case as only the breeze whose movement is felt is regarded as the cause of fluttering. In the case of the world also (in the theistic inference), only an embodied visible cause of it should be supposed to be inferrible. Such a contention however is simply wrong. The cognitions of positive and negative associations of two things that are visible are the means of determining that one of the two things is caused by the other. But though the two things are visible their visibility is certainly not the result of the association-cognitions. In the two visible things inhere the generic properties respectively belonging to them. When one of the two things as endowed with its own generic property is causally determined by the other thing as endowed with its own generic property then both visible and invisible things endowed with the generic property belonging to them (the effects) are cognised as caused by the things endowed with their own generic property. Such causal relationship (holding amongst visible and invisible things) is admitted by you—the Buddhist also. The gross qualities of touch, smell, taste etc. are admitted by the Buddhist to be the effects of similar qualities of the subtle and invisible form. In our (Nyāya's) view also the invisible relations of inherence etc. are inferred on the basis of the determinate cognition of qualities, movements etc. (which are perceptible). If such generic causal relationship among things is not admitted, then only the luminous fire and the visible stick etc. would be known as the respective causes of smoke and fluttering movement and so the invisible fire and the still air would remain unknown. Only if generic causal relationship is admitted the invisible digestive fire in the stomach and the still air can be ascertained to be real entities. Otherwise the causal relationship covering the digestive fire and the still air cannot be established. This could be possible if like some product being caused by something other than

an embodied being, smoke and fluttering movement in tree-branches were caused respectively by fire generally instead of the visible terrestrial fire and air generally instead of the felt and blowing air. Such a deviation of causal relationship cannot be adduced in the case of a sentient agent and an ephemeral product (because unlike the digestive fire for the smoke a sentient agent is invariably needed for the production of an ephemeral object). So enough of this attempt to meet the objections of childish debaters.

Even if the causal relationship of the visible universe and the invisible God is not supposed to be established by the above arguments, the natural concomitance between producedness and 'having a causal agent to produce' has already been established by repudiating the conditional character of the concomitance. If despite there being such concomitance the possibility of a product—like the universe—coming into being without a cause like God is precipitated then the counter-possibility that an effect can arise even without a cause and thus lose its effect—nature can also be precipitated. All this has been explained very clearly in the treatise *Ātmatattvaviveka* and so it is not elaborated here. Thus the concomitance mentioned having been established there is no scope left for counter-inferences and other trivial objections as are raised by the Buddhists against the theistic inference. If in the counter-inference the middle term is really concomitant with the major then the contingency sought to be precipitated by the inference cannot be unfavourable to the theist. But if there is no concomitance at all between the middle and the major terms then there is no counter-inference at all.

It may yet be asked that if God is the absolute cause of the universe then no other cause being needed for the creation of the universe it should come into being at all times (as God is always there). But if God depends upon certain causal conditions to support His creative activity then these conditions alone may be regarded as the creators of the universe. God's creativity may then be treated as superfluous. Thus what is described above as childish prattle could be a small flame developing into a conflagration and burn to ashes the city of theistic inference. No! This is not possible. (A similar question can be asked about the causes of all the things in the world). For example one may ask whether the potsherds etc. the main unchanging causes of pots etc. produced the latter by themselves or with the help of the auxiliary causes. If the auxiliaries are supposed to be essential in addition to the main cause then as in the case of God it may be asked why the former alone are not treated as the cause. On the other hand if the main cause alone is supposed to be needed for production then as in the above case the production

will be continual. Thus everything in the world would have to be treated as causeless. The Buddhist does not regard this contingency as unfavourable but it has been shown to be unacceptable earlier. (That this kind of rational confirmation of God's existence is necessary) is stated by the great sage Manu in a verse in which it is said that only that person knows the truth about religious or transcendental matters exhorted by great sages who investigates them by means of rational methods which are not in conflict with the scriptures and their commentaries. This fact is confirmed and the opposite of it is disconfirmed by scriptures in a verse which describes God as a Being who is the single creator of the heaven and earth, who sees everything, teaches everything and brings together the atoms with the help of the destinies of selves for the creation of the universe. The detailed explanation of the verse is as follows:

The first adjective in the verse signifies omniscience as 'eyes' denoted by the adjective symbolise vision. The second adjective signifies 'Omnivocality' as the mouth meant by the adjective symbolises speech. The third adjective signifies efficient causality, the fourth adjective signifies pervasion, as the feet denoted by the adjective signifies pervasion. The fifth adjective signifies efficient causality in relation to virtue and vice as these are symbolised by the hands denoted by the adjective because the goings on in the world are sustained by virtue and vice as the hands sustain bodily movements. The sixth adjective signifies the fact of being the sustainer of atoms, the main cause of the world. It is the atoms which because of their floating nature are referred to by the Sanskrit word *'Patatra'* occurring in the above verse. The prefix *'san'* joined to the word 'धमति' is to be connected with the word 'पतत्र' and this same suffix joined to the word 'पतत्र' in the verse is to be connected with the word 'संधमति'. Thus we get the meaning that God while creating the world brings together its ultimate atomic constituents. The word 'द्यौ:' symbolises the seven celestial spheres. The word 'एक:' symbolises beginninglessness. Even a Smṛti text corroborates the above description. It says that 'I the God am the source of all the world, as it issues forth from out of my being'. In this manner the scriptural statements referring to the deity Brahmā as the original cause of the world have to be interpreted as stating that God in the form of Brahmā is the main cause of the world.

EXPL.: Here the author discusses a Buddhist objection to the theistic inference which is based on the assumption that only visible causes and their visible effects can be known to be positively and negatively associated. So a supposedly invisible being like God cannot be inferred to be the creator of the visible world. This assumption fails even for the Buddhist as he admits the causality of subtle colour, taste etc. in relation to gross colour, taste etc. The causal relation is generic in nature, it is not confined to individual causes and individual effects. This does not mean that any individual cause endowed with its general casual-character is causally related to any individual effect endowed with the general effect—character. If it were so then smoke being caused by the visible fire it could be caused even by the digestive fire in the stomach. The generic characters pertaining to individual causes and their corresponding effects respectively determine their causal and effect-nature.

Another objection summarily disposed of by the author is this: God cannot be regarded as the absolute pervasive cause of the universe as such a cause being always present everywhere there will be continual creation of everything. If God's causality is dependent upon the auxiliary causality of other causes then these alone may be treated as the causes and God may be disregarded as the cause. This objection is dismissed by the retort that if it is entertained then everything will be rendered causeless. For example if the main cause of the pot viz. the potsherd is regarded as the absolute cause of the pot then whenever it is present the pot should come into being irrespective of the presence or absence of the auxiliary causes. But if the auxiliaries are supposed to be necessary for the production of the pot then the main cause may be treated as redundant. But neither the main nor the auxiliary causes of any effect are found to be redundant. This is true of divine causality also. Both God and auxiliary causes like destiny etc. are needed for the origination of the world.

Another proof for God's existence discussed

TEXT: आयोजनात् खलु अपि–
स्वातंत्र्ये जडता–हानि: न अदृष्टं दृष्ट–घातकम्।
हेतु–अभावे फल–अभाव: विशेष: तु विशेषवान्॥
परमाण्वादय: हि चेतन–आयोजिता: प्रवर्तंते. अचेतनत्वात्, वास्यादिवत्।
अन्यथा कारणं विना कार्य–अनुत्पत्ति–प्रसङ्ग:। अचेतन–क्रियाया:

चेतनाधिष्ठान-कार्यत्व-अवधारणात्। क्रिया-विशेष-विश्रांतः अयं अर्थः न तु तन्मात्र-गोचरः। चेष्टा हि चेतन-अधिष्ठानं अपेक्षते इति चेत्? अथ का इयं चेष्टा नाम? यदि प्रयत्नवत्-आत्म-संयोग-असमवायिकारणिका क्रिया, प्रयत्न-मात्रकारणिका इति वा विवक्षितम्? तत् न। तस्य एव तत्र अनुपाधित्वात्। अथ हित-अहित-प्राप्ति-परिहार-फलत्वं तत्वम्? तत् न। विष भक्षण-उद्बंधनादि-अव्यापनात्। इष्ट-अनिष्ट-प्राप्ति-परिहार-फलत्वं इति चेत्? कर्तारं प्रति अन्यं वा? उभयथा अपि परमाण्वादि-क्रिया-साधारण्यात् अविशेषः। भ्रान्त-समीहायाः अतथा-भूतायाः अपि चेतन-व्यापार-अपेक्षणात् च। शरीर-समवायि-क्रियात्वं तदिति चेत्? न। मृत-शरीर-क्रियायाः अपि चेतन-पूर्वकत्व-प्रसक्तेः। जीवतः इति चेत्? न। नेत्र-स्पंदादेः चेतन-अधिष्ठान-अभ्युपगम-प्रसङ्गात्। स्पर्शवत्-द्रव्यांतर-अप्रयोगे सति इति चेत्? न। ज्वलन-पवनादौ तथाभाव-अभ्युपगम-आपत्तेः। शरीरस्य स्पर्शवत्-द्रव्यांतर-अप्रयुक्तस्य इति चेत्? न। चेष्टया एव शरीरस्य लक्ष्यमाणत्वात्। सामान्य-विशेषः चेष्टात्वं, यतः उन्नीयते प्रयत्न-पूर्विका इयं क्रिया इति चेत्? न। क्रियामात्रेण एव तदुन्नेयनात्। भोक्तृ-बुद्धिमत्-पूर्वकत्वं यतः इति चेत्? न। तर्हि तत्-विश्रांतत्वं एव तस्य। न च एतावता एव क्रियामात्रं प्रति अचेतन-मात्रस्य चेतन-अधिष्ठानेन व्याप्तिः अपसार्यते, विशेषस्य विशेषं प्रति प्रयोजकतया सामान्यव्याप्तिं प्रति अविरोधकत्वात्। अन्यथा सर्व-सामान्य-व्याप्तेः उच्छेदात् इत्युक्तम्। एतेन अशरीरत्वादिना सत्प्रतिपक्षत्वं अपास्तम्। अत्रापि आगम-संवादः-

यदा सः देवः जागर्ति तदा इदं चेष्टते जगत्।
यदा स्वपिति शांतात्मा तदा सर्वं निमीलति॥
अज्ञः जंतुः अनीशः अयं आत्मनः सुख-दुःखयोः।
ईश्वर-प्रेरितः गच्छेत् स्वर्गं वा श्वभ्रं एव वा॥
मया अध्यक्षेण प्रकृतिः सूयते सचराचरम्।
तपामि अहं अहं वर्षं निगृण्हाणि उत्सृजामि च॥

अत्र जागर-स्वप्नौ सहकारि-लाभ-अलाभौ। ईश्वर-प्रेरणायां अज्ञत्वं

अप्रयतमानत्वं च हेतू दर्शितौ परमाण्वादि-साधारणौ। स्वर्ग-श्वभ्रे च इष्ट-अनिष्ट-उपलक्षणे। एतदेव सर्व-अधिष्ठानं उत्तरत्र विभाव्यते मयेत्यादिना। न केवलं प्रेरणायां अहं अधिष्ठाता, अपि तु प्रतिरोधे अपि। यः हि यत्र प्रभवति सः तस्य प्रेरणावत्-धारणे अपि समर्थः। यथा अर्वाचीनः शरीर-प्राण-प्रेरणा-धारणयोः इति दर्शितं तपामीत्यादिना। धृतेः खलु अपि। क्षित्यादि-ब्रम्हाण्ड-पर्यंतं हि जगत् साक्षात् परंपरया वा विधारक-प्रयत्न-अधिष्ठितं, गुरुत्वे सति अपतन-धर्मत्वात्, वियति विहंगम-शरीरवत्, तत्-संयुक्त-द्रव्यवत् च। एतेन इन्द्र-अग्नि-यमादि-लोकपाल-प्रतिपादकाः अपि आगमाः व्याख्याताः। सर्व-आवेश-निबंधनः च सर्व-तादात्म्य-व्यवहारः, आत्मा एव इदं सर्वं इति। यथा एक एव मायावी अश्वः, वराहः, व्याघ्रः, वानरः, किन्नरः, भिक्षुः, तापसः, विप्रः इत्यादि।

अदृष्टात् एव तदुपपत्तेः अन्यथासिद्धं इदं इति चेत्? तद्भावे अपि प्रयत्न-अन्वय-व्यतिरेक-अनुविधानेन तस्य अपि स्थितिं प्रति कारणत्वात्। कारणैकदेशस्य च कारणांतरं प्रति अनुपाधित्वात्। उपाधित्वे वा सर्वेषां अकारणत्व-प्रसङ्गात्। शरीर-स्थितिः एवं न तु अन्य-स्थितिः इति चेत्? न। प्राण-इन्द्रिययोः स्थितेः अव्यापनात्। प्राक्-न्यायेन अपास्तत्वात् च। अत्रापि आगमः-'एतस्य वा अक्षरस्य प्रशासने गार्गि द्यावा पृथिव्यौ विधृते तिष्ठतः' इति। 'प्रशासनं दण्डभूतः प्रयत्न'।

उत्तमः पुरुषः तु अन्यः परमात्मा इति उदाहृतः।
यः लोकत्रयं आविश्य बिभर्ति अव्ययः ईश्वरः॥

इति स्मृतिः। अत्र उत्तमत्वं असंसारित्वं सर्वज्ञत्वादि च। परमत्वं सर्व-उपास्यता। लोकत्रयं इति सर्व-उपलक्षणम्। आवेशः ज्ञान-चिकीर्षा-प्रयत्नवतः संयोगः। भरणं धारणम्, अव्ययत्वं आंगतुक-विशेष गुण-शून्यत्वम्। एश्वर्यं संकल्पः अप्रतिघातः इति। एतेन कूर्मादि-विषयाः अपि आगमाः व्याख्याताः।

संहरणात् खलु अपि। ब्राम्हाण्डादि-द्व्यणुकपर्यंतं जगत् प्रयत्नवत्-विनाश्यं, विनाश्यत्वात्, पाट्यमान-पटवत्। अत्रापि आगमः-

एष सर्वाणि भूतानि समभिव्याप्य मूर्तिभिः।
जन्म-वृद्धि-क्षयैः नित्यं संभ्रामयति चक्रवत्॥
सर्वभूतानि कौन्तेय प्रकृतिं यांति मामिकाम्।
कल्पक्षये पुनः तानि कल्पादौ विसृजामि अहम्॥
एतेन रौद्रं अंशं प्रतिपादयंतः अपि आगमाः व्याख्याताः।

TRANS.: If the atoms (whose motion brings them together to give rise to the world-structure) are self-dependent for their movement then they cease to be insentient. Destiny is certainly a cause of the atomic movements but it cannot obstruct the causality of other known causes. The atomic movements are effects which cannot take place without causes. The special types of these effects however require special types of their causes to produce them.

To explain: The atoms, dyads etc. become active only by being impelled by some sentient agent as they are insentient or inert like the pickaxe and other instruments of movement. If this were not so then the rule that 'no effect without a cause' cannot hold. The movement of the insentient is known to be caused by a being who is a ground of sentience. One may contend against this that this fact is true only of certain special types of movement, not of all kinds of movement. (So the movements of atoms may not need the causation of a sentient agent). It is only the bodily movement that needs a sentient cause. Well! If so what is then this (so-called) bodily movement? May one mean by the word 'bodily action' the movement which has the contact with the self endowed with effort (to prompt movement) as its non-material cause or the movement which has effort alone as its cause (unless there is effort in the self and the mind pertaining to it conjoins with it in a certain region of the body no bodily movement can take place according to Nyāya)? No! If one of these is the meaning of the above word then it coincides with the major term in the inference, 'The atomic movement is caused by a sentient being because it is a special kind of movement'. Merely to be caused by a sentient being is the same as the two above-mentioned meanings. So the property of being a bodily movement cannot be adduced as a condition afflicting the inference which seems to be the purpose of the above contention. May then a bodily movement be definable as the movement that procures the good and eliminates the bad? No! Such a definition cannot cover the cases of attempting suicide by consuming poison or by tightening a rope round one's neck as these actions cause only harm and not any good to the agent. This

difficulty may be avoided by substituting the 'desired' and the 'undesired or hateful' in place of 'the good' and 'the bad' respectively in the above definition. (Even poison consumption is a desired activity to one intending to commit suicide). Then it may be asked whether the activity (to qualify as 'bodily activity') should be a desired or hateful one for the agent or for another person. In either case the atomic movements qualify as bodily because these produce happiness to God as well as the beings created by Him who benefit from the results of these movements. Besides even the action of a deceived person who mistakenly treats the bad for the good is caused by his misapprehension (which is a kind of sentience). 'To be inherent in the body' cannot also be the definition of 'bodily action' as the body is devoid of sentience when it is dead. Qualifying the term 'body' as 'living' in the above cannot also yield a precise definition because the batting of the eyelids is only a reflex action of the living body which is not caused by sentience (but being the movement of a part of the body it would have to be regarded as consciously generated). Another qualification that 'the movement should be such that it occurs without the impact of any substantive entity which is endowed with the quality of touch' may exclude the reflex action in the eye as 'bodily movement' as it is caused by the impact of air on the eyelids. But then the upward movement of fire and the multidirectional movement of air which are not always caused by the impact of any substantive entity cannot be excluded by the above qualification. All these difficulties can be overcome if 'bodily movement' is defined as the movement of the body which is not caused by the impact of anything endowed with touch. (The idea on which this definition is based is that every living body moves of itself). But since a body is definable only by means of its voluntary movement, this movement cannot be defined in terms of the body to which it belongs. Perhaps it may be urged against this that the property of 'being bodily movement' is a species of the generic property of 'being a movement'. The presence of the specific property in certain movements is inferred on the basis of their causation by effort. So 'a bodily movement' can be understood as the species of movement which can be inferred to be caused by effort. But this is not correct. All movements are caused by effort (directly or indirectly). There is no specific property describable as the property of 'being bodily effort.' Can then 'bodily movement' be defined as 'movement that has as its antecedent cause the cognition of the experiences of pleasure and pain (what this means is that all actions produce pleasure or pain to their agent, actions are produced by effort which is produced by desire for pleasure and the desire for pleasure is produced by the cognition of the desired object

causing pleasure)?' Well! This may be so. Bodily movements can be supposed to be caused by sentient beings only. But merely because of this special causation the general concomitance of all movements with insentient entities through their being the support of sentience cannot be ruled out. Specific determination obtaining between certain particulars is not opposed to their generic determination. If this were not so then all general concomitance would be jeopardised.

The above rejoinder meets a possible counter-argument like the following:

> 'The atoms are not supported or sustained by sentience (or a sentient being) because they are other than a bodily organism (since all movement is caused by effort and effort depends upon sentience or intelligence; the movement of atoms needs divine support for its occurrence so that the dyads, triads etc. could result from the conjunction of the atoms caused by the movement).'

This fact is also confirmed by scriptural statements like the following ones:

> 'When this divine Being is awake, then this world becomes active and when being quiescent this Being goes to sleep the whole world becomes evanescent. The human creature being ignorant is incapable of securing or controlling its pleasure and pain. Only through the impetus communicated by God the human being is able to enjoy heavenly bliss or suffer hellish pain. 'It is nature as controlled by me which gives rise to mobile and immobile entities of the world. It is God who controls the world, helps its expansion and also causes its destruction by means of His own power.

The explanation of the above is this: waking and sleeping of God referred to above symbolise the collocation and non-collocation of auxiliary conditions of all productions. Ignorance and lack of all capacity common to everything including the atoms, dyads etc. are here described as the reason for divine impetus to move the world. Heaven and hell referred to above stand for the desired and the hateful. This very universal supportiveness of the divine being is found to be expressed in the subsequent verse by words like *'māyā'* in Sanskrit which mean 'by me' (that is God) God is the support or sustaining ground not of universal disposition alone. He is the ground of their obstruction too. One who is capable of causing something is capable of preventing it too. Like any empirical self which supports dispositions for action of the body it inspires and also sustains it.

Even from supportiveness God's existence can be inferred. Right from the earth etc. to the whole cosmos all the universe is directly or indirectly supported by some sustaining effort because it is (extraordinarily heavy and yet does not fall down) as is the heavy body of a bird flying in the sky or some object conjoined with the body of the bird. It is God's effort that supports the universe as well as the different spheres of existence of deities like Indra, Yama etc. and prevents them from falling down. And because God pervades the being of all deities God is regarded as identical with them and so all these (and other entities too) are described as divine. It is just like a single sorcerer assuming the forms of the horse, the pig, the tiger, the monkey, the angel, the recluse, the monk etc.

But can't destiny itself account for the stability of the cosmos and if it can then the admission of divine existence will become superfluous? Yes! Besides destiny, effort also is known to be positively and negatively associated with every occurrence and so its causality cannot be dispensed with. If a thing is known to be the cause of an effect this individual causality cannot render other causes of the same effect redundant. If such a thing happened then all causes of an effect would be rendered redundant. To avoid this difficulty if the causality of effort is supposed to be confined to the body only then effort will have nothing to do with life, sense-organs etc. which though based in the body are other than it. Besides as stated earlier if the causal relation holds between two individual specimens belonging respectively to two genera then that relation extends to all the individuals belonging to the same two genera. So if the self's effort—a certain specimen of effort—is needed to sustain the body—a certain effect—then some or other kind of effort is sure to be needed to sustain the existence of every effect. This is supported by a scriptural statement which addressing 'Gārgī' the wife of the sage Yājñyavalkya says that these heaven and earth stand firm only as supported by the controlling effort of this unchanging being. There is also a similar statement in the Smṛti or the *Gītā*. It says that this unchanging supreme Being pervading the three sphere of existence sustains them. The supremacy of this Being consists in His omniscience and non-empirical character. He is Highest because He is worshipped by all. The three spheres of existence symbolise everything that is there. Pervasion is conjunction with the world of this Being as endowed with knowledge, will to do and effort. Sustaining is supporting. Unchanging nature consists in being devoid of mutable attributes. This Being is the overlord because His will is absolutely free. This explanation applies to the epic

legends of incarnations of God as tortoise, pig etc. (God Himself in the form of these creatures is described as the sustainer of the worlds).

Even destruction is a proof for God's existence. There is this inference: 'Everything from the vast universe to the smallest dyads is destructible by a being endowed with effort because it is destructible, just like a piece of cloth which is being destroyed by tearing'. This inference is also confirmed by certain scriptural statements. These say that 'This Being namely God, pervades all (living) beings through his various incarnations and then He makes them pass as if on a wheel through the stages of origination, growth and decay. O Son of Kuntī, at the end of each cycle of creation all (living) beings are dissolved into my being. When a new cycle of creation starts I bring these (living) beings into existence again'. This explains those scriptural statements which refer to the dreadful end of the world.

EXPL.: In the foregoing verse and its commentary the author discusses the second and third proofs for the existence of God listed earlier. The second proof is based on the insentient nature of the atoms coupled with the need for the effort of a sentient being to generate movement in the atoms. Here the objection is raised by the atheist that only bodily movement calls for effort and because God is not supposed to be embodied His effort would not be required for moving the atoms. In reply to the objection the author considers various possible definitions of bodily movement called *'Cheṣṭā'* in Sanskrit and refutes them all. The main basis of all the refutations is that both bodily and non-bodily movements require sentient causality (direct or indirect). The kind of movement of the atoms preceding creation which leads to their conjunction cannot be demarcated as a special kind of movement needing bodily activity to cause it. Some movements need body as their cause and some do not do so but all movements need (directly or indirectly) sentience as their cause.

Another possible objection to the above theistic proof that destiny being the universal cause of all occurrences the supposed divine causality of the world is rendered superfluous is also considered and easily answered. Destiny is only one of the causes of the world and even destiny which is insentient requires some sentient cause to activate it.

Here an important question arises. Granting that bodily movement called *'Cheṣṭā'* is not precisely definable as the author has shown, isn't the distinction between bodily movement and other kinds of movement quite obvious? Isn't it also equally obvious that the movements of natural objects like air, fire, water etc. are other than bodily movements and

not caused by any sentient being? Can't the atomic movements preceding creation be treated as natural as those of other natural objects not requiring the causality of any sentient being? The objection can be satisfactorily answered only if the creative movement of atoms is regarded as of a different kind than the natural movement of natural objects. This difference may be supposed to consist in the fact that the atomic movement is creative and constructive while the movements of air, fire etc. are not so. Being caused by the body or belonging to the body is not a distinction which is very relevant to the discussion of the foregoing theistic proof. Whether God is embodied or not it is enough for his creativity that He is sentient. If the question is raised 'how God's sentience or effort is transmitted to atoms, dyads etc. if God has no body, the simple answer is that effort generates movement in its object. Whether the object is a body (of God) or the atoms, dyads etc. does not make any difference to the causality of effort.'

Elucidation of the remaining proofs for the existence of God

TEXT: पदात् खलु अपि–

कार्यत्वात् निरुपाधित्वं एवं धृति–विनाशयो:।
विच्छेदेन पदस्य अपि प्रत्ययादे: च पूर्ववत्॥

पदशब्देन अत्र पद्यते गम्यते व्यवहारांगं अर्थ: अनेन इति वृद्ध–व्यवहार: एव उच्यते। अत: अपि ईश्वर–सिद्धि:। तथाहि. यदेतत् पटादि–निर्माण–नैपुण्यं कुविन्दादीनां, वाक्–व्यवहार: च व्यक्तवाचां, लिपि–तत्–क्रम–व्यवहार: च बालानां, स सर्व: स्वतंत्र–पुरुष–विश्रांत:, व्यवहारत्वात्, निपुणतर–शिल्पि–निर्मित–अपूर्व–घट–घटना–नैपुण्यवत्, चैत्र–मैत्रादि–पदवत्, पत्र–अक्षरवत्, पाणिनीय–वर्ण–निर्देश–क्रमवत् च इति। आदिमान् व्यवहार: एवम्। अयं तु अनादि: अन्यथा अपि भविष्यति इति चेत्? न। तदसिद्धे:। आदिमत्तां एव साधयितुं अयं आरंभ:। न च एवं संसारस्य अनादित्व–भंग–प्रसङ्ग:? तथापि तस्य अविरोधात्। न हि चैत्रादि–व्यवहार: अयं आदिमान् इति भवस्यापि अनादिता नास्ति। तत्–अनादित्वे वा न चैत्रादि–पद–व्यवहार: अपि आदिमान् इति। अस्तु

अर्वाक्-दर्शी कश्चिदेव अत्र मूलं इति चेत्? न। तेन अशक्यत्वात्। कल्पादौ आदर्श-आभासस्य अपि असिद्धेः। साधितौ च सर्ग-प्रलयौ। ननु व्यवहारयितृ-वृद्धः शरीरी समधिगतः, न च ईश्वरः तथा, तत् कथं एवं स्यात्? न। शरीर-अन्वय-व्यतिरेक-अनुविधायिनि कार्ये तस्य अपि तद्वत्वात्। गृह्णाति हि ईश्वरः अपि कार्य-वशात् शरीरं अंतरा अंतरा, दर्शयति च विभूतिं इति। अत्र अपि आगमः-

पिता अहं अस्य जगतः माता धाता पितामहः।

तथा-

यदि हि अहं न वर्तेयं जातु कर्मणि अतंद्रितः।
मम वर्त्म अनुवर्तंते मनुष्याः पार्थ सर्वशः॥
उत्सीदेयुः इमे लोकाः न कुर्यां कर्म चेत् अहम्॥

इति।

एतेन 'नमः कुलालेभ्यः कर्मारेभ्यः' इत्यादि यजूंषि बोद्धव्यानि।

प्रत्ययः अपि। प्रत्यय शब्देन अत्र समाश्वास-विषय-प्रामाण्यं उच्यते। तथा च प्रयोगः-आगम-संप्रदायः अयं कारण-गुण-पूर्वकः प्रमाणत्वात्, प्रत्यक्षादिवत्। न हि प्रामाण्य-प्रत्ययं विना क्वचित् समाश्वासः। न च असिद्धस्य प्रामाण्यस्य प्रतीतिः। न च स्वतः प्रामाण्यं इति आवेदितम्। न च न इदं प्रमाणं, महाजन-परिग्रहात् इत्युक्तम्। न च अ-सर्वज्ञो धर्माधर्मयोः स्वातंत्र्येण प्रभवति। न च अ-सर्वज्ञस्य गुणवत्ता इति निःशंकं एतत्।

श्रुतेः खलु अपि। तथाहि, सर्वज्ञ-प्रणीताः वेदाः वेदत्वात्। यत् पुनः न सर्वज्ञ-प्रणीतं, न असौ वेदः यथा इतर-वाक्यम्। ननु किं इदं वेदत्वं नाम? वाक्यत्वस्य अदृष्ट-विषय-वाक्यत्वस्य च विरुद्धत्वात्। अदृष्ट-विषय-प्रमाण-वाक्यत्वस्य च असिद्धेः। मन्वादि-वाक्ये गतत्वेन विरोधात् च इति चेत्? न। अनुपलभ्यमान-मूलांतरत्वे सति महाजन-परिगृहीत-वाक्यत्वस्य तत्वात्। न च अस्मदादीनां प्रत्यक्षादि मूलम्। भ्रम-विप्रलिप्से, महाजन परिग्रहात् इत्युक्तम्। नापि परंपरा एव मूलम्। महाप्रलये विच्छेदात् इत्युक्तम्।

अन्वयतः वा। वेदवाक्यानि पौरुषेयानि वाक्यत्वात् अस्मदादि-वाक्यवत्। अ-स्मर्यमाण कर्तृकत्वात् न एवं इति चेत्? न। असिद्धेः।

अनंतरं च वाक्येभ्यः वेदाः तस्य विनिःसृताः।
प्रति मन्वंतरं च एषां श्रुतिः अन्या विधीयते॥

'वेदांत-कृत् वेदवित् एव च अहम्' इति स्मृतेः। तस्मात् यज्ञात् सर्वहुतः भक्ष्यः सामानि जज्ञिरे इत्यादि-श्रुति-पाठक-स्मृतेः च। अर्थवाद-मात्रं इदं इति चेत्? न। कर्तृस्मरणस्य सर्वत्र अ-विध्यर्थत्वात्। तथा च अस्मरणे कालिदासादेः अस्मरणात्। एवं च कुमार-संभव-आदेः अकर्तृकत्व-प्रसङ्गः। अनैकांतिकत्वं वा हेतोः। प्रमाणांतर-अगोचर-अर्थत्वात् सत्प्रतिपक्षत्वं इति चेत्? न। प्रणेतारं प्रति असिद्धेः। अन्यं प्रति अनैकांतिकत्वात्। आकस्मिक-स्मित-बीज-सुख-अनुस्मृतेः कारण-विशेषस्य अन्यं प्रति प्रमाणांतर-अगोचरस्य अपि तेन एव वक्त्रा प्रतिपाद्यमानत्वात्।

वक्ता एव प्रकृते न संभवति। हेतु-अभावे फल-अभावात्। चक्षुरादीनां तत्र असामर्थ्यात्। अस्मदादि-इन्द्रियवत्। मनसः बहिः अ-स्वातंत्र्यात्। न। चेतनस्य ज्ञानस्य इन्द्रियस्य मनसः वा पक्षीकरणे आश्रयासिद्धेः प्रागेव प्रपंचनात्। नित्य-निराकरणे च असामर्थ्यात्। परमाण्वादयः न कस्यचित् प्रत्यक्षाः तत्-सामग्री-रहितत्वात् इति चेत्? न। द्रष्टारं प्रति असिद्धेः। अन्यं प्रति सिद्धसाधनात्। तथापि वाक्यत्वं न प्रमाणम्। अप्रयोजकत्वात्। प्रमाणांतर-गोचर-अर्थत्व-प्रयुक्तं तत्र पौरुषेयत्वं, न तु वाक्यत्व-प्रयुक्तम्। न। सुगतादि-आगमानां अपौरुषेयत्व-प्रसङ्गात्। प्रमाण-वाक्यस्य सतः इति चेत्? न। प्रणेतृ-प्रमाणांतर-गोचर-अर्थत्वस्य साध्य-अनुप्रवेशात्। स्वतंत्र-पुरुष-प्रणीतत्वं हि पौरुषेयत्वम्। अर्थ-प्रतीति-एक-विषयौ हि विवक्षा-प्रयत्नौ स्वातंत्र्यम्। मन्वादि-वाक्यस्य अपौरुषेयत्व-प्रसङ्गात् च। तदर्थस्य शब्देतर-प्रमाण-अगोचरत्वात्। प्रयुज्यमान-वाक्येतर-गोचरार्थत्व-मात्रं इति चेत्? न। तस्य वेदे अपि सत्वात्। एकस्य अपि अर्थस्य शाखा-भेदेन बहुभिः वाक्यैः प्रतिपादनात्। अस्तु एवम् न तु तेषां मूल-मूलीभावः इति चेत्? न। उक्तोतरत्वात्।

संख्या-विशेषात् खलु अपि। द्वयणुक-त्र्यणुके तावत् परिमाणवती द्रव्यत्वात्। तत् च परिमाणं कार्यं, कार्य-गुणत्वात्। न च तस्य परमाणु-परिमाणं, द्वयणुक-परिमाणं वा कारणम्। नित्य-परिमाणत्वात्। अणु-परिमाणत्वात् च। अन्यथा अनाश्रय-कार्य-उत्पत्ति-प्रसङ्गात्। द्वयणुकस्य महत्व-प्रसङ्गात् च। त्र्यणुकवत् अणु-आरम्भत्व-अविशेषात्। तत्र कारण-बहुत्वेन महत्वे अणु-परिमाणस्य अनारंभकत्व-स्थिते:। अणुत्वं एवं महत्-आरंभे विशेष: इत्यपि न युक्तम्। महत: महत्-अनारंभ-प्रसङ्गात्। अणुत्व-महत्वयो: विरुद्धतया एकजातीय-कार्य-अनारंभकत्व प्रसङ्गात्। बहुभि: अपि परमाणुभि: द्वाभ्यां अपि परमाणुभ्यां आरंभ-प्रसङ्गात् च। एवं सति क: दोष: इति चेत्? परमाणु-कार्यस्य महत्व प्रसङ्ग:। कारण-बहुत्वस्य तत्-हेतुत्वात्। अन्यथा द्वाभ्यां, त्रिभि:, चतुर्भि: इति अनियमेन अपि अणु-आरंभे तत्-वैयर्थ्य-प्रसङ्गात्। अणुन: एव तारतम्य-अभ्युपगम: तु संख्यां अवधीर्य न स्यात्। अस्तु महत्-आरंभ एव त्रिभि: इति चेत्? न। महत: कार्यस्य कार्य-द्रव्य-आरभ्यत्व-नियमात्। तथापि वा तारतम्ये संख्या एव प्रयोजिका इति। न च प्रचय: अपेक्षणीय:, अवयव-संयोगस्य अभावात्। तस्मात् परिमाण-प्रचयौ महत: एव आरंभकौ इति स्थिति:। अत: अनेक-संख्या परिशिष्यते। सा अपेक्षा-बुद्धि-जन्या, अनेक-संख्यात्वात्। न च अस्मदादीनां अपेक्षाबुद्धि: परमाणुषु संभवति। तत् यस्य असौ सर्वज्ञ:। अन्यथा अपेक्षाबुद्धे: अभावात् संख्या-अनुत्पत्तौ तद्गत्-परिमाण-अनुत्पादे अपरिमितस्य द्रव्यस्य अनारंभकत्वात् त्र्यणुक-अनुत्पत्तौ विश्व-अनुत्पत्ति-प्रसङ्ग:। अस्मदादीनां एव आनुमानिकी अपेक्षाबुद्धि: अस्ति इति चेत्? न। इतरेतराश्रय-प्रसङ्गात्। जाते हि स्थूल-कार्ये तेन परमाण्वादि-अनुमानं, तस्मिन् सति द्वयणुकादि-क्रमेण स्थूल-उत्पत्ति:। अस्तु अदृष्टात् एव परिमाणं कृतं अपेक्षा-बुद्ध्या इति चेत्? न। अस्तु तत: एव सर्वं किं दृष्ट-कारणेन इत्यादे: अ-सयाधेयत्व-प्रसङ्गात् इति।

TRANS.: The inferences based on the middle terms—sustaining and destroying, discussed above cannot be charged of the fallacy of

conditionality as the principle of causality which is the basis of the inferences—is opposed to any counter-inference that may seek to prove that the world as a whole and its destruction—being unique entities, do not need a cause. Likewise even in the case of the theistic inferences based on diverse usages and validity of scriptural tradition it is the principle of causality that establishes their unconditionality. Since due to periodical occurrence of annihilation the world and its destruction are recurring entities, they cannot be treated as exceptions to the causal principle.

To explain the above: The etymological meaning of the word *'pada'* (used in the text) stands for the art and craft of elderly people or the experts (because it is by means of the former that things or objects of usage are known). By means of this new middle term also God's existence is established. To elucidate: The well-known expertise of weavers etc. in weaving cloth and manufacturing other things, the verbal activities of adult human beings and the usages pertaining to alphabets and their order which children engage in can all be traced back ultimately to an independent being as their originator because these are all different types of usages. (The examples instantiating the concomitance of the major and middle in the inference are) the fineness of the structure of a unique pot fashioned by a potter artisan possessing expertise of a high order, the skilful mutual dealings of men like Chaitra, Maitra etc., the inscription in a letter and the order of certain prefixes and suffixes as laid down by the great grammarian Pāṇinī. (Just as all these usages and practices originate from some independent human being, the above-mentioned usages etc. also originate from some independent being who is knowledgeable about them all). Can it be urged against this that unlike the instantiated usages the other usages (the minor terms in the inference) are beginningless and so do not depend upon any being to start them? No! It is not established that the usages have no beginning. In fact this discussion is intended to establish that the usages have an ultimate origin. But doesn't this prove (indirectly) that the world is not beginningless (if the usage etc. taking place in it have a beginning)? No! There is no opposition between the two facts as in every cycle of creation it is only God who starts the usages. Certainly the beginninglessness of the world and the frequent originations of the usages do not contradict each other so that if one is true the other is false. But can't some person of limited vision be the originator of the usages? No! Such a person is incapable of starting the usages. Besides at the start of creation even degenerate human beings are not present to start the usages. And it has already been proved that creation and annihilation are facts. But isn't it a fact that all expert usage-originators are embodied beings

but God is not supposed to be such? No! Even God incarnates Himself in a body for accomplishing things that being positively and negatively associated with a body demand an embodied creator. God does assume human form again and again and manifests his glory through it. This too is confirmed by the scripture thus: It says, 'I am the father, the mother, the grandfather and the author of this world'. Further it says, 'If I did not remain alert in all actions then since, son of Pṛthā! All human beings follow the path blazed by me, they and all this world would be ruined by following me on the wrong path'.

The above explains the Vedic prayer addressed to God in which God is saluted as a potter, etc., etc.

Even 'Validity' is a proof for God's existence. The Sanskrit word *'Pratyaya'* stands for the validity of the object of belief. Thus we have the inference: 'This scriptural tradition is based on the excellence of its causal attributes as it is a means of knowledge like perception etc. Without the cognition of its validity no belief can be entertained. But unless validity is proved it cannot be known and it has already been stated that a cognition (or tradition) is self-valid. Since the scriptural tradition is followed by knowledgeable people it cannot be invalid. A non-omniscient person however cannot independently start a tradition nor such a being is endowed with excellence. All this is beyond doubt.

Even the scriptures are a proof for God. The inference based on scriptures is this: 'The scriptures are authored by an omniscient being because they are scriptures, whatever is not authored by an omniscient being is not scripture as are the words of human beings'. 'But what is it to be a scripture?' It may here be asked. 'Being a collection of sentences' or 'being a collection of sentences dealing with non-empirical objects' cannot be the definition of scriptures as atheistic texts are also full of such sentences. If the sentences are qualified as authoritative to exclude atheistic texts then the Smṛties composed by Manu etc. would also fulfil this definition. Besides the authoritativeness of the scriptures is not yet established. The right definition of the scriptures therefore is, 'Being a collection of sentences accepted by knowledgeable people but having no basis other than itself.' The perceptions etc. of common people, or any erroneous cognitions or intention to deceive is not the basis of scriptural authority as it is accepted by knowledgeable people. Even tradition cannot be the basis of this authority as it has already been stated that tradition is disrupted during annihilation.

Even a positive inference based on scripture can be adduced as a proof for God. The inference is this: 'Scriptural statements are authored by some sentient being as they are statements like the statements of common people'. But can't there be a counter-inference like, 'Scriptural statements are not authored by any being as no such author can be recalled?' No! This is unestablished as God is mentioned to be the author of the scripture in the scripture itself. The following Smṛti verses confirm this. They state that 'thereafter from the mouth of God the scriptures came out as in every cycle of creation a new scripture is supposed to prevail!' The Smṛti also says that 'God is the author and knower of the scripture' and that from that universal man (that is, the universally immanent God) who accepts all oblations the *Ṛk* and *Sāma* scriptures emanated'. But can't these be mere eulogies (which are not to be taken literally)? No. The reference to the author of the scriptures—that is—God, is in every case not indicated by imperatives (which are other than eulogies). If these references were not indicated by eulogies then eminent poets like Kālidās, not being mentioned anywhere by imperatives their poetical works like *Kumārasambhava* would cease to have any author. So the middle term 'not being mentioned by imperatives' in the inference of 'not being authored by any sentient being' becomes deviant. 'But can't a counter-inference seeking to prove the above major term (of the scriptures) by means of the middle term 'having those facts as its contents that are not known through any other source' be set forth? It may be asked. The answer to the question is this: 'That the contents of the scriptures are not apprehended through any other source' is not true of God Himself as He has direct perceptual knowledge of these contents. If the non-apprehension of the contents included in the above middle term is that of a person other than the author of the statements then the middle term turns out to be deviant. A man recollecting a pleasant occurrence in his past life which evokes a smile on his face can speak about the cause of the smile to his interlocutor who does not know beforehand why the man smiles. Here the cause of the smile though unknown to the other person is the object of speech but the speech is not (like the scriptures) authorless. So there cannot be any concomitance between authorlessness and inapprehensibility to any non-scriptural source of knowledge. It may yet be argued that there cannot be a speaker at all for the scriptures as in the absence of the causal collocation no result ensues and neither the external senses nor the internal sense-mind—can apprehend the scriptural contents. The external senses grasp external objects and so the external senses of the hypothetical author of the scriptures would also grasp only external objects. As for the mind it cannot by itself grasp the external objects. In reply to this argument we say only this that the various possible inferences that may be set forth to prove that divine knowledge, sense-organs or mind is

incapable of apprehending the contents of the scriptures are all riddled with the fallacy of unestablished minor term. This fact has already been elaborated earlier in some other connection (the minor term in all these inferences involves God's existence). Moreover even if the inferences succeeded in disproving the possibility of non-eternal knowledge they cannot rule out the possibility of eternal knowledge. But can't it be contended that atoms, dyads etc. are not perceptible to any being as the causal collocation of their perception is not available? No! If it is non-perceptibility to God that is sought to be proved then this is simply inadmissible as the reality of God is itself being debated. If on the other hand the non-perceptibility to other beings is sought to be proved then it is the proof of the obvious. Nyāya doesn't admit that any being other than God can perceive atoms.

It may still be argued that 'being a collection of sentences' cannot be the middle term in an inferential proof for God's existence as it is irrelevant to the major term. The divine authorship of the scripture is due mainly to their contents being accessible to non-scriptural sources of knowledge. No! This cannot be the case as then the scriptures of the Buddhists etc. would have to be reckoned as authorless because they are not concerned with things known through non-scriptural (here the scriptures are those of the Buddhists) sources. This difficulty can be got over if 'accessibility to non-scriptural sources' is taken to be the determinant of 'sentient authorship characterising authoritative statements'. The atheistic scriptures not being authoritative they can be excluded from the purview of the major term in the above inference. The theist can reply to this by qualifying the major term in the inference by the adjective, 'known or knowable through non-scriptural sources to the author himself'. (This is the meaning of sentient authorship, God, the author of the scriptures has direct perception of the non-empirical things etc. described in the scriptures). Sentient authorship means generally 'being authored independently by an author human or divine'. The independence of the author consists in his possessing the non-scriptural knowledge, the desire to impart to others this knowledge and the effort following the desire, concerning the scriptural matters. (This being the case the major term turns out to be identical with the condition which the objector takes to be its determinant. This rules out the possibility of the fallacy of conditionality in the inference).

Moreover on the objector's view the statements of sages like Manu would have to be reckoned as authorless because their content is inaccessible to empirical or nonverbal sources of knowledge. This undesirable contingency may be avoided by stipulating that the non-empirical

source could even be verbal although it should be other than the statements in the text. What Manu etc. have stated is already stated in the scriptures. So the compositions of Manu etc. cannot be treated as authorless. But such qualified authorship which characterises Manu's statements characterises scriptural statements too as a few of the contents of the scriptures are common to their different recensions. Of course these common contents are not related with each other as 'basis and based' (In the case of the statements of Manu etc. the similar statements contained in the scriptures are the basis of the former and so they cannot be regarded as authorless or having no human author—as the scriptures can be). But the above objection has already been answered earlier.

Even on the basis of a particular number, God's existence can be inferred. The inference is this: 'The dyads and triads do possess certain dimensions as they are substantive entities. These dimensions are not eternal as they belong to non-eternal substances. Nor are these generated respectively by the dimensions of the atom and the dyad as these belong respectively to an eternal and an infinitesimal entity. If even the eternal dimension of the atom could be productive (of the larger dimension of the dyad) then the infinite dimension of space, time etc. could also be productive of some dimension but no substantive entity being the product of space and time, the dimensions resulting from the infinite dimensions of space and time would have no substance to rest upon. Besides the dyad will turn into an entity of large size (which it is not supposed to be by Nyāya) as like the triad it too is the product of an entity of the small size (which is supposed to be intrinsically different from the large size). But if the large dimension of the triad is regarded as caused by the plurality (a number larger than two) of dyads and not by their size then it is established that the small size of the atom and the dyad is totally unproductive. May it be urged here that the small size of the dyad possesses some peculiar characteristic on account of which it produces the large size of the triad? No! If such a thing happened then the general rule that only what is a large entity is productive of another large entity would be breached. Besides smallness and largeness being mutually exclusive neither the small nor the large dimension can be productive of any dimension. If notwithstanding this the small size of the dyad itself is taken to be productive of the large size of the triad then even a plurality of atoms or just two dyads (instead of three as is the Nyāya view) could be regarded as the cause of the large size of the triad. 'What is wrong in admitting this? ' one may ask. The answer is that on this view the product of the atoms would be an entity of large size as it is

caused by the plurality of atoms. (So even a dyad would be endowed with a large size). If to avoid this contingency the product of even a plurality of atoms is regarded as an entity of small size then the same number of atoms coming together may produce the triad of the large size. It may yet be urged that although both the atom and the dyad are small-sized, yet their smallnesses are of different type, consequently the small-sized atom produces the dyad possessing the small size of a different type while the latter produces the large size of the triad. But even in such a view the causality of number in relation to size is not discarded because the difference in the smallness of the dyad from that of the atom is taken to be caused by the dual number of the atoms. Likewise the large size of the triad is also taken to be caused by the plural number of dyads. 'Why not then admit that it is the plurality of atoms themselves that is productive of the triad?' One may ask. The answer is that a non-eternal and large-sized object like the triad is, as a rule the product of only a non-eternal material object. And even if the plurality of atoms themselves is reckoned to be the cause of the triad of the large-size and likewise the duality of the same atoms is reckoned as the cause of the dyad of the small size, the difference in these sizes is supposed to be determined only by number. Mere aggregation of the atoms however cannot be the cause of the triad because aggregation is the result of a special type of combination of aggregating units but the triad cannot be the result of such a (loose) combination of dyads or atoms. Thus since the large dimension and aggregation of components produce only the larger dimensions of the composite entity the small dimension of the dyad differing from that of the atoms can be accounted for only by means of the number of atoms. This number-duality—is the product of counting as it differs from unity which is the intrinsic quality of every substance. But the counting process or the numerical consciousness of beings like us cannot be concerned with the atoms as they are invisible to us. The being who has this consciousness is the omniscient God. If this numerical consciousness is not available then numbers from duality onwards cannot originate. Consequently the peculiar size of the dyads cannot originate. But an entity devoid of any size cannot be productive of any substance so that the world starting from the triads cannot come into being at all. Can one urge here that the inferential numerical consciousness of human beings themselves is productive of the said dimension? No! This assumption involves the fallacy of mutual dependence. Only if there comes into being the gross world, the existence of atoms is inferred therefrom and only if the atoms are there the gross world from dyads onwards comes into being. 'Alright! Yet the said dimension can be caused by destiny itself?' One may urge. No! This is not a correct view. If in this manner destiny is upheld as the cause of everything then all other known causes of all things would have to be discarded.

EXPL.: Now God's existence is sought to be established on the ground that all the arts, crafts etc. developed by man must have God as their ultimate originator. The argument is not quite convincing. Can't man himself originate and develop different arts, crafts etc. in which he attains expertise? Man may not have an insight into an art right from the moment he conceives it though vaguely. He dabbles in it for some time in a haphazard manner and then suddenly he discovers the right method to tackle it. From this point onward the man's efficiency in handling the art grows gradually. In course of time the man attains perfection in the art mainly by dint of his own relentless effort without always needing guidance from others. In reply to the question that God must be embodied in order to impart instruction in arts, crafts etc. at the start of every creation-cycle the author says that when necessary God does assume human form. Why doesn't he do so while creating the universe? Why should he remain bodiless before creation? Simply because during annihilation no non-eternal thing except destiny can exist.

The second ground for God's existence is the general belief in the validity of the scriptural tradition. This is a stronger ground than the previous one. It is true that a tradition which somehow survives the ravages of time automatically acquires sanctity in people's eyes. Yet reflective-minded people uphold a tradition only if they believe that God Himself is its originator or that it is beginningless and endless or if they find it to be inherently rational. The third ground is the authorship of the scriptures. According to Mīmāṃsā, scriptures have no author—human or divine—because the knowledge derived from the scriptures is not available from any other source. Nyāya's contention is that God does have even direct perceptual knowledge of the scriptural contents. But for this proof to be effective it is necessary first to establish the validity of scriptural statements. If this validity itself is based on God's authorship of the scriptures how can God's existence be based on his authorship of the scriptures? The only independent proof for the validity of the scriptures adduced by the author is the fact that venerable people uphold this validity. But this is only a belief. It cannot be treated as an indisputable proof.

The last ground for God's existence is number excluding unity (duality and plurality of the atoms and the dyads respectively) which have inevitably to be regarded as the cause of the dyad and the triad. The

infinitesimally-small dimension of the atom and the dyad cannot be such causes because they can produce only the small dimension and not the large dimension of the triad. This argument is mainly based on the assumption that the small dimension of the atom and the dyad is of a different type than the large dimension of the triad. This assumption is based on the fact that while the triad is visible the dyad and the atom are not. But isn't there the difference of clear visibility and difficult visibility between a large molecule and a triad? Many such differences in respect of visibility are noticeable in the case of other objects of different sizes. In view of this will it be proper to treat the infinitely-small size or dimension of the atom and the dyad unproductive? Besides, if this dimension is simply unproductive how can its reality be established? It is not visible and there is no inferential proof either of its reality. But even admitting the plural number of the dyads as the cause of the triad it is difficult to understand how the dual number of the atoms is supposed to cause the dyad which is said to have only small dimension. Why not admit the atomic dimension itself as the cause of the dimension of the dyad? Nyāya in upholding such uncommonsensical views seems to have proceeded on the presumption that the product of an object of small dimension must be smaller than its cause just as the product of an object of larger dimension is larger than its cause. This presumption does not seem to be quite rational. Of course modern physical science does admit that the motion etc. of atoms or, more precisely, their constituent particles obey different laws than those that govern the motion etc. of gross objects. But science has arrived at this conclusion by means of various intricate experiments conducted on the atoms. How Nyāya has arrived, more or less—at this very conclusion is almost a mystery because the reason that it has adduced for the conclusion is not acceptable. There must be some other more cogent reason which is not spelt out in Nyāya texts.

An alternative interpretation of the words for middle terms used in the text

TEXT: अथवा–'कार्य' इत्यादिकं अन्यथा व्याख्यायते–

उद्देशे एव तात्पर्यं व्याख्या विश्वदृश: सती।
ईश्वरादि पदं सार्थं लोकवृत्त–अनुसारत:॥

आम्नायस्य हि भाव्य–अर्थस्य कार्ये पुरुष–प्रवृत्ति–निवृत्ती। भूतार्थस्य

तु यद्यपि न आहत्य प्रवर्तकत्वं निवर्तकत्वं वा तथापि तात्पर्यत: तत्र एव प्रामाण्यम्। विधि शक्ति: एव अवसीदंती स्तुत्यादिभि: उत्तभ्यते। प्रशस्ते हि सर्व: प्रवर्तते निन्दितात् च निवर्तते इति स्थिति:। तत्र पदशक्ति: तावत् अभिधा, तद्–बल–आयात: पदार्थ:। आकांक्षादिमत्वे सति वा अन्वय शक्ति: पदानां पदार्थानां वा वाक्यं, तद्बल–आयात: वाक्यार्थ:। तात्पर्य–अर्थ: तु चिंत्यते। तदेव परं साध्यं, प्रतिपाद्यं, प्रयोजनं, उद्देश्यं वा यस्य तदिदं तत्परम्। तस्य भाव: तत्वम्। तत् यद्विषयं स: तात्पर्यार्थ: इति स्यात्। तत्र न प्रधम:। प्रमाणेन अर्थस्य कर्मण: असाध्यत्वात्। फलस्य च तत्–प्रतिपत्तित: अन्यस्य अभावात्। प्रशस्त–निन्दित–स्वार्थ–प्रतिपादन–द्वारेण प्रवृत्ति–निवृत्तिरूपं साध्यं परं उच्यते इति चेत्? न। गंगायां घोष: इत्यत्र तीरस्य अ–प्रवृत्ति–निवृत्ति–रूपस्य अ–साध्यस्य अपि परत्वात्। तीर–विषये प्रवृत्ति–निवृत्ती साध्ये इति तीरस्य अपि परत्वं इति चेत्? न। स्वरूप–आख्यान–मात्रेण अपि पर्यवसानात्। न द्वितीय:। पद–वाक्ययो: पदार्थ–तत्–संसर्गे विहाय प्रतिपाद्य–अंतर–अभावात्। 'पद–शक्ति–संसर्ग–शक्ती विना स्वार्थ–अविनाभावेन प्रतिपाद्यं परं उच्यते' इत्यपि न सांप्रतम्। न हि यत् यत्–शब्दार्थ–अविनाभूतं तत्र तत्र तात्पर्यं शब्दस्य, अतिप्रसङ्गात्। तदा हि गंगायं। जलं इत्याद्यपि तीरपरं स्यात्। अविनाभावस्य तादवस्थ्यांत्। मुख्ये बाधके सति तत्तथा स्यात् इति चेत्? न। तस्मिन् असति अपि भावात्। तद् यथा–

'गच्छ गच्छसि चेत् कांत!' पथान: संतु ते शिवा:।
मम अपि जन्म तत्रैव भूयात् यत्र गत: भवान्॥

इति मुख्यार्थ–अबाधे अपि वारणे तात्पर्यम्। न च परं व्यापकं एव। अव्यापके अपि तात्पर्य–दर्शनात्। तद् यथा–'मंचा: क्रोशंति' इति पुरुषे तात्पर्यम्। न च मंच–पुरुषयो: अविनाभाव:। नापि पुरुष–क्रोशनयो:। नापि तृतीय:। तद्धि प्रतिपाद्य–अपेक्षितं प्रतिपादक–अपेक्षितं वा स्यात्। नाद्य:। शब्द–प्रामाण्यस्य अ–तदधीनत्वात्। तथात्वे वा अतिप्रसङ्गात्। यस्य यदपेक्षितं तं प्रति तस्य परत्व–प्रसङ्गात्। तदर्थ–साध्यत्वेन अपेक्षा–नियम: इति चेत्? न। कार्य–ज्ञाप्य भेदेन साध्यस्य बहुविधत्वे भिन्न–

तात्पर्यतया वाक्य भेद-प्रसङ्गात्। धूमस्य हि प्रदेश-श्यामलता, मशक-निवृत्त्यादि अनेकं कार्यम्। आर्द्रेन्धन-दहनादि अनेकं ज्ञाप्यम्। तथा च इह प्रदेशे धूम-उद्गमः इत्यभिहिते तात्पर्यतः कः वाक्यार्थः भवेत्? चेतनापेक्षायाः नियंतुं अशक्यत्वात्। नापि प्रतिपादक-अपेक्षितं, वेदे तदभावात्।

चतुर्थः तु स्यात्। यदुद्देशेन यः शब्दः प्रवृत्तः सः तत्परः, तथैव लोक-व्युत्पत्तेः। तथा हि प्रशंसा-वाक्यं उपादानं उद्दिश्य लोके प्रयुज्यते, तदुपानपरम्। निन्दावाक्यं हानं उद्दिश्य प्रयुज्यते तत्-हानपरम्। एवं अन्यत्रापि स्वयं ऊहनीयम्।

तस्मात् लोक-अनुसारेण वेदे अपि एवं स्वीकरणीयम्। अन्यथा अर्थवादानां सर्वथा एव आनर्थक्य-प्रसङ्गात्। स च उद्देशः, व्यवसायः, अधिकारः, अभिप्रायः, भावः, आशयः इति अन्-अर्थांतरं इति तदाधार-प्रणेतृ-पुरुष-धौरेय-सिद्धिः।

तथा च प्रयोगः-वैदिकानि प्रशंसावाक्यानि उपादान-अभिप्राय-पूर्वकाणि, प्रशंसा-वाक्यत्वात्। 'परिणति-सुरसं आम्रफलं' इत्यादि लोक-वाक्यवत् इति। एवं निन्दावाक्यानि-हान-अभिप्राय-पूर्वकाणि, निन्दावाक्यत्वात्। 'परिणति-विरसं पनस-फलं' इत्यादि-वाक्यवत्। अन्यथा निरर्थकत्व-प्रसङ्गः च विपक्षे बाधकं उक्तम्। अपि च नो चेत् एवं, श्रुत-अर्थापत्तिः अपि हीयेत। सिद्धः हि अर्थः प्रमाणयिष्यते, न तु तेन एव कर्तव्यः। न च 'पीनः देवदत्तः दिवा न भुंक्ते' इत्यत्र 'रात्रौ भुंक्ते' इति वाक्य-शेषः अस्ति, अनुपलंभ-बाधितत्वात्। उत्पत्ति-अभिव्यक्ति-सामग्री-ताल्वादि-व्यापार-विरहात्। अयोग्यस्य आशंकितुं अपि अशक्यत्वात्। तस्मात् अभिप्रायस्थः एव परिशिष्यते। गत्यंतराभावात्। सः चेत् वेदे नास्ति, नास्ति श्रुतार्थापत्तिः इति तद्-व्युत्पादन-आनर्थक्य-प्रसङ्गः। तस्मात् कार्यात् तात्पर्यात् अपि उन्नीयते अस्ति प्रणेता इति।

आयोजनात् खलु अपि। न हि वेदात् अव्याख्यातात् कश्चिदर्थं अधिगच्छति। न च एकदेश-दर्शिनः व्याख्यानं आदरणीयम्।

पौर्वापर्य-परामृष्टः शब्दः अन्यां कुरुते मतिम्।

इति न्यायेन अनाश्वासात्। त्रि-चतुर-पदकात् अपि वाक्यात् एकदेश-श्राविणः अन्यथा-अर्थप्रत्ययः स्यात्। किं उत अतीन्द्रियात् अंतर-वाक्य-संभेद-दुरधिगमात्?

ततः सकल-वेद-वेदार्थ-दर्शी कश्चित् एव अभ्युपेयः अन्यथा अंध-परंपरा-प्रसङ्गात्। सः च श्रुत-अधीत-अवधृत-स्मृत-सांग-वेद-वेदार्थः तद्विपरीतः वा न सर्वज्ञात् अन्यः संभवति। कः हि अ-प्रत्यक्षीकृत-विश्व-तदनुष्ठानः एतावान् एव अयं आम्नायः इति निश्चिनुयात्। कः च अर्वाक्-दृक् निःशेषाः श्रुतीः ग्रंथतः अर्थतः वा अधीयीत अध्यापयेत् वा?

अत्र अपि प्रयोगः-वेदाः कदाचित् सर्व-वेदार्थ-विद् व्याख्याताः, अनुष्ठातृ-मतिचलने अपि निश्चल-अर्थ-अनुष्ठानत्वात्। यदेवं तत्सर्वं तदर्थवित्-व्याख्यातं यथा मन्वादि संहिताः इति। अन्यथा तु अनाश्वासेन अव्यवस्थानात् अननुष्ठानं अव्यवस्था वा भवेत् अनादेशिकत्वात्। अनुष्ठातारः एव आदेष्टारः इति चेत्? न। तेषां अनियत-बोधत्वात्। वेदवत् वेदानुष्ठानं अपि अनादि इति चेत्? न। तद्धि स्वतंत्रं वा वेदार्थ-बोध-तंत्रं वा? आद्ये निर्मूलत्व-प्रसङ्गः। द्वितीये तु अनियमापत्तिः। नहि अ-सर्वज्ञ-अविशेषे पूर्वेषां तत्-अवबोधः प्रमाणं न तु इदानीं-तनानां इति नियामकं अस्ति।

पदात् खलु अपि। श्रूयते हि प्रणव-ईश्वर-ईशानादि पदम्॥ तत् च सार्थकम्। अ-विगानेन श्रुति, स्मृति-इतिहासेषु प्रयुज्यमानत्वात्। घटादिपदवत् इति सामान्यतः सिद्धे कः अस्य अर्थः इति व्युत्पित्सोः विमर्शे सति निर्णयः। स्वर्गादि-पदवत्।

उत्तमः पुरुषः तु अन्यः परमात्मा इत्युदाहृतः।
यः लोक-त्रयं आविश्य निभर्ति अव्ययः ईश्वर॥

इति अर्थवादात्। यव-वराहादिवत् वाक्यशेषात् वा। तद्यथा ईश्वर-प्रणिधानं उपक्रम्य श्रूयते-

सर्वज्ञता तृप्तिः अनादि बोधः स्वतंत्रता नित्यं अलुप्त-शक्तिः।
अनंत-शक्तिः च विभोः विधिज्ञाः षट् आहुः अंगानि महेश्वरस्य॥
एवंभूतः अर्थः प्रमाण-बाधितः इति चेत्? न। इतरेतराश्रय-प्रसङ्गात्। अवधृते हि स्वर्गरूपे तत्र प्रवृत्तिः। प्रवृत्ति-अन्यथानुपपत्त्या च तदवधारणं इति। पूर्व-वृद्ध-प्रवृत्त्या तदवधारणे अयं अदोषः इति चेत्? न। अंध-परंपरा-प्रसङ्गात्। विशिष्ट-अदृष्ट-वशात् कदाचित् कस्यचित् एवंविधं अपि सुखं स्यात् इति नास्ति विरोधः, तन्निषेधे प्रमाणाभावात् इति चेत्? तुल्यं इतरत्र अपि।
अत्र अपि प्रयोगः—यः शब्दः यत्र वृद्धैः असति वृत्त्यंतरे प्रयुज्यते सः तस्य वाचकः, यथा स्वर्ग शब्दः सुख-विशेषे प्रयुज्यमानः तस्य वाचकः। प्रयुज्यते च अयं जगत्-कर्तरि इति। अन्यथा निरर्थकत्व-प्रसङ्गे सार्थक-पद-कदंब-समभिव्याहार-अनुपपत्तेः इति। एतेन रुद्र-उपेन्द्र-महेन्द्रादि-देवता-विशेष-वाचकाः व्याख्याताः।
अपि च अस्मत्-पदं लोकवत् वेदेपि प्रयुज्यते। तस्य च लोके न अचेतनेषु अन्यतमत् अर्थः। तत्र सर्वथा एव अप्रयोगात्। नापि आत्ममात्रं अर्थः, परात्मनि अपि प्रयोग-प्रसङ्गात्। अपि तु यः तं स्वातंत्र्येण उच्चारयति तं एव आह, तथा एव अन्वय-व्यतिरेकाभ्यां अवसायात्। ततः लोक-व्युत्पत्तिं अनतिक्रम्य वेदेपि अनेन स्व-प्रयोक्ता एव वक्तव्यः, अन्यथा अप्रयोग-प्रसङ्गात्। न च यः यदा उच्चारयति वैदिकं अहंशब्दं सः एव तदा तस्य अर्थः इति युक्तम्। तथा सति 'मां उपासीत' इत्यादौ सः एव उपास्यः स्यात्। 'अहं सर्वस्य प्रभवः मत्तः सर्वं प्रवर्तते' इति उपाध्याय-शिष्य-परंपरा एव आत्मनि ऐश्वर्यं समधिगच्छेत्। तथा सति उपासनां प्रति उन्मत्तकेलिः स्यात्। लोक-व्यवहारः च उच्छिद्येत। तस्मात् न अनुवक्ता अस्य वाच्यः अपि तु वक्ता इति स्थिते प्रयुज्यते-'वेदे अस्मत्-शब्दः स्व-प्रयोक्तृ-वचनः अस्मत् शब्दत्वात्, लोकवत्' इति। एवं अन्ये अपि यः कः सः इत्यादि शब्दाः द्रष्टव्याः। तेषां बुद्धि-उपक्रम-प्रश्न-परामर्शादि-उपहित-मर्यादत्वात्। तस्य च वक्तृ-धर्मत्वात्। बुद्धि-उपक्रमः हि प्रकृतत्वं, जिज्ञासा-आविष्करणं च प्रश्नः, प्रतिसंधानं च

परामर्शः इति। एवं च संशयादि-वाचकाः अपि उन्नेयाः।
न च जिज्ञासा-संशयादयः सर्वज्ञे प्रतिषिद्धाः इति युक्तम्। शिष्य-प्रतिबोधनाय आहार्यत्वेन अ-विरोधात्। कः धर्मः, कथं-लक्षणकः इत्यादि भाष्यवत् इति। एतेन धिक्, अहो, बत, हन्त इत्यादयः व्याख्याताः।

TRANS.: The word *'Kāryatva'* in the text stands for 'the object only' which is what is intended or meant by a speaker. God is the speaker whose intended meanings are expressed by scriptural statements. Besides the word *'Īśwara'* in Sanskrit and synonyms of it are all meaningful and this meaning is 'Omniscient being' which is ascertained from the scriptures themselves. This manner of ascertaining the meaning of a word is in accordance with common practice.

To explain the above: Certainly the scriptures are concerned with whatever is to be brought into being and this is achieved by enjoining or prohibiting people to do or not to do certain things. So far as the merely descriptive statements of the scriptures are concerned, they are not directly injunctive or prohibitive, yet their validity consists only in commending and deprecating respectively different actions. Since the force of the injunctions is likely to be weakened it is reinforced by commendation, praise etc. Everyone is disposed towards whatever is commendable and avoids whatever is condemnable.

(To explain now the nature of 'intended meaning' we may consider different types of meanings): The capacity of words to denote their meaning is called *'abhidā'* in Sanskrit (or convention). The word-meaning results from this capacity. When words get syntactically related with each other in a sentence then there results from this capacity—which is the same as the syntactical relation—the sentential meaning. Now we consider the nature of what the intended meaning is. Etymologically the word *'tātparya'* in Sanskrit means 'To mean that alone which is the main object, denotend, objective or purpose of the word which is said to intend it'. The property of so denoting etc. the object may be meant by the Sanskrit term. Among these the first cannot be the intended meaning of a word because no valid statement brings into being the state of affairs which is its import. There is no result over and above the knowledge of its meaning that a statement produces. 'But can't a statement produce inclination or disinclination for action—which is a result, by means of the commendation or condemnation of the action?' It may be asked. No! A suggestive statement like 'The cow-shed is just on the Ganges', the bank of the Ganges, which is the suggested meaning of

the word 'Ganges' is quite other than inclination and disinclination and yet it is the intended meaning of the word. It may here be contended that after all it is the inclination or disinclination towards the bank of the Ganges of the listener that is intended to be produced by the word 'Ganges' and so the word may be supposed to intend the 'Ganges-bank' as its meaning due to its connection with inclination and disinclination. This contention however cannot be sustained as even if no inclination or disinclination towards the Ganges-bank is intended the latter can be intended by the word 'Ganges'.

Even the second of the above-mentioned meanings of 'intention' cannot be accepted. Words and sentences composed of them do not mean anything other than their denotends and their relations respectively, but the intended meaning is not confined to these. May it be urged that apart from what is conventionally-related to a word or that which is otherwise related to it, even those things that are concomitant with these are the intended meanings of the word? No! This is not the correct view. Certainly not everything that is invariably concomitant with the indirect meaning of a word can be treated as its intended meaning. If such were the case then even in the statement, 'There is water in the Ganges' the word 'Ganges' would mean 'the bank of the Ganges' as the concomitance between the Ganges and its bank is always present. Can one retort against this that only if the direct meaning is inapplicable the intended meaning of a word in a sentence is preferred. For example a well-known verse which is addressed to her lover by his beloved states this, 'O darling, go wherever you like, may your journey be auspicious, may I be reborn at the place where you settle down at the end of your journey'. In this verse the primary meaning is not inapplicable or contradicted but the intended meaning, viz., dissuading the lover from taking the journey, excludes it. It can't be maintained that the intended meaning is always pervasive of the primary meaning as even the non-pervasive meaning is sometimes intended by a word or sentence. For example in the Sanskrit sentence meaning, 'The plinths are in furore' the word 'plinth' is intended to mean 'the men sitting on the plinth'. There is no concomitance between the plinth and the men sitting on it nor between men and shouting.

The third of the above-mentioned intentional meanings also cannot be entertained. The objective—the third meaning—may be either that which is expected by the person spoken to or the person speaking. The first cannot be true as the truth of a sentence does not depend upon the objective that the hearer may have in attending to the sentence. If such were the case then a sentence may mean anything that its hearer expects to have on hearing it and this would lead to deviation. A sentence may mean different things to different persons hearing it. If the objective of the hearer of a word or sentence is qualified as 'what follows from the meaning of the latter' then the above irregularity may be avoided. But what follows or results from a meaning is either an effect of it or something known by means of it, so one and the same sentence may come to have different imports depending upon the difference of the two kinds of result of the self—same meaning. For example, smoke has different effects like smearing a place with blackness or ridding a place of mosquitoes. Also the presence of wet fuel etc. nearby are facts which are known through smoke. Now if one says 'From this place smoke arises' what meaning may be taken as intended by the sentence? The different needs and expectations of different hearers of the sentence (or any other sentence) cannot be numerically restricted. (So far the expectations of the hearer were considered). But even the expectation of the speaker when he utters a sentence cannot be supposed to be determinative of its import. There is no first speaker or author of the Veda (according to Mīmāṃsā).

The fourth of the above-mentioned alternatives however can be upheld. A word or sentence intends that meaning, to convey which it has been used. Only thus word-meanings and sentence-meanings are commonly understood. For example commendatory sentences are used with the object of obtaining the recommended thing and the deprecatory sentences are used with the object of rejecting the deprecated object. So this common colloquial convention has to be followed in the interpretation of scriptural sentences also. Otherwise the commendatory passages of the scriptures will be rendered utterly senseless. Thus the intended meaning of scriptural sentences is the same as is conveyed by words like purpose, obligation, import, sum and substance and from this it can be inferred that there is an author who is the ground of this intention. This is formulated inferentially in this manner. 'The scriptural commendatory sentences are uttered with the import of upholding the recommended things or actions' as like the common sentences viz. 'mango fruits taste sweet if eaten' the former eulogise the things or actions they describe. Similarly the deprecatory sentences are uttered with the intention of disparaging what they describe as are the common sentences like, 'The jack-fruit if eaten causes ill-effects'. If such interpretations are not accepted then the said sentences would have to be regarded as meaningless. Moreover if the foregoing explanation is not accepted then what is recognised as 'verbal postulation' by Mīmāṃsā would have to be given up. Only what is already established is the object of verbal knowledge, not that which the speaker himself produces while

speaking. For example the well-known statement, 'The fat Devadutta does not eat during the day' leading to postulation is not followed by the statement, 'He eats at night' as the speaker of the earlier statement does not make any laryngeal or other movements needed for the utterance of the latter sentence expressing the postulated meaning. And what is not uttered or utterable cannot even be suspected to be present to yield the postulated content. So only the intended sentence is here resorted to as there is no other alternative means of postulation. If, therefore, there is no author of the scriptures then there is no verbal postulation and so its exposition is rendered senseless. So even on the basis of intentional meaning—which is denoted by the word 'effect' it is inferred that there is an author of the scriptures.

Even on the basis of '*Āyojana*' or 'exposition' God's existence is provable. Certainly none can understand scriptural contents unless they are properly interpreted. Nor is any interpretation attempted by a man of partial knowledge worth accepting, as the saying goes only if words and sentences are interpreted contextually they yield the right meaning, otherwise the meaning conveyed by them cannot be depended upon. Even in a sentence consisting of three or four words only, a person who hears only a part of the sentence is sure to misunderstand the meaning of the sentence. If such is the case with a small sentence what to say of the scriptures which are replete with sentences and these referring to transcendental entities on account of which they are not easily comprehensible. So we have to admit a certain being who has direct knowledge of all the scriptures and their contents, otherwise the scriptural tradition will consist only of a series of blind men one following the other. Such a being, if he is knowledgeable about all the scriptures in every possible way or if he is not so, in either case he cannot be other than omniscient. Who is there other than God who, without the direct knowledge of the world or of the contents of the scriptures can determine the exact scope of the scriptures? And can there be a man of limited vision who can study the scriptures exhaustively or teach them to others? This can be proved by inference too. The form of inference is this: 'The scriptures must have been expounded at some time by a being who is knowledgeable about the whole scriptural lore, because despite the irregular practices of scriptural injunctions by several people there has never been any variation in the injunctions concerning ritualistic practices.' It is just like the instructions concerning various religious practices contained in the Smṛties of sages like Manu who are known to be quite knowledgeable about what they say. If the author of scriptural injunctions were not omniscient nobody would have faith in scriptural injunctions and as a result there will arise confusion and irregularity in religious practices as they would cease to have any authoritative basis. 'Can't the religious practitioners themselves impart instruction about these?' One may ask. No! The knowledge of such people about the scriptures cannot be comprehensive and it may differ from person to person. But can't the religious practices following the scriptures be as beginningless as the scriptures themselves? No! If they were so then they may be independent of any authority or they may depend upon the authority of others' knowledge of the scriptures. If the first is the case then the practices become baseless. On the second alternative there will result irregularity in the practices. When nobody is omniscient and fully knowledgeable about the scriptures how can the partial knowledge of people of bygone ages be held more authoritative than that of contemporary people? There is nothing to discriminate between these.

Even from words God's existence can be inferred. There are in vogue Sanskrit words like प्रणव, ईश्वर, ईशान etc., which are meaningful as they are respectfully used in the scriptures, Smṛties, epics and historical works. The words are just like the common words, pot, cloth etc. Now what is the meaning of these words? When such a problem arises in the mind of an enquirer, then as in the case of words like 'heaven' the problem is tackled with the help of the eulogistic verse which states that 'the supreme being is quite different from the embodied self and is called the great self, He is immutable and He sustains all the three spheres of existence by pervading them. Even as in the case of Sanskrit words like *Yava* and *Varāha*, their respective meanings are fixed on the basis of certain statements following the use of these words in certain texts so also in the case of the words mentioned above, their meanings can be fixed on the basis of what is stated in a verse following the reference to meditation on God in Yoga texts. The verse says that omniscience, bliss, eternal knowledge, freedom, eternal power and infinite capacity are the six attributes of the Lord Śiva as mentioned by experts in scriptures (so the word God can be taken to stand for a being who is endowed with all the above attributes). But there being no being endowed with such attributes isn't the above-mentioned meaning of the word 'God' irrational? No! We have already refuted the objections against the admission of the reality of the above attributes. But what is the positive evidence for this? Well, this question can be asked about 'heaven' 'hell' etc. also. None of us has any perceptual knowledge of these entities. May it be urged that the activities of priests who are dedicated to sacrificial rituals will not be possible unless heaven and such other entities are real? No! Such a proof

entails the fallacy of mutual dependence. Only if the reality of heaven etc. is admitted one will engage in the performance of sacrificial rituals and only on the basis of the performance the reality of heaven etc. can be admitted. But can't this be ascertained on the basis of the tradition of the performances of ancient sages and thus the fallacy of mutual dependence avoided? No! This would be just like a series of blind men following each other (without the knowledge of any path to their destination). It may be urged here against the admission of the reality of 'heaven' (heavenly existence etc.) that the happiness supposed to be the result of ritualistic performances can sometimes (if not always) be produced by the ritualistic performances through the special merit generated by them and thus there would be no evidence to deny totally their causality. So words like 'heaven' can be taken to mean 'supreme happiness' (unless there is evidence contrary to this). Well! This can be said of words like 'God' also. They too can be treated as meaningful in the absence of any contrary evidence. This fact too can be formulated syllogistically thus: 'Whatever word is used by elderly people to stand for a certain object when no conventional relation other than denoting between the word and the object is conceivable then the word denotes that object'. For example the word 'heaven' is the denoter of a special kind of pleasure (or happiness) as it is used to indicate it, similarly the word God is used to denote the creator of the world, If the word were not so used then it would be meaningless and so it cannot be combined with a meaningful arrangement of words in a sentence. In this manner words like 'Indra, Rudra, Mahendra' etc. used for these various deities be taken to be the denoters respectively of the different deities. Moreover, the demonstrative pronoun 'we' is used both colloquially and in the scriptures. No insentient entity is taken to be the meaning of the word in common parlance as it is never used to denote an insentient entity. Nor is every individual self denoted by the word as then a person can refer to other persons by the word 'We' The word denotes only that being who uses it independently in his own right as by means of positive and negative association of this word with the former it is determined to be its denoter only. So without transgressing the rules of common parlance the word as used in the scripture too may be taken to denote only its utterer or user. It cannot be used otherwise at all. But can't the scriptural use of the word refer to the very person who utters it while reciting the scriptural text containing the word? No, if it were so then in the sentence like, 'one should worship me' occurring in a scriptural passage only the utterer of the sentence will have to be taken as the object of worship. Likewise in a verse of the *Gītā* stating, 'I am the originator of everything as it is from out of me that all things emanate', the reciters of the sentence, namely generations of teachers and the students would regard themselves as endowed with the glory of world-creatorship. As a result of this, worship would degenerate into a flippant indulgence of irresponsible persons and no decency will be left in human life and dealings. So it has to be admitted that only the first teacher of the scriptures, not those who succeed him and take instructions from him can be meant by the word 'I' or 'We' used in the scripture. On this ground we formulate the following syllogism, 'I or We as used in the scriptures refers to the being who first uses it because it is a first-person demonstrative as we find it to be in common parlance'.

In this very manner even demonstratives in different scriptural texts have to be understood as referring to their first user or speaker. The demonstrative means direct reference, present cognition, the object of interrogation or recall. All these are (concerned with things and) doubting, questioning etc. are attributes of sentient beings. Words expressing doubt are also to be regarded as (concerned with things and) uttered by sentient beings. It is not however correct to think that the desires to know, doubt etc. are not possible for the omniscient being. For instructing disciples, deliberate desires, doubts etc., even God can be supposed to acquire just as the author of Mīmāṃsā who, despite possessing all knowledge about religion raises questions like, 'what is religion and, its definition' etc.; exclamatory terms like, 'Phew! Oh! What a pity! etc. occurring in the scriptures here and there are also to be explained like the above words (and they too help infer God's existence).

EXPL.: In the foregoing verse the words used as middle terms are interpreted differently and another set of inferences is laid down by the author to prove God's existence. The first word *Kārya* bears the meaning of intended meaning in addition to the meaning discussed earlier. The injunctive and prohibitive sentences of the scriptures are directly meaningful. No question of intended meaning different from literal meaning arises in the case of such scriptural sentences. But the commendatory and condemnatory sentences and passages of the scriptures need to be interpreted keeping in view the purpose for which they are inserted in the scriptures. This purpose only a sentient being who is omniscient can be expected to have. The purpose is the prescribing of commendable actions and condemnation of the proscribed actions. The literal meaning of such sentences or passages is not entertained at all.

The second word *'Āyojana'* too bears the additional meaning of exposition. Only an omniscient being can elucidate the scriptures correctly,

as such a being is expected to possess the knowledge of all the transcendent things, facts etc. discussed and described in the scriptures. Such a being must be endowed with unshakable conviction regarding the veridicity of the contents of the scriptures. This conviction is the additional meaning of the word *'dhṛti'* occurring in the list of middle terms. The fourth word *'Pada'* in the list means all the different words used for God in common parlance. In scriptures too a plethora of such words are used. Personal pronouns like 'I', 'we' etc. happen to be frequently used in the scriptures. Only the speaker who cannot be other than God can be the referend of these pronominal and other terms.

The above four new inferences for God's existence are not quite convincing but they are also not quite flimsy. The first inference based on the speaker's im port as the determinant of the meaning of sentences uttered by him or her is sufficiently strong. Mīmāṃsā has laid down certain rules to determine the right import of many confusing sentences and passages of scriptures. But what are the bases of these rules themselves? The commendatory and condemnatory sentences and passages in common parlance are not interpreted in the manner in which these occurring in scriptures are sought to be interpreted by Mīmāṃsā. Even the admission of God as the author of scriptures does not help us solve this difficulty. How can we know what God intends to say by means of the commendatory or condemnatory stories, descriptions etc.? Nyāya would say in reply that God himself taught the scriptures to the ancient sages from whom the tradition of teaching scriptures to disciples of successive generations started. But how do we know this? If it is from the scriptures themselves then the fallacy of mutual dependence mentioned above cannot be avoided in this view too. However it cannot be denied that there is an author of the scriptures whose import is conveyed by the scriptural sentences.

The long list of innumerable names which are generally used in every language to denote God is a proof which is not strong enough to prove God's existence. Many names and words having no real object to name or denote are current in every language. One cannot say definitely on this ground that the words used to name God are the names of a real being.

Discussion of other proofs for God's existence

TEXT: प्रत्ययात् खलु अपि। लिङ्गदि-प्रत्यया: हि पुरुष-धौरेय-नियोगार्था:
भवंत: तं प्रतिपादयंति। तथाहि-

प्रवृत्ति: कृति: एव अत्र सा च इच्छात: यतश्च सा।
तत्-ज्ञानं विषय: तस्य विधि: तत्-ज्ञापक: अथ वा॥

प्रवृत्ति: खलु विधि-कार्या सती न तावत् काय-परिस्पंद मात्रम्। 'आत्मा ज्ञातव्य:' इत्यादि-अव्यापनात्। नापि इच्छा मात्रम्। तत: एव फलसिद्धौ कर्म-अन्-आरंभ-प्रसङ्गात्। तत: प्रयत्न: परिशिष्यते। आत्म-ज्ञान-भूतदयादौ अपि तस्य अभावात्। तदुक्तं 'प्रवृत्ति: आरंभ:' इति।

सा इयं प्रवृत्ति: यत: सत्तामात्र-अवस्थितात् न असौ विधि:, तत्र शास्त्र-वैयर्थ्यात्। अ-प्रतीतात् एव कुतश्चित् प्रवृत्ति-सिद्धौ तत्-प्रत्यायनार्थं तत्-अभ्यर्थन-अभावात्। न च प्रवृत्ति-हेतु-जननार्थं तदुपयोग:, प्रवृत्ति-हेतो: इच्छाया: ज्ञान-हेतुत्वात्। ज्ञानं अनुत्पाद्य तदुत्पादनस्य अशक्यत्वात्। तस्य च निरालंबनस्य अनुत्पत्ते: अप्रवर्तकत्वात् च। नियामकाभावात्।

तस्मात् यस्य ज्ञानं प्रयत्न-जननीं इच्छां प्रसूते स: अर्थ-विशेष:, तत्-ज्ञापक: वा अर्थविशेष: विधि:, प्रेरणा, प्रवर्तना, नियुक्ति:, नियोग:, उपदेश: इति अन्-अर्थांतरं इति स्थिते विचार्यते। स: हि कर्तृ-धर्म: वा स्यात्, कर्म-धर्म: वा, करण-धर्म: वा नियोक्तृ-धर्म: वा इति? तत्र न प्रथम:।

TRANS.: Even certain prefixes prove the existence of God. The injunctive and prohibitive suffixes denote the commands of the supreme being and so they involve reference to such a being.

To explain: What is called (*'pravṛtti'* in Sanskrit or) inclination is nothing but effort. And this effort issues from the desire to bring a thing into being. That from which this desire arises is the knowledge that the desired object can be produced or attained by effort. The object of this knowledge is called *Vidhi* in Sanskrit. It is nothing other than 'attainability by effort'. But according to another view *Vidhi* is what denotes this attainability by effort of the desired thing. The disposition or impulse to work is the result of the knowledge of the injunctive suffix but is not the same as mere bodily movement. In the injunctive statement 'the *ātman* is to be known', the injunction to know the *ātman* or self does not result from bodily movement. It is also not mere desire or will. If the object can be attained by mere desire no action will be needed for attaining

the result. So there remains only effort which can be taken to be the meaning of injunction. The knowledge of self or the feeling of sympathy for all beings are not bodily movements but they can be viewed as kinds of effort. This is why it is remarked in the Nyāya aphorism that 'the disposition to work is the same as effort' If this effort issued from a certain thing by itself then it cannot be an injunction. Scriptures would be of no use if a thing by itself issued in effort. If something by itself caused the impulse to action then there would be no need to take recourse to the scripture; once the effort has taken place nobody will turn to the scripture to know the nature of the effort. Nor is there some unknown cause of effort which is produced by the scripture. Desire which is the cause of effort is produced only by knowledge. Without producing knowledge scripture cannot produce effort but knowledge cannot arise without its object or, prompt action; so it is its object that determines the nature of a knowledge, there is no other determinant of knowledge. So that whose knowledge produces the desire which is the cause of effort is a special type of entity or there is an entity which produces the knowledge of this special entity. It is called by various names like. injunction, impetus, prompter, command, exhortation etc., which are all synonymous terms. Regarding this entity we ask, 'Does this entity inhere in the agent of action, the object of action, the instrument of action or the being who lays down the command for action? The first of these alternatives is not true.

EXPL.: Taking up the fourth listed middle term for the proof for which the Sanskrit word is *'Pratyaya'* the author gives it the different interpretation of command and tries to explain how God alone can be the source of the commands laid down in scriptural texts. No effort to engage in the arduous religious rituals is possible unless it is caused by strong desire for the result of the ritual. But desire needs as its cause knowledge and since no knowledge is without an object the object of the knowledge that ultimately results in action is the command to do or not to do a thing. God is the being from whom these commands ensue.

Nature of vidhi or command discussed

TEXT: इष्टहानेः अनिष्ट-आप्तेः अप्रवृत्तेः विरोधतः।
असत्वात् प्रत्यय-त्यागात् कर्तृधर्मः न संकरात्॥

सः हि न स्पंदः एव। 'आत्मानं अनुपश्येत्' इत्यादि अव्याप्तेः। ग्रामं

गच्छति इत्यादौ अतिव्याप्तेः च। नापि तत्कारणं प्रयत्नः। तस्य सर्व-आख्यात-साधारणत्वात्। न च सर्वत्र प्रयत्नः एव प्रत्ययार्थः। करोति इत्यादौ प्रकृति-अर्थ-अतिरेकिणः तस्याभावात्। संख्या-मात्र-अभिधानेन प्रत्ययस्य चरितार्थत्वात्। ततः लिङ्गदि-वाच्यः एव प्रयत्नः इति। न। 'कुर्यात्' इत्यत्र अपि तुल्यत्वात्। प्रयत्नमात्रस्य प्रकृत्यर्थत्वे अपि तस्य परांगता-आपन्नस्य प्रत्ययार्थत्वात् न तुल्यत्वं इति चेत्? न। तथापि तुल्यत्वात्। न च एकस्य तद्वाचकत्वे अन्यस्य तद्विपर्ययः आपद्येत। एको, द्वौ, बहवः एषिषति इत्यादौ व्यभिचारात्। तत्र द्वितीय-संख्या-इच्छादि-कल्पने करोति, प्रयतते इत्यादौ अपि तथा स्यात्। प्रत्येकं अन्यत्र सामर्थ्य-अवधृतौ संभेदे तथा कल्पनायाः तुल्यत्वात्। रथो गच्छातीत्यादौ तदसंभवे का गतिः इति चेत्? तंतवः पटं कुर्वंति इत्यत्र या। लोक-उपचारः अयं अ-पर्यनुयोज्यः इति चेत्? तुल्यम्। लिङ्गः कार्यत्वे वृद्धव्यवहाराद् व्युत्पत्तौ सर्वं समंजसम्। आख्यातमात्रस्य तु न तथा इति चेत्? न। विवरणादेः अपि व्युत्पत्तेः। अस्ति च तदिह-किं करोति? पचति, पाकं करोति इत्यर्थः, इत्यादि-दर्शनात्।

तथापि फल-अनुकूलता-आपन्न-धात्वर्थमात्र-अभिधाने तदतिरिक्त-प्रयत्न-अभिधान-कल्पनायां कल्पना-गौरवं स्यात्। अतः विवरणं अपि तावत्-मात्र-परं इति चेत्? भवेदपि एवं यदि पाकेन इति विवृणुयात्। न तु एतदस्ति। धात्वर्थस्य एव पाकं इति साध्यत्वेन निर्देशात्। ततः तं प्रत्येव किंचित्-अनुकूलतापन्नं प्रत्ययेन अभिधानीयं इति युक्तम्।

न तथापि तेन प्रयत्नेन एव भवितव्यं न तु अन्येन इति चेत्? नियमेन तस्य विवरणात्। बाधकं विना तस्य अन्यथाकर्तुं अशक्यत्वात्। अन्यथा अतिप्रसङ्गात्।

स्यात् एतत्। यस्य कस्यचित् फलं प्रति अनुकूलता पत्तिमात्रं एव 'करोति' अर्थः न तु प्रयत्नः एव। सः अपि अनेन एव उपाधिना प्रत्ययेन वक्तव्यः न तु यत्नत्व-मात्रेण। प्रयत्न-पदेन अविशेष-प्रसङ्गात्। तद्वरं तावत्-मात्रं एव अस्तु लाघवाय। अन्यथा तु अनुकूलत्व-प्रयत्नत्वे द्वे उपाधी कल्पनीयौ। अचेतनेषु सर्वत्र गौणार्थाः लिङः असति बाधके कल्पनीयाः इति चेत्?

TRANS.: movement or action is not injunction as then the injunction to realise *ātman* would cease to be such and the action indicated in the statement 'He goes to the village' will become injunctive. Effort also is not injunction, as a person, despite being endowed with effort is not always impelled to action. Desire too cannot be the nature of injunction as the desire to act which on this view is caused by the knowledge of the meaning of injunction which is nothing other than desire is itself caused by desire (which is the objective cause of its own knowledge). Thus there results the fallacy of mutual dependence. If it is contended against this that desire by itself and not its knowledge is needed for the impulse to action then, since the knowledge of injunction (being verbal in nature) is not always preceded by its object, viz. desire, injunction cannot be regarded as the cause of the impulse to action. It may he urged here that the injunctive suffix itself causes the impulse to action. But if this is admitted then the established causality of the knowledge of an intended action being productive of the object of desire in relation to the impulse action would have to be given up. (Merely by hearing the injunctive suffix one should be prompted to act even if the agent does not know the act to be productive of a desired result). So if the said causality is admitted then the desire involved in the causal knowledge may itself be regarded as the prompter of action. There is no need to admit the desire to act resulting from the said knowledge as the cause of action. (Thus injunction cannot be other than causality relating to the desired).

The first of the above alternatives that the *Vidhi* or command is the property of the agent of action is not acceptable because action is not the nature of the contemplation that is prescribed in the injunction 'one should realise the *ātman*'. Realisation is not a (physical) activity. Contrariwise the action denoted by the verb in the sentence, 'He goes to the village' will have to be treated as injunction as it denotes the action of going. Nor is injunction that which causes action, namely, effort, as this is the common denotation of all suffixes of verbs. But it may be urged against this that effort is not the common meaning of all verb-suffixes. In 'verbal' terms like 'he acts' effort is denoted by the verb, not its suffix—there being no effort other than what is meant by the verb. The meaning of the suffix is exhausted in referring to the singular number only. So it has to be admitted that effort is meant by the verb only. No! This cannot be the truth. In the injunctive verb meaning, 'one should do' the suffix is taken to denote effort although the verb too denotes it. Of course mere effort is meant by the verb here but the effort as pertaining to its agent or its object is denoted by the suffix and so there is no parity between the meanings of this suffix and the suffixes of other verbs. But this too is not the truth. There is parity between the meanings despite the above difference. Certainly it cannot be the case that if one word—the verb—denotes effort the other word—its suffix—must be other than its denoter. Words like, 'one', 'two', 'many' denote respectively numbers which are included in the numbers succeeding them; similar is the case of the word एषिषति meaning 'desires to desire'. The verb and the suffix denote the same thing. If in this case, the suffix is taken to denote different numbers or desires than those denoted by the verb then in verbal terms like 'does', 'attempts' etc. also, such a duality of meanings can be conceived. Moreover if both the verb and its suffix have the same—or nearly the same denotation then despite the former being different from one another, they (while combined) would not cease to be meaningful or either of them would be redundant (the two together would yield an identical meaning). But if this is so in a sentence like 'the chariot is moving or running', the chariot being an insentient entity it cannot have effort; how then can it be described in the sentence as making effort (for moving)? Well! The interpretation of the verbal suffix in the sentence is just the same as we make in the sentence, 'the Yarns produce the cloth'; yarns too are not endowed with the effort productive of the cloth. So this movement is here to be taken as the suggested meaning. The same is the case with the former sentence. 'But isn't this a common convention and so unquestionable?' One may ask. Yes! It is so but not in this case only. 'But if the imperative alone is taken in the sense of effort and thus the expert usage is accounted why regard all suffixes as denoters of effort?' One may ask, Well! Even the explanation of the verb in the sentence justifies this. For example if one asks, 'what does a certain person do?' It is answered, 'He cooks or, to be explicit, he makes the effort for cooking'. But can't the suffix be taken in the sense of the action indicated by the verb which is conducive to the ultimate result of the action and thus isn't it superfluous to indicate the effort over and above the action by the suffix and thus even the explanation mentioned is concerned only with action and not the effort?' It may yet be asked. Well! This could be the explanation if it stated that by means of the cooking activity 'he cooks'. 'But this is not conceivable as cooking activity itself is indicated by the verb. So there has to be something conducive to action which is effort only and nothing else? Well! This is so because always the suffix is interpreted in this manner. Unless there is contrary evidence this fact cannot be subverted as it may lead to the fallacy of over-extension of the meaning so that

any word can mean any thing. Well! Let then be this meaning of the suffix, namely, 'conduciveness to the ultimate result'. This property is common both to action and the effort generating it. There is no reason to accept effort alone as the meaning of the suffix. Even effort is denoted only as endowed by the above property by the suffix. If it is denoted as effort by the suffix then the word 'effort' and the suffix would become synonymous. Thus the law of parsimony requires that only the above property be treated as the suffix-meaning instead of both this property and the additional property of effortness. In the case of insentient agents of action (like the chariot) however, the verbal suffix is to be taken in the secondary sense of mere action. (The property of effortness does not characterise the actions in such cases).

EXPL.: According to Nyāya God is the repository of what is denoted by scriptural imperatives and God prompts a religious-minded person to engage in religious activities. Mīmāṃsā which is atheistic does not admit God to be the repository of the meaning of the imperative suffix. So it may be the agent, the object, the instrument of the action or a being who impels the religious-minded person to act. Regarding the first of these alternatives there arises the question whether it is desire or effort of the agent of the action that disposes him or her to act. In the course of the discussion of this problem the author tries to prove that all verbal suffixes have the primary meaning of 'effort'. This meaning is not peculiar to the injunctive suffix. Mīmāṃsā takes objection to this view on the ground that ordinary verbal suffixes need not stand for effort particularly. Whatever is conducive to the action indicated by the verb may be treated as meant by the ordinary verbal suffix.

Proof that the verbal suffix denotes effort

TEXT: अत्र उच्यते-

कृत-अकृत-विभागेन कर्तृरूप-व्यवस्थया।
यत्न एव कृतिः पूर्वा परस्मिन् सा एव भावना॥

यत्न-पूर्वकत्वं हि प्रतिसंधाय घटादौ 'कृतः' इति व्यवहारात्। हेतुसत्व-प्रतिसंधाने अपि यत्न-पूर्वकत्व-प्रतिसंधान-विधुराणां अंकुरादौ तत्-अव्यवहारात् करोति-अर्थः यत्नः एव तावत् अवसीयते। अन्यथा हि यत्किंचित्-अनुकूल-पूर्वकत्व-अविशेषात् 'पटादयः कृताः न कृताः

तु अंकुराः इति कुतः व्यवहार-नियमः। तेन च सर्वं आख्यातपदं विव्रियते इति सर्वत्र सः एव अर्थः इति निर्णयः। तथा च समुदिते प्रवृत्तं पदं तदेकदेशे अपि प्रयुज्यते। विशुद्धि-मात्रं पुरस्कृत्य ब्राम्हणे श्रोत्रियवत्। अन्यथापि मध्यम-उत्तम-पुरुष-गामिनः प्रत्ययाः, प्रथमे पुरुषे जानाति इच्छति, प्रयतते, अध्यवस्यति, शेते, संशेते इत्यादयः च गौणार्था, एव अचेतनेषु। न च वृत्त्यंतरेण अपि प्रयोग-संभवे शक्तिकल्पना युक्ता। अन्यायः च अनेकार्थत्वं इति स्थितेः। अतः एव अनुभवः अपि। यावदुक्तं भवति पाक-अनुकूल-वर्तमान-प्रयत्नवान् तावदुक्तं भवति पचति इति। एवं तथाभूत-अतिवृत्त-प्रयत्नः अपाक्षीत् इति। एवं तथा भूत-भावि-प्रयत्नः पक्ष्यति इति। न तु पचति इति पाक-अनुकूल यत्किंचित्वान् इति। अन्यथा अतिथौ अपि परिश्रम-शयाने पचति इति प्रत्यय-प्रसङ्गात्। अपि च कर्तृव्यापारः एव कृञ्-अर्थः, चेतनः च कर्ता। अन्यथा तत्-व्यवस्था-अनुपपत्तेः। न हि अभिधीयमान-व्यापारत्वं कर्तृत्वम्। अनभिधान-दशायां कुर्वतः अपि अकर्तृकत्व-प्रसङ्गात्। नापि आख्यात-प्रत्यय-अभिधान-योग्य-व्यापार-शालित्वं कर्तृत्वम्। योग्यतायाः एव अनिरूपणात्। फल-अनुगुण मात्रस्य सर्व-कारक-व्यापार-साधारणत्वात्। नापि विवक्षातः नियमः। अविवक्षायां अ-नियम-प्रसङ्गात्। स्वव्यापारे न इदं अनिष्टं इति चेत्? एवं तर्हि 'स्वव्यापारे च कर्तृत्वं सर्वत्र एव अस्ति कारके' इति न्यायेन करणादि-विलोप-प्रसङ्गः। न स्व-व्यापार-अपेक्षया करणादि-व्यवहारः किंतु प्रधान-क्रियापेक्षया। अस्ति हि कांचित् क्रियां उद्दिश्य प्रवर्तमानानां कारकाणां अवांतर-व्यापार-योगः न तु अवांतर-व्यापारार्थं एव तेषां प्रवृत्तिः इति चेत्? तर्हि तदपेक्षया एव कर्तृ-कर्मादि-व्यवहार-विशेष-नियमे किं कारणं इति चिंत्यताम्। स्वातंत्र्यात् इति चेत्? ननु तदेव किं अन्यत् प्रयत्नादि-समवायात् इति विविच्य अभिधीयतां इति। तस्मात् सर्वत्र समानव्यापार एव आख्यातार्थः।

TRANS.: (Replying to the foregoing objection) the author states in the verse-text above that certain things like the pot (for example) are distinguished from others like the seedling on the ground that the former

are connected with a creative sentient agent while the latter are not so connected. So effort itself is action but when the effort precedes what is meant by the verb—that is, the result produced, then the effort is what is meant by the verbal suffix. The fact is that only because the movements productive of pot etc. are apprehended as preceded by the efforts of their creative agent these objects are spoken of as created or manufactured. But despite the knowledge that the sprout etc. must have some or other cause, none sees any effort preceding the burgeoning of the sprout etc. For this reason these things are not recognised as created or manufactured entities. From this it is concluded that the suffix to the verb 'does' means effort. If this were not so then (as per the meaning of the suffix suggested above) there is no difference between the movement preceding the production of the pot etc. and the processes resulting in the burgeoning of the sprout in respect of their having some cause preceding them. It is therefore 'effort' which elucidates what is meant by any verbal suffix and this is the conclusion of the discussion. But although the suffix denotes the effort characterised by effortness, its antecedence and conduciveness to the result to be achieved by it, yet sometimes the suffix is used in a partial sense only, as for example a Brahmin by caste is sometimes referred to as a priest well-versed in the Vedas only because he is pious as the priest (ignoring other qualities of a priest). Mīmāṃsā's denial that only certain suffixes mean effort is based on the fact that in sentences in which an insentient being is meant by the subject term the suffix cannot be taken in its primary meaning. But the fact is that all the verbal suffixes in verbs like knows, desires, strives, exerts, sleeps, rests etc., which apply to the third person and the forms corresponding to these suffixes applying to the second and first person have to be taken in the secondary meaning only by Mīmāṃsā. In sentences having insentient entities as subject-terms (the distinction of primary and secondary meaning of verbal suffixes cannot be avoided by Mīmāṃsā. Why not then admit that 'effort' is the primary meaning of all verbal suffixes? Just as 'knows' etc. are used in their secondary meaning in sentences with insentient entities as subject-terms even by Mīmāṃsā, 'Goes' etc. also are used in their secondary meaning by Nyāya).So if the suffixes can be supposed to have a secondary or suggested meaning applicable to insentient entities there is no need to postulate different primary meanings for the suffixes. It is an established practice that unless it is unavoidable no word is to be taken to have more than one meaning. Even common experience supports this fact. To say that 'one is cooking' (for example) means the same as 'one is endowed with the effort coducive to cooking'. When such an effort has

ceased to exist it is said that cooking is over. Likewise if the said effort is yet to take place it is said that the cooking will take place. Certainly 'one cooks' is never taken to mean that 'one is endowed with something that is conducive to cooking' If such an interpretation of the suffix is accepted then even a guest who is resting after hard work may be described as 'one who is cooking' as his resting may indirectly help the guest to engage in the cooking-activity.

Moreover the Sanskrit verbal root *'Kṛ'* means only 'the activity of the agent (the subject in a statement)' and the agent is a sentient being. If this is not admitted then even as sprouts are brought into being by the watering of their seeds they too can be described as produced by some agent. This irregularity of usage cannot at all be overcome by defining agency as 'being the locus of the activity that is being mainly indicated by the verb in the concerned sentence'. ('The sprout is being produced' is not treated as a sensible sentence as the flow of water needed for the burgeoning of the sprout is not denoted by the verb in the sentence). If the sentient agent is active in doing something although nobody refers to the activity then the agent will forfeit his agency simply because it is not spoken of. Can then agency be defined as 'the property of being the repository of some activity that is capable of being denoted by the verbal suffix so that even in the absence of any statement the possibility of a statement containing the verbal suffix is not ruled out? No! The nature of this hypothetical possibility is itself inexplicable (what kind of activity endows the subject with agency and what verbal suffix can be identified as denotative of it cannot be explained). If the said activity is sought to be identified as one which is conducive to the ultimate result then all the terms in a sentence (whatever may be their case) can be treated as subject terms (as their diverse activities are directly or indirectly conducive to the production of the final result). Even the intention of the speaker of the concerned sentence cannot be supposed to determine agency as in the absence of the intention on the part of the speaker of the relevant sentence the subject will forfeit agency and any other term may acquire it 'But isn't this an admissible contingency as every entity denoted by a term in a sentence is the agent of its own activity (like say, the axe as the agent of the activity of cutting which is peculiar to it)?' 'Well, if thus every term is admitted to be the agent of its own activity then the distinction between the objective, the instrumental etc. cases will simply disappear. Mayn't it be urged here that the usage as 'instrument', 'Object' etc. is certainly not based upon the different activities of these terms. These are so-called only in relation to the primary activity of the subject (or agent for the fulfilment of which alone they take place

and so the distinction of cases cannot be denied)? Well, if this is the fact then it has to be ascertained what it is that determines the objectivity, the instrumentality etc. of the various terms (used in a sentence) when their diverse activities are relevant only to the primary activity. If 'independence' is the property that is supposed to distinguish the subject term from other terms in a sentence then it has to be explained if this independence is something different from 'being endowed with effort' (The independence of the subject term in relation to other terms consists in the fact that the subject alone is endowed with effort). So it is concluded that only one kind of activity or effort is the meaning of the verbal suffix.

EXPL.: Here the author seeks to refute the Mīmāṃsā view that only certain verbal suffixes like *'lin'* (so-called in Sanskrit) denote 'effort', other suffixes do not do so. It is true that effort belongs to a sentient being only but since even insentient entities are spoken of as 'doing', 'going', 'resting' etc. in various sentences of common usage, they have to be taken in the secondary sense. There is no need to postulate different meanings for different verbal suffixes if with one primary meaning and some secondary meanings all common usages of the suffix can be satisfactorily explained. Even Mīmāṃsā has to take recourse to secondary meanings of verbal suffixes in certain sentences. Besides, the subject term cannot be distinguished from other terms in a sentence without treating the subject as endowed with effort which initiates the activities of other terms involved in a sentence. So the author concludes that effort is the common meaning of all verbal suffixes.

Defence of the above view by further arguments

TEXT: तथापि फलानुगुणता एव अस्तु प्रवृत्ति-निमित्तं, प्रयत्नः तु आक्षेपतः लप्स्यते इति चेत्? न।

भावना एव हि यत्न-आत्मा सर्वत्र आख्यात-गोचरः।
तथा विवरण-ध्रौव्यात् आक्षेपानुपपत्तितः॥

केन हि तदाक्षिप्येत? न तावत् अनुकूलत्वमात्रेण। तस्य प्रयत्नत्वेन अव्यापनात्। न हि यत्नत्व-एकार्थ-समवायि एव अनुकूलत्वम्। अत एव न संख्यया। तस्याः संख्येय-मात्र-पर्यवसायित्वात्। कर्ता इति चेत्?

न। द्रव्यमात्रस्य अकर्तृत्वात्। व्यापारवतः चाभिधाने व्यापाराभिधानस्य अवश्य-अभ्युपगमनीयत्वात्। नापि धात्वर्थेन तदाक्षेपः। विद्यते इत्यादौ तदसंभवात्। न हि अत्र धात्वर्थः भावनापेक्षी। सत्तायाः नित्यत्वात्। तत्र न भविष्यति इति चेत्? न। पूर्वापरी-भूत-भावना-अनुभवस्य अविशेषात्। भावना-उपरागेण हि अतथाभूतः अपि अर्थः तथा भासते इति। न च पदांतर-लब्धया भावनया अनुकूलतायाः प्रत्ययार्थस्य अन्वयः। तदसंभवात्। न खलु प्रकृत्यैव सा अभिधीयते धातूनां क्रिया-फल-मात्र-अभिधायित्वात्। अन्यथा 'पाकः' इत्यादौ अपि भावना-अनुभव-प्रसङ्गात्। नापि चैत्रः इत्यादिना पदांतरेण। प्रकृति-प्रत्यययोः उभयोः अपि अ-कारकार्थत्वात्।

ओदनं इत्यादेः कारक-पदत्वात् तस्य च क्रिया-उपहितत्वात् तेन अभिधानं आक्षेपः वा। कथं अन्यथा ओदनं इत्युक्ते, किं भुंक्ते, पक्ष्यति वा इति विशेषाकांक्षा इति चेत्? न। पचति इत्युक्ते किं ओदनं तेमनं वा इति विशेषाकांक्षा-दर्शनात्। सा च आक्षेप-अभिधानयोः अन्य तरं अंतरेण न स्यात्। तस्यां दशायां न चेत् आक्षेपः नूनं अभिधानं एव इति।

स्यात् एतत्। अभिधीयतां तर्हि कर्ता अपि। तदनभिधाने हि संख्येयमात्रं आक्षिप्य संख्या कथं कर्तारं अन्वियात्ः न तु कर्मादिकं अपि? शाक-सूपौ पचति, शाक-सूप-ओदनान् पचति इत्यादौ विरोध-निरस्ता संख्या चैत्रं इति कर्तारं अविरुद्धं अनुगच्छति इति चेत्? चैत्रः ओदनं पचति इत्यत्र का गतिः?

एकत्र निर्णीतः शास्त्रार्थः अपरत्रापि तथा, यव-वराहादिवत् इति चेत्? न। पच्यते इत्यादौ अपि तथाभाव-प्रसङ्गात्। चैत्राभ्यां, चैत्रैः इति विरोध-निरस्ता सूपः इति अविरुद्धं कर्म समनुक्रामति इति चेत्? चैत्र-मैत्राभ्यां शाक-सूपौ पच्येते इत्यत्र का गतिः? अन्यत्र निर्णीतेन व्यवहारः इति चेत्? न। पचति इत्यादौ अपि तथा-भाव-प्रसङ्गात्। तत्र पूर्वकः एव निर्णयः, पच्यते इत्यत्र तु अपरः इति चेत्? न। विशेषाभावात्। आत्मनेपद, परस्मैपदाभ्यां विशेषः इति चेत्? न। पच्यते, पचते, पक्ष्यते इत्यादौ विप्लव-प्रसङ्गात्। दृश्यते च समान-प्रत्यय-अभिहितेन अन्वयः

संख्यायाः, तद् यथा-भूयते, सुप्यते इत्यादौ। न हि तत्र कर्त्रा, कर्मणा वा अन्येन एव वा केनचिद् अन्वयः। किंतु भावेन एव। अनन्वये तदभिधायिनः अनर्थकत्व-प्रसङ्गात्। आक्षिप्तेन च अन्वये तत्रापि कर्त्रा एव अन्वयापत्तेः। कः हि सुप्यते, स्वपिति इत्यनयोः कर्त्राक्षेपं प्रति विशेषः? स्यात् एतत्। भाव-कर्मणोः इत्यादि अनुशासन-बलात् तावत् भाव-कर्मणी प्रत्ययवाच्ये। ततः तदभिहिता संख्या ताभ्यां अन्वीयते। यः तु प्रत्ययः न तत्र उत्पन्नः तदभिहिता संख्या 'मुख्यं वा पूर्वचोदनात् लोकवत्' इति न्यायेन कर्तारमेव आश्रयते इति नियमः। न। विपर्यय-प्रसङ्गात्। 'शेषात् कर्तरि परस्मैपदं' 'कर्तरिशप्' इत्यनुशासन-बलात् भाव-कर्तारौ प्रत्यय-वाच्यौ। ततः तदाभिहिता संख्या अपि ताभ्यां अन्वीयते। यस्तु प्रत्ययः न तत्र उत्पन्नः तदभिहिता संख्या तेन एव न्यायेन कर्म समाश्रयेत् इति नियम-उपपत्तेः। तस्मात् मति-कर्दमं अपहाय यथा-अनुशासनं एव गृह्यते इति प्राप्तम्। एवं प्राप्ते अभिधीयते-

TRANS.: It may here be asked, 'why not treat conduciveness to the result or fruit (of action)' as the connotation of the verbal suffix if the meaning of effort can be yielded by postulation itself? The answer is that it is not possible. Effort which is the same as what is called *'Bhāvanā'* by Mīmāṃsā is meant by all verbal suffixes because in all usages of this suffix 'effort' is the definite meaning assigned to the suffix and also because postulation of this meaning is not possible.

To explain: How at all can the meaning 'effort' be postulated? Certainly not because effort is conducive to the result. Everything that is conducive to the result is not of the nature of effort. Nor is 'conduciveness to result' necessarily co-inherent with effortness (that is to say, every effort is not conducive to some result). Even the number of the agent denoted by the suffix cannot help postulate the effort. The number indicated by the suffix can lead to the inference or postulation of the numbered entity, not its effort. The agent that is indicated by the suffix is also incapable of leading to the postulation as a bare entity—human or non-human—cannot be an agent endowed with effort. If it is 'the entity endowed with activity or effort' that is denoted by the suffix then the effort cannot remain undenoted by the suffix. Even the meaning of the verb cannot lead to the postulation. In verbs like 'is' there is not available such a meaning (on the basis of which the postulation can be

made). 'Existence' that is meant by 'is' is eternal and therefore it does not depend upon any effort. But can't one urge that in all sentences verbal meaning is not associated with effort but wherever the association obtains the verbal meaning does lead to the postulation of effort? No! Even in the use of the verb 'is' (in sentences like 'the book is here') we do get the meaning of 'an effort or activity that is conducive to some result. (So there is no distinction between the meanings of the suffix in this and other cases). If it is asked how 'existence' which is eternal can precede the activity meant by the verb above the answer is that existence as qualified by effort or urge (called *'Bhāvanā'* by Mīmāṃsā) can appear as preceding the activity although by itself it is not so. It may here be argued that *'Bhāvanā'* or 'effort' is the meaning yielded by the verb and 'conduciveness to it' is the meaning yielded by the suffix; so where is the need to have 'effort' (or *Bhāvanā*) as the meaning of the suffix? This however is not correct. The verb is the original word to which the suffix is added. The verb itself cannot denote *'Bhāvanā'* as it is the nature of verbs to mean only that which results from an activity. Otherwise even the word 'cooking' would come to mean the effort or *Bhāvanā* (relating to cooking). The subject term Chaitra (in the sentence 'Chaitra cooks') also cannot be taken to denote effort as both the name and its suffix in this word mean things quite different from effort (Chaitra stands for a man, and the suffix for his number viz. unity).

'Alright! If the word 'Chaitra' cannot mean effort then the word 'food' in the objective case (in the sentence 'Chaitra cooks food') may be taken to mean effort because the meaning of the word is associated with some activity or other. Otherwise when the word is uttered the utterance would not evoke the special query whether the food is being eaten or cooked. (This may be a counter-argument against the above). The argument however cannot stand. When the verb 'cooks' (for example) is uttered there arises the special desire to know whether it is food or some snack that is being cooked. Such a desire cannot arise unless some activity relating to food is indicated by the suffix. But this indication can be either through denoting or postulating. If the latter is not possible as shown above then the former alone—that is—denoting is possible, so it has to be admitted that the suffix does denote effort.

Let then be this argument (for the view that it is not 'effort' that is denoted or postulationally indicated by the verbal suffix). Let the agent also be the denotend of the suffix (the agent and the object are both the denotends of the suffix according to grammarians and so the number indicated by the suffix is attributable to these denotends only). If the agent is not denoted by the suffix then, how can the number denoted

by the suffix apply to the agent only which is also its denotend and not to the object (which is not denoted by it)? In sentences like 'He cooks vegetables and gruel' or 'He cooks vegetable, gruel and food' the number unity being excluded from dual and triple objects it has to be attributed to the agent who is a single being. Well! If this is the rule then what would the number unity denoted by the suffix in the sentence 'Chaitra cooks food' apply to when both Chaitra and food are single entities? Can't it be urged against this criticism that whatever principle has been decided upon in one case has to be treated as a general precedent so that the principle of the attribution of the number denoted by the suffix to the agent arrived at in one case may be treated as applicable in the above case also? This is the practice followed in other cases also. For example the Sanskrit words *'Yava'* and *'Varāha'* occurring in a certain Vedic text are fixed in certain meanings on the basis of certain principle. So these words occurring in other contexts also are assigned the same meanings although no indication to this effect is available from the context. But such a contention cannot be upheld. In a sentence like 'The food is being cooked by Chaitra' the number unity can apply both to the agent and the object as each of them is a single entity. (The principle for the application of number is only agreement between the number and the entity numbered). May it be urged against this objection that in sentences like 'food is being cooked by both or all the Chaitras (each one named by the same name)' unity is in conflict with the number of the agents and so it is applicable to the object alone which here is one only (namely food)? No! such a rejoinder will not do in the case of a sentence like 'The vegetable and the gruel are being cooked both by Chaitra and Maitra' as both the agent and the object indicated in the sentence are dual in number. (So the number can apply even to the agents in the sentence). One may urge against this that as in the sentence, 'The food is being cooked both by Chaitra and Maitra' the suffix-denoted-number unity is taken to apply to the object only, so in the above sentence too the dual number may be regarded as applicable to the dual objects only. But then on this assumption, in the sentence 'Chaitra cooks food' the singular number should be taken to apply to the object—food and not to the agent. Can it be contended here that in the sentence quoted the rule of agreement is to be followed while in other kinds of sentence the different rule mentioned above has to be followed? No! There is no basis for such a discriminating use. 'Can the grammatical distinction of active voice' (of sentences like 'Chaitra cooks food') and the passive voice of sentences like 'food is being cooked by Chaitra') be taken as the basis of the discriminating use mentioned

above? No! There are sentences like चैत्रः पचति in Sanskrit containing verbs like *'Pach'* (in Sanskrit which can be used in both the active and the passive voices) where the suffix denoted-number is taken as applicable to the agent only (although the object in the sentence is also single). So the above assumption is sure to create confusion. (It may be objected here that both the agent and the number being the denotends of the suffix in the above sentence the number—which is one part of the meaning of the suffix cannot apply to the other part of its meaning. But such cannot be the case). There are sentences like 'It is being slept by him', 'existence is enjoyed by him' (it is a crude rendering of the Sanskrit word सुप्यते, भूयते). The suffix-denoted number is taken to apply neither to the subject nor to the object. The number applies only to the action denoted by the verb. If the number did not apply to the action then the suffix would be rendered meaningless (as the action is denoted by the verb itself). If it is urged here that the number applies to that which is implied (or postulated) by the suffix then in the above cases it should be applicable to the agent only (not to the action meant by the verb). In respect of implying the agent no discrimination can be made between, 'It is being slept by Chaitra' and 'Chaitra sleeps.' So there is no inconsistency in the assumption that one part of the meaning of the suffix applies to the other part of its own meaning.

Against the above view of the grammarians there can be a retort like this. According to a certain prescriptive aphorism of Pāṇinī—the great grammarian—suffixes of intransitive verbs (like 'sleep') and those of transitive verbs mean respectively what is meant by the verb and the objective term in the sentence. As such the number denoted by these suffixes apply respectively to the action meant by the verb and the object. But the suffixes which are not connected with verbs of the above type (like 'goes', 'takes' etc.) are such that the number denoted by them applies to the agent only as per the rule of priority (in sentence the subject term) as elucidated in a certain aphorism of Mīmāṃsā.

The above retort can however be countered by another retort based on certain two aphorisms which prescribe that in sentences in which the verbal suffixes denote the action indicated by the verb or the agent of the action the number denoted by these suffixes applies respectively to the action or the agent. But the suffixes which are other than these denote the number which applies to the objective term only. Thus the aforementioned conclusion can be reversed on the basis of rules laid down by Pāṇinī himself. Thus it may be concluded that the suffix denoting the agent stands for the number connected with the latter while the

number denoted by a suffix denoting the object is connected with it. This is according to what the great grammarian has said and it has to be accepted as the correct view to avoid confusion.

EXPL.: In the above verse and its commentary the author has tried to refute the Mīmāṃsā contention that effort is not meant by the verbal suffix but is postulationally obtained in the sentence. The grammarian's view that it is the agent that is denoted by the suffix is also elucidated and defended above by the author. The crux of the refutation of the view that 'effort' is the postulational content of sentence is that there isn't any part of the content of a sentence which may lead to the postulation. Turning next to the view of grammarians that even the agent is denoted by the suffix (along with the effort) the author argues that on this view the number indicated by the suffix—unity or duality—would then get connected even with the objective term. There is no definite rule to regulate the application of the number denoted by the suffix to the subject alone and not to the object. Many hypothetical rules to regulate this application in sentences of active and passive voice or considered and rejected. Ultimately certain prescriptions of Pāṇinī are trotted out to explain how the said application is regulated.

Rebuttal of the above views

TEXT: आक्षेपलभ्ये संख्येये न अभिधानस्य कल्पना।
संख्येयमात्र-लाभे अपि साकांक्षेण व्यवस्थितिः॥

संख्या अपि तावत् इयं भावना-अनुगामिनी। यं यं भावना अन्वेति तं तं संख्या अपि इति स्थितेः एक-प्रत्यय वाच्यत्व-नियमात्। भावना च शुद्धं प्रातिपादिकार्थ-मात्रं आकांक्षति। न हि व्यापारवंतं व्यापारः आश्रयते आत्माश्रयत्वात्। समवायं प्रति तदनुपयोगात्। विजातीय-व्यापारवतः अ-कर्तृत्वात् च। न च द्वितीयाद्याः प्रातिपदिकविभक्तयः। ततः प्रथम-निर्दिष्टैनैव भावना अन्वीयते इति तस्य अन्वय-योग्यता-नियमात् संख्या अपि तदनुगामिनी तेनैव अन्वीयते इति न अतिप्रसङ्गः नञर्थवत्। यथा हि चैत्रः न गौरः, न स्पंदते, न कुंडली इत्यादौ विशेषण-विशेष्य-समभिव्याहार-अविशेषे अपि नञर्थस्य विशेषण-अंशैः एव अन्वयः न विशेष्यांशेन। ननु बाधात् तत्र तथा, नहि विशेषणेन तदन्वये विशेषण-

उपादानं-अर्थवत् भवेत्, तन्निषेधेनैव विशेषण-निषेध-उपलब्धेः। उभय-निषेधे च आवृत्तौ वाक्यभेदात्। अन्-आवृत्तौ निराकांक्षत्वात् इति चेत्? न। तुल्यत्वात्। समान-प्रत्यय-उपात्त-भावना-आक्षिप्त-अन्वय-उपपत्तौ बाधकं विना संनिहित-त्यागे व्यवहित-परिग्रहस्य गुरुत्वात्। भावनायाः च सामान्याक्षेपे अपि साकांक्ष-परित्यागे निराकांक्ष-अन्वय-अनुपपत्तेः। न हि अन्यतराकांक्षा अन्वय-हेतुः, अपि तु उभयाकांक्षा। प्रातिपादिकार्थः हि फलेन अन्वयं अलभमानः क्रिया-संबंधं अपेक्षते। भावना अपि व्यापारभूता सती व्यापारिणं इत्यु भयाकांक्षा अन्वय-हेतुः। कटं कटेन इत्यादि तु कारकतया एव फल-समन्वितं न व्यापारांतरं अपेक्षते इति निराकांक्षं इति।

अतः एव 'आस्यते, सुप्यते' इत्यादौ न आक्षिप्तेन अन्वयः। न हि चैत्रेण इति तृतीयांत-शब्दस्य भावनायां आकांक्षा अस्ति चेत्? न। फलेन शयनादि-धात्वर्थेन अन्वयात्। फल-संबंधिनः च अत्र कर्तृ-अनतिरेकात्। न हि शयनादयः धात्वर्थाः कर्तृ-अतिरेकि-संबंधाः। न च फले-तत्संबंधि-व्यतिरेकेण अन्यः भाव्यः नाम यं अपेक्षेत।

स्यात् एतत्। कि मिति न प्रयुज्यते 'कटः करोति चैत्रं, इत्यादि, अभिहित-अनभिहित-व्यवस्थाभावात् इति चेत्? न। चैत्रं इति प्रथमांतस्य असाधुत्वात्। द्वितीयांतस्य तु कर्म-वचनत्वेन तत्संबंधात् भाव्य-अनपेक्षणीभावेन भावकमात्रं अपेक्षेत। न च कटस्य चैत्रं प्रति भावकत्वं विपर्ययात्। अनाप्तेन तु विवक्षायां प्रयुज्यते एव। प्रयुज्यतां तर्हि 'कटः करोति चैत्रः'। इत्यादि। न। नित्य-संदिग्धत्वेन वाक्यार्थ-अ-समर्पक त्वात्। ततः तदुपपत्तये विशेषस्य व्यंजनीयत्वात्। व्यज्यतां तर्हि तृतीयया 'चैत्रेण' इति। एवं 'देवदत्तः क्रियते कटं' इति व्यज्यतां द्वितीयया इति चेत्? न। अप्रयोगात्। न हि अनाप्तेनापि एवं-प्रायाणि प्रयुज्यंते। लक्षण-अविरोधेन कुतः एतदेवं इति चेत्? लोकस्य अपर्यनुयोज्यत्वात्। न हि गार्गिकिय(इति पदं साधु इति श्लाघा-अभिधायि-पद-संनिधिं अनपेक्ष्य प्रयुज्येत। तस्य तदुपाधित्वेन एव विहितत्वात् इति चेत्? एतदेव कुतः? लोके तथैव प्रयोग-दर्शनात् इति चेत्? तुल्यम्। 'करोति' इत्यादि कर्म-

विभक्ति-समभिव्याहारेण एव प्रयुज्यते, क्रियते इति कर्तृ-विभक्ति-समभिव्याहारेण एव इति किमत्र क्रियताम्?

इमं एव विशेषं उररीकृत्य अनभिहित अधिकार-अनुशासनेन हि एतावान् परामर्शः सर्वेषां हृदि पदं आदधाति इति अभिधान-अन्-भिधान-विभागः एव व्युत्पादन दशायां पेशलः इति।

स्यात् एतत्। भवतु सर्वाख्यात-साधारणी भावना। काल-विशेष-संबंधिनी सा लट्-आद्यर्थः। कालत्रय-अपरामृष्टा लिङ्-अर्थः इति चेत्? न। यत्न-पदेन समानार्थत्व-प्रसङ्गात्। विषयोपराग-अनुपरागाभ्यां विशेषः इति चेत्? न। यागयत्नः इत्यनेन पर्यायतापत्तेः। कर्तृ-संख्याभिधान-अनभिधानाभ्यां विशेषः इति चेत्? न। यागयत्नवान् इत्यनेन साम्य-आपत्तेः। इष्ट एवायं अर्थः इति चेत्? न। इतः वत्सरशतेनापि अप्रवृत्तेः। फल-समभिव्याहाराभावात् न प्रवर्तते इति चेत्? न। स्वर्गकामः यागयत्नवान् इत्यतः अपि अप्रवृत्तेः। तत् कस्य हेतोः? न हि यत्नः यत्नस्य हेतुः यत्नप्रतीतिः वा यत्नस्य कारणं, अपि तु इच्छा। न च सापि प्रतीता यत्नजननी येन सा एव विध्यर्थः इति अनुगम्यताम्। अपि तु सत्तया। न च लिङः श्रुतिकाले सा सती। नच लिङेव तां जनयति। अर्थ-विशेषं अप्रत्यत्ययंत्याः तस्याः तज्जनकत्वे व्युत्पत्ति-ग्रहण वैयर्थ्यात्। अनुपलब्ध-लिङा च इच्छानुत्पत्ति-प्रसङ्गात् इति। एतेन वृद्धव्यवहारात् व्युत्पत्तिः भवंती बालस्य आत्मनि प्रवृत्ति-हेतुः। यः अवगतः तमेव आश्रयेत्। स्वयं च कुर्यां इति संकल्पात् एव अयं प्रवृत्तः, ततः सः एव लिङर्थः इति निरस्तम्। कुर्यां इति प्रयत्नः वा स्यात् इच्छा वा? नाद्यः। स्वात्मनि वृत्ति-विरोधात्। न द्वितीयः। सा हि सत्तया एव प्रयत्न-उत्पादिनी। न च लिङः श्रुतिकाले सा सती इत्युक्तम्। फलेच्छा तु निसर्ग-वाहितया सती अपि न प्रयत्नं प्रति हेतुः अन्य-विषयत्वात्। तदर्थं च शास्त्र-वैयर्थ्यात्। तस्याः कारणांतरतः एव सिद्धेः। तत्-प्रतीत्यर्थं अपि शास्त्र-अनपेक्षणात्। तस्याः मनोवेद्यत्वात्। अप्राप्ते च शास्त्र-अनवकाशात्। तदभिधाने च स्वर्गकामः इति कर्तृ-विशेषण-पौनरुक्त्यात्। तदा हि यजेत इत्यस्य एव यागकर्ता स्वर्गकामः इत्यर्थः स्यात्। यदि च

फल-विषया एव साधन-विषयं प्रयत्नं जनयेत् अन्यत्र अपि प्रसुवीत, नियामकाभावात्। हेतु-फलभावः एव नियामकः इति चेत्? न। अज्ञातस्य तस्य नियामकत्वे लिङं विनापि स्वर्गेच्छातः यागे प्रवृत्ति-प्रसङ्गात्। ज्ञातस्य तु तत्साधनत्वस्य नियामकत्वे तदिच्छा एव तत्र प्रवर्तयतु। यः यत् कामयते स तत्साधनं अपि कामयते एव इति नियमात्। न च सा तदानीं सती। न च तत्-ज्ञानं एव प्रयत्न-जनकं, तच्च लिङा क्रियते इति युक्तम्। स्वर्गकामः यागचिकीर्षावान् इत्यतः अपि प्रवृत्ति-प्रसङ्गात्। लिङ्गः वा इच्छां प्रतीत्य अनिच्छन् अपि सर्वः प्रवर्तेत। स्वसंबंधितया तदवगमः तथा न तु सामान्यतः इति चेत्? न। प्रथमपुरुषेण तदभिधाने तस्य अ-अविध्यर्थत्व-प्रसङ्गात्। ओदन-कामः त्वं पाकचिकीर्षावान् इत्यतः अपि प्रवृत्त्यापत्तेः च।

अपि च संकल्पज्ञानात् यदि प्रयत्नः जायेत तथापि संकल्पस्य कुतः जननं किमर्थं च? संकल्प-ज्ञानादेव, प्रयत्नार्थं च इति चेत्? ननु इच्छा-विशेषः संकल्पः, स तावत् सुखे स्वभावतः, तत्-साधने च औपाधिकः? संकल्पविषयः तु कथम्? तत्साधनत्वात् एवेति चेत्? तर्हि तत्साधनत्व-ज्ञानात् न तु संकल्प-स्वरूप ज्ञानात् भवितुं अर्हति इति। अन्यथा इष्ट-साधनता-ज्ञानं अपि अनर्थकं आपद्येत। तस्मात् संकल्पः प्रवर्तकः इत्यभ्युपेयते किंतु सत्तामात्रेण न तु ज्ञातः इति न असौ विधिः। ज्ञानं च विषय-उपहारेण एव व्यवहारयति इति तद्विषय एव अवशिष्यते इति कर्तृधर्म-व्युदासः।

अस्तु तर्हि कर्मधर्मः। न इत्युच्यते–

अतिप्रसङ्गात् न फलं न अपूर्वं तत्व-हानितः।
तदलाभात् न कार्यं च न क्रिया अपि अप्रवृत्तितः॥

कर्म हि फलं वा स्यात्, तत्कारणं अपूर्वं वा, तत्कारणं क्रिया वा? न प्रथमः। फलेच्छायाः प्रवृत्तिं प्रति अहेतुत्वात् अतिप्रसङ्गात् इत्युक्तम्। न द्वितीयः अव्युत्पत्तेः। लिङः हि प्रवृत्ति-निमित्तं अपूर्वत्वं वा स्यात् उभयं वा? न प्रथमः। शब्द-प्रवृत्ति निमित्तस्य अपूर्वत्वस्य प्रमाणांतरात् अवगतौ अपूर्वत्व-व्याघातात्। अनवगतौ अव्युत्पत्तेः। संबंधिनः अनवगमे

संबंधस्य प्रत्येतुं अशक्यत्वात्। ततः एव अवगतौ इतरेतराश्रयत्वात्। दोषात्। न च गंधवत्त्वेन उपनीतायां पृथिव्यां पृथिवी-शब्दवत् अपूर्वे प्रवर्तते लिङ् इति युक्तम्। तत्र उभयोः अपि प्रतीयमानत्वेन संदेह-कल्पनागौरव-पुरस्कारेण पृथिवीत्वे एव संगति-विश्रांतेः उपपत्तेः। न तु अत्र अपूर्वत्व-प्रतीतिः।

स्यात् एतत्। कार्यत्वं उपलक्षणीकृत्य तावत् एषा लिङ् प्रवृत्ता। तदुपलक्षितः च यागः वा, यत्नः वा, अन्यः वा शब्देतर-प्रमाण-गोचरः न अधिकारि-विशेषण-स्वर्ग साधन-समर्थः। न च अकाम्य-फले कामी नियोक्तुं शक्यते। ततः अन्यदेव अलौकिकं किंचित् अनेन उपलक्ष्यते यः लिङादि-प्रवृत्ति-गोचरः इति किं अनुपपन्नं इति चेत्? उपलक्षणं हि स्मरणं अनुमानं वा? उभयं अपि अनवगत-संबंधेन अशक्यम्। न हि संस्कारवत्, मनोवत्, अदृष्टवत् वा कार्यत्वं अपूर्वत्वं उपलक्षयति, ज्ञान-अपेक्षणात्। ततः हस्ती इव हस्तिपकं, धूम इव धूम-ध्वजं, तत्संबंध-ज्ञानात् उपलक्षयेत्, न तु अन्यथा। तथा च न्याय-संपादना अपि अरण्ये रुदितम्। न हि युक्ति-सहस्रैः अपि अविदिते संगतिग्रहः, अविदित-संगतिः वा शब्दः प्रवर्तते इति। एतेन भेदा ग्रहात् क्रिया-कार्ये व्युपत्तिः इति निरस्तम्। न हि अज्ञाते भेदाग्रहः व्यवहारांगम्। अतिप्रसङ्गात्। किं च अपूर्वत्वे प्रवृत्ति-निमित्ते कल्प्यमाने लौकिकी लिङ् अनर्थिका प्रसज्येत, तत्र उपलक्षणीयाभावात्। तत्र कार्यत्वं एव प्रवृत्ति-निमित्तं यदि, प्रकृते अपि तथा एव अस्तु क्लृप्तवात् संभवात् च इति।

अस्तु तर्हि तदेव प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तं, तर्क-संपादनया तु अपूर्व-व्यक्ति लाभः इति चेत्? न। नित्य-निषेध-अपूर्वयोः अलाभ-प्रसङ्गात्। न च अस्मिन् पक्षे एकत्र निर्णीतेन शास्त्रार्थेन अन्यत्र तथैव व्यवहारः इति संभवति। कार्यत्वस्य एव प्रवृत्ति-निमित्तत्वेन निर्णीतित्वात्, न तु अपूर्वत्वस्य। न्याय-संपादनायाः च तत्र असंभवात्। फलानुगुण्येन हि व्यक्तिविशेषः लभ्यते, न च तत् तत्र श्रूयते। न च अश्रुतं अपि कल्पयितुं शक्यते। बीजाभावात्। नहि विधि-अन्यथानुपपत्त्या कल्प्येत, कार्यत्व-प्रत्यय-

अन्यथानुपपत्त्या वा लोकवत्। भवतां दर्शने तस्य उपेय-रूपत्वात्। अतः श्रुत-स्वर्ग फलत्वे अपि साध्य-विवृद्धिः उच्यते। न द्वितीयः। शब्दबलेन तत्प्रत्यये तदनपेक्षणात्। लोके हि तत्प्रत्ययः इष्टाभ्युपायताधीनः न तु वेदे इति अभ्युपगमात्। अन्यथा इष्टाभ्युपायता एव प्रथमं वेदात् अवगंतव्या प्रमाणांतराभावात्। ततः कार्यता इति आनुमानिकः विधिः स्यात् न शाब्दः। आनुमानिकं फलं अस्तु। यत् कर्तव्यं तदिष्टाभ्युपायः इति व्याप्तेः इत्यपि न युक्तम्। सुखेन व्यभिचारात्। अन्यत्वे सति इति चेत्। न। दुःखा-भावेन व्यभिचारात्। फलं विहाय इति चेत्? तदेव किमुक्तं स्यात्? इष्टं स्वभावतः इति चेत्? तर्हि ततः अन्यत् अनिष्टं स्यात्। तत् च कर्तव्यं इति व्याघातः। तत्-साधनं इति चेत्। तत्-साधनत्वे सति इति साध्याविशिष्टं विशेषणम्। स्वभावतः न इदं इष्टं कर्तव्यं च। ततः नूनं इष्टसाधनं इति साधनार्थः इति चेत्? न। स्वभावतः न इदं इष्टं इत्यसिद्धेः। अनन्य-उद्देश-प्रवृत्त-कृति-व्याप्तत्वात्। अन्यथा तदसिद्धेः। ततः व्याघातात् अन्यतरापायः इति। अस्तु नित्य-निषेध-अपूर्वयोः अलाभः किं नः छिन्नं इति चेत्? किं नः छिन्नं यदा कामाधिकारे अपि तदलाभः? न हि लिङा कार्यं स्वर्ग-साधनं उक्तम्। नापि स्वर्गकाम-पद-समभिव्याहार-अन्यथानुपपत्तया तत् लब्धम्। ब्राम्हणत्वादिवत् अधिकारि-अवच्छेद-मात्रेण एव उपपत्तेः। न चेत् अनुमानं-यस्य यदिच्छातः यत्कर्तव्यं, तत्तस्य इष्टसाधनं इति। अन्येच्छया एव तत्कर्तव्यतायाः सुखेन अनैकांतिकत्वात्। औपाधिक-कर्तव्यतायाः च इष्टसाधनत्वं अप्रतीत्य प्रत्येतुं अशक्यत्वात्।

किं अनया विशेषचिंतया? प्रतीयते तावत् शब्दात् अन्यदिच्छातः अन्यत् कार्यं इति एतावता एव अनुमानं इति चेत्? ननु अन्वितं अभिधानीयं, योग्यं च अन्वीयते। अन्यत्-इच्छातः च अन्यत् कर्तव्यं अन्वयायोग्यं, तत्कथं अभिधीयताम्? ततः एव तत्साधनत्व-सिद्धिः इति चेत्? एवं तर्हि इष्टसाधनता-एकार्थसमवायि-कर्तव्यत्वाभिधानात् अनुमान-अनवकाशः। न च अन्विताभिधाने अपि तत्साधनत्वसिद्धिः। अधिकारि-अवच्छेद-मात्रेणापि अन्वय-योग्यता-उपपत्तेः। न च कार्यत्वं अपूर्वं

संभवति। तद्धि कृतिव्याप्यता चेत्? व्रीह्यादिषु एव सिद्धत्वात्। कृति-फलत्वात् चेत्? यागस्यैव, ततः तस्यैव आहत्य उत्पत्तेः। कृत्युद्देश्यता चेत्? स्वर्गस्यैव, निसर्ग-सुंदरत्वात्, न तु अपूर्वस्य। तद्विपरीतत्वात्। स्तन्यपानादिवत् औपाधिकी इति चेत्? सापि यागस्यैव। स्वर्गस्य साध्यत्वस्थितौ यागस्यैव साधनत्वेन अन्वयात्। काल-व्यवधानात् न एतत् निर्वहति इति चेत्? यथा निर्वहति श्रुतानुशेधेन तथा कल्प्यताम्। व्यापारद्वारा कथंचित् स्यात्। नतु भिन्नकालयोः व्यापार-व्यापारिभावः। कारणत्वं च व्यापारेण युज्यते। अव्यवधानेन पूर्वकाल नियमः च तत्वम्। अन्यथा अतिप्रसङ्गात् इति चेत्? न। पूर्वभाव नियम-मात्रस्य कारणत्वात्। कार्यानुगुण-अवांतर-कार्यस्य एव व्यापारत्वात्। कृषि-चिकित्सादौ बहुलं तथा व्यवहारात्। लाक्षणिकः असौ इति चेत्? न। मुख्यार्थत्वे विरोधाभावात्।

अस्तु तर्हि पुत्रेण हते ब्राम्हणे चिरध्वस्तस्य पितुः तं अवांतर-व्यापारीकृत्य कर्तृत्वम्। तथा च लोक-यात्रा-विप्लवः इति चेत्? न। सत्यपि सुते कदाचित् तदकरणात्, तस्मिन् असत्यपि कदाचित् करणात्। अनिर्वाहकतया तस्य व्यापारत्व-अयोगात्। यं जनयित्व। एव हि यं प्रति यस्य पूर्वभाव-निर्वाहः सः एव तं प्रति तस्य व्यापारः, न अपरः। यथा अनुभवस्य स्मरणं प्रति संस्कारः। तस्य हि अन्वय-व्यतिरेक-अनुविधाने सिद्धे तदन्यथानुपपत्त्या संस्कारः कल्प्यते, न तु अन्यथा। तथा इहापि। न चेदेवं तथापि ब्रम्ह-भिदुर-शर-विमोक-सम-समय-हतस्य हंतृत्वं न स्यात्। स्यात् च स्वनिवेशन-शयानस्य तत्-पितुः इति। एतेन उभयं वा इति निरस्तम्।

अस्तु तर्हि क्रिया-धर्मः एव कार्यत्वं विधिः। सर्वः हि कर्तव्यं एतदिति प्रत्येति, ततः कुर्यां इति संकल्प्य प्रवर्तते इति चेत्? न। कर्तव्यं मया इति कृत्यध्यवसायार्थः वा स्यात्, कर्तव्यं मया इति उचितार्थः वा स्यात्? तत्र प्रथमः संकल्पात् न भिद्यते। व्यवहित कार्य-संकल्पः हि कर्तव्यः मया इति। संनिहित-कार्य-संकल्पः तु कुर्यां इति। सः च न लिङ्-अर्थः। सत्ता-मात्रेण प्रवर्तनात् इत्युक्तम्। तदेतत् कर्तव्यतायां जातायां

प्रवर्तते इति वस्तुस्थितौ भ्रान्तेः ज्ञातायां इति गृहीतम्। औचित्यं तु क्रियाधर्मः प्रागभाववत्वम्। तस्मिन् सति शक्यत्वं वा, तस्मिन् सति कर्तारं प्रति उपकारकत्वं वा? प्रथमे कुतश्चिदपि न निवर्तेत। द्वितीये दुःखे अपि तथाविधे प्रवर्तेत। तृतीये तु वक्ष्यते।

TRANS.: Replying to the grammarian's view discussed above the author says that the agent is known (or included in the sentence-meaning) by postulation itself as it is the bearer of the number denoted by the suffix. There is therefore no need to admit that the suffix denotes the agent (as per the rule that a word in a sentence means only that which does not appear through any other source in the meaning of the sentence). Of course the suffix-meaning (viz. number) can lead to the postulation of the object too (because it is the bearer of a number) yet the effort denoted by the suffix depends upon the agent only (it is the agent who makes the effort) and so (as per another rule) that the suffix-denoted number is connected only with that with which effort is connected, the number is connected with the agent (this is the case with sentences in the active voice. In sentences of the passive voice the suffix-denoted number gets connected with the object instead of the agent).

To explain: This number follows the effort for sure. Since both the effort and the number are denoted by the same suffix; the number gets connected with every entity with which effort gets connected. As to the effort it demands to be connected with the bare entity denoted by the subject-term. This entity cannot be one already endowed with effort (or denoted as such in the sentence) because the effort with which the entity is endowed being the same to which the suffix-denoted effort is attributed this will entail the fallacy of self-dependence. Besides, it is the inherence-relation by which the agent is endowed with effort. So if the suffix-denoted effort is supposed to demand connection with the agent as endowed with effort then the inherence-relation is to be supposed to benefit from the connection. How can this happen if the inherence-relation is known to be eternal? The effort cannot also be connected with an entity endowed with a different kind of effort (like the object, the instrument etc.) because such an entity is different from the agent. (The fallacy of self-dependence can thus be avoided but what is not an agent cannot have syntactical connection with effort). The accusative and other cases are other than the nominative case and the effort gets connected only with that entity which is denoted by a word in the nominative case. Only such an entity has competence to be connected with

effort and the suffix-denoted number too follows the effort in getting connected with the entity. Thus there does not arise the fallacy of deviation if some other entity gets treated as the agent. This is just like the connection of negation in a negative sentence. In a sentence like, 'Chaitra has no white complexion, no earring, no movement etc.', although the negatives are equally associated with the adjectives as well as the noun qualified by them and none of them is denoted by the negatives yet the negation indicated by the negative term is connected only with the adjectives and not the noun. May it be urged here that the said non-connection of the negative is due to the fact that the qualified entity denoted by the noun cannot be negated as it exists. If the qualificand is negated then the negation of the adjectives would become futile as the negation of the qualificand would itself entail the negation of the qualifying adjectives. If the negative negates both the qualifier and the qualificand separately then there will have to be two sentences each including one negative. If there is only one negative term then the sentence including it will have no syntactical relation with the other sentence devoid of the negative term. But the case of the effort also is just like this. Both number and the effort are denoted by the same suffix and so it is but proper that the number should get connected with that entity only which is entailed by the effort. Unless there is some contrary evidence it goes against the law of parsimony to connect number with what is not proximate to it (like the instrument etc.) instead of the agent which is most proximate to it. Effort entails generally the entity that is endowed with it but the agent and the effort have mutual expectancy. So by discarding the agent the effort cannot have syntactical connection with any other term in the sentence. It is not the expectancy of either of two terms or entities that brings them in connection with each other. There has to be mutual expectancy between two terms for them to be connected with each other. The subject-term in a sentence needs to be connected with effort in order to be connected with the result of effort and the effort also in its turn needs some locus as it is of the nature of a process. Thus there is mutual expectancy between the subject or agent and the effort. The accusative, the instrument etc. however are presented in the sentence as endowed with their respective processes by their case-endings, so they do not need any other process to connect them with the ultimate result.

On this very account effort does not get connected with the agent in sentences like 'It is being slept or sat by Chaitra' as it does in sentences in which the subject-term is in the nominative case (as in the sentence 'Chaitra sleeps'). The word Chaitra in the instrumental case stands for

Chaitra as endowed with his instrumental activity, so this does not demand to be connected with any further activity. 'But doesn't this meaning demand being connected with the result of activity?' It may be asked. Yes! But the result here is nothing but sleep and there is nothing other than the agent who is the locus or bearer of this result. Certainly what is denoted by verbs like 'sleeps' etc. in the foregoing sentences is not connected with anything other than the agent itself. Since the verb 'sleeps' is intransitive there is nothing other than the denotend of this verb with which the word Chaitra in the instrumental case may demand connection. So in such sentences the number denoted by the suffix would get connected with the denotend of the verb itself and not with the agent which is presented (by the instrumental case) as already endowed with the activity of sleep denoted by the verb (in the passive voice).

Alright! Let then there be this argument against the above explanation of the grammarians. If the agent, the object etc. are alike in not being denoted by the suffix then why don't we use a sentence like 'The mat weaves Chaitra' to signify that Chaitra the agent weaves the mat (unless the agency of Chaitra is taken to be denoted by the suffix the sentence cannot be faulted and the subject and object in the sentence cannot be distinguished from each other)? The simple answer to the question is that the word Chaitra in the sentence cannot be in the nominative case and its use as such is ungrammatical. In the accusative case the word Chaitra indicates the objective character of Chaitra. But this does not demand any connection with effort which demands connection with its agent only. The mat however is not the agent in relation to Chaitra. It is just the other way about. Of course an unreliable person may utter such misleading sentences. Well! If the subject-term has to be in the nominative case for effort to be connected with the entity denoted by the term then the sentence, 'the mat Chaitra (in the nominative case) produces' should be regarded as grammatically correct. This objection may be met by the rejoinder that the meaning of the sentence ever remains doubtful (it may mean either that the mat produces Chaitra or Chaitra produces the mat). So to yield a definite meaning some distinction between the cases of the two words 'mat' and 'Chaitra' has to be exhibited in the sentence. Alright! Let then the desired distinction be expressed by using the word 'Chaitra' in the instrumental case as in the sentence 'The mat produced by Chaitra'. Even by using the word 'mat' in the accusative case as in the sentence 'The mat is produced Devadutta' the said distinction can well be exhibited'. No! Such sentences are never used. Even unreliable persons do not use such sentences. 'But if the sentences do not violate grammatical rules why should

they be dubbed as wrong?' One may ask. The answer is that such is common usage which cannot be transgressed. This is why the Sanskrit word 'Gārgikā' though grammatically correct, its use except in association with any word meaning commendation is not considered idiomatic (as common usage is against it). But isn't it prescribed by Pāṇinī that the said word is to be used only along with commendatory words? Yes, but why so? If it is because of such common usage only then the same can be said regarding the words 'Chaitra', 'Mat' etc. used in certain sentences in nominative and other cases (common usage is against the way the words are employed in the above-mentioned sentences). Verbs like 'does etc.' are used only in combination with words in the accusative case while verbs like 'is done' are used in combination with subject-words in the instrumental case. This is the convention and we cannot transgress it. It is by keeping in view only this diversity of usage relating to the verbs in the active and passive voice that Pāṇinī has laid down certain prescriptions. The distinction of denoting or not denoting the agent, the object etc. by the verbal suffix is of use only for explaining the meanings of certain sentences. (Otherwise it has not much importance). Only in this way the relevant prescription of Pāṇinī is commonly apprehended.

Alright! We raise here another question. Let effort be a common meaning of all verb-suffixes. But so far as suffixes other than the imperative ones are concerned it is as occurrent in the present that the effort is denoted by them while the imperative-suffix denotes the effort without any reference to the time of its occurrence. Thus there is a difference between the two types of suffixes. This argument however is inadmissible as then the imperative will become synonymous with the word 'effort'. Can it be urged against this that there is a difference here as the imperative-suffix denotes the effort relevant to a particular result like certain sacrifices, while the word 'effort' means just some effort? No! In that case the word 'effort for sacrifice' would become synonymous with the imperative. 'But isn't there the difference that the imperative also denotes the number of the agent while the above word does not denote it? Yes! But in that case the words 'one who makes the effort for sacrifice' become synonymous with the imperative because the word denotes the number of the person who is endowed with the effort. If however such a synonymy is admitted then the said word should prompt a person to action as the imperative does. But it can never do it. May it be the case that only because there is no mention of a benefit like celestial habitation along with the said word that it is not synonymous with the imperative? No! Even a sentence like, 'One who desires to attain heavenly bliss makes the effort for performing the sacrifice' could be treated

as synonymous with the imperative (as in the sentence the benefit resulting from effort is indicated). The reason why the foregoing sentence does not prompt action is that effort itself is not the cause of effort nor is the cognition of effort (as yielded by the above sentence) the cause of effort. It is desire which causes effort and even desire is not such a cause through its cognition but it is so by itself. But when the imperative is uttered by someone the hearer does not (necessarily) have the desire to act. Can't one say that the imperative itself produces the desire? No! Unless the imperative gives rise to the cognition of desire as its meaning there will be no use to know the conventional meaning of the imperative. Moreover if the imperative itself produced the desire for action then no one who has not heard the imperative-suffix will have the desire for action. Thus since it is the knowledge of the conventional meaning of the imperative acquired through the usage of the latter by elderly people that leads to the action only of that person who is cognisant of the convention, the view that a person's decision to act is the meaning of the imperative also gets rebutted. Those who maintain this view argue that through the observation of the usage of elderly people one knows that one's decision to do a certain thing disposes him or her to do it and one is also actually impelled to act by means of one's such decision only. But this argument and the view based upon it that this decision is the meaning of the imperative are ruled out by the foregoing argument. For, what is the nature of this decision to do? Is it effort or desire? It cannot be the first. Effort which is the meaning of the imperative cannot be the cause of the decision which is the effort itself. One cannot be one's own cause. The second too cannot be the nature of the decision. Desire produces the effort by itself but it is not present at the time when the imperative is uttered or heard. (This has already been mentioned). As to the desire to obtain the fruit of action, it is true that it exists before the action because this desire produces the desire to make the effort to obtain the fruit and from the effort the action results but the desire cannot be meant by the imperative because its object is different from that of the desire to make the effort (of course the desire for a result precedes the desire for the effort to obtain the result but the one does not cause the other). Moreover the imperative cannot produce the desire for the result as all desires are caused by the cognition of the object of the desire. There is no need of the Vedic imperative (which is only indirectly needed for the production of the desire). Even the cognition of the desire is not produced by the imperative as all cognitions are caused by the mind, What is cognised by empirical means does not come within the purview of the scripture. If despite this the

desire for heaven etc. is supposed to be meant by the imperative then words like 'the desirer of celestial bliss etc.' occurring in the Vedic imperatives would be redundant. The imperative by itself would convey the meaning that the performer of the sacrifice desires to obtain heavenly bliss. If however it is urged that since the desire for result is known to cause the effort to obtain the means of the result and so the desire for the result is the cause of the desire for the means of the result then any desire can be supposed to produce any other desire as there would be nothing to determine the causality of one desire in relation to another. Can it be urged here that the causal relation holding between the means and the result is itself the determinant of the causal relation between the two desires? No! If this causal relation by itself and not as known is the determinant then even in the absence of the imperative, the mere desire for heavenly bliss can prompt one to perform the sacrifice. Whether heaven is known or not known as the result of the sacrificial performance through the imperative the mere desire to have the heavenly bliss should cause one to perform the sacrifice as there actually obtains the causal relation between the two. If the known causal relation determines the said causality then the desire for the means itself may be supposed to dispose one towards them as the desire and the disposition have a common object. There is the general rule that whatever one desires to obtain one necessarily desires to obtain its means also. But this desire is not present when the imperative is uttered or heard. But isn't it a fact that the knowledge of the desire for the heaven is the cause for the desire for its means and this knowledge can be obtained through the imperative only? No! If this were the case then the sentence, 'The desirer for heaven has the desire to perform the sacrifice' should prompt the hearer of the sentence for sacrificial performance (as this sentence produces the knowledge of the said causality). Besides a person not desiring to perform a sacrifice should be disposed towards the performance simply by ascertaining that the concerned imperative denotes the desire for heaven. But can't one say against this that instead of this general knowledge (of meaning) only the knowledge that the desire for heaven in oneself is denoted by the imperative and one who has this knowledge will also have the desire for the result? No! The imperative like 'one should perform the sacrifice' is in the third person and as such the knowledge of the desire for the result of sacrifice does not inhere in the person who is disposed towards the sacrificial performance. (The performer and the prompter of the performance are not the same person). So the said knowledge cannot be meant by the imperative. Besides a sentence like 'you who crave for food have

the desire to do the cooking' should prompt one for cooking as this sentence has the same meaning as the sentence containing the imperative 'you should cook'

Moreover if the knowledge of the decision to do a thing disposes one to do it then it needs to be answered what produces this decision and for what purpose? If the answer to the first question is, that 'the knowledge of the decision' produces the decision and the answer to the second is that 'effort is the purpose of the decision' then it may be objected that the said decision is a special kind of desire which is natural in the case of happiness and conditional in the case of the means of happiness (because happiness is obtained by means of its means but there cannot be a desire for the decision itself). If the special desire is supposed to arise because the desire is indirectly the cause of the ultimate result then only the knowledge of this causality and not the mere desire has to be regarded as the cause of the special desire. Otherwise even the knowledge that the desire is caused by the knowledge of the causality of the desired result would be rendered futile. The upshot of all this is that decision certainly prompts action but not as known. So it cannot be meant by the imperative. As to knowledge it too cannot be meant by the imperative as it prompts action only through its association with its object. So this object alone can ultimately dispose one to action. This object is nothing but the property of being the cause of a desired result. Thus no attribute of the agent can be meant by the imperative suffix.

EXPL.: In the foregoing verse and its commentary the author rebuts the grammarians' view that the agent is the meaning of the imperative. The number denoted by the imperative demands to be connected with some term and that term denotes the agent which is therefore postulationally obtained. Even if the objective term can be postulationally obtained yet, since the effort meant by the imperative demands connection with the agent therefore, the number denoted by the imperative gets syntactically connected with it. On this account the agent is not denoted by the imperative. This is just like the syntactical connection of negation in the negative sentence with the adjectival term occurring in the negation on account of the mutual expectancy of the adjectival and the negative terms. The number denoted by the imperative gets connected with that only with which the effort gets connected as both are the denotends of the same imperative suffix. Here an important question is raised by the grammarian. If the agent etc. are not denoted by the verbal suffixes why can't there be a sentence like 'The mat produces Chaitra' with the words 'mat' and 'Chaitra' in the nominative case as, if

the agency of Chaitra is not denoted by the suffix the objectivity of the mat is also not denoted by it? The answer given to this question by the author is not quite satisfactory. It is true that the usage of the nominative case for both the words 'mat' and 'Chaitra' in the sentence is ungrammatical and is not in accordance with common usage. But it needs to be explained why the cases used are ungrammatical or why there is no such common usage. Unless the meaning of the verbal suffix is connected with the agent and not with the object as the grammarians opine it is not easy to account for the ungrammatical character of the above sentence.

Next the Mīmāṃsā view that pure effort is meant by the imperative is taken up for consideration. The crux of the elaborate criticism of this view attempted by the author is this. The imperative or its hearing impels one to action but the mere denotation of general effort or some special effort or the effort of a person desiring some benefit cannot prompt anybody's action. Besides it is not effort supposed to be meant by the imperative which prompts the action or effort. Even desire which is the prompter of effort is so by itself and not as known. So even desire cannot be meant by the imperative. But it is the cognition of the meaning of the imperative that is supposed to prompt action (while desire by itself is known to lead to action). Even in the case of 'the decision' to act called *'Saṃkalpa'* in Sanskrit supposed to be meant by the imperative by certain thinkers the above criticism applies and so the view needs to be rejected. Thus none of the attributes of the agent can be regarded as the meaning of the imperative according to Nyāya.

TRANS.: (So far the author rebutted the views that the cognition, or desire or decision to act etc. characterising the agent can be the meaning of the imperative. Now the second view mentioned earlier that it is a characteristic of action that is meant by the imperative is being taken up for detailed consideration and refutation). The opponent suggests, 'why not admit a characteristic of action as the meaning of the imperative?' The reply to the suggestion is 'No'! The reasons for the negative reply are as below:

(The Sanskrit word '*Karma*' means three different things namely heavenly bliss which is the result of action, the unseen result issuing from the action and leading to the final result and the sacrificial action or ritual which gives rise to the unseen result). The characteristic property of heavenly bliss namely its achievability cannot be the meaning of the imperative because it is the achievability of the ritual leading to heavenly bliss that prompts a man to perform the ritual. Only that which disposes a man for this performance can be meant by the imperative. It cannot be the case that the cognition of one thing namely the achievability of the heavenly bliss should dispose one to the performance of sacrifice which is quite other than heavenly bliss. Such a view leads to the fallacy of deviation. (Cognition and the disposition to action prompted by it must have the same object). The second meaning of 'action' viz., the unseen transcendental result of action, also cannot be meant by the imperative because if it is cognisable it forfeits its unseen nature. If however the unseen result is meant by the imperative simply as a result and not as something characterised by the property 'unseenness' then in the case of obligatory actions like the performance of daily rituals—which are not supposed to yield any result, although their nonperformance leads to sin or demerit, the imperative cannot be taken to denote the unseen result. The third meaning suggested above also cannot be entertained as the mere executability of ritualistic action cannot lead to their performance. The action must be known to produce some desired result. Nobody does something voluntarily simply because he is capable of doing it. He has to have the knowledge that the doing of the thing procures for him some benefit.

To explain: As stated above the word 'action' in Sanskrit may mean either the result of action or the unseen process leading to the result or the ritualistic action initiating the unseen process. The first cannot be the meaning of the imperative as it has already been explained that the desire for the ultimate result is not the cause of the disposition towards action. The second too cannot be the meaning as the 'unseen' cannot be known to be that which the imperative means. The basis of the convention that the imperative means the 'unseen process' may be either the 'unseenness' of the unseen or both these. It cannot be the first. If the unseenness of the unseen is known through any non-scriptural source of knowledge then it forfeits its unseenness. If it is not so known then the convention remains unknown. A convention is a relation between a word and its meaning. If the 'unseenness' which is one relatum of this relation is unknown then the relation too will remain unknown. If the relation is supposed to be known through the imperative suffix itself then there would result the fallacy of mutual dependence as the 'unseen' is known to be meant when the convention is known and the convention is known when the imperative is known to mean the unseen. It may be urged here that the term 'earth' means an object of the genus earth and endowed with the quality of smell, but the genus earthness although not known before the quality of smell of the earth is known, is yet regarded as the determinant of the denotedness of the word 'earth',

so also the unseen can be taken to be meant with its denotedness as determined by unseenness. But this defence is not acceptable. Both earthness and the quality of smell are perceptible entities and so if there is doubt as to which one of these is the determinant of the conventional meaning of the word 'earth' the law of parsimony dictates that earthness—an unanalysable genus—only is the determinant. But such is not the case with unseenness as both the unseen and its genus are imperceptible.

Well then, let there be this defence for the above view. The imperative is conventionally used to mean that which is executed or endowed with the property of executedness. Now the sacrifice, or the effort or anything else is known by non-scriptural sources of knowledge as what is executed but none of these can produce heavenly bliss whose desire is the qualification of the agent of sacrifice. And one who desires a certain result cannot be prompted to act for what is not coveted by him. So there must be something quite different from all the above things which is indicated by the above meaning of the imperative.

In reply to the above defence we ask whether 'suggestion' (referred to above as *'upalakṣaṇa'*) is recollection or inference. Neither of these is possible of occurrence unless the relation of the unseen and the imperative is already known. Certainly 'executedness' or 'obligatoriness' is not like the residual impression in the mind or destiny which by itself gives rise to its effect so that simply because the unseen is produced it will be meant by the imperative. Obligatoriness is a cognitive cause so its cognition is necessary for either the recollection or the inference of the unseen. So just as the perception of the elephant reminds one of the elephant-rider or the perception of smoke leads one to the inference of fire, only through the knowledge of a certain relation, not otherwise, so in the present case also the relation between the unseen and obligatoriness needs to be known for the former to be suggested by the latter. Thus to say as above that either sacrifice or effort or something else is first known as 'an obligatory act' and thereafter the 'unseen' is inferred as the meaning of the imperative is just like a cry in wilderness. Certainly thousands of arguments cannot produce the knowledge of the convention relating to an unknown entity nor can a word with unknown convention be ever used.

The above rejoinder also refutes the likely suggestion that the special type of obligatoriness of the unseen and obligatoriness in general are not known to be different from each other and thus obligatoriness as inherent in all obligatory things is known to be meant by the imperative. Certainly the absence of knowledge of difference with regard to the unknown cannot lead to any usage as this entails the fallacy of deviation. Like the unseen any unknown thing can thus be meant by a word. Besides if 'unseenness' is supposed to be the connotation of the imperative then the commonly-used imperative will be rendered meaningless as there is nothing 'unseen' which can be denoted by imperatives like 'One should cook food etc.?' If in common usage, the imperative is supposed to mean common effects like cooking then in scriptural imperatives too similar effects should be taken to be meant. This is possible too.

Alright! Let then this itself be the conventional meaning of the scriptural imperative. But although the general property of obligatoriness may be connoted by the scriptural imperative yet through inference or conditional argument the special type of effect viz. the unseen is meant by the imperative. This contention however is not sustainable. In the imperatives concerned with obligatory and prohibited action the unseen process being totally absent it cannot be covered by the connotation of the former. It cannot be contended against this that whatever conclusion with regard to the meaning of the imperative is adopted in the case of other scriptural imperatives should be adopted in all cases of imperatives so that even prohibitives etc. are to be used in the sense of the 'unseen'. The imperative has only obligatoriness as its connotation and it has been so decided. Unseeness is not the connotation. In prohibitions etc. there is no reason or precedent to regard the unseen as the meaning of the imperative. There is no need of the unseen process to prevent the generation of demerit from sinful action or to produce any merit from virtuous action. Only if such results are observed there will be any reason to infer the unseen as their cause but no such results are noted in these cases.

'If in the cases of obligatory and prohibited actions the 'unseen' is supposed to be their result, is it because without generating the 'unseen' the concerned imperatives will forfeit their imperative character or because they will not produce the awareness of obligatoriness or its reverse in the actions denoted by them as is the case with common imperatives like 'one should cook?' Nyāya may thus ask Mīmāṃsā in further defence of its view. The first of the alternatives is not acceptable as, in the Mīmāṃsā view the 'unseen' is the result or fruit of action not its means. So it is not like cooking or any other empirical activity which is recognised as worth executing because it yields some result. Of course heavenly bliss is the primary result but the 'unseen' also is a result though secondary, of ritualistic actions. So not being the means of a desired result the unseen cannot be regarded as worth executing.

The second alternative too is not acceptable. The obligationness or

otherwise of scriptural actions is not ascertained through the imperative character of the imperatives because these are not like empirical imperatives. The obligationness of the actions denoted by these is known through their causation of some desired result. Such is not the case with Vedic imperatives. Otherwise it would be necessary to ascertain first this fact about them before the actions prescribed by them are known as obligatory through inference. If this is admitted then the obligatoriness of Vedic duties will cease to be based on verbal knowledge only. Alright! Let there be then the inference that 'the obligatory actions lead to some desirable result based on the knowledge of the concomitance that whatever is obligatory is the means of a desired result like the unseen process'. No! The concomitance fails in the case of happiness itself which though desired is not of the nature of an obligatory duty. If the qualification 'different from happiness' is introduced in the concomitance then again the concomitance fails in the case of absence of pain. If difference from all desired results is introduced as the new qualification then it may be asked what the nature of this so-called result is? The answer to this may be that, 'that which is intrinsically desired is such a result and that which is other than this is undesired'. But then because of this qualification, that which is undesired would have to be treated as obligatory but this is contradiction in terms. But isn't it a fact that, that which is not intrinsically desirable is yet sometimes the cause of the desired and so can be treated as obligatory? The contradiction can then be avoided by adding the further qualification 'that which is the cause of the desired', to the middle or pervaded term in the concomitance. But this too will not do as the qualification would be identical with the major term and it is not established that the obligatory acts are not intrinsically desirable. Intrinsic desirability consists in being the result of that action which has no object beyond its result and since the obligatory actions do not have any object to achieve they can be regarded as ever-obligatory; otherwise these actions cannot be both desirable and ever-obligatory. So on account of the conflicting nature of the properties of desirability and eternal obligatoriness only one of the two can characterise the ever-obligatory actions. 'If so let the imperative concerned with obligatory and prohibitive actions be excluded from the scope of imperatives (on account of their denotation of the "desirable" result). What does Mīmāṃsā lose because of this exclusion?' It may be asked. Well, Nyāya too may ask a similar question of Mīmāṃsā in the case of ritualistic actions intended to produce some desirable results. If even such actions are regarded as unproductive of the unseen (result) by Nyāya it does not lose anything (or violate any of its principles). Certainly the imperative suffix by itself does not denote that the sacrificial ritual prescribed is the cause of heavenly bliss so that the 'unseen' is assumed to exist till the occurrence of the latter result. (If the imperative denoted the above meaning then the imperatives in common usage like 'one should cook' would be rendered meaningless. Besides intrinsic desirability cannot coexist in sacrifices with causality in relation to heavenly bliss). Nor can it be contended that the syntactical relation of the imperative with the word 'the desirer of heavenly bliss' world turn out to be insignificant if the imperative did not denote 'the unseen'. The meaning of the word 'the desirer of heavenly bliss' can well be recovered without the above assumption. Just as a prescription like 'The Brahmin should perform the sacrifice signifies (of itself) the disqualification of the non-Brahmin from the performance of the sacrifice so in the above case too the very word 'the desirer of heavenly bliss' used in the prescription can yield the meaning that 'whoever wishes to have heavenly bliss should perform the sacrificial ritual'. (So the need for the admission of the 'unseen' lasting till the emergence of the heavenly bliss can easily be avoided). But isn't there an inference (to prove the existence of the unseen in the case of obligatory actions) like this: 'Whatever a person does to achieve a certain desired result is the means of that result, the obligatory actions are certainly performed with the object of achieving some purpose; which must be the unseen itself? No! This inference is fallacious. If the purpose is natural then it cannot be pursued for the sake of something else (or with the desire to obtain something other than itself). On the other hand if the inference is that whatever is desired is obligatory (action) then happiness although desired is not obligatory and so the inference fails. Besides conditional obligationness of an action is itself known through the knowledge that it is productive of some desired object. It is not the other way about. So obligatoriness cannot be a proof for an action's being the cause of the desired object.

'But what is the purpose of this discussion whether obligatoriness is natural or conditional?' What we are really concerned with is the question whether the imperative occurring in the prescriptions of obligatory sentences denotes the unseen or not. (The naturalness or otherwise of obligatoriness has no relevance to this question). It is certainly a matter of common knowledge that when the heavenly bliss is desired it is the sacrifice which is other than the bliss that is treated as obligatory. Thus the obligatoriness of obligatory actions can well be meant by the imperative. No! This is not the truth of the matter. In a sentence a word denotes the meaning which is syntactically connected with the meaning of another word (in the sentence) and only the meaning which is

denotable is denoted by words (in sentences). But if a person desires one thing something else cannot be connected with it. In the sentence under consideration since the unseen is the desired thing the action prescribed cannot be treated as obligatory and so it cannot be syntactically connected with it. 'But can't the causality of the obligatory action be ascertained from the prescriptive sentence itself? It may be asked. Yes! This means that the imperative in the sentence means obligatoriness as coexistent with causality in relation to the desired. There is now no need of any inference for obtaining this knowledge. (Since there has to be connection between the unseen and the obligatory act so that the desire for the unseen may prompt one to perform the obligatory act, the scriptural statement itself should be taken to mean that the obligatory act is the cause of the desired result). Even if the desirer of one thing may consider something else as obligatory and thus the words respectively denoting these two may be regarded as connected with each other the said causality of action in relation to the desired cannot be inferred. The desire for (the desired) object may even be regarded as the qualification of the agent to perform the obligatory action (without the causality of the latter in relation to the desired object being established). Moreover the unseen cannot be obligatory. If obligatoriness consists in 'being executed or pre-empted by effort' then only things like paddy—which are already in existence can be treated as obligatory. If 'being the result of effort is obligatoriness,' then only sacrifice and such other things can be treated as obligatory (the unseen does not result from the effort which is only indirectly connected with it). Being the object of effort is also not obligatoriness. Only heaven and things like it which are intrinsically covetable are the objects of effort. The unseen is other than such a covetable object. But can't the unseen be the indirect object of effort like the breast-sucking of a baby—as the unseen procures heavenly bliss to the person making the effort? No! Even this indirect objecthood belongs to the sacrifice only. If the heaven is the ultimate object of effort then only the sacrifice which is the means of attaining heavenly bliss is the indirect object of effort (the unseen is posited only to account for the deferred causality of the sacrifice). But isn't it the case that due to the temporal gap between the sacrifice and the attainment of heaven the causality of the sacrifice is not sustainable? Well! Since the scriptures say so, the causality has got to be maintained. It can perhaps be urged that through the instrumentality of some intermediate process the said causality is sustainable. But things separated from each other by a long temporal gap cannot be viewed as related by the relation of instrumentality. Only the cause is connected with its effect through its instrument and the cause is that which immediately precedes its effect (the sacrifice does not immediately precede the heavenly bliss). If this is not admitted to be the nature of the cause then even things in the remote past could be the causes of things in the present.

This however will not do. Mere invariable precedence to the effect is the nature of causality. And instrumentality consists only in being the external process conducive to the production of the effect. In agriculture, medical treatment etc. it is this process that is frequently recognised to be the instrument of the cause in the production of the ultimate effect. But isn't this usage indirect? No! There is no contrary evidence to treating the usage as direct. Well! If the nature of causality is as mentioned then if a certain Brahmin is killed by the son of a certain person the charge of murder can be attributed to this person by treating his son as the intermediary in the killing process. If such things happened then there will be great upheaval in the affairs of the world. No! Such will not be the case. Even if the son were there he might not have committed the murder and even if the person had no son he himself could have committed the murder, so the son cannot be regarded as the determinant of the murder-causality of the father and so he cannot be supposed to be the instrument in the murder of the Brahmin by his father. The instrument (or the instrumental process) of one entity in relation to another is only that whose generation by the former determines its precedence to the latter. This is illustrated by the residual impression produced by an experience which does not produce memory without the mediation of the impressions. The positive and negative association of experience with memory being established, it cannot be accounted for without postulating the occurrence of the residual impressions, not otherwise. Similar is the condition in the present case too. If (the nature of causality) were not as explained above then in your (Mīmāṃsaka's) view too a hunter who dies accidentally just before a Brahmin is shot dead by the arrow shot by the him would cease to be a Brahmin-killer (as he ceases to exist before the death of the Brahmin (his prey) occurs. 'Besides the father of the hunter sleeping in his bed when the murder occurs would have to be regarded as the killer. By this rebuttal is also rebutted the view that both the unseen and its obligatoriness are together the meaning of the imperative.

Alright! Let then the very obligatoriness of the action or performance be the meaning of the imperative. No! This is not admissible. The statement 'I should do this' (expressing the said obligatoriness) may be the cognition either of the desire conducive to effort or of that which is worth executing. The first of these does not differ form decision. If the

decision relates to a remote object it is expressed by the words, 'This should be done by me'. But if the decision concerns a present object it is expressed as 'I may do this now'. (The second of these decisions arises from the first). But these decisions cannot be meant at all by the imperative as they themselves—not their cognition—predisposes one to action. This has already been explained. So when the fact is that one is disposed to act as soon as the decision to act arises in his mind the Mīmāṃsists have mistakenly regarded the knowledge of this decision as the cause of the disposition. As to the second suggested meaning, namely, 'obligatoriness', it is a property of actions. This may be understood either as the prior nonexistence of the contemplated action, or executability coupled with prior nonexistence of the action or finally executability, beneficence to the doer coupled with prior nonexistence of the action. On the first meaning, nobody would avoid anything as, before coming into being everything is nonexistent and so worth having. On the second even pain should be worth having as it can be procured and is nonexistent before emergence. As to the third proposed meaning, we shall state our criticism later.

EXPL.: Having refuted the view that some attribute or property of the agent is denoted by the imperative the author now turns to the view that it is some property of action that is denoted by the imperative, with a view to rebut the view thoroughly all possible meanings of the Sanskrit word *'Karma'* are to be successively considered and refuted. The first possible meaning of the word is, 'the result of action and the concerned property of this result is its achievability'. In connection with this it has already been explained that the disposition to actions like sacrifice arises only from the desire generated by the knowledge of this action. The achievability of heaven or any other result does not have anything to do with the action. Of course indirectly the knowledge may prompt one to act so as to achieve the result. The second meaning called 'the achievability of the *Apūrva* (in Sanskrit and standing for the unseen continuing process mediating between the action and its result)' also cannot be accepted. The unseen being unseen cannot be known at all. How can then it be known and its achievability be understood as meant by the imperative? The unseenness of the unseen is not a property like earthness or any other empirical property through which it can be identified. It may however be contended that the imperative is used to denote that which is worth doing or seeking. Sacrifice or any other empirical object though doable or sought for is not capable of producing heavenly bliss whose desire qualifies a person to be the agent of the sacrifice.

So all these objects sought for being excluded from the purview of the objects sought for, only the unseen is identifiable as the object worth seeking. But this defence of the cognition of the unseen is not acceptable. Unless the connection between the unseen and the property of 'sought-for-ness' or obligatoriness is known the latter by itself, apart from its cognition cannot yield the cognition of the unseen. Besides neither through words nor through non-cognition of difference between the unseen and the obligatory is it possible to acquire the knowledge of the unseen; further if unseenness is regarded as the connotation of the imperative then the empirical imperative like 'one should cook' not having the unseen as its meaning it would be rendered meaningless. If obligatoriness is regarded as the connotation of empirical imperatives then all imperatives should be regarded to have the same connotation.

The crux of all the above argumentation is that the unseen as the intermediary between ritualistic actions and their result and as meant by the imperative postulated by Mīmāṃsā serves no purpose. There is also no convincing proof—inferential or otherwise—for the occurrence of the unseen. In the obligatory actions there is no result issuing from the actions, yet Mīmāṃsā is emphatic that the actions produce the unseen. It is however not a result desired to be produced by the agent of the action. It cannot therefore be treated as both desired and obligatory. The unseen cannot also be viewed as an intermediary between the ritualistic cause and its remote result—the heavenly bliss. The unseen cannot serve the purpose of an intermediary because the causality of rituals in relation to the heavenly bliss is in no way subserved by the unseen. It has to be proved that the rituals cannot produce heavenly bliss unless the 'unseen' (about which nothing is known except that it is unseen) mediates between the former and the latter. Nyāya however has no explanation to offer as to how the sacrificial and other rituals considered to be the causes of heavenly bliss or other results taking place after a long lapse of time can be regarded as effects of the rituals etc. If the merit resulting from rituals and lasting till the emergence of the ultimate effect is supposed to be the intermediary between the rituals and their results then there cannot be any difference between this view and the view of Mīmāṃsā.

The view that a property of words is denoted by the imperative discussed and refuted.

TEXT: अस्तु तर्हि-करण-धर्मः। न। करणं हि शब्दः, तद्धर्मः अभिधा वा

स्यात्, तदर्थः भावनादिः वा तद्धर्मः इष्टसाधनता वा? न प्रथमः–

असत्वात् अप्रवृत्तेः च न अभिधाऽपि गरीयसी।
बाधकस्य समानत्वात् परिशेषः अपि दुर्लभः॥

संगति-प्रतिसंधान-अधिकायां तस्यां प्रमाणाभावात्। अन्य-समवेतस्य अपूर्ववत् अन्य-व्यापारत्वेन अपि उपपत्तेः। विषयतया अपि च स्वव्यापारं प्रति लिंगवत् हेतुभाव-अविरोधात्। अधिकत्वेऽपि ततः अप्रवृत्तेः। बालानां तदभावेऽपि तद्भावात्। शब्दांतरेण तत्-श्राविणां अपि अप्रवृत्तेः। न च विलक्षणा-एव सा लिङ्गविषयः? तद्-वैलक्षण्यं प्रतीतं प्रति चेत्? अर्थविशेषः अपि स्यात्। प्रवृत्तिमात्रं प्रति चेत्? अभिधासमवेतं तदिति कुतः? तत्संनिधानात् इति चेत्? न। अ-नियमात्। अन्यस्य सर्वस्य निषेधात् इति चेत्? न। प्रवृत्ति हेतुत्व-निषेधस्य तुल्यत्वात्। शब्दैक-वेद्यत्वे च अव्युत्पत्तेः। प्रवृत्ति-अन्यथानुपपत्तिसिद्धे व्युत्पत्तिः इत्यपि वार्तम्। न हि प्रवृत्ति-हेतुः कश्चिदस्तीति प्रवर्तते। इष्टसाधनता तु स्यात्। सर्वः हि मया क्रियमाणं एतत् मतं समीहितं साधयिष्यति इति प्रति-संधत्ते, ततः इच्छति 'कुर्यां' इति, ततः करोति इति सर्वानुभवसिद्धम्। तदयं व्युत्पित्सुः यज्ज्ञानात् प्रयत्नजननीं इच्छां अवाप्तवान् तज्ज्ञानमेव लिङ्-श्राविणः प्रवृत्ति-कारणं अनुमिनोति। ततश्च कर्तव्यतैकार्थ-समवायिनी इष्टसाधनता लिङर्थः इत्यवधारयति। न च वाच्यं-'एवं चेत् वरं कर्तव्यतैव अस्तु, अवश्याभ्युपगमनीयत्वात् कृतं इष्टसाधनतयेति? यथा हि नेष्टसाधनतामात्रं प्रतीत्य प्रवर्तते, असाध्येषु व्यभिचारात, तथा प्रयत्न-विषय-समवायिनीं इष्टसाधनतां अधिगम्य अधिकारी प्रवर्तते इत्यनुभवः। तत्र विषयः धातुना, भावना आख्यातमात्रेण, शेषं तु तद्विशेषेण लिङ्गा इत्येवं इष्टाभ्युपायतायां अन्वय-बलात् तद्विषयस्य इष्टसाधनत्वावगतिः इति कर्तव्यतैकार्थ-समवायिनी इष्टाभ्युपायता लिङः प्रवृत्ति-निमित्तं इत्युक्तम्। करणस्येष्टसाधनताभिधाने ज्योतिष्टोमेनेति तृतीयया न भवितव्यमिति तु देश्यं अवैयाकरणस्य अवधीरणीयमेव। तत्संख्या-भिधानं हि तदभिधानं आख्यातेन। न च तत् प्रकृते। न च यागेष्ट-साधनताभिधानं लिङा। किंतु अन्वयबलात् तल्लाभः इत्युक्तम्। यत्तु सिद्ध-

अपदेशादपि प्रतीयते इष्टसाधनता न च अतः संकल्पात्मा प्रवृत्तिः अस्तीति देश्यम्। तत्र समुत्कट-फलाभिलाषस्य समर्थस्य तत्साधनता-अवगमेपि न प्रवृत्तिरिति कः प्रतीयात्? सर्वपक्ष-समानं चैतत् समान-परिहारं चेति किं तेन?

अत्राभिधीयते-अस्तु प्रयत्न-विषय-समवायिनी इष्टसाधनता प्रवृत्ति-हेतुः, तथापि नासौ लिङर्थः, संदेहात्। सा हि किं साक्षादेव लिङा अवगम्यते, स्तनपानादौ अनुमानादिव बलेन, कि वा तत्प्रतिपादितात् कुतश्चिदर्थात् अनुमीयते, चेष्टा विशेष-अनुमितादिव अभिप्राय-विशेषात् समया-भिज्ञेनेति संदिह्यते। एवं च सति सा नाभिधीयते इत्येव निर्णयः।

TRANS.: Let then some property of the instrument or the word in the instrumental case be denoted by the imperative! No! It is words that are the instruments. The properties inhering in words are some power (or capacity) called *'abhidhā'* in Sanskrit or the desire to impel a person to act called *Bhāvanā* in Sanskrit or the causality relating to some desired object. The first of these cannot be meant by the imperative. The reasons for this denial are first, there is no power or capacity in words as suggested by Mīmāṃsā; secondly, none is prompted to act simply by the knowledge of this alleged capacity. Thirdly, as in the case of other alternatives discussed above here too there are similar contrary considerations which prevent any eliminative inference from establishing the above alternative.

To explain: There is no basis for admitting any capacity like *abhidhā* which is other than the conventional relation of words and their meanings by means of which words denote their meanings. It may here be objected that the knowledge of the conventional relation pertains to the self while the denotative capacity belongs to words. How can then the said knowledge belong to words as their capacity or process? The answer to the objection is similar to that which Mīmāṃsā gives to a similar question. The answer is that the sacrificial ritual is supposed to have the unseen as its instrument which belongs to the self not to the ritual. Moreover even if the knowledge of conventions does not arise from words yet as objects of the knowledge, words can be their objective causes just as the middle term is the object or the objective cause of its determinate knowledge in relation to the major and minor terms in inferences. Even if such a property is admitted an ignoramus who does not know that the imperative denotes the property is impelled to action on hear-

ing the imperative. Moreover if instead of the imperative some other word like *abhidhā* or *bhāvanā* itself is uttered by a speaker the hearer is not prompted to action. May it be urged that the imperative generates a peculiar kind of cognition of *abhidhā* which alone is capable of producing the urge to act? No! A peculiarity of cognition may be due either to the peculiarity of its object or the peculiarity may be intrinsic to the cognition. The first cannot be the case because no difference is noticeable between the *abhidhā* as denoted by the word *abhidhā* and that supposed to be denoted by the imperative. (The second too cannot be the case because if only that cognition of *abhidhā* which prompts action is supposed to be the peculiar cognition then since *abhidhā* is not commonly recognised as that which prompts action, it cannot be regarded as the denotation of the imperative). Alright! 'But if every cognition of *abhidhā* does not prompt action then on the basis of the occurrence of disposition to action only in certain cases can't the said peculiarity of certain cognitions of *abhidhā* prompting action be inferred?' One may ask. No! There can be such an inference but it can not establish that the peculiarity of the prompting cognition is due to the peculiarity of the *abhidhā*. There may be some other basis for the peculiarity. May it be that because *abhidhā* is an object included among the objects known through the imperative the peculiarity of the said cognition is to be taken to depend upon the peculiarly of *abhidhā*? No. There is no rule that the peculiarity of the cognition depends upon *abhidhā* only. Sometimes it is found to depend even upon 'the causality relating to the desired', of the cognition. (Even the knowledge of this prompts action). If these are denied to be the prompters of action then *abhidhā* too can be denied to be such (that is, it does not always produce the disposition for action). As to the comprehension in the meaning of the imperative, if it cannot be denied of *abhidhā* it cannot be denied of 'the causality of the desired' too. It may here be contended that *abhidhā* as known through empirical means of knowledge is of no use for action because these are concerned with actual entities only and so only the imperative has to denote the peculiar *abhidhā* needed to prompt action. The answer to this is that, that the imperative means *abhidhā* can be established only by empirical methods, not by means of verbal testimony. So such an *abhidhā* cannot be known at all. To say in retort to this that because of the occurrence of the disposition to action, *abhidhā* is postulated as the cause and thus its conventional relation with the imperative is established, is just empty talk. None acts because he knows that there is some cause for his being disposed to action. Such a knowledge does not prompt action. Causality relating to the desired may however be regarded as the meaning of the imperative. Everyone has first the realisation that what he or she is going to do will bring about some desired result, then desires to do it and thereafter actually does it. This is the common experience. Thus the seeker of the knowledge of the meaning of the imperative (who acts later) infers that the cause of his or her disposition to action is the desire which is generated by his or her knowledge of the causality relating to the desired. This is precisely what is meant by the imperative. So on hearing the imperative uttered by someone the hearer learns that the said causality coexisting with obligatoriness is meant by the imperative.

It should not be stated against this that obligatoriness alone can be regarded as the meaning of the imperative as it has necessarily to be admitted as the determinant of the denotedness of the said causality as its coexistent property, why then bring in the causality within the purview of the meaning of the imperative? Nobody is disposed to do anything simply by recognising its causality relating to the desired as things impossible to do though productive of desired ends are not sought after. But the realisation that this causality is inherent in a feasible object does prompt action to secure the object by the persons desiring it. This is common experience.

The analysis of the total meaning of the verb with its imperative suffix is this. The object of action or effort is indicated by the verbal root. The effort called *Bhāvanā* in Sanskrit is indicated by the suffix as suffix, and the said causality is indicated by the special imperative nature of the suffix. Thus when the causality of the desired is denoted by the imperative suffix then the action denoted by the verb gets connected with it. As a result this causality coexistent with the obligatoriness of the action like the sacrifice is connoted by the imperative. Such a connected meaning of the verb results from the grammatical structure of the verb (with its suffix).

Here it is objected by certain non-grammarians that in scriptural imperatives like 'One should perform the *jyotiṣtoma* sacrifice if one wishes to attain heavenly bliss' the instrumental case occurring with the word *jyotiṣtoma* would be unjustified if the imperative is supposed to denote the instrument. Since the causation of the desired is—as explained above, denoted by the imperative, the cause—that is the sacrifice—also is denoted by the imperative. As per the grammatical rule, a word in the instrumental case can occur in a sentence only if the imperative does not denote the instrument. This objection is met by the rejoinder that the said denotation by the imperative is the denotation of the number of the agent in the nominative case, not the instrument (the sacrifice). (It is the singular number of the performer of the sacrifice). Moreover

the imperative does not denote the causality pertaining to the sacrifice specifically (so that the sacrifice would get denoted by it). The specific causality is signified by means of syntax (as it has already been explained). Another objection urged against the above is that the imperative can denote only that which is to be achieved, not what is already existent, but the causality relating to the desired is an existent property, so it cannot be denoted by the imperative. The statement that sacrifice leads to heaven does not prompt anybody to perform the sacrifice. The objection is however misplaced as a competent person intensely desiring to attain heavenly bliss and knowledgeable about the means of attaining the bliss will certainly be prompted to perform the sacrifice even by the foregoing descriptive statement. No objector would deny this fact. The objection and its rejoinder are common to thinkers of all schools of thought.

Now we set forth our view with regard to the above conclusion. We may admit that the causality relating to the desired and inherent in the object of effort disposes one to act (that is to say that the knowledge that what one is striving for is productive of some desired result prompts one to act). But this causality cannot be supposed to be meant by the imperative. It is doubtful whether this causality is learnt directly from the imperative (on hearing it) or is inferred on the basis of some thing else denoted by the imperative, as for example a baby's awareness of the causality of the desire relating to breast-feeding is inferred from its feeding movements. It may be that as a person aware of certain conventions is able to infer what another person thinks from his special movements and gestures, so in the present case too the said causality is inferred from something else denoted by the imperative. If this is so the conclusion follows that the said causality is not meant by the imperative (it is only inferred).

EXPL.: After rebutting the views that the imperative denotes some property of the agent or the accusative, the author seeks to refute the possible view upheld by Mīmāṃsā that some property of the instrument (in a sentence) is meant by the imperative. The likely candidates for being such properties are what are called (*abhidhā* or *bhāvanā* in Sanskrit and the causation of the desired). The word *abhidhā* has a special meaning in Mīmāṃsā which is given the technical name *'Śābdī Bhāvanā'* by this school. In other schools *abhidhā* means the denotative capacity of words but in Mīmāṃsā *abhidhā* is more than this capacity. In fact it is the prompting or impelling capacity which the imperative possesses. Even the property viz. the causation of the desired by which the effort is produced on

hearing the imperative can be regarded as the meaning of the latter. In rebutting these views the author says that the mere understanding of the denotative capacity of the imperative does not prompt action. The causality of the desired characterising an action may dispose one towards it but one cannot be sure whether it is this property or something else inferred on the basis of the knowledge of the latter which prompts action. So the above view that the prompting capacity of the imperative or the causality of the desired characterising the effort and resulting from the hearing of the imperative is what is meant by the imperative is rejectable.

A point needs to be noted in the Mīmāṃsā view of the meaning of the imperative. The capacity called *abhidhā* or the verbal *bhāvanā* residing in the imperative is regarded as denoted by the imperative by Mīmāṃsā. This means that a certain word or suffix is the denoter of a certain property of itself because it is on hearing the imperative that the hearer is prompted to make effort to do something. Can such a view be rational? That the imperative means a command or the hearing of the word impels the hearer to strive for the commanded action is understandable. But to maintain that a word denotes one of its own properties is to incur the fallacy of mutual dependence. The property is known only if it is known as residing in the imperative but it is so known only if its conventional relation with the imperative is known.

Justification of the foregoing conclusion

TEXT: हेतुत्वात् अनुमानाच्च मध्यमादौ वियोगात:।
अन्यत्र क्लृप्त-सामर्थ्यात् निषेधानुपपत्तित:॥

तथाहि-'अग्निकाम: दारुर्णी-मथ्नीयात्' इति श्रुत्वा कुत: इत्युक्ते वक्तार: वदंति 'यत: तन्मन्थनादग्नि: सिद्ध्यतीति।' 'तरति ब्रम्हहत्यां य: अश्वमेधेन यजते' इत्यादौ इष्टाभ्युपायतायामेव अवगतायां अनुमिमते तांत्रिका:-यत् अश्वमेधेन यजेत मृत्यु-ब्रम्हहत्या-तरण-काम: इत्यादि विधिम्। निंदया च निषेधम्। तद्यथा-

अंधं तम: प्रविशंति ये के चात्महन: जना:।

इत्यत: नात्मानं हन्यादिति। कुर्या:, कुर्यां इत्यत्र लिङ् नेष्टाभ्युपायता माह, किंतु वक्तृसङ्कल्पम्। न हि इष्टाभ्युपाय: ममायं इति कुर्यां इति पदार्थ:,

किंतु तत्प्रतिपत्ते रनन्तरं योऽस्य संकल्पः-कुर्या मिति सः एव। सर्वत्र चान्यत्र वक्तुरेवेच्छा अभिधीयते लिङा इत्यवधृतम्। तथा हि आज्ञा-अध्येषणा-अनुज्ञा-संप्रश्न-प्रार्थना-आशंसा-लिङि नान्यत् चकास्ति। यां वक्तुरिच्छां अननुविदधानः तत्क्षोभाद्बिभेति सा आज्ञा। या तु श्रोतुः पूजा-संमान-व्यंजिका सा अध्येषणा। वारणाभावव्यंजिका अनुज्ञा।अभिवचन-प्रयोजनः सं-प्रश्नः। लाभेच्छा प्रार्थना। शुभाशंसनं आशीः इति।

न च त्रिधिविकल्पेषु निषेधः उपपद्यते। तथाहि यदा अभिधा विधिः तदा न हन्यात्, हनन-भावना न अभिधीयते इति वाक्यार्थः व्याघातात् निरस्तः। यदा कालत्रयापरामृष्टा भावना तदा नेति संबंध-अत्यंताभावः मिथ्या। यदा कार्यं तदा न हन्यात्, न हननं कार्यमित्यनुभव-विरुद्धम्। क्रियते एव यतः। न हननेन कार्यं, हननकारणकं कार्यं नास्तीत्यर्थः इत्यपि नास्ति। दुःखनिवृत्ति-सुखाप्त्योः अन्यतरस्य तत्र सद्भावात्। हनन-कारणकं अदृष्टं नास्तीत्यर्थः इति तु निरांतकं दृष्टार्थिनं प्रवर्तयेदेवेति साधु शास्त्रार्थः। अहनेन अपूर्वं भावयेदिति तु अशक्यम्। कारणस्य अनादित्वेन कार्यस्यापि तथाभावप्रसङ्गात्। भावनायाश्च तदविषयत्वात्। अहनन-संकल्पेन इति यावज्जीवं अविच्छिन्न-संकल्पः स्यात्। सकृत् कृत्वैव वा निवृत्तिः। पश्चात् हन्यादेव अविरोधात्। संपादितो हि अनेन नियोगार्थः।

यावत् यावत् हननसंकल्पवान् तावत् तावत् विपरीत-संकल्पेन अपूर्वं भावये दिति वाक्यार्थः तथाभूतस्य अधिकारित्वात् इत्यपि वार्तम्। तदश्रुतेः। प्रसक्तं हि प्रतिषिध्यते न अप्रसक्तं इति चेत्? न वै किंचिदिह प्रतिषिध्यते। तदभावः प्रतिपाद्यते इति निषेधार्थः। हनन-करणकं अपूर्वं वाक्यार्थः। किं च न हन्या दिति अहनेन अपूर्वस्य कर्तव्यता-प्रत्ययः जातः वेदात्, जातश्च हननक्रियायां रागात्। निष्फलाच्च कार्यात् अपेक्षितफलं गरीयः इति न्यायात् हन्यादेव इत्यहो वेदव्याख्या-कौशलं आस्तिक्याभिमानिनः मीमांसक-दुर्दुरूढस्य।

इष्टसाधनतापक्षेऽपि 'न हन्यात्' न हनन-भावना इष्टाभ्युपायः इति वाक्यार्थः। तथा च अनिष्टसधनत्वं कुतः लभ्यते? न हि इष्टसाधनं यन्न

भवति तदवश्यं अनिष्टसाधनं दृष्टं उपेक्षणीयस्यापि भावात्। यत् रागादि-प्रसक्तं प्रतिषिध्यते तदवश्यं अनिष्टसाधनं दृष्टम्। यथा सविषं अन्नं न भुंजीथाः इति। तेन वेदेप्यनुमास्यते, इत्यपि न साधीयः। प्रतिषेधार्थस्यैव चिंत्यमानत्वात्। न हि कर्तव्यत्वस्य, इष्टसाधनत्वस्य, भावनायाः वा अभावः प्रतिपादयितुं शक्यते। लौकिकानां लौकिक-प्रमाण-सिद्धत्वात्। तथापि प्रतिपाद्यते तावदिति चेत्? न। पाषंडागम-निषेधेन अनैकांतात्। नासौ प्रमाणमिति चेत्? न। अर्थ-विपर्यय-प्रतिपादनाविशेषे अस्यापि तथाभावात्। तात्पर्यतः प्रामाण्यं इति चेत्? न। विधि-निषेधयोः अनन्यपरत्वात्, 'न विधौ परः शब्दार्थः' इति न्यायात्। तथापि निषेधे तथा भविष्यतीति चेत्? न। अविनाभाव-तदुद्देश-प्रवृत्त्योः अभावात्। नापि 'असुरा विद्यादिवत्' अस्य नञः विरोधिवचनत्वम्। क्रियासंगत-त्वात्, असमरस्तत्वाच्च।

TRANS.: Causality relating to the desired cannot be meant by the imperative because this causality is (separately) stated in sentences as the cause of action (where some action is enjoined). Further if the said causality were denoted by the imperative then on the basis of it the imperative character of certain sentences cannot be inferred. Besides in third person and first person sentences the verbal suffixes like say, 'Do it' or 'I may do it' express only the will to do and not the said causality. Lastly the imperative is generally known to denote things quite different from causality and in prohibitive sentences like 'one should not indulge in killing' there is no desired object to be brought into being by the action of the agent.

To explain: In the Vedic injunction prescribing that 'one who wishes to kindle fire should churn a holed stick with another stick', if it is asked, why should one do such a thing, the experts reply that by this means fire is obtained by the person seeking it. Now if the imperative itself in the sentence denoted the causation of the desired in the churning action, the reply given would become superfluous. In other Vedic sentences like the one stating that whoever performs the *'Aśvamedha'* (named) sacrifice succeeds in getting rid of the sin of killing a Brahmin, the causality of the sacrifice in relation to the desired object known through the sentence is regarded by ritualists to lead to the inference of the imperative that one should perform such a sacrifice if one desires to

overcome the sin of killing. Likewise to condemn an action as the cause of the undesired leads to the inference of a prohibitory imperative. For instance the Upaniṣadic statement that 'those who kill themselves enter into a region of pitch darkness' entails the prohibition that one should not commit suicide (or remain ignorant of the self). Further the imperative used in the second and third person like, 'you should do it' 'I shall do it' respectively do not mean the said causality. Instead they mean the desire or decision of the speaker. Certainly 'I shall do it' does not signify that 'this that I am going to do is desired by me'. The decision following the knowledge that the action is beneficial is what is meant by the suffix. Thus it becomes very clear that in all other cases the imperative denotes only the desire of the utterer of the verb in the imperative mood. So no meaning other than certain kinds of desires (to be explained below) are found to be expressed by the imperative. There is first the threatening desire of the speaker which if ignored causes fear in the mind of the hearer called in Sanskrit *'Adhyeśṇā'*, The desire which expresses the absence of the speaker's dissent to the hearer's action is called permission or *'anugyā'* in Sanskrit, The desire of a speaker seeking answer to a question is called query or *'Sampraśna'* in Sanskrit. The desire to have some benefit is called prayer. Lastly the desire for the good of another is benevolence.

If the different meanings of the imperative suggested by Mīmāṃsā (mentioned above) are accepted then prohibitions cannot be properly explained. For example, if *abhidhā* referred to above is the meaning of the imperative then the prohibitive sentence 'one should not kill' would signify that the effort for killing is not stated. This is contradiction in terms as the statement says precisely what is here denied. If the effort irrespective of the time of its occurrence is indicated by the imperative then the statement would signify the absolute absence of the effort for killing. This however is false. If 'executability' is taken to be meant by the imperative then the prohibition could mean that killing is not executable (or obligatory). But this is not the case at all. 'There is no effect produced by killing' cannot also be meant by the imperative. Either the removal of pain or the acquisition of pleasure is certainly effected by killing by those indulging in it. If however the imperative is taken to mean that there is no merit which is caused by killing then the prohibition would serve no purpose. A killer who does not care to earn any merit would fearlessly indulge in the killing activity. Can then the imperative mean that, by not killing one should bring into being the unseen (merit)? No, Not killing is the anterior absence of killing which (absence) is beginningless (all anterior absences are beginningless). So

the product of this beginningless entity will also be beginningless. Can it be urged against this that although the absence is beginningless the effort relating to the absence is not so? No! Absence not being the goal of effort it cannot be its object (none strives for maintaining any anterior absence). It may here be suggested that the decision called *Saṃkalpa* in Sanskrit is meant by the imperative and so the prohibition means 'that one should seek merit by cultivating the decision not to kill'. But if this decision is to be a lifelong decision it is impossible to cultivate it. On the other hand if the decision is expected to occur only once then one may be free for killing without violating the prohibitions, if one decides not to kill only once; perhaps the prohibition may be taken to mean that whenever the decision or desire to kill arises in one's mind one should cultivate the decision opposed to the latter for earning merit. Only such a person is qualified to make the right decision. This too is not correct as the sentence does not consist of words stating the fact. But mayn't it be contended that since only what is possible is desired the denial involved in the prohibition presupposes the possibility of recurrent decisions to kill on the part of the killer? No! Nothing is denied in the sentence. The occurrence-denial means only absence of the denied. But the sentence signifies the occurrence of the unseen merit resulting from avoidance of killing.

Further it is to be noted that even if the scriptural prohibition is supposed to stand for the unseen merit resulting from non-killing it cannot dissuade anyone from killing. The desire for killing arises from passion. The avoidance of killing does not produce any (concrete) result while killing does produce a concrete result. So in respect of productivity of result killing is superior to non-killing and thus despite one's knowledge that non-killing causes the unseen merit the killer would not be dissuaded from killing (such a person may not care for the unseen merit). Thus all the various attempts of the vainglorious Mīmāṃsaka to properly interpret the Vedic statements are found to be full of folly.

If the view of old Naiyāyikas is accepted then the prohibitive statement would mean that the effort to kill is not productive of any desired object. But this interpretation does not yield the meaning that the effort to kill is productive of the undesired. Certainly what is not productive of the desired is not necessarily productive of the undesired. There is also the third category of the negligible. But isn't it a fact that, that which is prompted by passion is bound to be definitely productive of the undesired? Such for example is the case with the prohibition, 'Do not eat poisoned food' So in Vedic prohibitions too the causality of the undesired (in the case of the action which is not productive of the de-

sired) can certainly be inferred. No! The inference is based on prohibition and it is the meaning of prohibition itself that is being inquired into. Certainly the negation involved in prohibition cannot state the absence, of executability, or causality relating to the desired or even the effort pertaining to the prohibited act. Empirical activities which are prohibited are known to be executable, productive of the desired and are also strived for. If despite their being such they are desired (so that killing etc. are maintained to be productive of the undesired) then even the statements of the hypocritic alien thinkers should have to be treated as authoritative. They too make prohibitive statements which are not concerned with facts. These cannot be set apart as invalid or nonauthoritative unlike the Vedas because both of these are alike in respect of making non-factual statements. May it be contended here that the causality of the undesired although not actually stated by the prohibitive statement is yet its real import? No! Scriptural injunctions and prohibitions do not mean anything beyond what they denote. This is the rule laid down by Jaimini, the author of Mīmāṃsā. It can't be contended against this that the said rule applies only to injunctions not prohibitions. The suggested but undenoted meaning in Vedic injunctions and prohibitions is admitted only in those cases where the two meanings are concomitant with each other and the suggested meaning is mainly intended to be conveyed. It may still be contended that like the words 'ignorance' 'non-divine' etc. the negations in Vedic prohibitions do not mean absence of causality relating to the desired but the positive quality of being the cause of the undesired (as ignorance means a positive state of foolishness). The negation in the said statements stands for the opposite of the positive property. But such a contention cannot be sustained. Only when negation is compounded with a word and is not associated with the verb is it possible for it to yield a positive meaning (opposed to another positive meaning). But in Vedic prohibitions negations stand apart and are associated with the verb.

EXPL.: In justification of the conclusion stated at the end of the earlier passage the author sets forth certain reasons why causality relating to the desired cannot be the meaning of the imperative. The desire or decision of the speaker it is—not the said causality—which is meant by the imperative. Prohibitive statements specially cannot be interpreted as prohibitive if the said causality is supposed to be meant by the imperative. The crux of the various arguments set forth against other possible interpretations of the imperative is that on these interpretations the statements cease to perform the prohibitive function.

Conclusion of the foregoing arguments

TEXT: तस्मात्

विधि: वक्तु: अभिप्राय: प्रवृत्त्यादौ लिङादिभि:।
अभिधेय:, अनुमेया तु कर्तु: इष्टाभ्युपायता॥

तत्र स्वयं-कर्तृक-क्रिया-इच्छाभिधानं 'कुर्याम्' इति। संबोध्य कर्तृक-क्रिया-इच्छाभिधानं 'कुर्या:' इति। शेष कर्तृक-क्रियेच्छाभिधानं 'कुर्वीत' इति। तथा च 'अग्निकाम: दारुणी मथ्नीयात्' इत्यस्य लौकिक-वाक्यस्य अयमर्थ: संपद्यते, 'अग्निकामस्य दारुमथने प्रवृत्ति:-ममेष्टेति। तत: श्रोता अनुमिनोति 'ननु दारुमथन-यत्न: अग्ने: उपाय: इति'। यत्-विषय: हि प्रयत्न: यस्य अनेन इष्यते स: तस्य अपेक्षित-हेतु:। तथा तेनावगतश्च। यथा ममैव पुत्रादे: भोजनविषय: इति व्याप्ते:। विषं न भक्षयेदित्यस्य तु विषभक्षण-गोचरा प्रवृत्ति: मम नेष्टा इत्यर्थ:। ततोऽपि श्रोता अनुमिनोति 'नूनं विषभक्षण-भावना अनिष्ट-साधनम्। यद्विषयो हि प्रयत्न: कर्तु-अभिमत-साधक: अपि आप्तेन नेष्यते स: तत: अधिकतर-अनर्थ-हेतु:। तथा तेनावगतश्च। यथा ममैव पुत्रादे: क्रीडा, कर्दम, विषभक्षणादि-विषये इति व्याप्ते:। लौकिके एव वाक्ये अयं प्रकार: कदाचित् बुद्धिं अधिरोहति न तु वैदिकेषु, तेषु पुरुषस्य निरस्तत्वात् इति चेत्? न। निरास-हेतोरभावात्। तदस्तित्वे हि प्रमाणं नास्तीति चेत्? मा भूदन्यत्। विधिरेव तावत् गर्भे इव पुंयोगे प्रमाणं श्रुतिकुमार्या:, किमत्र क्रियताम्? लिङो वा लौकिकार्थातिक्रमे ये एव लौकिका: ते एव वैदिका: ते एव च एषां अर्था: इति विप्लवेत। तथा च 'जबगडदशा' दिवत् अनर्थकत्व-प्रसङ्ग: इति भव सुस्थ:।

स्यात् एतत्। तथापि वक्तृणां उपाध्यायनां एव अभिप्राय: वेदे विधिरस्तु कृतं स्वतंत्रेण वक्त्रा परमेश्वरेण इति चेत्? न। तेषां अनुवक्तृतया अभ्यासाभिप्राय-मात्रेण प्रवृत्ते: शुकादिवत्। तथा विधाभिप्राया भावात्। भावे वा न राजशासनानुवादिन: अभिप्राय: आज्ञा, किं नाम? राज्ञ: एव इति लौकिक: अनुभव:।

TRANS.: For all the above reasons *'abhidhā'* etc. cannot be the meaning of the imperative. The speaker's intention regarding the hearer's disposition or non-disposition to work is alone the meaning of the imperative. From this intention is inferrible the causality relating to the desired of the hearer's disposition to work. So the knowledge of this causality on the part of the agent (the hearer) is the direct cause of his disposition to work.

To explain: when the speaker seeks to give expression to his desire to execute an act the verb used by him or her is '(I) shall do (this)'. Where the desire that the addressed person should execute an act is expressed by a speaker the verb used is 'do (it)'. When the desire that another person should execute his or her act is expressed the verb used is, '(one) should do it'. Thus for example a common sentence that 'one who wants to kindle fire should churn sticks together', signifies that the utterer of the sentence desires that the person seeking to kindle fire should churn sticks together. From this expressed intention or desire of the speaker the hearer infers that the churning of sticks is the cause of the kindling of fire. It is a rule (or concomitance) that if a reliable person desires that a certain other person should seek by his or her effort a certain object then that object is the cause of what the reliable person expects to have and he so regards it. For example, I like my son to take a certain dish in his food (the concomitance is illustrated in this case). In the case of a prohibition like, 'one should not consume poison', what is meant is that nobody's urge to consume poison is liked by the utterer of the prohibiting sentence. From this (prohibition) too the hearer infers that the consumption of poison causes undesirable effects. However if the reliable person does not approve of the effort to seek an object by another person although beneficial to him or her then (it means) that the effort produces more evil than good and it is so regarded by him. For example I do not approve of my son's playfulness, or wallowing in mud or the desire to consume poison. (This illustrates the concomitance stated above).

But do not these concomitances seem to apply sometime to empirical instances only but not to scriptural cases as the scriptures are proved to be authorless? No! There is no basis for denying authorship for the scriptures. But is there any basis for maintaining the authorship either, for the scriptures? Well, let there be no other proof, the imperative sentences themselves contained in the scriptures are such proofs, for their being authored, as an embryo in the womb of a virgin is the proof for her having had intercourse with a man. We can't deny at all such a proof. If to sidetrack such a proof it is contended that scriptural imperatives

mean something different from the empirical ones then the rule that the empirical meanings of words are the same as those that are ascribed to them in the scriptures will be violated. As a result the scriptural words would be rendered meaningless like any jumble of letters.

Alright! Let there be then this proof for the absence of an author for the scriptures. The imperatives in the scriptures may well express the intention only of their teachers. Why should there be an independent teacher-author like God of the scriptures? No! The teachers of scriptures only follow the instructions received from their own teachers (and ultimately from God). They are just like parrots which reproduce the words to utter which they are trained. They do not and cannot have any intention in uttering the words taught to them. Even if the teachers are supposed to have some intention in uttering the scriptural imperatives the intentions are only the renderings of God's as are the intentions of a government-officer who just conveys the intentions or orders of the government. This is common experience.

EXPL.: Having refuted all other views of what the imperative means the author propounds the view which is upheld by the Nyāya school that it is the intention of the speaker (or author) of the imperative that is meant by latter. The speaker pronounces the imperative, being convinced that what he is prescribing for execution by the hearer is beneficial to him and what he is prohibiting by means of his pronouncement is malefic to him. Such being the case the benefic or malefic nature of action prescribed or proscribed by the scriptural imperatives is inferrible from the intentions expressed by the imperatives. There has therefore to be an author fully aware of the good or bad consequences of the actions prescribed or proscribed by him. Such a being cannot but be God. So the very fact that the scripture consists mainly of imperatives is a proof for the existence of God.

Scriptural references as proofs for God's existence

TEXT: श्रुते: खलु अपि–

कृत्स्न: एव हि वेद: अयं परमेश्वर-गोचर:।
स्वार्थ-द्वारैव तात्पर्यं तस्य स्वर्गादिवत् विधौ॥

न संत्येव हि वेद-भागा: यत्र परमेश्वर: न गीयते। तथा हि स्रष्टृत्वेन

सूक्तेषु, विभूत्या रुद्रेषु, शब्द-ब्रम्हत्वेन मण्डल-ब्राम्हणेषु, प्रपंचं पुरस्कृत्य निष्प्रपंचतया उपनिषत्सु, यज्ञ-पुरुषत्वेन मंत्र-विधिषु, देहाविर्भावैः उपाख्यानेषु उपास्यत्वेन च सर्वत्र इति।

सिद्धार्थतया न ते प्रमाणं इति चेत्? न। तद्धेतोः कारण-दोष-शंका-निरासस्य भाव-भूत-अर्थ-साधारणत्वात्। अन्यत्र अमीषां तात्पर्यं इति चेत्? स्वार्थ-प्रतिपादन द्वारा, शब्द-मात्रतया वा? प्रथमे स्वार्थे अपि प्रामाण्यं एषितव्यम्। तस्य अर्थस्य अनन्य-प्रमाणकत्वात्। अत एव तत्र तस्य स्मारकत्वं इत्यपि मिथ्या। तत् प्रतिपादकत्वे अपि न तत्र तात्पर्यं इति चेत्? स्वार्थापरित्यागे ज्योतिः शास्त्रवत् अन्यत्रापि तात्पर्ये कः दोषः? अन्यथा स्वर्ग-नरक-व्रात्य-श्रोत्रियादि-स्वरूप-प्रतिपादकानां अप्रामाण्ये बहु विप्लवेत। तत्र अबाधनात् तथा इति चेत्? तुल्यं इति। न तादृगर्थः क्वचिदिष्टः इति चेत्? स्वर्गादयोऽपि तथा। तन्मिथ्यात्वे तदर्थिनामप्रवृत्तौ विधानानर्थक्यप्रसमङ्गः इति चेत्? इहापि तदुपासना-विधानानर्थक्यप्रसङ्गः। तन्मिथ्यात्वे हि सालोक्य-सायुज्यादि-फल मिथ्यात्वे कः प्रेक्षावान् तमुपासीत इति तुल्यमिति। वाक्यात् अपि। संसर्ग-भेद-प्रतिपादकत्वं हि अत्र वाक्यत्वं अभिप्रेतम्। तथा च यत् पद-कदंबकं यत्-संसर्ग-भेद-प्रतिपादकं तत् तदनपेक्ष-संसर्ग-ज्ञान-पूर्वकं, यथा लौकिकं, तथा च वैदिकं इति प्रयोगः। विपक्षे च बाधकं उक्तम्।

TRANS.: Even from the statements in the Vedas God's existence is provable. The whole of the Veda is concerned with God's existence. Just as the commendatory statements in the Veda referring to heaven etc. getting syntactically connected with imperatives convey their intended meaning viz., the commendation of the Vedic rituals, so the statements referring to God also covey their intended meaning viz., the beneficent character of God's worship. There is no portion of the Veda which does not contain God's praise. For example in the Man-hymn of the *Ṛkveda* God is eulogised as the creator of the universe, in the *Rūdra* portion of another Veda God's glory is praised, in the *Maṇḍala Brāhmaṇa* portion of yet another Veda God is described as word which is *Brāhman* itself, in the Upaniṣads God is referred to as transcending the reality of the world.

In the incantations of the Veda God is identified with the sacrificial man. In epical stories God is described in terms of his various bodily incarnations and as the object of worship in all other literature. It may be contended that all the references to God are concerned with actualities and so they are not to be treated as valid like injunctions. This contention however is baseless. The basis of invalidity are defects in the causes of the statements dubbed as invalid. If these are absent in statements relating even to past or present things and events there is no reason why they should not be regarded as valid. May it be urged that the intended meanings of these statements are different from their literal meanings? Well! If the intended meanings are conveyed through the literal meaning, then these must be treated as valid as these meanings are not obtained through any invalid source of knowledge. It may be contended against this that the words, referring to existent entities do not denote them. They only remind us of them so that the full syntactical meaning could be conveyed by the sentence. But such a contention is wrong. Words and their meanings are related by the conventional relation only. May then it be urged that although the words denote their literal meanings their import is different from these? No! If the words retain their literal meaning despite having a different intended meaning they cannot be treated as defective. It is just as in the statements of the science of astronomy (which is an auxiliary of the Vedas). The statements in astronomy are literally concerned with actual events but their import has connection with Vedic rituals. If such were not the case then Vedic statements dealing with heaven, hell, the sinner, the virtuous etc. (entities which are existent) would turn out to be invalid thus creating a lot of confusion in Vedic interpretation. But aren't these things not proved to be unreal? Yes, but then this holds good of other existent entities too. But is it not a fact that such entities are nowhere observed? Well, heaven, hell etc. also are not observed entities. If these were all imaginary entities then people craving for heavenly bliss would not care to perform scarifies so that the Vedic injunctions relating to sacrifices would be rendered meaningless? But then the injunctions relating to worship, prayer etc. of God would also be rendered meaningless if God were just an imaginary entity. And if this prayer, worship etc. were baseless then the different kinds of results like proximity to or coexistence with God etc. supposed to arise from God's worship and prayer would also turn out to be imaginary. No sensible person would then care for these things.

Even on the basis of the sentential construction of Vedic passages God's existence can be established. Here 'sentence' means the struc-

ture which signifies the different syntactical relations of the words it consists of. So a combination of words constituting a sentence signifies the relations (of its words) which are known otherwise than through the sentence (unless these relations are already known through other means they cannot be imported into sentences). This is so in empirical sentences and similar must be the case in Vedic sentence. Arguments opposed to this view have been refuted earlier.

EXPL.: Another argument in favour of the existence of God is the various eulogistic references to God and his worship and prayer leading to celestial happiness, freedom etc., contained in the Vedas. These cannot be dismissed as mere commendatory references having relevance only to ritualistic and other injunctions which alone are self-valid according to Mīmāṃsā. There is no reason why non-imperative type of statements in the Veda should be treated as invalid. Unless some flaw is found in the causes of these statements they cannot be treated as invalid. The discrimination between imperative and non-imperative statements made by Mīmāṃsā is simply baseless. This will render all indicative empirical statements invalid. (Which Mīmāṃsā too will not admit). This argument for the existence of God is however not convincing in view of the fact that God himself is regarded as the author of the Vedas. Besides God would have to be supposed to indulge in self-adulation and thus forfeit His Godly nature if this argument is accepted.

Even from number God's existence can be established

TEXT: संख्या-विशेषात् अपि-

स्यामभूवं भविष्यामि इत्यादि संख्या च वक्तृगा।
समाख्या अपि न शाखानां आद्य-प्रवचनात् ऋते॥

कार्यतया हि प्राक् संख्या उक्ता। संप्रति तु प्रतिपाद्यतया उच्यते। तथा हि उत्तम-पुरुषा भिहिता संख्या वक्तारं अन्वेति इति सुप्रसिद्धम्। अस्ति च तत्प्रयोगः प्रायशः वेदे। ततः तदभिहिततया तयाऽपि सः एव अनुगंतव्यः। अन्यथा अनन्वय-प्रसङ्गात्।

अथवा समाख्या-विशेषः संख्याविशेषः उच्यते। काठकं, कालापकं इत्यादयः हि समाख्या-विशेषाः शाखाविशेषाणां अनुस्मर्यंते। ते च-न

प्रवचन-मात्र-निबंधनाः, प्रवक्तृणां अनंतत्वात्। नापि प्रकृष्ट-वचन-निमित्ताः। उपाध्यायेभ्यः अपि प्रकर्षे प्रत्युत अन्यथाकरणदोषात्। तत्-पाठ-अनुकरणे च प्रकर्षाभावात्। कति च अनादौ संसारे प्रकृष्टाः प्रवक्तारः इति कः नियामकः इति? नापि आद्यस्य वक्तुः समाख्या इति युक्तम्। भवद्भिः तदनभ्युपगमात्। अभ्युपगमे वा सः एव अस्माकं वेदकारः इति वृथा विप्रतिपत्तिः।

स्यात् एतत्। ब्राम्हणत्वे सति अवांतर-जाति-भेदाः एव कठत्वादयः। तदध्येया तदनुष्ठेयार्था च शाखा तत्-समाख्यया व्यपदिश्यते इति किमनुपपन्नम्? न। क्षत्रियादेः अपि तत्रैव अधिकारात्। न च यः ब्राम्हणस्य विशेषः सः क्षत्रियादौ संभवति। न च क्षत्रियादेः अन्यः वेदः इत्यस्ति। न च कठाः काठकं एव अधीयते तदर्थमेव अनुतिष्ठंतीति नियमः। शाखासंचारस्यापि प्रायशः दर्शनात्। प्रागेवायं नियमः आसीत् इदानीमयं विप्लवते इति चेत्? विप्लवः एव तर्हि सर्वदा। कठादि-अवांतर-जाति-विप्लवात् इति अगतिः एव इयम्। तस्मात् आद्य-प्रवक्तृ-वचन-निमित्तः एव अयं समाख्या-विशेष-संबंधः इत्येव साधु इति।

स एवं भगवान् श्रुतः अनुमितश्च। कैश्चित् साक्षात् अपि दृश्यते प्रमेयत्वादेः घटवत्। ननु तत्सामग्री-रहितः कथं द्रष्टव्यः? सा हि बहिरिन्द्रिय-गर्भा मनोगर्भा वा तत्र न संभवति। चक्षुरादेः नियत-विषयत्वात्। मनसः बहिः अस्वातंत्र्यात्। तदुक्तं 'हेत्वभावे फलाभावात्' इत्यादि। न। कार्यैक व्यंग्यायाः सामग्र्याः निषेद्धुं अशक्यत्वात्।

अपि च दृश्यते तावत् बहिरिन्द्रियोपमे अपि अ-संनिहित-देश-काल-अर्थ-साक्षात्कारः स्वप्ने। न च स्मृतिरेवासौ पटीयसी। स्मरामि स्मृतं वेति स्वप्नानुसंधानाभावात्। पश्यामि, दृष्टं इत्यनुव्यवसायात्। न च आरोपितं तत्र अनुभवत्वम्? अबाधनात्। अननुभूतस्यापि स्वशिरः-छेदनादेः अवभासनाच्च।

स्मृतिविपर्यासः असौ इति चेत्? यदि स्मृति-विषये विपर्यासः इत्यर्थः तदा अनुमन्यामहे। अथ स्मृतौ एव अनुभवत्व-विपर्यासः इति तदा प्रागेव निरस्तः। न च संभवत्यपि। न हि अन्येन आकारेण अध्यवसितः अन्येन

ज्ञानावच्छेदकतया अध्यवसीयते। तथा च 'सः घटः' इति उत्पन्नायां स्मृतौ भ्राम्यतः 'तं घटं अनुभवामि' इति स्यात्। न तु इमं घटं इति। न हि 'अयं घटः' इति स्मृतेः आकारः। तस्मात् अनुभवः एव असौ स्वीकर्तव्यः। अस्ति च स्वप्नानुभवस्य अपि कस्यचित् सत्यत्वं, संवादात्। तच्च काकतालीयमपि न निर्निमित्तम्। सर्व-स्वप्न-ज्ञानानामपि तथात्व-प्रसङ्गात्। हेतुश्चात्र धर्मः एव। स च कर्मजवत् योगजः अपि योगविधेः अवसेयः। कर्म-योग विध्योः तुल्य-योग-क्षेमत्वात्।

तस्मात् योगिनां अनुभवः धर्मजत्वात् प्रमा, साक्षात्कारित्वात् प्रत्यक्षफलं, धर्माननुगृहीत-भावना-मात्र-प्रभवस्तु न प्रमेति विभागः इति। अतः तत्सामग्री-विरहः असिद्धः।

तथापि विपक्षे किं बाधकं इति चेत्? 'द्वे ब्रम्हणी वेदितव्ये' इत्यादि योग-विधि-वैयर्थ्य-प्रसङ्गः। अशक्यानुष्ठानोपायोपदेशकत्वात्। न च असाक्षात्कारि-ज्ञान-विधानं एतत्? अर्थज्ञाना वधिना अध्ययन विधिना एव तस्य गतार्थत्वात् इति। एतेन परमाण्वादयः व्याख्याताः इति।

तदेवं एवंभूतं अधिकृत्य श्रूयते-'न द्रष्टुः दृष्टेः विपरिलोपः विद्यते' इति। 'एकं एव अद्वितीयं' इति। 'पश्यति अचक्षुः स शृणोति अकर्णः' इति। 'द्वे ब्रम्हणी वेदितव्ये परं च अपरं च' इति। 'यज्ञेन यज्ञं अयजंत देवाः' इति। 'यज्ञो वै विष्णुः' इत्यादि। स्मर्यते च-सर्वधर्मान् परित्यज्य मामेकं शरणं व्रज।

मदर्थं कर्म कौन्तेय मुक्तसङ्गः समाचर।

यज्ञार्थात् कर्मणः अन्यत्र लोकः अयं कर्म बंधनः।

यज्ञायाचरतः कर्म समग्रं प्रविलीयते। इत्यादि।

अनुशिष्यते च सांख्य प्रवचने ईश्वर-प्रणिधानम्। तमिमं ज्योतिष्टोमादिभिः इष्टैः, प्रासादादिना पूर्तेन शीतातप-सहनादिना तपसा, अहिंसा दिभिः नियमैः शौच-संतोषा दिभिः नियमैः, आसनप्राणायामादिना योगेन महर्षयोऽपि विविदिषंति। तस्मिन् ज्ञाते सर्वमिदं ज्ञातं भवतीत्येवं विज्ञाय श्रुत्वा एकतानः तत्परो भवेत्। यत्रेदं गीयते-

मन्मना भव मद्भक्तः मद्याजी मां नमस्कुरु।
मामेवैष्यसि युक्तैवं आत्मानं मत्परायणः॥
भोक्तारं यज्ञतपसां सर्वलोक-महेश्वरम्।
सुहृदं सर्वभूतानां ज्ञात्वा मां शांति ऋच्छति॥
इत्येवं श्रुतिनीति-संप्लव-जलैः भूयोभिः आक्षालिते।
येषां नास्पदं आदधासि हृदये ते शैलसाराशयाः।
किंतु प्रस्तुत-विप्रतीप-विधयः अपि उच्चैः भवच्चिंतकाः।
काले कारुणिक त्वयैव कृपया ते भावनीयाः न राः॥
अस्माकं तु निसर्ग-सुन्दर चिरात् चेतः निमंग्नं त्वयि।
इत्यद्धा-आनन्दनिधे! तथापि तरलं नाद्यापि संतृप्यते॥
तन्नाथ! त्वरितं विधेहि करुणां येन त्वदेकाग्रताम्।
याते चेतसि नाप्नुवाम शतशः याम्याः पुनर्यातनाः॥
इत्येष नीति-कुसुमांजलिः उज्ज्वल-श्रीः।
यद्वासयेदपि च दक्षिण-वामकौ द्वौ॥
नो वा ततः किममरेश-गुरोः गुरुस्तु।
प्रीतोस्तु अनेन पद-पीठ समर्पणेन॥

॥इति न्यायकुसुमाञ्जलि प्रकरणं समाप्तम्॥

TRANS.: Even on the basis of number God's existence can be proved. There occur numerous first-person statements in the Veda in which the suffix denoted-number gets connected with the agent in the nominative case, that is, God. ('May I be many', 'I became so' and so on, supposed to be made by God Himself). Even the nomenclatures of different recensions of the Vedas could not have been coined unless there were some being to fix the nomenclatures and instruct human beings in their use.

To explain: Earlier, number, that is, duality of the atoms, triplicity of dyads etc. were mentioned as products to prove God's existence. Now number is used as a knowable entity for the same purpose. It is well-known that the number denoted by the verbal suffix in a first-person-sentence gets connected with the agent who is the speaker. There are many such first-person uses in the Veda. So it is only God whose singular number is to be regarded as denoted by the verbal suffix,

otherwise the verbal suffix will remain unconnected with any word in the sentence.

Alternatively the Sanskrit word *'Sāṃkhya'* may be used in the sense of 'special nomenclature'. Certain recensions of Veda are known as '*Kāthaka*' '*Kālāpaka*' etc. These nomenclatures cannot be due merely to these recensions having been expounded by certain sages bearing the names *'Kātha' 'Kalāpa'* etc. There have been innumerable expounders of these recensions in the past. Nor also these special names are due to the fact that the sages bearing these names were superior expounders of the recensions. If these sages are supposed to excel their teachers in expounding or propagating the recensions they would be guilty of misrepresenting them. There cannot be different ways in which the same recensions can be expounded. But mere following the manner of expounding which the teachers adopted cannot constitute the superiority of the disciple. Moreover who knows how many superior teachers of the Vedas there have been so far in the world? How to decide this? Nor can it be urged that the nomenclature belongs to the first expounder or teacher of a recension. Mīmāṃsā does not admit such a first teacher. If it does then for us he is the author of the Veda. So this debate is senseless.

Alright! Let there be this explanation of the nomenclature. These may have been used for certain sub-castes among Brahmins. The recension specially studied and followed by the members of these sub-castes might have been given these names. No! This could not have been the case. Even people belonging to the Kṣatriya and Vaiśya castes are entitled to study the recensions. The special character of a Brahmin cannot belong to a person of the Kṣatriya caste. Nor is there a Veda specially studied by those belonging to the Kṣatriya caste. Nor also there is a rule that the people of the so-called Kātha caste study and follow only the Kāthak recension and not any other. Studying and following of different recensions by people of different sub-castes is often seen. May it be the case that this was the rule in ancient times but now there is promiscuity in this matter? No! If it were so why not admit that there was always this promiscuity as the different sub-castes might have mingled with each other. So this is no solution of the problem. It has therefore to be admitted that these special nomenclatures owe their vogue to there being a first expounder of the concerned recensions.

Thus this great Lord known through the Veda and inferentially ascertained as above is even directly intuited by some persons. This intution is like the intuitive perception of the property of knowability in the claypot (for example). But how can there be this perception without its causal collocation? The collocation cannot be inclusive of the external senses or the internal sense. The external senses like the ear, eye etc. have each their respective objects of perception. As for the mind it is not operative in respect of external objects. So as the saying goes 'No cause no effect' (There cannot therefore arise God's perception). No! This is not correct. A causal collocation is inferred to exist mainly on the basis of the occurrence of an effect. There is the effect namely the intuitive perception of God. So its causal collocation must also exist. Besides even if the external senses become inoperative we have in dreams the internal perception of distant and non-contemporary objects. Can we treat the dream as a special type of recollection? No! We do not have the introspection that we were recollecting in respect of our dreams (after awakening). The reflective awareness relating to dreams has the form, 'I see or I saw' (this or that in my dream). Can it be urged that the experiential nature is imposed on dreams? No! If it is imposition it should be contradictable but the experiential nature of dreams is never contradicted. Moreover even one's own decapitation is perceived sometime in ones dream. If it were recollection then a corresponding experience should have occurred prior to the occurrence of the dream (which is simply impossible). Can it then be a distorted recollection? Well, if distortion of recollection here means the distortion in respect of the object of recollection then we admit this to be the case in dreams. One's head is recollected first and then it appears in the dream in a distorted manner. But if distorted recollection is taken to mean the mistaking of recollection as experience then this conception has already been refuted, Nor is such distortion even possible. Certainly an object appearing under a certain form in one cognition can appear under a different form in a different type of cognition as its adjectival determinant. So if a recollection having the form as 'That pot' is mistaken for an experience of the pot then it would be introspectible as 'I see that pot' and not as 'I see this pot'. But both in the dream and its introspection the dreamt object appears as 'this' and not as 'that'. The object of recollection does not have the form expressible as 'this pot'. So the dream is to be regarded only as experience. Moreover even some dreams turn out to be veridical as they correspond with reality. The correspondence may be accidental but not uncaused. Otherwise all dreams would be veridical. (This shows that it is not right to maintain that all mental perceptions are false. So it is conceivable that we can have direct perception of God through mind) with the help of merit earned either through virtuous action or *yogic* practices. Since there are laid down different prescriptions for acquiring the two kinds of merits there are in fact the two kinds

of merits. So it follows that the experience of God enjoyed by *yogins* is veridical because it is born of merit and being direct it is perceptual in nature. But those *yogic* experiences which are the result of mere intense concentration unsupported by merit are not veridical. Thus the absence of the causal collocation of divine experience suggested above is unproved.

'Still what is the evidence against the opposite view?' It may be asked. The answer is the Upaniṣadic imperative prescribing that 'Two kinds of Ultimate realities have to be known.' If the direct experience of God were not possible the prescription would become futile as such an experience is impossible to have. May the prescription concern only indirect knowledge of God (not the direct perceptual one)? No! The attainment of such knowledge is implied even by the prescription for the study of the Veda which is expected to cover even the prescription for the study of the Veda and the knowledge of all the Vedic lore. Regarding such a being we have statements like the following which say that 'There is never the absence of sentience in the sentient', 'This is the non-dual sole reality' 'He sees without eyes and hears without ears' 'Two kinds of Brahman are to be known, namely the superior and the inferior one,' 'The Gods offered sacrifice to the sacrificial being', 'Sacrifices themselves are God', 'Sacrifice itself is the nature of the God known as Viśṇu' and so on. There is also the statement in the *Gītā* which states that 'discarding all religions one should surrender one's being to God', 'O son of Kuntī, do everything for my sake without attachment to anything', 'Except the action which is done in the interest of sacrifices every other action is a source of bondage for man', 'If one acts for the sake of sacrifice then the whole act is dissolved' and so on. While explaining the *Sāṃkhaya* doctrine the sage Patañjali has exhorted the necessity of the contemplation of God. Even great sages and other persons seek to realise this great Being God by performing sacrifices like the *Jyotiṣtoma* which yield desired results, by constructing large and spacious buildings for housing shelterless persons, by practising austerities like tolerating the rigours of climate, by engaging in *yogic* exercises, by following the *yogic* discipline of piety, contentment etc. and by performing the exercises of breath-control and *yogic* postures. If God's being is realised then everything else is realised. Knowing and hearing this truth one should single-mindedly meditate on God. About this meditation *Gītā* remarks as below:

> 'Merge your mind in me, be devoted to me, perform sacrifices for me and make obeisance to me. By thus involving yourself in me and being engrossed with me you are sure to attain me. Realising me as the object of all sacrifices and austerities, as the overlord of all the worlds and as the benefactor of all beings, one attains perfect serenity of minds.'

Thus by means of the waters of verbal and inferential arguments I (the author) have tried to flush out all misconceptions from the minds of the atheists. If despite this the minds of these people are not ready to receive you then their minds must be as hard to penetrate as granite. But my prayer to you, O kind Lord! Is that even such persons of perverse intellect may at proper time be redeemed and put on the right track by you.

As for us, O natural incarnation of beauty, our mind has long since been absorbed in you who art the ocean of bliss. Despite this our mind being fickle in nature it does not yet experience contentment. So O Lord! Confer upon us your grace so that our mind becomes engrossed with you and as a result we shall never again suffer the pangs of birth and death and thus attain complete freedom from bondage.

Thus, may this offer of the flowers of arguments—resplendent with glory—fill with fragrance both the right and left nostrils—which means that the argument presented in this treatise should satisfy both theists and atheists. Even if this did not become possible, my prayer is that the great Lord Śiva who is the teacher even of the teacher of all gods may be pleased by this offer of mine at his feet.

EXPL.: The number one which certain imperatives used in Vedic sentences denote relate to God Himself. So number as an attribute of God is one more proof for God's existence. Earlier number was used as an effect to establish God's existence. Here it is used as an object of cognition for the same purpose. The drawback of this argument is that God's own pronouncements are used to prove His existence.

Referring to another possible meaning of the Sanskrit word *'Sāṃkhya'* viz., a nomenclature the author argues that names like *'Kāthaka' 'Kālapā'* etc. by which certain recensions of the Veda are identified owe their origin to God Himself. Granting that these names cannot be used in the various senses suggested by the opponents how can it be maintained that God Himself assumed the body of sages called *Katha* or *Kalāpa* and taught the Vedas to other sages after the creation of the world? It is stretching too far the commonsensical meaning of well-known words like *'Katha' 'Kalāpa'* etc.

At the end of all these inferential proofs the author urges that even direct intuition of God by mind with the help of *yogic* powers is possible. Mind is not always dependent upon the external senses to have intuitive perception. In dreams the mind does not depend upon any external sense for having experiences which are exactly like external perception. Nor are all dreams false or just recollective. Thus the possibility of mental perception of God can be shown to be within the limits of possibility.

GLOSSARY

(Important Technical Terms used in Nyāyakusumāñjali)

अतिशय:	Property, Excellence or Merit.
अधिगतार्थम्	Already cognised.
अध्यवसाय:	Determinate cognition.
अनुपपत्ति:	Inexplicability, Inconsistency.
अनैकान्तिक:	Deviant.
अनुपाख्यम्	Undefinable.
अन्वयव्यतिरेकौ	Positive and negative associations.
अन्यूनानतिरिक्तम्	Neither less nor more.
अभिसंस्कार:	Sanctification.
अन्विताभिधानवाद:	Theory of connected-word-meaning.
अपवर्ग:	Release, Freedom from bondage.
अपरोक्षम्	Immediately-perceptible or Sensible.
अप्रयोजक:	Irrelevant middle term.
अपोहवाद:	Theory that universals are exclusions of the other.
अर्थापत्ति:	Postulation.
अभेदाग्रह:	Non-cognition of non-difference.
असंसर्गाग्रह:	Non-cognition of non-relationship.
अपूर्वम्	Unseen merit supposed to result from rituals.
असमवायिकारणम्	Non-material cause.
अभिधा	Denotative capacity of words, The prompting capacity of imperatives.
अविनाभाव:	Non-deviation.
आख्यात:	Suffix to the verb.

आत्माश्रय:	Fallacy of self-dependence
आधेयशक्ति:	Implanted capacity.
आकांक्षा	Syntax.
आप्त:	Reliable person.
आशय:	The merit and demerit resulting from good and bad actions.
आश्रयासिद्धि:	Fallacy of unproved or uncognised locus.
इष्टसाधनता	Causality relating to the desired object.
इष्टापूर्तम्	Sacrifices, Water-tanks, etc.
उपजीव्योपजीवकभाव:	Cause-effect relation.
उपनीतभानम्	Cognition of an imported content.
उपलक्षणम्	Non-qualifying mark.
कारणम्	The cause.
करणम्	The immediately-productive cause.
कालातीत:	Fallacy of the absent major.
कार्यानुपलब्धिलिंगम्	The absence of the effect as proof of the absence of the cause.
कारकम्	Case (Nominative, Objective, etc.).
कूटस्थम्	Absolute.
गृहीतग्राहित्वम्	The property of cognising the cognised.
तादात्म्यम्	Identity.
तर्क:	Contrafactual conditional.
धर्मिग्राहकमानम्	The evidence establishing the locus.
निर्विकल्पकम्	Indeterminate cognition.
नियतम्	Necessary, Invariable.
परिणामी	Transformable.
परापरभाव:	Being wider or narrower in scope.
पक्षधर्मता	Locatedness in the minor term.
प्रतिपत्ति:	Cognition.

प्रत्यय:	Suffix, Experience, Concept.
प्रतिबंधक:	Obstructor, Agent causing deficiency in causal collocation.
प्रागभाव:	Anterior non-existence.
परत: प्रामाण्यम्	Extrinsic validity.
प्रवृत्ति-व्याघात:	Contradiction of the disposition to act.
प्रत्यभिज्ञानम्	Recognition.
पुरुषोपराग:	Involvement of the sentient being.
भावना	Effort (so called in Mīmāṃsā).
भेदाग्रह:	Non-cognition of difference.
बाध:	Fallacy of the absent major.
समय:	Convention.
समवायिकारणम्	Material cause.
संगति:	Denotative capacity of words.
साधिकारा	Endowed with or Transformed.
सामानाधिकरण्यम्	Coexistence, Coordinate use.
सहकारिण:	Auxiliary causes.
सामग्री	Collocation or totality of causes.
सत्प्रतिपक्ष:	Opposed by a contradictory inference: a fallacy.
सविकल्पकम्	Determinate cognition.
संस्थानम्	Structure, Form.
समाख्या	Nomenclature.
स्वरूपयोग्यता	Natural or intrinsic capacity.
संकल्प:	Decision to do something.
संनिकर्ष:	Contact (of senses with objects).
सहज शक्ति:	Innate capacity.
स्वत: प्रामाण्यम्	Self-validity of cognition.
समभिव्याहार:	Synthesis, Syntactical combination.
समाहार:	Collocation.

संयुक्त-समवाय:	Inherence in the conjunct.
सिद्धसाधनम्	Fallacy of proving the already-proved.
यथार्थत्वम्	Truth, Correspondence with reality.
योग्यानुपलब्धि:	Non-cognition of the cognisable.
विशेष्य-विशेषणभाव:	Qualified-qualifierhood.
विरम्य व्यापाराभाव:	Non-delayed activity.
ज्ञातता	Cognisedness.
ज्ञाप्यज्ञापकभाव:	Indicated-indicator relationship.

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